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# ---- reference sources ----
# Nested clones of public upstream repos, consulted while writing docs/ngo-litenetlib-wire.md.
# Nothing builds against these - re-create with the README commands if you need to re-check the
# spec against upstream. vendor/LiteNetLibPP is DIFFERENT: it is a pinned git SUBMODULE (the C++
# transport the server builds against), tracked via .gitmodules; the marker-layer patch in
# patches/ is applied to it at configure time.
vendor/litenetlib/
vendor/ngo/
vendor/mcc/
# ---- C++ build output ----
build/
build-*/
# ---- captures and logs ----
# traffic.txt is deliberately tracked; ad-hoc captures and probe logs are not.
*.log
capture-*.txt
traffic-*.txt
# NGO batch captures contain the client's (encrypted) auth blobs - keep them local.
ngo-batch*.txt
# ---- python ----
__pycache__/
*.py[cod]
# ---- editors / os ----
.vs/
.vscode/
.idea/
*.swp
*~
.DS_Store
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[submodule "vendor/LiteNetLibPP"]
path = vendor/LiteNetLibPP
url = https://github.com/Revan600/LiteNetLibPP.git
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# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## What this is
**Tachyon** is a clean-room, protocol-compatible **voice server** for the Rec Room client (build
20250718.01) — in-room proximity voice over Dissonance → NGO → a RecRoom encrypt layer → LiteNetLib.
It is its own protocol (not Photon; unrelated to the sibling LuxonServer beyond shared clean-room
posture). Two real clients can hear each other through it, plaintext, with no client patch.
Compatibility logic is derived only from public MIT sources (NGO, the community LiteNetLib transport,
LiteNetLib) and black-box traffic observation. Client static analysis is done by a **separate agent**
on a dumped image; questions to it live in `docs/client-agent-request-*.md`. `docs/ngo-litenetlib-wire.md`
and `docs/tachyon-findings.md` are the authoritative wire spec, tagged `[PROVEN]`/`[UNVERIFIED]` — read
them before touching protocol code, and keep them in sync when the wire understanding changes.
## The implementation
One server: `src/` → **`tachyon`** (C++23). Transport is the `vendor/LiteNetLibPP` submodule;
hashing is the official single-header xxHash in `third_party/`; the recflare room lookup uses
libcurl. (A C#/.NET reference implementation existed earlier and proved the protocol; it has been
removed — the wire knowledge now lives in `docs/`. Old commits still have it if ever needed.)
## Build & run
```sh
git submodule update --init --recursive # LiteNetLibPP is a pinned submodule
cmake -S . -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build build -j
./build/tachyon --port 7777 # fork + dissonance + 0x11 layer + rooms are defaults
```
Configure applies `patches/0001-tachyon-packet-layer-hook.patch` to the submodule working tree
idempotently, so the submodule shows as "dirty" afterward — **that is expected**, not a mistake
(reset with `git -C vendor/LiteNetLibPP checkout .`). Needs CMake ≥3.16, a C++23 compiler,
**`libcurl-devel`** (room lookup) and **`openssl-devel`** (blob decryption).
Settings come from a `key = value` **config file** (`--config <path>`, see `tachyon.conf.example`);
CLI flags override it. Flags: `--port` / `--no-fork` / `--no-dissonance` / `--no-encrypt` /
`--no-rooms` / `--room-url <u>` / `--room-timeout <ms>` / `--private-key <xml-file>` /
`--ds-count-width N`; logging `-v`/`-q`/`--log-level error|warn|info|debug` (default info;
per-message/relay spam is debug-only). Runs as a service: logs to stdout, exits 0 on SIGINT/SIGTERM.
### Testing
`./build/tachyon --selftest [batch.hex]` is the offline test (no network, no curl): it checks
bit-packing round-trips, the message-id hashes, batch build↔parse with hash verification (fork +
stock), and the Dissonance primitives; an optional hex file is fed through the batch parser. Exit 0
= pass, 1 = failure (CI-friendly). Beyond that, validation is against the real client — `tachyon -v`
prints per-relay/id diagnostics, and `tools/decode_lnl.py <capture>` decodes LiteNetLib hex dumps.
## Architecture — the protocol stack (bottom-up)
Each layer wraps the one below.
1. **LiteNetLib 1.x transport, ProtocolId 13.** Reliable/unreliable UDP via LiteNetLibPP. Connect
handshake, ping/pong, MTU, fragmentation are the library's job.
2. **RecRoom encrypt layer** — a trailing-**marker** byte, below LiteNetLib framing. Plaintext appends
`0x11` outbound and strips it inbound; `0x2A` (encrypted) is dropped (Burst cipher unidentified).
The whole handshake runs key-null, so plaintext is sufficient. LiteNetLibPP has no packet-layer
hook, so `patches/` adds generic `outbound_layer`/`inbound_layer` `std::function`s to `net_manager`
at the socket boundary; `main.cpp` installs the marker through them.
3. **NGO forked batch.** Rec Room forks NGO's batch header to **24 bytes** (BatchCount@16); `BatchHash`
is **XXHash64 over bytes [24:end]**. Messages are bit-packed `type` + `size` + body. The session's
**message-id space is defined by the version list the server echoes in ConnectionApproved**
(`MESSAGE_ORDER`) — the client rebuilds its mapping from that, so the echo must be verbatim.
4. **Tachyon handshake.** JSON in the NGO ConnectionData: `AI` (AccountId, plaintext) plus
`AT`/`VB`/`CKA`/`CIA`/`CPK`, all RSA-encrypted to a 1024-bit public key hardcoded in the client
(`VB`/`CKA`/`CIA` are single 128-byte blocks; `AT` is larger — hybrid/chunked). With the original
Rec Room key these are opaque, but with a **patched client** (its embedded modulus swapped for our
own keypair) the server decrypts them using the matching private key (`src/crypto.cpp`,
`RSAKeyValue` XML via `--private-key`/config; `rsa_key::decrypt` tries PKCS#1 then OAEP). The
server's ConnectionApproved payload must contain `{"DR":"Carrot"}`; `KT` (a session key) is
currently **omitted**, leaving the client key-null → plaintext voice (`0x11`). Minting `KT` would
move the client to the encrypted path (`0x2A`), which needs the transport cipher confirmed first.
5. **Dissonance session** (Placeholder Software stock v8.x). Rides in an NGO NamedMessage:
`[u16 NamedMessageType LE][i32 len LE][Dissonance packet]`. **Dissonance is BIG-ENDIAN** — a
deliberate exception; everything else on the wire is little-endian. Magic `0x8bc7`. The server
answers `HandshakeRequest`→`HandshakeResponse` (assigns a client id), relays `ClientState` for
roster discovery, and handles voice via **ServerRelay unwrap**.
### Relay model (the core design)
Star topology: the server is a **dumb relay** and clients decide who hears them. A speaking client
sends `ServerRelayUnreliable` = `session + recipientCount + recipientIds(u16 BE) + innerLen + inner
VoiceData`. The server **unwraps** it and delivers the inner packet to each named Dissonance client id
— it must NOT forward the wrapper. This is the whole reason voice works.
**Room enforcement is server-side, keyed on recflare (implemented).** There is no room id anywhere
on the wire — the ConnectionData JSON is only `AI`/`AT`/`VB`/`CKA`/`CIA`/`CPK` (`AI` = AccountId; the
rest are RSA-encrypted auth/crypto blobs, opaque). So the server resolves the room from the AccountId:
at handshake, `GET <room-url>?id=<AI>` → a bare numeric `roomInstanceId` (`src/room_lookup.cpp`,
libcurl; **not cached** — a player's room changes when they switch rooms, and a reconnect must see
the new one). Each room gets its **own Dissonance session id** (`m_session_by_room`), and the relay
scopes `ClientState` roster, `ServerRelay` delivery, `RemoveClient`, and broadcast to the same
`client_state.room`. A lookup failure or a `0` result **isolates** the client in a unique room of its
own (fail-safe: it hears no one). `--no-rooms` reverts to one shared session for the whole port.
Key proven fact behind this: the client routes voice by **the ds id the server assigns in
HandshakeResponse** (a relay showed `account=205 senderId=1`), and it honors both that ds client id
and the u32 session we hand it — which is why per-room sessions work as an enforcement layer (a
cross-room packet is also dropped client-side as wrong-session). Matchmaking separately points a
room's clients at a voice server via `VoiceServerId`.
### Reconnect-stable ids — an invariant to preserve
Rec Room clients drop and reconnect frequently. Two mechanisms keep rosters consistent; **do not
regress them**:
- Dissonance client ids are **stable per player**, keyed on the Tachyon AccountId (`AI`), so a
reconnect reuses its id (`m_ds_id_by_account`) instead of orphaning a ghost.
- An **owner-per-id** map (`m_ds_owner`): the newest handshake owns an id, so a superseded old peer's
delayed disconnect does not broadcast `RemoveClient` for an id now held by the reconnected client,
and relay delivers only to the current owner.
- `RemoveClient` is Dissonance message type **10** (2026-09-27, read from the 2025 client's receive
switch, which accepts 1..11 only). It was 0 here until then: every "player left" was ignored as an
unknown header, rosters never shrank, and a returning player's speech was discarded against the
stale entry's timing ("missed target activation time ... discarding") until the listener
rejoined. Symptom in Player.log: endless "Failed to find player for voice playback: N".
Deployed by `UploadUpdate.bat` via `Deploy/update-tachyon.sh` (rebuilds only when `src/` changed).
Untrusted-input paths (batch loop, version list) are bounds-checked (`wire::try_get_*`); keep new
parsing of client data guarded — the server is exposed on UDP.
### Not yet implemented / known caveats
- The room lookup is **synchronous** on the handshake path (blocks up to `--room-timeout`); make it
async if join storms matter.
- No object replication / NetworkVariable / scene management (the client build omits those types).
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cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.16)
project(tachyon LANGUAGES CXX)
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 23)
set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD_REQUIRED ON)
set(CMAKE_POSITION_INDEPENDENT_CODE ON)
# LiteNetLibPP (the LiteNetLib transport) is a pinned git submodule under vendor/. It carries no
# packet-layer hook for the RecRoom 0x11 marker, so we apply patches/0001-tachyon-packet-layer-hook
# to its working tree here, idempotently, before building it. See patches/README.md.
set(LNLPP_DIR ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/vendor/LiteNetLibPP)
set(LNLPP_PATCH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/patches/0001-tachyon-packet-layer-hook.patch)
if (NOT EXISTS ${LNLPP_DIR}/CMakeLists.txt)
message(FATAL_ERROR "vendor/LiteNetLibPP is empty. Run: git submodule update --init --recursive")
endif ()
find_package(Git QUIET REQUIRED)
# If the patch reverse-applies cleanly it is already present; otherwise apply it forward.
execute_process(
COMMAND ${GIT_EXECUTABLE} -C ${LNLPP_DIR} apply --reverse --check ${LNLPP_PATCH}
RESULT_VARIABLE LNLPP_ALREADY_PATCHED OUTPUT_QUIET ERROR_QUIET)
if (NOT LNLPP_ALREADY_PATCHED EQUAL 0)
execute_process(
COMMAND ${GIT_EXECUTABLE} -C ${LNLPP_DIR} apply ${LNLPP_PATCH}
RESULT_VARIABLE LNLPP_PATCH_RESULT)
if (NOT LNLPP_PATCH_RESULT EQUAL 0)
message(FATAL_ERROR "Failed to apply ${LNLPP_PATCH} to LiteNetLibPP")
endif ()
message(STATUS "Applied Tachyon packet-layer hook to LiteNetLibPP")
else ()
message(STATUS "LiteNetLibPP packet-layer hook already applied")
endif ()
# Turn off LiteNetLibPP's tests (they fetch a googletest incompatible with modern CMake) and examples.
set(BUILD_EXAMPLE OFF CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)
set(BUILD_AND_RUN_TESTS OFF CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)
add_subdirectory(vendor/LiteNetLibPP)
# libcurl: the room lookup (AccountId -> roomInstanceId) calls recflare over HTTP(S).
find_package(CURL REQUIRED)
# OpenSSL: decrypt the client's RSA-encrypted wire blobs with the configured private key.
find_package(OpenSSL REQUIRED)
add_executable(tachyon
src/main.cpp
src/tachyon_server.cpp
src/dissonance.cpp
src/hashing.cpp
src/room_lookup.cpp
src/config.cpp
src/crypto.cpp)
target_compile_features(tachyon PRIVATE cxx_std_23)
target_include_directories(tachyon PRIVATE
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/src
${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/third_party)
target_link_libraries(tachyon PRIVATE lnl CURL::libcurl OpenSSL::Crypto)
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# Tachyon — voice server for an NGO/LiteNetLib client
A clean-room, protocol-compatible **voice server** (project name **Tachyon**) for the Rec Room
client's in-room proximity voice. Same clean-room posture as the sibling LuxonServer, but a
different, unrelated protocol: compatibility logic is derived from public MIT sources (NGO, the
community LiteNetLib transport, LiteNetLib itself) and from black-box observation of network
traffic. The stack, bottom-up, is Dissonance over NGO over the RecRoom encrypt layer over LiteNetLib.
Two real clients hear each other through it, in plaintext, with no client patch — and voice is
scoped to rooms server-side.
## Layout
- `src/` + `CMakeLists.txt` — **Tachyon** (C++23). Dependency-light: the LiteNetLib transport comes
from the `vendor/LiteNetLibPP` submodule, hashing from the official single-header xxHash in
`third_party/`, and the recflare room lookup from libcurl.
- `patches/` — `0001-tachyon-packet-layer-hook.patch`, applied to the LiteNetLibPP submodule at
configure time (adds the datagram-layer hook the RecRoom `0x11` marker needs). See `patches/README.md`.
- `docs/ngo-litenetlib-wire.md` — the wire specification. Read this first.
- `docs/tachyon-findings.md` — client static-analysis findings (the full Tachyon stack).
- `docs/client-agent-request-*.md` — questions to the client-side static-analysis agent.
- `tools/decode_lnl.py` — decoder for hex-dump captures of LiteNetLib traffic.
- `traffic.txt` — an early capture of the client failing to connect (see spec §7).
- `vendor/litenetlib`, `vendor/ngo`, `vendor/mcc` — upstream reference clones, git-ignored and not
built against; re-create if you need to re-check the spec:
```sh
mkdir -p vendor && cd vendor
git clone --filter=blob:none https://github.com/Unity-Technologies/com.unity.netcode.gameobjects.git ngo
git clone --filter=blob:none https://github.com/Unity-Technologies/multiplayer-community-contributions.git mcc
git clone --filter=blob:none https://github.com/RevenantX/LiteNetLib.git litenetlib
```
(A C#/.NET reference implementation lived in `reference/` earlier and proved the protocol end to end;
it has been removed now that the C++ server is the product. Old commits still have it.)
## Build & run
Needs CMake, a C++23 compiler, `libcurl-devel` (room lookup) and `openssl-devel` (blob decryption)
— e.g. `sudo dnf install libcurl-devel openssl-devel`. `vendor/LiteNetLibPP` is a submodule, so
clone with it:
```sh
git clone --recurse-submodules <repo> # or: git submodule update --init --recursive
cmake -S . -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build build -j
./build/tachyon --config tachyon.conf # or all-flags; fork+dissonance+0x11+rooms are defaults
```
Settings load from a `key = value` config file (`--config`, see `tachyon.conf.example`); CLI flags
override it. The RSA private key that decrypts the client's wire blobs (`AT`/`VB`/`CKA`/`CIA`/`CPK`)
is set via `private_key` in the config or `--private-key <file>` — a `.NET RSAKeyValue` XML file.
Offline self-test (no network): `./build/tachyon --selftest [batch.hex]` — checks packing, batch
build↔parse + hashes (fork & stock), and Dissonance primitives; exit 0 = pass. An optional captured
NGO batch (hex) is fed through the parser.
Flags: `--no-fork` / `--no-dissonance` / `--no-encrypt` / `--no-rooms` / `--room-url <u>` /
`--room-timeout <ms>` / `--ds-count-width N`, plus logging: `-v`/`--verbose` (debug: per-message +
per-relay), `-q`/`--quiet` (warnings/errors only), `--log-level error|warn|info|debug`. The default
is **info** — a startup banner plus connect/disconnect/handshake lifecycle and all warnings, quiet
enough to run as a service. It logs to stdout (line-buffered) and shuts down cleanly on SIGINT/SIGTERM
(exit 0), so a minimal systemd unit is just:
```ini
[Service]
ExecStart=/path/to/tachyon --port 7777 --quiet
Restart=on-failure
```
With `--verbose`, a connection walks through, in order: LiteNetLib connect accepted →
`ConnectionRequest` parsed → `ConnectionApproved` sent → room resolved (`account=… -> room=…`) →
Dissonance `HandshakeResponse` → `ClientState` roster relays → `[relay] … delivered=1/1` when
same-room clients talk.
## Current status
Works end to end against the real client (build 20250718.01): LiteNetLib (ProtocolId 13) + RecRoom
`0x11` marker + forked NGO batch + the Tachyon `"Carrot"` approval + the Dissonance session/relay,
all plaintext. Same-room clients hear each other; cross-room is silent; room membership follows
players live as they switch rooms (resolved per handshake from recflare).
## Scope
Connection handshake, time sync, the Dissonance session handshake, voice relay (ServerRelay unwrap +
per-client fan-out), and **server-side room scoping**. Rooms come from recflare
(`GET <room-url>?id=<AccountId>` → room instance id — there is no room id on the wire); each room
gets its own Dissonance session, and the relay/roster are scoped to same-room peers, with a
lookup-failure fail-safe that isolates the client. There is no object replication, no NetworkVariable
sync and no scene management — the client build does not contain those message types.
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# Deploying Tachyon voice with Campus
Tachyon is a standalone C++ UDP voice server that runs **alongside** the Campus C# server on
the Linux VPS. Voice is proximity/room-scoped: Tachyon relays Dissonance voice and asks the C#
server which room each speaker is in. **No client patch is needed** (plaintext `0x11` path).
The C# server changes are already in the repo (see "What the C# side does" below) and are
**config-gated OFF by default** — until you set `TachyonVoiceEndpoint`, clients keep using the
existing Photon Voice P2P path, so nothing about voice changes until you flip it on.
---
## 1. Build Tachyon on the VPS
Needs: `git`, CMake ≥ 3.16, a C++23 compiler (gcc 13+/clang 16+), `libcurl-devel`,
`openssl-devel`. (Debian/Ubuntu: `libcurl4-openssl-dev libssl-dev`.)
```sh
sudo mkdir -p /opt/tachyon && sudo chown "$USER" /opt/tachyon
git clone <this repo> /opt/tachyon
cd /opt/tachyon
git submodule update --init --recursive # LiteNetLibPP is a pinned submodule
cmake -S . -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build build -j
```
The configure step applies `patches/0001-tachyon-packet-layer-hook.patch` to the submodule, so
`vendor/LiteNetLibPP` shows as "dirty" afterward — **that is expected**.
Smoke-test the binary offline (no network):
```sh
./build/tachyon --selftest # exit 0 = pass
```
## 2. Config
`tachyon.conf` (repo root) is ready to use. Key line:
```
room_url = https://camprec.net/tachyon
```
Tachyon calls `GET <room_url>?id=<AccountId>` and expects a bare `roomInstanceId`. If Tachyon
and the C# server are on the same box and you know Kestrel's local port, you can change this to
`http://127.0.0.1:<port>/tachyon` to skip the public round-trip. Copy the file to `/opt/tachyon`
if you cloned elsewhere.
## 3. Firewall — open UDP 7777
Clients connect over **UDP**, not TCP. Whatever the C# server's HTTPS uses, voice needs 7777/udp
open to the internet:
```sh
sudo ufw allow 7777/udp # or the cloud provider's security-group equivalent
```
If the VPS is behind a NAT/provider firewall, forward/allow 7777/udp to this host too.
## 4. Run as a service
```sh
sudo cp deploy/tachyon.service /etc/systemd/system/tachyon.service
# edit paths in the unit if you did not use /opt/tachyon
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable --now tachyon
journalctl -u tachyon -f # watch it; -v in the conf for per-relay detail
```
## 5. Flip voice over to Tachyon (C# side)
In `ConfigCampus.cs` set the endpoint the CLIENT will dial (public IP or DDNS host + Tachyon's
port — **not** 127.0.0.1, the client is remote):
```csharp
public static string TachyonVoiceEndpoint = "camprec.net:7777";
```
Rebuild + redeploy the C# server. From then on `/Matchmaking/player/connection-info` hands the
client `voiceConnectionInfo = "camprec.net:7777"` and a non-empty `voiceServerId`, so it
routes voice through Tachyon. To roll back to Photon P2P instantly, set it back to `""`.
## 6. Verify
- `journalctl -u tachyon -f` shows a handshake and `account=… senderId=…` relay lines when two
players are in the same room and talking.
- Two clients in the **same** room hear each other; two in **different** rooms do not (room
scoping via `/tachyon`). A lookup failure isolates a client (fail-safe: they hear no one).
- `curl "https://camprec.net/tachyon?id=<someOnlineAccountId>"` returns that player's
numeric room instance id (or `0` if they're nowhere).
---
## What the C# side does (already committed)
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `Controllers/TachyonController.cs` | **New.** `GET /tachyon?id=<AccountId>` → bare `roomInstanceId` (text/plain), via `HeartbeatDB.PeekPresence`. `0` when unknown/offline (fail-safe). |
| `Controllers/MatchmakingController.cs` | `player/connection-info` now sets `voiceConnectionInfo`/`voiceServerId` from config (empty ⇒ Photon fallback). |
| `api/server/ConfigCampus.cs` | `TachyonVoiceEndpoint` (default `""`) + `TachyonVoiceServerId`. |
| `Middleware/PatchGateMiddleware.cs` | `/tachyon` added to the no-patch-header open list (server-to-server). |
## Notes / caveats
- Plaintext voice only (`0x11`); no `private_key` is set and none is needed. The encrypted
`0x2A` path would need `KT` minting + the transport cipher confirmed first — out of scope.
- The room lookup is synchronous on Tachyon's handshake path (blocks up to `room_timeout_ms`).
Fine for normal joins; revisit only if join storms matter.
- `voiceServerId` is just a stable client-side label — Tachyon's protocol has no room/server id
on the wire; room scoping is entirely via the `/tachyon` lookup.
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# systemd unit for the Tachyon voice server.
# Install: sudo cp deploy/tachyon.service /etc/systemd/system/tachyon.service
# sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now tachyon
# Logs: journalctl -u tachyon -f (Tachyon logs to stdout, exits 0 on SIGTERM)
#
# Adjust WorkingDirectory / ExecStart paths to wherever you cloned+built the repo on the VPS.
[Unit]
Description=Tachyon voice server (Campus)
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
# Tachyon already runs in the FOREGROUND and logs to stdout - it does not daemonize, so
# Type=simple is right and no backgrounding flag is wanted. (Note: --no-fork is NOT a
# process flag - it disables the NGO 24-byte batch header and would break voice. Leave it
# off so the protocol fork stays on.)
Type=simple
WorkingDirectory=/opt/tachyon
ExecStart=/opt/tachyon/build/tachyon --config /opt/tachyon/tachyon.conf
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=3
# Voice is UDP on 7777 - make sure the firewall allows it (see DEPLOY.md).
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
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# Follow-up request: the RecRoomClientEncryptLayer 9-byte format
Your Tachyon findings resolved the handshake failure. Reconciled against the server side:
- The client's inbound layer strips 9 bytes off **every** datagram before LiteNetLib parses it.
- Our stock server sent a 15-byte ConnectAccept; after the client strips 9 it is 6 bytes, so
`NetConnectAcceptPacket.FromData` fails `Size != 15` and returns null — the exact silent
ignore-and-retry-to-timeout we observed.
- Confirmed on the server: a stock server absorbs the client's over-long ConnectRequest (the 9
extra bytes fold into variable-length connect data), which is why the server logged
"peer connected" while the client never did.
So the server needs the matching layer. We have built it as a configurable
`PacketLayerBase` with `ExtraPacketSizeForLayer = 9`, and proved the plumbing: with the same
9-byte framing on both ends the handshake completes; with it on the server only, a stock
client fails identically to the game today.
**The one thing blocking a live test is the exact 9-byte format and the null-key behaviour.**
This is §3 / step 1 of your own task doc, and it is now the whole critical path.
## Q1 — `RecRoomClientEncryptLayer.ProcessOutBoundPacket` (RVA `0x735D760`)
Full disassembly / decompile. Specifically:
- Are the 9 bytes **prepended** (written at the front, payload shifted) or **appended**
(written after the existing payload)? The offset math in the method answers this.
- What are the 9 bytes when the session key field (`DAKIIEIEKNI`, `NetPacket`+`0x18`) is
**null** — the state during the whole LiteNetLib + NGO handshake, before
`RecRoom_SetEncryptionInfo` runs? Zero fill? A counter? A magic constant? Copied from
somewhere in the packet?
- When the key is **non-null**, what transforms the payload — AES over the body, and the 9
bytes carry a nonce/tag? We need the outbound path, but the null-key branch is what unblocks
the handshake.
- Does it branch on packet property (e.g. treat ConnectRequest/Accept differently from
Channeled data), or is it uniform for every datagram?
## Q2 — `RecRoomClientEncryptLayer.ProcessInboundPacket` (RVA `0x735DF90`)
Full disassembly / decompile. Specifically:
- Does it **validate** the 9 bytes (compare a MAC/magic/counter and drop on mismatch), or just
**strip** them? This is the single most important question: if it only strips when the key is
null, a zero-fill server reply connects immediately; if it validates, we must reproduce the
exact bytes.
- Same prepend-vs-append question from the read side (which 9 bytes are removed, front or back).
- The null-key branch specifically — what happens to a datagram that arrives before a key is set
(which is every handshake packet). Does it early-out, strip-only, or reject?
- Any length guard (e.g. drop if `size < 9`).
## Q3 — the two unidentified layer methods
`0x735DC20` and `0x735E140` are listed as unidentified members of the layer. One-line summary
of each — likely a key setter (the sink for `RecRoom_SetEncryptionInfo`) and/or a
nonce/counter helper. If one installs the key into `DAKIIEIEKNI`, note its signature.
## Q4 — the `.cctor` at `0x735E220`
If the layer has static state (a fixed magic, a base nonce, an RNG seed), it is initialised
here. Dump any constants it writes.
## Why this precise scoping
We are one bounded read from a live handshake. If Q2's null-key path is strip-only, the layer
we have built connects the real client as-is and we move straight to the NGO ConnectionRequest
(where your Tachyon JSON / `"Carrot"` findings take over). If it validates, we need the byte
recipe before any wire test is meaningful — a guess here is the "plausible-but-wrong costs more
than not-found" trap you flagged.
Report bytes and offsets, not prose. Where the null-key path is genuinely absent (i.e. the
layer assumes a key is always set), say so — that itself would be a finding, implying the key
is established out-of-band before the first datagram.
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
# Request #3: the forked NGO batch/message framing and ConnectionApproved
The LiteNetLib layer is solved and the client now completes the transport handshake against
our server and sends its NGO ConnectionRequest. We decoded it and confirmed the Tachyon JSON
(`AI/AT/VB/CKA/CIA/CPK`). But the fork changed NGO's batch and message framing, so we cannot
send a ConnectionApproved the client will accept without the exact serialization.
## What we already worked out from the wire (for your cross-check)
Decoded from a real 2041-byte ConnectionRequest batch:
```
[0:2] magic u16 = 0x1160
[2:4] count u16 = 0 (stock BatchCount, sent as 0)
[4:8] size u32 = 2041 (total datagram length)
[8:16] hash u64 = 0x3faa53cee8c5e338 (= XXHash64 over bytes [24:2041], VERIFIED)
[16:24] u64 = 1 (fork field; equals message count here)
[24] bitpacked = 1 (message type: ConnectionRequest, client-local idx)
[25:27] bitpacked = 2014 (message size)
[27] 0x81 (version-header preamble byte)
[28:63] 7 × { u32 hash ; 1 byte version=0 }
[63:68] 00 00 00 00 01 (5 bytes, not in stock NGO)
[68:76] u64 ConfigHash
[76:80] u32 = 1961 (ConnData length)
[80:2041] Tachyon JSON
```
So the batch hash covers `[24:end]` (message stream), NOT stock's `[16:alignedLength]`, and
the batch is NOT padded to 8 bytes. Two message-body bytes are unexplained: the `0x81`
preamble, and the `00 00 00 00 01`.
## Questions (in priority order)
**Q1 — forked batch header & hash, in `NetworkMessageManager`.**
Confirm the header layout above. Specifically:
- Is the `u64` at `[16:24]` the message count, a tick, or something else? What writes it?
- Confirm `BatchHash = XXHash64(buffer + 24, size - 24)` (or give the real range/seed).
- **Does the RECEIVER validate `BatchHash` and reject on mismatch, or log-and-continue?**
This decides whether our outbound hash must be exact.
- Does the receiver iterate messages by the `u64` count, by `BatchCount`, or by position?
**Q2 — the version-header preamble.**
In the forked `ConnectionRequestMessage.Serialize` (and the shared version-header code), what
is written before the version table? Stock writes `BytePacker.WriteValueBitPacked(N)` (N=7 ->
`0x39`). We see a single `0x81`. And what is the `00 00 00 00 01` written AFTER the table,
before `ConfigHash`? Give the exact field sequence of the forbidden segment as this build
serializes it.
**Q3 — `ConnectionApprovedMessage` serialization (the thing we must send).**
Full `Serialize` (server→client) for this build. We need every field and its encoding, in
order: the version header (same preamble as Q2?), `OwnerClientId`, `NetworkTick`, any
`ConnectedClientIds`, `sceneObjectCount`, and anything the fork added. Also the message
**type index** the client expects for ConnectionApproved in the pre-approval (local) space,
and how `Deserialize` reads it — because the client's `Deserialize` is what accepts or rejects
our packet.
**Q4 — how the approval reaches Tachyon.**
Earlier finding: `NetworkManager.RecRoom_ConnectionInfo` is a fork addition, hypothesised to
carry the approval JSON (`PMFAAFNFMAL`, the `"Carrot"` / `SessionKeyB` blob). Confirm whether
the approval JSON rides inside `ConnectionApprovedMessage`'s ConnectionData, in
`RecRoom_ConnectionInfo`, or elsewhere — i.e. where in the server→client bytes we must place
`{"DR":"Carrot",...}`.
**Q5 — key-null path for the session.**
Does the client require a non-null `SessionKeyB` to proceed, or will it accept an approval with
`"Carrot"` and no key and stay plaintext (marker `0x11`)? This decides whether we can defer the
RSA keypair patch and run voice unencrypted.
## Output
Decompiled `Serialize`/`Deserialize` bodies where possible, else exact field order + encodings
+ byte offsets. Distinguish read from inferred. If a field genuinely is not present, say so —
do not fill it from stock NGO; the fork has already diverged in three places above.
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
# Request #4: the Dissonance session handshake (server side)
Milestone reached: the real client completes the full LiteNetLib + encrypt-layer + forked-NGO +
Tachyon handshake against our server, connects without crashing, and reports "connected to
voice" — all in plaintext (marker `0x11`; omitting `KT` left the client key-null and its
post-connect RSA callback is evidently caught).
Now the client sends a **Dissonance handshake** over an NGO `NamedMessage` and repeats it every
~4 seconds because our server does not answer:
```
NGO NamedMessage, hash = 0xc78b0000000f0001
Dissonance payload (13 bytes) = 04 01 00 00 03 c0 00 00 bb 80 00 02 32
^^ type? ^^^^^ ^^^^^
0x03c0=960 0xbb80=48000 (Opus frame / sample rate)
```
**Confirmed empirically:** with a real client connected and the user actively speaking, the
client sends ONLY this handshake, repeating every ~4s, and no voice/UnnamedMessage/other
channel ever appears. So voice transmission is hard-gated on this handshake being answered —
this is the sole remaining blocker to plaintext voice.
Confident partial decode of the 13-byte payload (unverified field names): leading `0x04` =
message type; `0x03c0` = 960 = Opus frame size; `0xbb80` = 48000 = sample rate. The rest
(`01 00 00`, `00 00`, `00 02 32`) is unidentified.
To progress to actual voice, the server must send the Dissonance handshake reply. Questions,
from `DissonanceVoip.dll` / `Dissonance.Integrations.Unity_NFGO.NfgoCommsNetwork` /
`DissonanceNetworkManagerInjector` (`0x826A370`):
**Q1 — the NamedMessage channel.** What is `0xc78b0000000f0001`? Is it the hash of a Dissonance
channel name that NGO's `CustomMessagingManager` registered, and does the server reply on the
same channel/hash? Give the name if you can recover it.
**Q2 — the handshake message format.** Decode the 13-byte payload: what is the leading `0x04`
(a Dissonance `MessageTypes` enum?), and the full field layout. Confirm the 960/48000 reading
and identify the rest.
**Q3 — the server reply.** What does the client expect back — a Dissonance `HandshakeResponse`
that assigns it a player/session id? Give that message's type byte and field layout, and how
the client matches it to its request. This is the specific thing that will stop the 4s retry
loop and move the client into its connected voice state.
**Q4 — steady-state voice.** Once handshked, what does a voice packet look like (type byte,
whether it carries the player id and a sequence, and whether the audio body is opaque Opus we
can relay without parsing)? For proximity voice a relay ideally forwards voice bodies verbatim
between clients in a room — confirm that is viable, i.e. the server does not need to re-sign or
re-encode.
**Q5 — session/room membership.** How does the client learn about other players (join/leave)?
Is there a server broadcast the relay must send when a second client connects, so the two
clients hear each other?
## Output
Message-type bytes, field offsets, and the exact server reply bytes where possible. Dissonance
is a known asset (Placeholder Software) — if the protocol matches a documented/derivable
version, say which. Distinguish read from inferred.
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
# Request #5: exact Dissonance packet field encodings (client's PacketReader)
Request #4 landed it: NamedMessage = `u16 NamedMessageType LE` + `i32 length LE` + Dissonance
packet; reply on type 2 (DissonanceToClient); Dissonance is stock v8.x, magic `0x8bc7`
big-endian. We've implemented a best-effort HandshakeResponse from the docs' field lists and
are testing it live. This request is the authoritative fallback for the byte-exact encodings the
docs don't specify — read from the CLIENT's `PacketReader` (what parses what we send), which is
the ground truth for what we must produce.
Dissonance networking is in the un-indexed regions you noted; the reader methods are
`AJLLGKJMHIO` (PacketReader) / `BKJPKJLIHFE` @ 0x3136430 (magic check) and the `BaseClient`
handshake handler.
**Q1 — `ReadHandshakeResponse` exact layout.** After magic + type(5): confirm the order and
encoding of session id (u32?), assigned client id (u16?), and the three lists (clients, rooms,
listeners). For each list: is the count a **byte, u16, or u32** (big-endian?), and what is each
entry's layout? For the client list entry: name + codec settings + id — in what order, and how
is the **string (name)** encoded (length prefix width + UTF8? null sentinel?). Does the client
list include the joining client itself or only others?
**Q2 — `ReadClientState` layout.** Fields: name, client id, codec settings, rooms list. Same
questions — string encoding, list count width, field order. This is what we broadcast when a
second client joins so the two see each other.
**Q3 — `ReadVoiceData` header.** After magic+type(2)+session: sender client id (u16?), the
8-bit flags bitfield, the sequence number (u16?), and the "channels this voice is addressed to"
list (count width + per-channel layout). We want to relay the body verbatim — confirm the whole
packet after the session id can be forwarded unchanged to other clients, or if the server must
rewrite the sender id / channel list.
**Q4 — the `CodecSettings` block.** Confirm `byte codec, u32 frameSize, u32 sampleRate` (BE),
matching the captured HandshakeRequest (`01`, 960, 48000). Is there a trailing field? The
captured request had `00 02 32` after the codec settings that we read as the player name —
confirm the name encoding from `ReadHandshakeRequest`.
**Q5 — client id / session semantics.** Does the server pick the session id freely (any nonzero
u32)? What range/rule for assigned client ids (start value, reserved ids)? The client kicks on
"wrong session ID" for subsequent packets — confirm it stores the session from HandshakeResponse
and echoes it, so our chosen value just has to be consistent.
## Output
Byte offsets, field order, count widths, endianness, string encoding. This is the last layer —
once these are exact, plaintext voice relay is a direct implementation.
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# Request to the client-side agent (dumped game image)
## Context
We have a third-party NGO/LiteNetLib server that the game connects to. The LiteNetLib
transport handshake **fails in a specific, reproducible way**, and we've narrowed it to one
thing: the client silently ignores our `ConnectAccept`.
Evidence, so you know what's already excluded:
- The client's `ConnectRequest` is byte-identical in shape to a stock LiteNetLib 1.x request:
`protocolId = 13`, `HeaderSize = 18`, `addrSize = 16`, plus **3 bytes of connect data
`01 00 11`**. So the client's outbound path is stock or near-stock.
- Our server replies with a stock 15-byte `ConnectAccept` whose `connectionTime` matches.
- The client ignores it and resends `ConnectRequest` ~11 times, all with the *same*
`connectionTime` — i.e. one attempt being retried, never leaving `ConnectionState.Outgoing`.
- Meanwhile our server thinks it is connected, pings, gets no Pong, and times out at 5s.
- A synthetic stock-LiteNetLib-1.2.0 client, run from the *same machine and NAT* as the game,
connects to the same server successfully. So this is not the network, not NAT, and not our
server. It is client-side.
- We reproduced the exact symptom against a stock client by making the accept the wrong
length: `NetConnectAcceptPacket.FromData` begins `if (packet.Size != Size) return null`,
which yields precisely this silent-ignore-and-retry behaviour.
**Working hypothesis: the game's bundled LiteNetLib is forked and expects a `ConnectAccept`
that differs from stock — most likely a different length.** We need the exact layout.
The bundled LiteNetLib lives inside `Netcode.Transports.LiteNetLib.dll` (reported earlier as
116 types, "LiteNetLib itself bundled inside"). Third-party assemblies appear to have kept
their real names, so these types should be findable by name rather than by obfuscated slug.
## Stock reference (LiteNetLib 1.2.0, MIT) — diff against this
```csharp
internal sealed class NetConnectAcceptPacket
{
public const int Size = 15;
public readonly long ConnectionTime;
public readonly byte ConnectionNumber;
public readonly int PeerId;
public readonly bool PeerNetworkChanged;
public static NetConnectAcceptPacket FromData(NetPacket packet)
{
if (packet.Size != Size) return null;
long connectionId = BitConverter.ToInt64(packet.RawData, 1);
byte connectionNumber = packet.RawData[9];
if (connectionNumber >= NetConstants.MaxConnectionNumber) return null;
byte isReused = packet.RawData[10];
if (isReused > 1) return null;
int peerId = BitConverter.ToInt32(packet.RawData, 11);
if (peerId < 0) return null;
return new NetConnectAcceptPacket(connectionId, connectionNumber, peerId, isReused == 1);
}
public static NetPacket Make(long connectTime, byte connectNum, int localPeerId)
{
var packet = new NetPacket(PacketProperty.ConnectAccept, 0);
FastBitConverter.GetBytes(packet.RawData, 1, connectTime);
packet.RawData[9] = connectNum;
FastBitConverter.GetBytes(packet.RawData, 11, localPeerId);
return packet;
}
}
```
Stock wire layout: `[0]` property (6) | `[1..8]` connectionTime | `[9]` connectionNumber |
`[10]` isReused | `[11..14]` peerId.
## What we need
**Q1 (highest value — this likely ends the investigation).**
`LiteNetLib.NetConnectAcceptPacket` in the bundled copy:
- the value of `Size`;
- every field and its byte offset;
- the full body of `FromData`, especially every early-return/rejection condition;
- the full signature and body of `Make`.
If `Size != 15`, tell us what the extra bytes are and where `Make` writes them.
**Q2.** `LiteNetLib.NetConstants.ProtocolId`. We derived 13 from the wire; confirm from the
image. Also `MaxConnectionNumber` if it differs from stock (4).
**Q3.** Is `NetManager` constructed with a `PacketLayerBase` (a second constructor argument,
or a non-null `_extraPacketLayer` field)? If yes, name the layer type and give
`ExtraPacketSizeForLayer` plus the bodies of `ProcessInboundPacket` / `ProcessOutBoundPacket`.
We ruled a layer out by inference from wire bytes; we want it confirmed from the image.
**Q4.** `LiteNetLib.NetConnectRequestPacket.HeaderSize`, and **what writes the 3 connect-data
bytes `01 00 11`**. Find the `NetManager.Connect(...)` call site — expected to be in the NGO
voice session wrapper (`BAOFAOBLAMJ`) or in `LiteNetLibTransport` — and show how that
`NetDataWriter` is populated. If those bytes are a version/handshake field, we need to know
whether the server is expected to validate or echo them.
**Q5 (only if cheap).** In `NetPeer`, the method handling an inbound accept (stock name
`ProcessConnectAccept`): list every condition that returns false. That is the definitive list
of reasons our accept could be dropped.
## Output format
For each question: the decompiled source if you have it, otherwise field offsets and constant
values. Give **byte offsets and exact integer values** rather than prose. Where the fork
matches stock, just say "matches stock" — we only need the diff.
If something genuinely isn't present in the image, say so explicitly. Do not infer the layout
from stock LiteNetLib or reason about what it "should" be — we already have stock, and a
plausible-but-wrong layout costs us more than a "not found".
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
# NGO 1.x over LiteNetLib — wire notes for the voice relay
Derived entirely from public MIT sources: `Unity-Technologies/com.unity.netcode.gameobjects`
(tag `ngo/1.14.1`, cross-checked against `ngo/1.6.0`) and
`Unity-Technologies/multiplayer-community-contributions`
(`Transports/com.community.netcode.transport.litenetlib`). No compatibility logic here is
taken from a decompiled client; the client-side observations are listed separately as
open questions to be settled by black-box capture.
## 1. Transport layer
LiteNetLib, **ProtocolId 13** — the `1.x` line. This is confirmed directly from a live
capture: the client's `ConnectRequest` carries `protocolId = 13` at bytes `[1..4]`.
Note this is **not** the LiteNetLib copy vendored inside the community transport package,
which is still on the `0.9.5.x` / ProtocolId 11 line. A server built against the package's
bundled sources will have every connect dropped in `NetManager` before any callback fires.
Build against LiteNetLib 1.x.
`ConnectRequest` layout (LNL 1.x, `NetConnectRequestPacket`, header 18 bytes):
```
[0] property (ConnectRequest = 5) | connectionNumber << 5
[1..4] protocolId = 13
[5..12] connectionTime (long)
[13..16] peerId (int)
[17] addrSize (16 for IPv4, 28 for IPv6)
[18..] target SocketAddress, then connect data
```
Community transport behaviour the server must mirror:
| aspect | value |
|---|---|
| connect payload | **3 bytes, observed `01 00 11`** — see below |
| connection requests | accepted unconditionally (`request.Accept()`) |
| clientId | `peer.Id`, `+1` on the server |
| server clientId | `0` |
| delivery mapping | Unreliable→`Unreliable`, …Sequenced→`Sequenced`, Reliable*→`ReliableOrdered` |
| channel | always 0; LNL encodes `channel*4 + deliveryMethod` in its own header |
The observed connect payload does **not** parse as LiteNetLib's `Put(string)` — an empty key
writes `00 00`, and reading `01 00` as a length prefix (`size + 1 == 1`) leaves the trailing
`11` unaccounted for. So the client is not using `Connect(address, port, key)` with a plain
string; it passes a custom 3-byte blob. Because the transport accepts connection requests
unconditionally, our server does not need to interpret it — but it must not reject on it.
## 2. Batch framing
Every datagram payload is one batch:
```
offset 0 ushort Magic = 0x1160
offset 2 ushort BatchCount
offset 4 int BatchSize (== padded total length)
offset 8 ulong BatchHash (XXHash64, seed 0)
offset 16 ... messages
pad to a multiple of 8 bytes
```
`BatchHash` covers bytes `[16 .. BatchSize)` — i.e. **including the tail padding**.
The receiver hashes `receivedLength - 16`, so sender and receiver agree only if the
datagram arrives byte-exact.
## 3. Message framing
```
bitpacked uint MessageType (index into the negotiated id space)
bitpacked uint MessageSize (payload bytes, excluding this header)
byte[] payload
```
### Bit-packed integers
32-bit: low 3 bits of the first byte hold the byte count `n`.
If the value needs ≥30 bits, the first byte is literal `5` followed by a raw LE `uint32`.
Otherwise `v <<= 3`, `n = usedByteCount(v)`, write `v | n` in `n` LE bytes.
64-bit: identical with 4 bits and a `9` escape; `v <<= 4`.
Signed values are zig-zag encoded first (`(v << 1) ^ (v >> 31)`).
Arrays written with `WriteValueSafe` are a **raw LE `int` length** followed by raw elements —
not bit-packed.
## 4. The id space (the important part)
Message ids are **not** a fixed table. Each side builds a local list of its message types,
sorted ordinal by `Type.FullName`, then moves `ConnectionApprovedMessage` and
`ConnectionRequestMessage` to the front (`PrioritizeMessageOrder`). Because
`…ConnectionApprovedMessage` sorts before `…ConnectionRequestMessage`:
> **Index 0 is always ConnectionApproved and index 1 always ConnectionRequest**, for any
> build, no matter which other messages were trimmed out.
That is what lets the server parse the client's very first message without knowing anything
about the client's message set.
Then `ConnectionApprovedMessage` carries the server's hash list, and the client calls
`SetServerMessageOrder` with it — **the server's ordering becomes the id space for the rest
of the session**. The server therefore *chooses* the numbering and never has to discover
Rec Room's internal ordering.
Message identity is `XXHash32(Type.FullName)` over UTF-8, seed 0:
| index | hash | type |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | `0xa5e29a7d` | `Unity.Netcode.ConnectionApprovedMessage` |
| 1 | `0xb31736b2` | `Unity.Netcode.ConnectionRequestMessage` |
| 2 | `0xb81cf6d3` | `Unity.Netcode.DisconnectReasonMessage` |
| 3 | `0x978922a6` | `Unity.Netcode.NamedMessage` |
| 4 | `0x179751e9` | `Unity.Netcode.ServerLogMessage` |
| 5 | `0xc6887f42` | `Unity.Netcode.TimeSyncMessage` |
| 6 | `0x46f5a397` | `Unity.Netcode.UnnamedMessage` |
## 5. Handshake
**Client → server, `ConnectionRequestMessage`** (id 1, version 0 in every 1.x release):
```
bitpacked int count
count × { raw uint Hash ; bitpacked int Version }
raw ulong ConfigHash
[ byte[] ConnectionData ] only when the server has ConnectionApproval enabled
```
`ConfigHash` is `XXHash64` over, in order: `ProtocolVersion` (ushort, game-set),
the literal `NetworkConstants.PROTOCOL_VERSION`, sorted prefab hashes (only when
`ForceSamePrefabs`), `TickRate` (uint), then bools `ConnectionApproval`,
`ForceSamePrefabs`, `EnableSceneManagement`, `EnsureNetworkVariableLengthSafety`, and
`RpcHashSize`. A mismatch disconnects the client.
`PROTOCOL_VERSION` is `"15.0.0"` across **all** of NGO 1.6 → 2.0, so the config hash does
*not* identify the NGO version. It only constrains the game's own `ProtocolVersion`,
tick rate and flags — a small enough tuple to brute-force from one captured hash.
**Server → client, `ConnectionApprovedMessage`** (id 0):
```
bitpacked int count ← "forbidden segment", must come first
count × { raw uint Hash ; bitpacked int Version }
bitpacked ulong OwnerClientId
bitpacked int NetworkTick
raw int len + len × raw ulong ← ConnectedClientIds, only if targetVersion >= 1
raw uint sceneObjectCount ← always 0 for us
```
Version discipline: serialize using the version *the client advertised* for that message.
`ConnectionApprovedMessage.Version` is `0` in NGO 1.6–1.7 and `1`
(`k_VersionAddClientIds`) from 1.8.0 onward — implement both branches and switch on the
negotiated value rather than pinning a release. Every other message in our set is
version `0` across the whole 1.x line.
## 6. Session messages
`TimeSyncMessage` — `bitpacked int Tick`, sent unreliable at tick rate.
`NamedMessage` — `raw ulong Hash` then **opaque bytes to the end of the message**.
Dissonance's own protocol rides inside those bytes; a proximity relay forwards them
without parsing. `UnnamedMessage` is the same minus the leading hash.
## 7c. Forked NGO batch format (from a decoded ConnectionRequest)
The client's NGO batching is **not stock**. Decoded from a real 2041-byte ConnectionRequest
(`docs/client-agent-request-3.md` has the capture). Layout:
```
[0:2] magic u16 = 0x1160
[2:4] count u16 = 0 (stock BatchCount field, unused/zero)
[4:8] size u32 = total datagram length
[8:16] hash u64 = XXHash64 over [24:end] <-- NOTE: from 24, not 16
[16:24] u64 = 1 (fork field; == message count in this sample)
[24:] message stream
```
Message: `bitpacked type` (1 = ConnectionRequest in the client's local index),
`bitpacked size`, then body. The hash covers the message stream `[24:end]` exactly.
ConnectionRequest body (`[27:end]`, size 2014) vs stock:
```
0x81 <- 1 byte where stock writes bitpacked version-count (7 -> 0x39)
7 × { u32 hash ; 1 byte version=0 } version table (our 7 message hashes, all v0)
00 00 00 00 01 <- 5 bytes not present in stock, before ConfigHash
u64 ConfigHash
u32 ConnData length (1961)
ConnData = Tachyon JSON (AI/AT/VB/CKA/CIA/CPK)
```
The `0x81` preamble and the 5-byte field are in the shared "version header" (forbidden
segment), so ConnectionApproved must reproduce them. Their meaning, and the exact
ConnectionApproved serialization, are the last unknowns — see `docs/client-agent-request-3.md`.
## 7b. Live progress (real client)
- **LiteNetLib handshake: SOLVED against the real client.** With the trailing-marker layer,
the client reaches `Connected` and holds it — Ping/Pong and MTU discovery both flow, no
timeout. The client only disconnects (`RemoteConnectionClose`) after ~10s of no NGO approval.
- **NGO ConnectionRequest: reached.** The client sends a fragmented Channeled batch (3 LNL
fragments, ~2041 bytes reassembled) carrying the Tachyon handshake JSON (base64 `CKA`/`CIA`/
`CPK`, ends `=="}`).
- **Open anomaly:** that batch parses as `magic=0x1160, count=0, size=2041`, and the batch hash
does not match a stock XXHash64 over `[16..len]`. A count of 0 with a full message payload
means the batch header layout and/or hash range differs from stock NGO 1.6–1.14, OR the fork
frames the connection payload non-standardly. This must be resolved before ConnectionApproved,
because a wrong batch header means the client rejects our approval too. Use `--dump-batches`
to capture the full bytes for offline decode.
## 7. State of the evidence
Confirmed from the capture in `traffic.txt` (decode with `tools/decode_lnl.py`):
- ProtocolId 13 → LiteNetLib 1.x.
- A 3-byte connect payload `01 00 11`, not the stock empty key.
- Target `66.228.47.217:4499`.
- MTU probing at 1024, consistent with the LNL 1.x `PossibleMtu` table.
The capture's failure mode is unambiguous and is **entirely below NGO**: 11 `ConnectRequest`s
all carrying the *same* `connectionTime` (one connect attempt, resent), each answered by a
`ConnectAccept`, pings going out with **no Pong and no MtuOk in reply**, and the ping
sequence resetting 1‑4 → 1‑4 → 1‑4 as the peer times out at `DisconnectTimeout` (~5s) and
retries. **Not one Channeled or Unreliable data packet appears**, so nothing in sections 2–6
has yet been exercised against the real client.
Whatever answered that capture accepts the connection and then stops speaking LiteNetLib.
Using a real LiteNetLib library (LiteNetLibPP) in the server — rather than hand-rolling the handshake —
makes Ping/Pong, MTU discovery and keepalive correct for free, which is exactly the failure
that capture shows.
Still open:
1. **`ConfigHash` inputs.** Capture one `ConnectionRequestMessage` and brute-force the tuple
in §5 to recover `ProtocolVersion`, `TickRate` and the flags exactly. Nothing in the
current capture reaches this point.
2. **Client message set and versions.** The advertised hash/version table in that request is
a direct readout of the client's message set; the server logs it.
3. **The truncated byte.** Upstream `LiteNetLibTransport.OnNetworkReceive` hands NGO
`UserDataSize - 1`, with the comment "the last byte sent is used to indicate the channel"
— but the matching `Send` stopped appending that byte in commit `b32ffdd`. LNL carries the
channel in its own header, so upstream HEAD drops a real payload byte and the batch hash
cannot verify. Rec Room's build must diverge somewhere. The server tests both hypotheses
per packet and reports which one matches.
4. **What the 3 connect-data bytes mean.** Not blocking, since the server accepts
unconditionally, but more captures would settle it.
## 8. Transport-level encryption (Rec Room fork) — CORRECTED
An earlier revision of this doc argued from wire bytes that there was **no datagram-level
packet layer**. That was wrong. Client static analysis (`LiteNetLibTransport.Initialize`)
shows a `RecRoomClientEncryptLayer` is **always** installed, with
`ExtraPacketSizeForLayer = 9`. It adds 9 bytes to every outbound datagram and strips 9 from
every inbound one, **below** LiteNetLib — so it wraps the handshake, not just NGO payloads.
The clean-looking captures were app-level packet logs taken below the layer, not raw wire.
### Why this is the handshake failure
- Client strips 9 bytes off every inbound datagram before LiteNetLib parses it.
- A stock 15-byte ConnectAccept becomes 6 bytes → `NetConnectAcceptPacket.FromData` fails
`Size != 15` → returns null → **silent ignore**. The client stays in `Outgoing`, resends
ConnectRequest with the same `connectionTime`, and times out at ~5s. Exactly the observed loop.
- A stock server, lacking the layer, still *accepts* the client's over-long ConnectRequest
because the 9 extra bytes fold into variable-length connect data — which is why the server
saw "peer connected" while the client never did.
- Fix magnitude: a correct ConnectAccept is `15 + 9 = 24` bytes on the wire.
Verified in the server: a `PacketLayerBase` with `ExtraPacketSizeForLayer = 9` on both ends
completes the handshake; on the server only (stock client) it fails identically to the game.
See `src/main.cpp` (marker lambdas + `patches/`) and `--encrypt-layer`.
### The format is a trailing marker byte — SOLVED
Read from the image (see `docs/tachyon-findings.md`). The layer is variable-length; the marker
is the **last** byte of every datagram. Key-null (the whole handshake): outbound appends one
byte `0x11`; inbound strips it. Key-set: append 8-byte nonce + marker `0x2A` and encrypt.
Any other trailing marker is dropped. So a ConnectAccept must be `15 + 1 = 16` bytes on the
wire with a trailing `0x11`. Implemented in `src/main.cpp` (marker lambdas + `patches/`)
(`--encrypt-layer`) and verified end-to-end.
### Payload encryption (post-handshake)
Once `RecRoom_SetEncryptionInfo(clientId, key)` runs, the same layer encrypts NGO payloads
with a split-key AES scheme: client contributes `CKA`/`CIA`, server contributes `SessionKeyB`
(RSA-encrypted to the client's `CPK`), combined in a function at `0x8277880` (not yet read).
The handshake to establish that key is JSON in the NGO connection payload — the Tachyon
handshake, see `docs/tachyon-findings.md`.
**Key material is deliberately not committed.** It is supplied at runtime.
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
# Tachyon voice server — findings from client static analysis
Source: static analysis of Rec Room build `20250718.01`. Every RVA and obfuscated name below
is valid only for that build and must be re-derived by shape for any other. Facts are tagged
**[PROVEN]** (read from the image) or **[UNVERIFIED]** (hypothesis — confirm before building on it).
This file is the reference; the wire mechanics we have implemented/verified live in
`ngo-litenetlib-wire.md`. Open reads are tracked in `client-agent-request-2.md`.
## Architecture
**[PROVEN]** Dedicated server, star topology, server relays audio. The client can only ever be
a client: `NetworkManager.StartHost`/`StartServer` have zero call sites;
`LiteNetLibTransport.StartServer` is dead code; `StartClient` binds an ephemeral port and only
connects outbound. Dissonance role selection always resolves to client.
## Protocol stack
```
UDP
└─ RecRoomClientEncryptLayer +9 bytes/datagram, always present [PROVEN]
└─ LiteNetLib 1.x ProtocolId/HeaderSize UNVERIFIED
└─ NGO 1.6+ (trimmed) 7 message types, no objects/vars/scenes [PROVEN]
└─ Tachyon handshake JSON in the NGO connection payload
└─ Dissonance 8.x over NGO named/unnamed messages
```
## LiteNetLib layer (task doc section 4)
**[PROVEN]** Bundled inside `Netcode.Transports.LiteNetLib.dll`, name-obfuscated except
`LiteNetLibTransport`. `NetConnectAcceptPacket` matches stock exactly: `Size == 15`,
connectionNumber at `[9]` (reject `>= 4`), isReused at `[10]` (reject `> 1`), peerId at
`[11..14]` (reject negative). `ProcessConnectAccept` matches stock: requires state `Outgoing`
and `ConnectionTime == peer.ConnectTime`.
**[UNVERIFIED]** `NetConstants.ProtocolId` and `NetConnectRequestPacket.HeaderSize` — live in
metadata `fieldDefaultValues`, not yet walked. Our capture pins ProtocolId to **13** from the
wire, but that is not yet confirmed from the image. The 3 connect-data bytes `01 00 11` were
not traced to their writer.
## Encrypt layer (task doc section 3) — SOLVED
`RecRoomClientEncryptLayer` (`MGHAOMEMAHF`), always installed. **[PROVEN, read from image]** It
is a variable-length **trailing-marker** scheme — `ExtraPacketSizeForLayer = 9` is the
worst-case reservation, not the bytes added. The marker is always the LAST byte.
Method map (the task doc had inbound/outbound swapped — corrected):
| RVA | method |
|---|---|
| `0x735DC20` | `ProcessOutBoundPacket` |
| `0x735D760` | `ProcessInboundPacket` |
| `0x735DF90` | `SetKey` (copies exactly 32 bytes, AES-256 sized) |
| `0x735E140` | `ClearKey` (nulls key on disconnect) |
Outbound: `key == null` → append one byte `0x11`, `length += 1`. `key != null` → append 8-byte
RNG nonce + marker `0x2A` (`length += 9`) and encrypt the payload. No branch on packet property.
Inbound: read last byte. `0x11` → strip 1 (no key needed). `0x2A` → decrypt, needs key,
requires `length > 9`, strip 9. Any other marker → **drop** (this is why our earlier
`--accept-extra 00` sweep silently failed — `0x00` is an unknown marker).
**The whole LiteNetLib + NGO handshake runs key == null, so plaintext `0x11` is all that is
needed to reach NGO.** Implemented and verified end-to-end in
`src/main.cpp` (marker lambdas + `patches/`) (`--encrypt-layer`): the ConnectAccept goes out as 16
bytes (15 + `0x11`), the client accepts, and marker-framed NGO data flows.
**[UNVERIFIED]** The encrypted-path cipher. The transform (`0x73653E0`) is Burst-compiled and
dispatches through function pointers; the 32-byte key does not by itself prove AES. Not needed
for the handshake. It only matters if the session actually sets a key — which the Tachyon
approval flow controls, so keeping the client key-null (plaintext `0x11` throughout) is the
path worth checking before touching the cipher.
**[PROVEN deduction]** The connect-data bytes we saw as `01 00 11` are really `01 00` (2 bytes)
plus the layer's trailing `0x11` marker.
## NGO layer (task doc section 5)
**[PROVEN]** Trimmed to 7 message types, no NetworkObject/Behaviour/Variable/spawn/scene. We do
not reimplement NGO — just handshake, time sync, and a named/unnamed relay. NGO type names are
not obfuscated. Rec Room forked `NetworkManager` with `RecRoom_ConnectionInfo` get/set.
**[UNVERIFIED]** Hypothesis: `RecRoom_ConnectionInfo` carries the approval JSON to the client,
since stock `ConnectionApprovedMessage` has no arbitrary payload. Accessors are shared stubs —
call-xref is unreliable here.
## Tachyon handshake (task doc section 6)
Session wrapper `BAOFAOBLAMJ` = `TachyonClient`, `RecRoom.Networking.PhotonImpl.Runtime`.
**[PROVEN] Client to server** (NGO connection-request payload), `HCNIOOINPCA` `0x82786B0`,
JSON type `PAFCNOLGBNM`, all keys `[JsonProperty]` `Required.Always`, `byte[]` as base64:
| key | member | type |
|---|---|---|
| `AI` | AccountId | string |
| `AT` | AccessToken | byte[] |
| `VB` | VerificationBlob | byte[] |
| `CKA` | ClientKeyA | byte[] |
| `CIA` | ClientIVA | byte[] |
| `CPK` | ClientPublicKey | byte[] (RSA CspBlob) |
**[PROVEN] Server to client** (approval payload), `CDJMICBEALM` =
`NetworkManager_OnClientConnectedCallback` `0x8277880`, JSON type `PMFAAFNFMAL`:
| key | member | type | note |
|---|---|---|---|
| `DR` | Reason | string | `Required.Always`; **must equal `"Carrot"`** |
| `KT` | SessionKeyB | byte[] | `Required.Default`; RSA-encrypted to the client's `CPK` |
Split-key: transport key = f(client `CKA`/`CIA`, server `SessionKeyB`). **[UNVERIFIED]** the
combination function — read `0x8277880`.
**[PROVEN] The RSA blocker.** `DMIBBCKIGCG` (`.cctor` `0x827A820`) holds a hardcoded 1024-bit
RSA **public** key; the client encrypts `AT`/`VB`/`CKA`/`CIA` to it. A working server needs the
matching **private** key, which is Rec Room's and not present in the client. Recommended route:
generate our own 1024-bit keypair and **patch the embedded modulus literal** in the client
(plain string in `.data`), coordinated with the client patcher so both ship the same keypair.
Key material and the RSA modulus are NOT committed to this repo — supplied at runtime.
## CPK is opaque — the RSA blocker still stands
The client-agent's "you can mint KT without Rec Room's private key" does **not** hold against
the capture. The `CPK` in the request JSON is 160 bytes of high-entropy data: no
`PUBLICKEYBLOB` header (`0x06 0x02`), no `RSA1` magic, and an even low byte — so it is not a
plaintext RSA modulus or CspBlob. **CPK is itself RSA-encrypted** (to Rec Room's key, like
AT/VB/CKA/CIA). A third-party server cannot read it, so it cannot encrypt a `KT` the client
will decrypt. The `KT`-minting path is therefore not viable without Rec Room's private key.
Consequence: to run voice, the client-patch route is the real option — neuter the connected
callback's encryption setup / the layer's `SetKey` so the transport key stays null and the
layer keeps emitting plaintext `0x11`. This is independent of reaching NGO "Connected", which
does not need a valid `KT` at all (ConnectionApproved.Deserialize does no validation).
## NGO handshake: implemented
The server now speaks the fork batch format (`--fork`) and sends a ConnectionApproved:
24-byte header (`BatchCount` at offset 16, hash `XXHash64` over `[24:]`), message type 0
(ConnectionApproved in the client's pre-approval local order), the client's 8-entry version
header echoed verbatim, `OwnerClientId`, `NetworkTick`, and a length-prefixed
`{"DR":"Carrot"}` payload. Verified offline against the real captured request: the fork parser
confirms the batch hash and our reply round-trips. `KT` is omitted (CPK opaque), so the
client's post-connect callback will throw on `RSA.Decrypt` *after* the Connected event — which
is the expected boundary of what a patch-free server can reach.
## Dissonance (task doc section 7)
**[PROVEN — live]** After NGO Connected, the real client sends a Dissonance handshake as an NGO
`NamedMessage` (our message index 3), plaintext (marker `0x11`), and **repeats it every ~4s
because the server does not answer**:
```
NamedMessage hash = 0xc78b0000000f0001
payload (13 bytes) = 04 01 00 00 03 c0 00 00 bb 80 00 02 32
```
`0x04` looks like a Dissonance message-type byte; `03c0` = 960 and `bb80` = 48000 decode as the
Opus frame size and sample rate, so this is the client advertising its audio config and waiting
for a server handshake reply. This is the next layer to implement — see
`docs/client-agent-request-4.md`. For a proximity relay the *voice* packets can still be
forwarded opaque; only the session handshake needs server logic.
**[PROVEN]** `NfgoCommsNetwork` present, role from NGO client flags; integration rewired onto
raw named/unnamed messages (no NetworkBehaviour). Derive the handshake reply from
`NfgoCommsNetwork` methods, `DissonanceNetworkManagerInjector` `0x826A370`, and `DissonanceVoip.dll`.
## MILESTONE (2026-08-21): full handshake works, plaintext, no client patch
The server (`reference`, `--encrypt-layer --fork`) completes the entire stack against the
real client: LiteNetLib + encrypt layer + forked NGO + Tachyon `"Carrot"` approval. The game
**connects, does not crash, and reports "connected to voice."** Traffic is plaintext `0x11` —
omitting `KT` left the client key-null (its post-connect RSA callback is caught, non-fatal), so
**no client patch is needed** for plaintext voice. What remains is the Dissonance session
protocol above, then multi-client relay.
## Matchmaking DTO (task doc section 8)
**[PROVEN]** `GET https://match.<host>/player/connection-info?roomInstanceId={long}` returns a
bare 9-key DTO including `VoiceConnectionInfo` (`"<ip>:<port>"`) and `VoiceServerId`. Client
advertises `VoiceServerVersion` in the `matchmake/v2/room` body; server returns the allocated
voice server here. Empty strings for both voice fields = "no voice", definitely accepted — so
voice can ship dark while the handshake is brought up.
## Order of work (from the task doc)
1. Read the encrypt-layer 9-byte format + null-key path (`client-agent-request-2.md`). **now.**
2. Pin ProtocolId / HeaderSize from `fieldDefaultValues`.
3. Confirm how the approval JSON reaches the client (`RecRoom_ConnectionInfo`?).
4. Read the key-combination function at `0x8277880`.
5. Client to `Connected`: LiteNetLib + NGO ConnectionRequest/Approved + `"Carrot"`.
6. Time sync, then the Dissonance relay.
Steps 1–4 are each a bounded read that silently invalidates the implementation if guessed —
land them as written findings before server code.
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
diff --git a/include/lnl/net_manager.h b/include/lnl/net_manager.h
index c1ec872..e96dbf5 100644
--- a/include/lnl/net_manager.h
+++ b/include/lnl/net_manager.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#include <optional>
#include <thread>
#include <unordered_map>
+#include <functional>
+#include <vector>
#ifdef WIN32
@@ -80,6 +82,13 @@ namespace lnl {
bool disconnect_on_unreachable = false;
std::string name;
+ // Optional datagram transform layers (a generic hook, equivalent to the C# PacketLayerBase).
+ // outbound_layer: given the packet about to be sent, fill `out` with the bytes to put on the
+ // wire and return their length. inbound_layer: mutate a freshly received datagram in place
+ // and return the new length, or 0 to drop it. Used by Tachyon for the RecRoom 0x11 marker.
+ std::function<size_t(const uint8_t* data, size_t length, std::vector<uint8_t>& out)> outbound_layer;
+ std::function<size_t(uint8_t* data, size_t length)> inbound_layer;
+
explicit net_manager(net_event_listener* listener);
~net_manager();
diff --git a/src/lnl/net_manager.cpp b/src/lnl/net_manager.cpp
index 0cfe2a7..fa23eef 100644
--- a/src/lnl/net_manager.cpp
+++ b/src/lnl/net_manager.cpp
@@ -219,6 +219,15 @@ void lnl::net_manager::receive_logic() {
packet->resize(size);
+ if (inbound_layer) {
+ size_t newLen = inbound_layer(packet->data(), (size_t) size);
+ if (newLen == 0) { // layer dropped the datagram (unknown/undecryptable marker)
+ pool_recycle(packet);
+ continue;
+ }
+ packet->resize(newLen);
+ }
+
on_message_received(packet, addr);
}
}
@@ -517,8 +526,16 @@ int32_t lnl::net_manager::send_raw(const uint8_t* data, size_t offset, size_t le
return 0;
}
+ const uint8_t* sendData = &data[offset];
+ size_t sendLen = length;
+ if (outbound_layer) {
+ thread_local std::vector<uint8_t> layerBuf;
+ sendLen = outbound_layer(&data[offset], length, layerBuf);
+ sendData = layerBuf.data();
+ }
+
auto result = sendto(m_socket,
- (const char*) &data[offset], (int) length,
+ (const char*) sendData, (int) sendLen,
0,
(sockaddr*) &endpoint.raw, sizeof(sockaddr_in));
+45
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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
# Patches applied to vendored submodules
## `0001-tachyon-packet-layer-hook.patch` → `vendor/LiteNetLibPP`
Applies to: LiteNetLibPP @ `c6625b0652c5930046b75b495db314456c8bc411`
(https://github.com/Revan600/LiteNetLibPP), the pinned submodule under `vendor/LiteNetLibPP`.
### Why
Upstream has no packet-layer abstraction, but the Rec Room client wraps every datagram in a
trailing-marker "encrypt" layer (a `0x11` byte on the plaintext path). This patch adds a generic
datagram-transform hook — the equivalent of the C# LiteNetLib `PacketLayerBase` — so Tachyon can
install the marker without forking the library wholesale. It is deliberately generic (not
RecRoom-specific) so it could be submitted upstream unchanged.
### What it changes
- `include/lnl/net_manager.h` — two public `std::function` members, `outbound_layer` and
`inbound_layer` (both default null → stock behaviour), plus `<functional>`/`<vector>` includes.
- `src/lnl/net_manager.cpp`
- `send_raw()` — if `outbound_layer` is set, transform the bytes just before `sendto`.
- `receive_logic()` — if `inbound_layer` is set, transform/drop each datagram just after
`recvfrom`, before `on_message_received`.
Tachyon installs the `0x11` marker through these hooks in `src/main.cpp`.
### How it is applied
The top-level `CMakeLists.txt` applies this patch to the submodule working tree at configure time,
idempotently (`git apply --reverse --check` detects an already-patched tree and skips). This leaves
the submodule showing as "dirty" in `git status` — that is expected. To reset it:
`git -C vendor/LiteNetLibPP checkout .`
### Regenerating the patch (if the pin is bumped)
```sh
# from a pristine checkout of the new upstream commit, with the two files edited:
git -C <litenetlibpp> diff > patches/0001-tachyon-packet-layer-hook.patch
```
### Known limitation
The outbound hook appends its marker *after* LiteNetLibPP's MTU/fragmentation math, without
reserving space the way the C# `ExtraPacketSizeForLayer` did. Safe here because every packet the
server *sends* is far below the MTU; revisit if the server ever sends reliable data near the MTU.
+64
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@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
#include "config.h"
#include <fstream>
#include <sstream>
namespace {
std::string trim(const std::string& s) {
size_t a = s.find_first_not_of(" \t\r\n");
if (a == std::string::npos) return "";
size_t b = s.find_last_not_of(" \t\r\n");
return s.substr(a, b - a + 1);
}
bool parse_bool(const std::string& v, bool& out) {
if (v == "true" || v == "1" || v == "yes" || v == "on") { out = true; return true; }
if (v == "false" || v == "0" || v == "no" || v == "off") { out = false; return true; }
return false;
}
}
bool load_config(const std::string& path, config& cfg, std::string& err) {
std::ifstream f(path);
if (!f) { err = "cannot open config file '" + path + "'"; return false; }
std::string line;
int lineno = 0;
while (std::getline(f, line)) {
lineno++;
std::string s = trim(line);
if (s.empty() || s[0] == '#') continue;
auto eq = s.find('=');
if (eq == std::string::npos) {
err = "line " + std::to_string(lineno) + ": expected key = value";
return false;
}
std::string key = trim(s.substr(0, eq));
std::string val = trim(s.substr(eq + 1));
auto bad = [&](const char* why) {
err = "line " + std::to_string(lineno) + " (" + key + "): " + why;
return false;
};
if (key == "port") cfg.port = (uint16_t) std::stoi(val);
else if (key == "room_url") cfg.room_url = val;
else if (key == "room_timeout_ms") cfg.room_timeout_ms = std::stol(val);
else if (key == "private_key") cfg.private_key_path = val;
else if (key == "ds_count_width") cfg.ds_count_width = std::stoi(val);
else if (key == "encrypt") { if (!parse_bool(val, cfg.encrypt)) return bad("expected a boolean"); }
else if (key == "fork") { if (!parse_bool(val, cfg.fork)) return bad("expected a boolean"); }
else if (key == "dissonance") { if (!parse_bool(val, cfg.dissonance)) return bad("expected a boolean"); }
else if (key == "rooms") { if (!parse_bool(val, cfg.rooms)) return bad("expected a boolean"); }
else if (key == "log_level") {
if (val == "error") cfg.log_level = LogLevel::Error;
else if (val == "warn") cfg.log_level = LogLevel::Warn;
else if (val == "info") cfg.log_level = LogLevel::Info;
else if (val == "debug") cfg.log_level = LogLevel::Debug;
else return bad("expected error|warn|info|debug");
}
else return bad("unknown config key");
}
return true;
}
+30
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
#pragma once
//
// Runtime configuration, loaded from a simple `key = value` file (no dependency). CLI flags still
// win over the file. Unknown keys are an error so typos surface. See tachyon.conf.example.
//
#include "log.h"
#include <cstdint>
#include <string>
struct config {
uint16_t port = 7777;
bool encrypt = true;
bool fork = true;
bool dissonance = true;
bool rooms = true;
int ds_count_width = 2;
LogLevel log_level = LogLevel::Info;
std::string room_url = "https://match.recflare.net/tachyon";
long room_timeout_ms = 2000;
// Path to a file holding the RSA private key as .NET RSAKeyValue XML. Its public half is the
// key the client encrypts AT/VB/CKA/CIA/CPK to; the server decrypts those with this key.
std::string private_key_path;
};
// Load `path` over the defaults already in `cfg`. Returns false and sets `err` on any problem
// (missing file, bad line, unknown key, bad value).
bool load_config(const std::string& path, config& cfg, std::string& err);
+132
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@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
#include "crypto.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <array>
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ base64
std::vector<uint8_t> base64_decode(const std::string& in) {
static std::array<int8_t, 256> table = [] {
std::array<int8_t, 256> t{};
t.fill(-1);
const char* a = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++) t[(uint8_t) a[i]] = (int8_t) i;
return t;
}();
std::vector<uint8_t> out;
int val = 0, bits = 0;
for (char c : in) {
if (c == '=' || c == '\n' || c == '\r' || c == ' ' || c == '\t') continue;
int8_t d = table[(uint8_t) c];
if (d < 0) return {}; // malformed
val = (val << 6) | d;
bits += 6;
if (bits >= 8) {
bits -= 8;
out.push_back((uint8_t) ((val >> bits) & 0xFF));
}
}
return out;
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ RSA key
namespace {
// Extract the base64 body of <Tag>...</Tag> from the XML, then decode it to a BIGNUM.
BIGNUM* xml_bn(const std::string& xml, const char* tag) {
std::string open = std::string("<") + tag + ">";
std::string close = std::string("</") + tag + ">";
auto a = xml.find(open);
if (a == std::string::npos) return nullptr;
a += open.size();
auto b = xml.find(close, a);
if (b == std::string::npos) return nullptr;
auto bytes = base64_decode(xml.substr(a, b - a));
if (bytes.empty()) return nullptr;
return BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), (int) bytes.size(), nullptr);
}
}
rsa_key::~rsa_key() {
if (m_pkey) EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY*) m_pkey);
}
bool rsa_key::load_xml(const std::string& xml, std::string& err) {
// n, e, d are required; the CRT factors (p/q/dp/dq/iq) are optional but included when present.
BIGNUM* n = xml_bn(xml, "Modulus");
BIGNUM* e = xml_bn(xml, "Exponent");
BIGNUM* d = xml_bn(xml, "D");
BIGNUM* p = xml_bn(xml, "P");
BIGNUM* q = xml_bn(xml, "Q");
BIGNUM* dp = xml_bn(xml, "DP");
BIGNUM* dq = xml_bn(xml, "DQ");
BIGNUM* iq = xml_bn(xml, "InverseQ");
auto cleanup = [&] {
for (BIGNUM* b : {n, e, d, p, q, dp, dq, iq}) BN_free(b);
};
if (!n || !e || !d) { err = "RSAKeyValue XML missing Modulus/Exponent/D"; cleanup(); return false; }
OSSL_PARAM_BLD* bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d);
if (p && q) {
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, p);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, q);
if (dp) OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, dp);
if (dq) OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, dq);
if (iq) OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, iq);
}
OSSL_PARAM* params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
EVP_PKEY_CTX* ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(nullptr, "RSA", nullptr);
EVP_PKEY* pkey = nullptr;
bool ok = ctx && params &&
EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) > 0 &&
EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) > 0;
OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
if (ctx) EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
cleanup();
if (!ok || !pkey) { err = "failed to build RSA key from XML parameters"; return false; }
m_pkey = pkey;
return true;
}
int rsa_key::bits() const {
return m_pkey ? EVP_PKEY_get_bits((EVP_PKEY*) m_pkey) : 0;
}
std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> rsa_key::decrypt(const uint8_t* data, size_t len) const {
if (!m_pkey) return std::nullopt;
for (int padding : {RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING}) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX* ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new((EVP_PKEY*) m_pkey, nullptr);
if (!ctx) continue;
std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> result;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) > 0 &&
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding) > 0) {
size_t out_len = 0;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, nullptr, &out_len, data, len) > 0) {
std::vector<uint8_t> out(out_len);
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out.data(), &out_len, data, len) > 0) {
out.resize(out_len);
result = std::move(out);
}
}
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
if (result) return result;
}
return std::nullopt;
}
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#pragma once
//
// RSA private key loaded from .NET RSAKeyValue XML (RSA.ToXmlString), used to decrypt the client's
// wire blobs (AT/VB/CKA/CIA/CPK) which are RSA-encrypted to the matching public key. Wraps OpenSSL;
// no OpenSSL types leak into the header.
//
#include <cstdint>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
// Standard base64 decode (ignores whitespace). Empty result on malformed input.
std::vector<uint8_t> base64_decode(const std::string& in);
class rsa_key {
public:
rsa_key() = default;
~rsa_key();
rsa_key(const rsa_key&) = delete;
rsa_key& operator=(const rsa_key&) = delete;
// Build from .NET RSAKeyValue XML. Returns false and sets `err` on failure.
bool load_xml(const std::string& xml, std::string& err);
bool valid() const { return m_pkey != nullptr; }
int bits() const;
// RSA-decrypt one ciphertext block, trying PKCS#1 v1.5 then OAEP(SHA-1) (the two .NET defaults).
// Returns nullopt if neither padding yields a valid plaintext.
std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> decrypt(const uint8_t* data, size_t len) const;
private:
void* m_pkey = nullptr; // EVP_PKEY*
};
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#include "dissonance.h"
namespace dissonance {
const char* type_name(MsgType t) {
switch (t) {
case MsgType::RemoveClient: return "RemoveClient";
case MsgType::ClientState: return "ClientState";
case MsgType::VoiceData: return "VoiceData";
case MsgType::TextData: return "TextData";
case MsgType::HandshakeRequest: return "HandshakeRequest";
case MsgType::HandshakeResponse: return "HandshakeResponse";
case MsgType::ErrorWrongSession: return "ErrorWrongSession";
case MsgType::ServerRelayReliable: return "ServerRelayReliable";
case MsgType::ServerRelayUnreliable: return "ServerRelayUnreliable";
case MsgType::DeltaChannelState: return "DeltaChannelState";
case MsgType::HandshakeP2P: return "HandshakeP2P";
default: return "<unknown>";
}
}
static void write_count(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, int count, int width) {
if (width == 1) b.push_back((uint8_t) count);
else put_be_u16(b, (uint16_t) count);
}
std::vector<uint8_t> build_handshake_response(uint32_t session, uint16_t client_id, int count_width) {
std::vector<uint8_t> p;
put_be_u16(p, MAGIC);
p.push_back((uint8_t) MsgType::HandshakeResponse);
put_be_u32(p, session);
put_be_u16(p, client_id);
write_count(p, 0, count_width); // client list (others): empty
write_count(p, 0, count_width); // room list: empty
write_count(p, 0, count_width); // listeners list: empty
return p;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> build_remove_client(uint32_t session, uint16_t client_id) {
std::vector<uint8_t> p;
put_be_u16(p, MAGIC);
p.push_back((uint8_t) MsgType::RemoveClient);
put_be_u32(p, session);
put_be_u16(p, client_id);
return p;
}
} // namespace dissonance
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#pragma once
//
// The Dissonance session layer (Placeholder Software, stock v8.x).
// Dissonance rides inside an NGO NamedMessage:
//
// NamedMessage body = [u16 NamedMessageType LE][i32 length LE][Dissonance packet]
// NamedMessageType: 1 = DissonanceToServer (client->us), 2 = DissonanceToClient (us->client)
//
// Dissonance packet = [u16 magic 0x8bc7 BE][u8 MessageType][u32 session BE (most types)]...
// Dissonance's PacketWriter/Reader is BIG-ENDIAN.
//
// Field encodings INSIDE HandshakeResponse/ClientState (list widths, string encoding) are
// reconstructed from the protocol docs, not byte-verified; empty lists were proven sufficient
// for the basic multi-client case. See docs/client-agent-request-5.md.
//
#include <cstdint>
#include <cstddef>
#include <vector>
namespace dissonance {
inline constexpr uint16_t MAGIC = 0x8bc7;
inline constexpr uint16_t NAMED_TO_SERVER = 1;
inline constexpr uint16_t NAMED_TO_CLIENT = 2;
// Numbered as the Rec Room 2025 client (20250718.01) reads them. Its receive switch takes 1..11
// only - anything else is "Ignoring a packet with an unknown header". RemoveClient used to be 0
// here, so no client ever removed a departed player: the stale entry kept its old speech timing
// and a returning player's voice was discarded ("missed target activation time ... discarding")
// until the listener rejoined (2026-09-27). Case 10 is CheckSessionId + one roster call - the
// same shape as ClientState - and 11 is the peer-to-peer handshake.
enum class MsgType : uint8_t {
ClientState = 1, VoiceData = 2, TextData = 3,
HandshakeRequest = 4, HandshakeResponse = 5, ErrorWrongSession = 6,
ServerRelayReliable = 7, ServerRelayUnreliable = 8, DeltaChannelState = 9,
RemoveClient = 10, HandshakeP2P = 11
};
const char* type_name(MsgType t);
// ---- big-endian primitives (Dissonance PacketWriter/Reader) ----
inline void put_be_u16(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, uint16_t v) {
b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> 8));
b.push_back((uint8_t) v);
}
inline void put_be_u32(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, uint32_t v) {
b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> 24));
b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> 16));
b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> 8));
b.push_back((uint8_t) v);
}
inline uint16_t get_be_u16(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) {
uint16_t v = (uint16_t) ((d[p] << 8) | d[p + 1]);
p += 2;
return v;
}
inline uint32_t get_be_u32(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) {
uint32_t v = ((uint32_t) d[p] << 24) | ((uint32_t) d[p + 1] << 16) |
((uint32_t) d[p + 2] << 8) | (uint32_t) d[p + 3];
p += 4;
return v;
}
// Build a HandshakeResponse for a client joining an (initially empty) session: session id,
// client id, then three empty lists (clients, rooms, listeners). count_width: 1=byte else u16 BE.
std::vector<uint8_t> build_handshake_response(uint32_t session, uint16_t client_id, int count_width);
// Build a RemoveClient broadcast for a departing client.
std::vector<uint8_t> build_remove_client(uint32_t session, uint16_t client_id);
} // namespace dissonance
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// The single translation unit that compiles the official xxHash implementation, and the thin
// seed-0 wrappers the rest of Tachyon calls. Keeping XXH_IMPLEMENTATION here (and nowhere else)
// means the ~6k-line header is compiled exactly once.
#define XXH_IMPLEMENTATION
#define XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY
#include "xxhash.h"
#include "wire.h"
namespace wire {
uint32_t xxh32(const void* data, size_t len) { return (uint32_t) XXH32(data, len, 0); }
uint64_t xxh64(const void* data, size_t len) { return (uint64_t) XXH64(data, len, 0); }
}
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#pragma once
//
// Minimal leveled logging. Default level is Info (lifecycle: start, connect/disconnect, handshake
// completion, plus all warnings/errors) - quiet enough to run as a service. Debug adds the
// per-message / per-relay flood; Warn drops the lifecycle chatter for a near-silent service.
//
// The macros preserve printf format strings verbatim and self-gate, so a disabled level costs
// nothing but the comparison.
#include <cstdio>
enum class LogLevel { Error = 0, Warn = 1, Info = 2, Debug = 3 };
namespace tlog {
inline LogLevel level = LogLevel::Info;
inline bool enabled(LogLevel l) { return (int) l <= (int) level; }
}
#define LOGE(...) do { if (tlog::enabled(LogLevel::Error)) { printf(__VA_ARGS__); } } while (0)
#define LOGW(...) do { if (tlog::enabled(LogLevel::Warn)) { printf(__VA_ARGS__); } } while (0)
#define LOGI(...) do { if (tlog::enabled(LogLevel::Info)) { printf(__VA_ARGS__); } } while (0)
#define LOGD(...) do { if (tlog::enabled(LogLevel::Debug)) { printf(__VA_ARGS__); } } while (0)
+176
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// Tachyon voice server - C++ entry point.
//
// Mirrors the working C# reference-server invocation `--encrypt-layer --fork --dissonance`, which are the
// defaults here. The transport is LiteNetLibPP; the RecRoom trailing-marker encrypt layer is
// installed through net_manager's outbound/inbound hooks (the small vendored patch).
#include "tachyon_server.h"
#include "wire.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "room_lookup.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include <lnl/net_manager.h>
#include <curl/curl.h>
#include <atomic>
#include <chrono>
#include <csignal>
#include <cstdio>
#include <cstring>
#include <fstream>
#include <sstream>
#include <string>
#include <thread>
#include <vector>
namespace {
constexpr uint8_t PLAINTEXT_MARKER = 0x11;
constexpr uint8_t ENCRYPTED_MARKER = 0x2A;
// Set from a signal handler so the main loop exits cleanly (systemd sends SIGTERM to stop).
std::atomic<bool> g_stop{false};
void on_signal(int) { g_stop.store(true); }
bool parse_level(const std::string& s, LogLevel& out) {
if (s == "error") out = LogLevel::Error;
else if (s == "warn") out = LogLevel::Warn;
else if (s == "info") out = LogLevel::Info;
else if (s == "debug") out = LogLevel::Debug;
else return false;
return true;
}
}
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
setvbuf(stdout, nullptr, _IOLBF, 0); // line-buffered so logs appear live even when piped
config cfg; // defaults; a --config file loads over them; CLI wins
// Pass 1: load the config file first, so CLI flags can override it.
for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
std::string a = argv[i];
if (a == "--config" && i + 1 < argc) {
std::string err;
if (!load_config(argv[i + 1], cfg, err)) {
LOGE("[fatal] config: %s\n", err.c_str());
return 2;
}
}
}
tlog::level = cfg.log_level;
// Pass 2: CLI flags override the config.
for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
std::string a = argv[i];
if (a == "--config") { ++i; } // already handled
else if (a == "--port" && i + 1 < argc) cfg.port = (uint16_t) std::stoi(argv[++i]);
else if (a == "--no-encrypt") cfg.encrypt = false;
else if (a == "--no-fork") cfg.fork = false;
else if (a == "--no-dissonance") cfg.dissonance = false;
else if (a == "--no-rooms") cfg.rooms = false;
else if (a == "--room-url" && i + 1 < argc) cfg.room_url = argv[++i];
else if (a == "--room-timeout" && i + 1 < argc) cfg.room_timeout_ms = std::stol(argv[++i]);
else if (a == "--private-key" && i + 1 < argc) cfg.private_key_path = argv[++i];
else if (a == "--verbose" || a == "-v") cfg.log_level = tlog::level = LogLevel::Debug;
else if (a == "--quiet" || a == "-q") cfg.log_level = tlog::level = LogLevel::Warn;
else if (a == "--log-level" && i + 1 < argc) {
if (!parse_level(argv[++i], cfg.log_level)) {
LOGE("[fatal] unknown --log-level '%s' (use error|warn|info|debug)\n", argv[i]);
return 2;
}
tlog::level = cfg.log_level;
}
else if (a == "--ds-count-width" && i + 1 < argc) cfg.ds_count_width = std::stoi(argv[++i]);
else if (a == "--selftest") {
const char* hexfile = (i + 1 < argc && argv[i + 1][0] != '-') ? argv[++i] : nullptr;
tachyon_server st; st.fork = cfg.fork; st.ds_count_width = cfg.ds_count_width;
return st.run_selftest(hexfile); // offline, no network / no curl
}
else {
LOGE("[fatal] unknown argument '%s'\n", a.c_str());
return 2;
}
}
tachyon_server server;
server.fork = cfg.fork;
server.dissonance = cfg.dissonance;
server.ds_count_width = cfg.ds_count_width;
bool encrypt = cfg.encrypt;
// Load the RSA private key (decrypts the client's AT/VB/CKA/CIA/CPK blobs at handshake).
rsa_key key;
if (!cfg.private_key_path.empty()) {
std::ifstream kf(cfg.private_key_path);
if (!kf) { LOGE("[fatal] cannot read private key '%s'\n", cfg.private_key_path.c_str()); return 2; }
std::stringstream ss; ss << kf.rdbuf();
std::string err;
if (!key.load_xml(ss.str(), err)) { LOGE("[fatal] private key: %s\n", err.c_str()); return 2; }
server.priv_key = &key;
}
curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);
room_lookup rooms_lookup(cfg.room_url, cfg.room_timeout_ms);
if (cfg.rooms)
server.room_resolver = [&](const std::string& account) { return rooms_lookup.resolve(account); };
// Startup banner at Info (a --quiet service suppresses it); the id-space table is Debug detail.
LOGI("Tachyon voice server (C++ / LiteNetLibPP)\n");
LOGI(" LiteNetLib ProtocolId : 13\n");
LOGI(" listening : udp/%u\n", cfg.port);
LOGI(" fork header : %s\n", server.fork ? "ON (24-byte)" : "off (stock 16-byte)");
LOGI(" dissonance session : %s\n", server.dissonance ? "ON" : "off (parse+log only)");
if (cfg.rooms) LOGI(" room scoping : ON via %s (per-room session)\n", cfg.room_url.c_str());
else LOGI(" room scoping : off (single shared session)\n");
LOGI(" encrypt layer : %s\n", encrypt ? "ON, RecRoom trailing-marker (plaintext 0x11)" : "off");
if (server.priv_key) LOGI(" RSA private key : loaded (%d-bit) - decrypting client blobs\n", key.bits());
else LOGI(" RSA private key : none (client blobs left encrypted)\n");
LOGD(" message id space:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < tachyon_server::MESSAGE_ORDER.size(); i++)
LOGD(" [%zu] 0x%08x %s\n", i, wire::message_hash(tachyon_server::MESSAGE_ORDER[i]),
tachyon_server::MESSAGE_ORDER[i]);
lnl::net_manager manager(&server);
if (encrypt) {
// Server-side RecRoomClientEncryptLayer. Plaintext path only (key == null): append one
// 0x11 marker outbound, strip the trailing marker inbound. 0x2A (encrypted) is dropped -
// the Burst cipher is unidentified and the whole handshake runs key-null anyway.
manager.outbound_layer = [](const uint8_t* data, size_t length, std::vector<uint8_t>& out) -> size_t {
out.assign(data, data + length);
out.push_back(PLAINTEXT_MARKER);
return out.size();
};
manager.inbound_layer = [](uint8_t* data, size_t length) -> size_t {
if (length < 1) return 0;
uint8_t marker = data[length - 1];
if (marker == PLAINTEXT_MARKER) return length - 1;
// Dropped datagrams are Debug: a hostile peer could otherwise flood the log.
if (marker == ENCRYPTED_MARKER)
LOGD("[enc ] <- ENCRYPTED packet (marker 0x2A, len %zu) - cipher not implemented, dropping\n", length);
else
LOGD("[enc ] <- unknown marker 0x%02x (len %zu), dropping\n", marker, length);
return 0;
};
}
if (!manager.start(cfg.port)) {
LOGE("[fatal] failed to bind udp/%u\n", cfg.port);
return 1;
}
std::signal(SIGINT, on_signal);
std::signal(SIGTERM, on_signal);
while (manager.is_running() && !g_stop.load()) {
manager.poll_events();
server.pump_time_sync();
// Poll responsively while clients are connected (voice needs low relay latency), but back
// right off when the server is empty so an idle instance barely registers on the CPU.
std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(server.has_clients() ? 5 : 50));
}
LOGI("shutting down\n");
curl_global_cleanup();
return 0;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
#include "room_lookup.h"
#include "log.h"
#include <curl/curl.h>
#include <cctype>
#include <cstdlib>
namespace {
size_t write_cb(char* ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void* userdata) {
auto* out = static_cast<std::string*>(userdata);
out->append(ptr, size * nmemb);
return size * nmemb;
}
bool all_digits(const std::string& s) {
if (s.empty()) return false;
for (char c : s) if (!std::isdigit((unsigned char) c)) return false;
return true;
}
}
room_lookup::room_lookup(std::string base_url, long timeout_ms)
: m_base_url(std::move(base_url)), m_timeout_ms(timeout_ms) {}
std::optional<uint64_t> room_lookup::resolve(const std::string& account_id) {
// AccountId comes from an untrusted client. It must be a plain integer - anything else is
// rejected outright (also keeps it safe to splice into a URL).
if (!all_digits(account_id)) {
LOGW("[room] rejecting non-numeric AccountId '%s'\n", account_id.c_str());
return std::nullopt;
}
std::string url = m_base_url + "?id=" + account_id;
std::string body;
CURL* curl = curl_easy_init();
if (!curl) {
LOGW("[room] curl_easy_init failed\n");
return std::nullopt;
}
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, url.c_str());
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, write_cb);
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, &body);
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT_MS, m_timeout_ms);
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1L);
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_NOSIGNAL, 1L); // thread-safe timeout handling
CURLcode rc = curl_easy_perform(curl);
long http_code = 0;
curl_easy_getinfo(curl, CURLINFO_RESPONSE_CODE, &http_code);
curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
if (rc != CURLE_OK) {
LOGW("[room] lookup for %s failed: %s\n", account_id.c_str(), curl_easy_strerror(rc));
return std::nullopt;
}
if (http_code != 200) {
LOGW("[room] lookup for %s returned HTTP %ld\n", account_id.c_str(), http_code);
return std::nullopt;
}
// Body is a bare numeric instance id (possibly with trailing whitespace).
char* end = nullptr;
unsigned long long value = std::strtoull(body.c_str(), &end, 10);
if (end == body.c_str()) {
LOGW("[room] lookup for %s returned non-numeric body '%.32s'\n", account_id.c_str(), body.c_str());
return std::nullopt;
}
uint64_t room = (uint64_t) value;
LOGD("[room] AccountId %s -> room %llu\n", account_id.c_str(), (unsigned long long) room);
return room;
}
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#pragma once
//
// Resolves a Rec Room AccountId to its room instance id via recflare's matchmaking endpoint
// (GET <base_url>?id=<accountId> -> a bare numeric instance id). The lookup runs once per handshake
// on the connection path (synchronous, short timeout). It is deliberately NOT cached: a player's
// room changes when they switch rooms, and a reconnect after a switch must see the new room.
//
#include <cstdint>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
class room_lookup {
public:
// base_url e.g. "https://match.recflare.net/tachyon"; timeout in milliseconds.
room_lookup(std::string base_url, long timeout_ms);
// Returns the numeric instance id for an account, or nullopt on failure / non-numeric input.
// A returned 0 is passed through verbatim; the server decides what 0 means (isolate).
std::optional<uint64_t> resolve(const std::string& account_id);
private:
std::string m_base_url;
long m_timeout_ms;
};
@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
#include "tachyon_server.h"
#include "wire.h"
#include "dissonance.h"
#include "log.h"
#include <lnl/net_data_reader.h>
#include <cctype>
#include <cstdio>
#include <algorithm>
#include <string>
using lnl::DELIVERY_METHOD;
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ helpers
static std::string to_hex(const std::vector<uint8_t>& b) {
static const char* h = "0123456789abcdef";
std::string s;
s.reserve(b.size() * 2);
for (uint8_t c : b) { s.push_back(h[c >> 4]); s.push_back(h[c & 0xF]); }
return s;
}
// Printable-ASCII rendering with non-printables shown as '.', for eyeballing decrypted blobs.
static std::string to_ascii(const std::vector<uint8_t>& b) {
std::string s;
s.reserve(b.size());
for (uint8_t c : b) s.push_back((c >= 0x20 && c < 0x7f) ? (char) c : '.');
return s;
}
static std::string extract_json_string(const std::string& json, const char* field) {
std::string key = std::string("\"") + field + "\":\"";
auto i = json.find(key);
if (i == std::string::npos) return {};
i += key.size();
auto j = json.find('"', i);
if (j == std::string::npos) return {};
return json.substr(i, j - i);
}
tachyon_server::tachyon_server() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < MESSAGE_ORDER.size(); i++)
m_hashes[i] = wire::message_hash(MESSAGE_ORDER[i]);
m_start = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
}
int tachyon_server::index_of(const char* full_name) const {
for (size_t i = 0; i < MESSAGE_ORDER.size(); i++)
if (std::string(MESSAGE_ORDER[i]) == full_name) return (int) i;
return -1;
}
int tachyon_server::local_version(const char* full_name) const {
return std::string(full_name) == "Unity.Netcode.ConnectionApprovedMessage" ? 1 : 0;
}
int tachyon_server::current_tick() const {
auto secs = std::chrono::duration<double>(std::chrono::steady_clock::now() - m_start).count();
return (int) (secs * TICK_RATE);
}
tachyon_server::client_state* tachyon_server::find(lnl::net_peer* p) {
auto it = m_clients.find(p);
return it == m_clients.end() ? nullptr : &it->second;
}
uint32_t tachyon_server::session_for_room(uint64_t room) {
auto it = m_session_by_room.find(room);
if (it != m_session_by_room.end()) return it->second;
uint32_t s = (uint32_t) (std::chrono::steady_clock::now().time_since_epoch().count() & 0x7fffffff);
if (s == 0) s = 1;
m_session_by_room[room] = s;
return s;
}
// Resolve this client's room (via room_resolver) and pick the room's session. A failed lookup or a
// 0 result isolates the client in a unique room of its own, so it can neither hear nor be heard -
// fail-safe. With no resolver configured, everyone shares room 1 (the original single-room mode).
void tachyon_server::assign_room(client_state& st) {
if (st.room != 0) return; // already resolved
if (room_resolver && !st.account_id.empty()) {
auto r = room_resolver(st.account_id);
if (r && *r != 0) {
st.room = *r;
LOGI("[room] client %llu account=%s -> room %llu\n",
(unsigned long long) st.client_id, st.account_id.c_str(), (unsigned long long) st.room);
} else {
st.room = ++m_next_isolated_room;
LOGW("[room] client %llu account=%s has no room (lookup %s) - isolating\n",
(unsigned long long) st.client_id, st.account_id.c_str(), r ? "returned 0" : "failed");
}
} else {
st.room = 1; // single shared room
}
st.session = session_for_room(st.room);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ listener
void tachyon_server::on_connection_request(std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_connection_request>& request) {
// The community transport accepts unconditionally with an empty connect key.
LOGD("[lnl ] connect request -> accept\n");
request->accept();
}
void tachyon_server::on_peer_connected(std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_peer>& peer) {
client_state st;
st.peer = peer;
st.client_id = m_next_client_id++;
LOGI("[lnl ] peer connected -> clientId %llu\n", (unsigned long long) st.client_id);
m_clients[peer.get()] = std::move(st);
}
void tachyon_server::on_peer_disconnected(std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_peer>& peer, lnl::disconnect_info&) {
if (auto* st = find(peer.get())) {
if (dissonance) send_remove_client(*st);
LOGI("[lnl ] peer disconnected (clientId %llu)\n", (unsigned long long) st->client_id);
m_clients.erase(peer.get());
}
}
void tachyon_server::on_network_receive(std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_peer>& peer, lnl::net_data_reader& reader,
uint8_t, DELIVERY_METHOD) {
if (auto* st = find(peer.get()))
(void) handle_batch(*st, reader.data() + reader.position(), reader.remaining());
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ receive
bool tachyon_server::handle_batch(client_state& st, const uint8_t* data, size_t len) {
size_t min_header = fork ? 24 : (size_t) wire::BATCH_HEADER_SIZE;
if (len < min_header) {
LOGW("[warn] runt packet (%zu bytes, need %zu), ignoring\n", len, min_header);
return false;
}
size_t p = 0;
uint16_t magic;
uint32_t count;
int32_t size;
uint64_t hash;
size_t header_size;
if (fork) {
// 24-byte header: Magic u16 @0, pad @2, BatchSize u32 @4, BatchHash u64 @8,
// BatchCount u16 @16, pad @18..23. Hash covers [24:end].
magic = wire::get_u16(data, p);
wire::get_u16(data, p); // padding [2:4]
size = wire::get_i32(data, p); // [4:8]
hash = wire::get_u64(data, p); // [8:16]
count = wire::get_u16(data, p); // BatchCount [16:18]
p += 6; // padding [18:24]
header_size = 24;
} else {
magic = wire::get_u16(data, p);
count = wire::get_u16(data, p);
size = wire::get_i32(data, p);
hash = wire::get_u64(data, p);
header_size = wire::BATCH_HEADER_SIZE;
}
if (magic != wire::BATCH_MAGIC) {
LOGW("[warn] bad batch magic 0x%04x (want 0x%04x) - wrong framing or truncated\n",
magic, wire::BATCH_MAGIC);
return false;
}
uint64_t computed = wire::hash64(data, header_size, len - header_size);
if (computed != hash) {
// A mismatch means corrupt or hostile framing - drop, do not parse further.
LOGW("[warn] batch hash mismatch: got 0x%016llx computed 0x%016llx (len %zu, declared %d) - dropping\n",
(unsigned long long) hash, (unsigned long long) computed, len, size);
return false;
}
LOGD("[recv] batch count=%u size=%d len=%zu hashOk=1\n", count, size, len);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < count && p < len; i++) {
uint32_t type, msg_size;
if (!wire::try_get_packed_u32(data, p, len, type) ||
!wire::try_get_packed_u32(data, p, len, msg_size)) {
LOGW("[warn] truncated message header in batch (message %u)\n", i);
return false;
}
if (msg_size > len - p) {
LOGW("[warn] message %u claims %u bytes, only %zu left\n", i, msg_size, len - p);
return false;
}
handle_message(st, type, data, p, msg_size);
p += msg_size;
}
return true;
}
void tachyon_server::handle_message(client_state& st, uint32_t type, const uint8_t* data,
size_t off, size_t len) {
// Before approval the client uses its own local ordering, which always puts ConnectionApproved
// at 0 and ConnectionRequest at 1 regardless of the trimmed message set.
std::string name;
if (st.approved)
name = type < MESSAGE_ORDER.size() ? MESSAGE_ORDER[type] : "<unknown>";
else if (type == 0) name = "Unity.Netcode.ConnectionApprovedMessage";
else if (type == 1) name = "Unity.Netcode.ConnectionRequestMessage";
else name = "<pre-approval unknown>";
LOGD("[recv] [%u] %s (%zu bytes)\n", type, name.c_str(), len);
if (name == "Unity.Netcode.ConnectionRequestMessage")
handle_connection_request(st, data, off, len);
else if (name == "Unity.Netcode.NamedMessage")
handle_named_message(st, data, off, len);
else if (name == "Unity.Netcode.ServerLogMessage")
LOGD("[clog] client %llu sent a ServerLogMessage (%zu bytes)\n",
(unsigned long long) st.client_id, len);
else
LOGD("[recv] %s from client %llu (%zu bytes)\n", name.c_str(),
(unsigned long long) st.client_id, len);
}
void tachyon_server::handle_connection_request(client_state& st, const uint8_t* data,
size_t off, size_t len) {
size_t p = off;
size_t end = off + len;
int n;
if (!wire::try_get_packed_i32(data, p, end, n) || n < 0 || (size_t) n > end - p) {
// Each entry is >=5 bytes, so a count exceeding the remaining bytes is malformed/hostile.
LOGW("[warn] ConnectionRequest from client %llu: bad version count\n",
(unsigned long long) st.client_id);
return;
}
LOGD("[hand] ConnectionRequest from client %llu: %d message versions advertised\n",
(unsigned long long) st.client_id, n);
st.client_version_list.clear();
st.remote_versions.clear();
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
uint32_t h;
int v;
if (!wire::try_get_u32(data, p, end, h) || !wire::try_get_packed_i32(data, p, end, v)) {
LOGW("[warn] truncated version entry %d from client %llu\n", i, (unsigned long long) st.client_id);
return;
}
st.remote_versions[h] = v;
st.client_version_list.emplace_back(h, v);
}
// ConnectionApproval is off in the trimmed build, so only ConfigHash follows.
if (p + 8 <= off + len) wire::get_u64(data, p); // ConfigHash (skip)
// Tachyon connection data: a length-prefixed byte[] holding the handshake JSON.
if (p + 4 <= off + len) {
int conn_len = wire::get_i32(data, p);
if (conn_len > 0 && p + (size_t) conn_len <= off + len) {
std::string json((const char*) (data + p), (size_t) conn_len);
st.account_id = extract_json_string(json, "AI");
std::string cpk = extract_json_string(json, "CPK");
LOGD("[hand] Tachyon ConnectionData: %d bytes JSON, CPK=%zu b64chars, AccountId=%s\n",
conn_len, cpk.size(), st.account_id.empty() ? "?" : st.account_id.c_str());
// Full value of each key, debug-only (these include live auth tokens - don't share).
// For the RSA-encrypted blobs, decrypt with the private key when one is loaded.
int key_bytes = (priv_key && priv_key->valid()) ? priv_key->bits() / 8 : 0;
for (const char* key : {"AI", "AT", "VB", "CKA", "CIA", "CPK"}) {
std::string v = extract_json_string(json, key);
LOGD("[hand] %-3s len=%-4zu %s\n", key, v.size(), v.c_str());
if (key_bytes == 0 || std::string(key) == "AI") continue;
auto raw = base64_decode(v);
if ((int) raw.size() == key_bytes) {
// Exactly one RSA block -> decrypt directly.
auto dec = priv_key->decrypt(raw.data(), raw.size());
if (dec) LOGD("[hand] %s -> %zu bytes: %s | \"%s\"\n", key, dec->size(),
to_hex(*dec).c_str(), to_ascii(*dec).c_str());
else LOGD("[hand] %s decrypt FAILED (wrong key or padding)\n", key);
} else {
LOGD("[hand] %s = %zu bytes, not one %d-bit RSA block (hybrid/chunked)\n",
key, raw.size(), priv_key->bits());
}
}
}
}
assign_room(st); // AccountId -> room + session (recflare), before the Dissonance handshake
send_connection_approved(st);
st.approved = true;
LOGI("[hand] sent ConnectionApproved to client %llu\n", (unsigned long long) st.client_id);
}
// NamedMessage body = [u16 NamedMessageType LE][i32 length LE][Dissonance packet].
void tachyon_server::handle_named_message(client_state& st, const uint8_t* data, size_t off, size_t len) {
if (len < 6) { LOGW("[warn] runt NamedMessage (%zu bytes)\n", len); return; }
size_t p = off;
uint16_t named_type = wire::get_u16(data, p);
int diss_len = wire::get_i32(data, p);
if (diss_len < 0 || p + (size_t) diss_len > off + len) {
LOGW("[warn] NamedMessage nType=%u bad length %d\n", named_type, diss_len);
return;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> diss(data + p, data + p + diss_len);
if (named_type == dissonance::NAMED_TO_SERVER)
handle_dissonance_to_server(st, diss);
else
LOGW("[warn] NamedMessage from client %llu with nType=%u (expected 1=ToServer)\n",
(unsigned long long) st.client_id, named_type);
}
void tachyon_server::handle_dissonance_to_server(client_state& st, const std::vector<uint8_t>& diss) {
if (diss.size() < 3) return;
size_t p = 0;
uint16_t magic = dissonance::get_be_u16(diss.data(), p);
if (magic != dissonance::MAGIC) {
LOGW("[warn] Dissonance magic 0x%04x != 0x8bc7\n", magic);
return;
}
auto type = (dissonance::MsgType) diss[p++];
LOGD("[diss] client %llu: %s (%zu bytes)\n", (unsigned long long) st.client_id,
dissonance::type_name(type), diss.size());
if (!dissonance) return;
switch (type) {
case dissonance::MsgType::HandshakeRequest:
send_handshake_response(st);
break;
case dissonance::MsgType::ClientState: {
// Roster discovery: remember this client's state, tell everyone else about it, and
// replay everyone else's state to this client so both directions learn peers.
st.last_client_state = diss;
int peers = 0, replayed = 0;
for (auto& [ptr, other] : m_clients) {
if (!other.approved || other.client_id == st.client_id) continue;
if (other.room != st.room) continue; // room-scoped roster: no cross-room discovery
send_dissonance_to_client(other, diss, DELIVERY_METHOD::RELIABLE_ORDERED);
if (!other.last_client_state.empty()) {
send_dissonance_to_client(st, other.last_client_state, DELIVERY_METHOD::RELIABLE_ORDERED);
replayed++;
}
peers++;
}
LOGD("[diss] ClientState from ds#%u: relayed to %d peer(s), replayed %d peer state(s) back\n",
st.ds_client_id, peers, replayed);
break;
}
case dissonance::MsgType::ServerRelayReliable:
handle_server_relay(st, diss, DELIVERY_METHOD::RELIABLE_ORDERED);
break;
case dissonance::MsgType::ServerRelayUnreliable:
handle_server_relay(st, diss, DELIVERY_METHOD::UNRELIABLE);
break;
default:
relay_dissonance(st, diss, DELIVERY_METHOD::RELIABLE_ORDERED);
break;
}
}
// ServerRelay = magic(2) type(1) session(4) recipientCount(1) recipientIds(u16 BE each)
// innerLength(u16 BE) innerPacket. Deliver the inner packet to each named
// Dissonance client id - NOT forward the wrapper.
void tachyon_server::handle_server_relay(client_state& st, const std::vector<uint8_t>& diss,
DELIVERY_METHOD delivery) {
const uint8_t* d = diss.data();
size_t p = 7; // skip magic(2) + type(1) + session(4)
if (p >= diss.size()) return;
int rcount = d[p++];
std::vector<uint16_t> recipients;
for (int i = 0; i < rcount && p + 2 <= diss.size(); i++)
recipients.push_back(dissonance::get_be_u16(d, p));
if (p + 2 > diss.size()) return;
int inner_len = dissonance::get_be_u16(d, p);
if (inner_len <= 0 || p + (size_t) inner_len > diss.size()) return;
std::vector<uint8_t> inner(d + p, d + p + inner_len);
int delivered = 0, cross_room = 0;
for (uint16_t id : recipients) {
// Deliver to the current owner of the id, never a superseded/stale peer sharing it.
auto owner = m_ds_owner.find(id);
if (owner == m_ds_owner.end()) continue;
auto* target = find(owner->second);
if (!target || !target->approved) continue;
if (target->room != st.room) { cross_room++; continue; } // enforce room isolation
send_dissonance_to_client(*target, inner, delivery);
delivered++;
}
if (cross_room)
LOGW("[room] dropped %d cross-room recipient(s) from account=%s (room %llu)\n",
cross_room, st.account_id.empty() ? "?" : st.account_id.c_str(), (unsigned long long) st.room);
if (tlog::enabled(LogLevel::Debug)) {
auto inner_type = inner.size() >= 3 ? (dissonance::MsgType) inner[2] : (dissonance::MsgType) 255;
// Show the recipient ids and the inner VoiceData sender id (u16 BE right after
// magic+type+session, offset 7) so they can be compared against AccountIds directly.
std::string rlist;
for (uint16_t r : recipients) rlist += (rlist.empty() ? "" : ",") + std::to_string(r);
int inner_sender = inner.size() >= 9 ? ((inner[7] << 8) | inner[8]) : -1;
LOGD("[relay] from ds#%u (account=%s) recipients=[%s] inner=%s senderId=%d innerLen=%d delivered=%d/%zu\n",
st.ds_client_id, st.account_id.empty() ? "?" : st.account_id.c_str(),
rlist.c_str(), dissonance::type_name(inner_type), inner_sender, inner_len,
delivered, recipients.size());
}
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ send
void tachyon_server::send_remove_client(client_state& leaving) {
if (leaving.ds_client_id == 0 || leaving.session == 0) return;
// Only the current owner's disconnect removes the id. A superseded ghost (reconnect-before-
// timeout, its id reused by a newer peer) stays silent.
auto owner = m_ds_owner.find(leaving.ds_client_id);
if (owner == m_ds_owner.end() || owner->second != leaving.peer.get()) return;
m_ds_owner.erase(owner);
auto pkt = dissonance::build_remove_client(leaving.session, leaving.ds_client_id);
for (auto& [ptr, other] : m_clients) {
if (other.approved && other.client_id != leaving.client_id && other.room == leaving.room)
send_dissonance_to_client(other, pkt, DELIVERY_METHOD::RELIABLE_ORDERED);
}
}
void tachyon_server::send_handshake_response(client_state& st) {
if (st.session == 0) assign_room(st); // ensure room + per-room session are resolved
if (st.ds_client_id == 0) {
// Reuse this player's id across reconnects so a dropped-and-rejoined client does not leave a
// ghost id in the other clients' rosters (the churn that breaks addressing).
if (!st.account_id.empty()) {
auto it = m_ds_id_by_account.find(st.account_id);
if (it != m_ds_id_by_account.end()) st.ds_client_id = it->second;
}
if (st.ds_client_id == 0) {
st.ds_client_id = m_next_ds_client_id++;
if (!st.account_id.empty()) m_ds_id_by_account[st.account_id] = st.ds_client_id;
}
}
m_ds_owner[st.ds_client_id] = st.peer.get(); // newest handshake owns the id
auto resp = dissonance::build_handshake_response(st.session, st.ds_client_id, ds_count_width);
send_dissonance_to_client(st, resp, DELIVERY_METHOD::RELIABLE_ORDERED);
LOGI("[diss] -> client %llu: HandshakeResponse session=%u assignedId=%u account=%s room=%llu (%zu bytes)\n",
(unsigned long long) st.client_id, st.session, st.ds_client_id,
st.account_id.empty() ? "?" : st.account_id.c_str(), (unsigned long long) st.room, resp.size());
}
void tachyon_server::relay_dissonance(client_state& st, const std::vector<uint8_t>& diss,
DELIVERY_METHOD delivery) {
for (auto& [ptr, other] : m_clients) {
if (other.approved && other.client_id != st.client_id && other.room == st.room)
send_dissonance_to_client(other, diss, delivery);
}
}
void tachyon_server::send_dissonance_to_client(client_state& st, const std::vector<uint8_t>& diss,
DELIVERY_METHOD delivery) {
auto& body = m_named_scratch; // reused; distinct from m_wire_scratch used by send_message
body.clear();
wire::put_u16(body, dissonance::NAMED_TO_CLIENT); // u16 LE
wire::put_i32(body, (int32_t) diss.size()); // i32 LE (WriteValueSafe prefix)
body.insert(body.end(), diss.begin(), diss.end());
send_message(st, "Unity.Netcode.NamedMessage", body, delivery);
}
void tachyon_server::send_connection_approved(client_state& st) {
std::vector<uint8_t> body;
// Version header first. Echo the client's exact list (verbatim) so SetServerMessageOrder
// reproduces its own mapping.
if (!st.client_version_list.empty()) {
wire::put_packed_i32(body, (int32_t) st.client_version_list.size());
for (auto& [h, v] : st.client_version_list) {
wire::put_u32(body, h);
wire::put_packed_i32(body, v);
}
} else {
wire::put_packed_i32(body, (int32_t) MESSAGE_ORDER.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < MESSAGE_ORDER.size(); i++) {
wire::put_u32(body, m_hashes[i]);
wire::put_packed_i32(body, local_version(MESSAGE_ORDER[i]));
}
}
wire::put_packed(body, st.client_id); // OwnerClientId (bitpacked ulong)
wire::put_packed_i32(body, current_tick()); // NetworkTick (bitpacked int)
// Rec Room's ConnectionApproved carries the Tachyon approval payload as a length-prefixed
// byte[]. Deserialize does no validation; "DR":"Carrot" is required-present. KT is omitted
// (RSA to an opaque CPK we cannot mint), leaving the client key-null -> plaintext voice.
static const char* json = "{\"DR\":\"Carrot\"}";
size_t json_len = 15; // strlen({"DR":"Carrot"})
wire::put_i32(body, (int32_t) json_len);
body.insert(body.end(), json, json + json_len);
LOGD("[hand] approval payload: %s (%zu bytes; KT omitted)\n", json, json_len);
send_message(st, "Unity.Netcode.ConnectionApprovedMessage", body, DELIVERY_METHOD::RELIABLE_ORDERED);
}
void tachyon_server::send_time_sync(client_state& st, int tick) {
std::vector<uint8_t> body;
wire::put_packed_i32(body, tick);
send_message(st, "Unity.Netcode.TimeSyncMessage", body, DELIVERY_METHOD::UNRELIABLE);
}
// Fill the batch header in place (identical bytes to the old put_u16/put_i32/put_u64 sequence).
// Fork: Magic u16 @0, pad @2, BatchSize u32 @4, BatchHash u64 @8, BatchCount u16 @16, pad @18..23.
// Stock: Magic u16 @0, BatchCount u16 @2, BatchSize u32 @4, BatchHash u64 @8.
void tachyon_server::write_batch_header(uint8_t* d, size_t size, uint64_t hash) const {
d[0] = (uint8_t) wire::BATCH_MAGIC;
d[1] = (uint8_t) (wire::BATCH_MAGIC >> 8);
d[2] = fork ? 0 : 1; // fork: pad; stock: BatchCount low byte
d[3] = 0;
d[4] = (uint8_t) size; d[5] = (uint8_t) (size >> 8);
d[6] = (uint8_t) (size >> 16); d[7] = (uint8_t) (size >> 24);
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) d[8 + i] = (uint8_t) (hash >> (i * 8));
if (fork) { d[16] = 1; d[17] = 0; } // BatchCount (stock already wrote it at [2:4])
}
void tachyon_server::build_batch(const char* full_name, const std::vector<uint8_t>& body,
std::vector<uint8_t>& out) {
uint32_t type_id = (uint32_t) index_of(full_name);
int hdr = fork ? 24 : wire::BATCH_HEADER_SIZE;
out.assign(hdr, 0); // header placeholder (zeroed)
wire::put_packed(out, type_id);
wire::put_packed(out, (uint32_t) body.size());
out.insert(out.end(), body.begin(), body.end());
if (!fork)
while (out.size() % 8 != 0) out.push_back(0); // stock NGO pads to 8; fork does not
uint64_t hash = wire::hash64(out.data(), hdr, out.size() - hdr);
write_batch_header(out.data(), out.size(), hash);
}
void tachyon_server::send_message(client_state& st, const char* full_name,
const std::vector<uint8_t>& body, DELIVERY_METHOD delivery) {
build_batch(full_name, body, m_wire_scratch); // reused buffer - no per-packet allocation
st.peer->send(m_wire_scratch, delivery);
LOGD("[send] %s -> client %llu (%zu bytes on wire)\n", full_name,
(unsigned long long) st.client_id, m_wire_scratch.size());
}
void tachyon_server::pump_time_sync() {
int tick = current_tick();
if (tick != m_last_tick && tick % TICK_RATE == 0) {
m_last_tick = tick;
for (auto& [ptr, c] : m_clients)
if (c.approved) send_time_sync(c, tick);
}
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------ self-test
namespace {
int g_fails = 0;
void check(const char* name, bool ok) {
printf("[selftest] %-42s %s\n", name, ok ? "PASS" : "FAIL");
if (!ok) g_fails++;
}
// Parse a hex-dump file (whitespace-insensitive) into bytes. Returns false if not readable.
bool read_hex_file(const char* path, std::vector<uint8_t>& out) {
FILE* f = fopen(path, "rb");
if (!f) return false;
std::string hex;
int c;
while ((c = fgetc(f)) != EOF)
if (std::isxdigit(c)) hex.push_back((char) c);
fclose(f);
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < hex.size(); i += 2)
out.push_back((uint8_t) std::stoi(hex.substr(i, 2), nullptr, 16));
return true;
}
}
int tachyon_server::run_selftest(const char* hexfile) {
g_fails = 0;
LogLevel saved_level = tlog::level;
tlog::level = LogLevel::Error; // silence the expected warnings from the negative tests
printf("[selftest] Tachyon wire self-test\n");
// 1. Bit-packing round-trips (BytePacker/ByteUnpacker), incl. the 5/9-byte escape boundaries.
{
bool ok = true;
for (uint32_t v : {0u, 1u, 7u, 8u, 255u, 256u, 65535u, 0x1FFFFFFFu, 0x20000000u, 0xFFFFFFFFu}) {
std::vector<uint8_t> b; size_t p = 0;
wire::put_packed(b, v);
ok &= (wire::get_packed_u32(b.data(), p) == v) && (p == b.size());
}
for (int32_t v : {0, 1, -1, 63, -64, 1000, -1000, 2000000000, -2000000000}) {
std::vector<uint8_t> b; size_t p = 0;
wire::put_packed_i32(b, v);
ok &= (wire::get_packed_i32(b.data(), p) == v) && (p == b.size());
}
for (uint64_t v : {0ull, 1ull, 15ull, 16ull, 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFull, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFull}) {
std::vector<uint8_t> b; size_t p = 0;
wire::put_packed(b, v);
ok &= (wire::get_packed_u64(b.data(), p) == v) && (p == b.size());
}
check("bit-packing round-trip (u32/i32/u64)", ok);
}
// 2. Message-id hashes match the values proven against the real client.
{
static const std::pair<const char*, uint32_t> known[] = {
{"Unity.Netcode.ConnectionApprovedMessage", 0xa5e29a7d},
{"Unity.Netcode.ConnectionRequestMessage", 0xb31736b2},
{"Unity.Netcode.NamedMessage", 0x978922a6},
{"Unity.Netcode.TimeSyncMessage", 0xc6887f42},
};
bool ok = true;
for (auto& [name, h] : known) ok &= (wire::message_hash(name) == h);
check("message-id hashes match the client", ok);
}
// 3. Batch build <-> parse round-trip, both fork (24-byte) and stock (16-byte) headers. Build a
// TimeSync message, re-parse the header/body by hand, and confirm handle_batch accepts it;
// then corrupt a byte and confirm handle_batch rejects it (hash mismatch).
bool saved_fork = fork;
for (bool test_fork : {true, false}) {
fork = test_fork;
std::vector<uint8_t> body;
wire::put_packed_i32(body, 12345); // a TimeSync-shaped body
std::vector<uint8_t> batch;
build_batch("Unity.Netcode.TimeSyncMessage", body, batch);
// Manual re-parse: header, then packed type + packed size + body.
size_t hdr = fork ? 24 : 16, p = 0;
uint16_t magic = wire::get_u16(batch.data(), p);
uint64_t declared = 0;
{ size_t hp = 8; declared = wire::get_u64(batch.data(), hp); }
uint64_t recomputed = wire::hash64(batch.data(), hdr, batch.size() - hdr);
p = hdr;
uint32_t type = wire::get_packed_u32(batch.data(), p);
uint32_t sz = wire::get_packed_u32(batch.data(), p);
bool body_ok = (sz == body.size()) &&
std::equal(body.begin(), body.end(), batch.begin() + p);
bool ok = (magic == wire::BATCH_MAGIC) && (declared == recomputed) &&
(type == (uint32_t) index_of("Unity.Netcode.TimeSyncMessage")) && body_ok;
check(test_fork ? "batch round-trip (fork header)" : "batch round-trip (stock header)", ok);
client_state fake;
fake.approved = true; // no peer: TimeSync dispatch does not send
check(test_fork ? "handle_batch accepts valid (fork)" : "handle_batch accepts valid (stock)",
handle_batch(fake, batch.data(), batch.size()));
batch[batch.size() - 1] ^= 0xFF; // corrupt the body -> hash must fail
check(test_fork ? "handle_batch rejects corrupt (fork)" : "handle_batch rejects corrupt (stock)",
!handle_batch(fake, batch.data(), batch.size()));
}
fork = saved_fork;
// 4. Dissonance big-endian primitives + HandshakeResponse structure.
{
std::vector<uint8_t> b;
dissonance::put_be_u16(b, 0x8bc7);
dissonance::put_be_u32(b, 0x11223344);
size_t p = 0;
bool ok = (dissonance::get_be_u16(b.data(), p) == 0x8bc7) &&
(dissonance::get_be_u32(b.data(), p) == 0x11223344) && (p == b.size());
auto resp = dissonance::build_handshake_response(0xdeadbeef, 42, 2);
ok &= (resp.size() >= 9) && (resp[0] == 0x8b) && (resp[1] == 0xc7) &&
(resp[2] == (uint8_t) dissonance::MsgType::HandshakeResponse);
check("Dissonance BE primitives + HandshakeResponse", ok);
}
// 5. Optional: feed a captured NGO batch through the parser.
if (hexfile) {
std::vector<uint8_t> cap;
if (!read_hex_file(hexfile, cap)) {
printf("[selftest] could not read hexfile '%s'\n", hexfile);
g_fails++;
} else {
client_state fake;
fake.approved = true;
printf("[selftest] parsing captured %zu-byte batch from %s\n", cap.size(), hexfile);
check("captured batch parses (hash ok)", handle_batch(fake, cap.data(), cap.size()));
}
}
printf("[selftest] %s (%d failure%s)\n", g_fails == 0 ? "ALL PASS" : "FAILURES",
g_fails, g_fails == 1 ? "" : "s");
tlog::level = saved_level;
return g_fails == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
+132
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#pragma once
//
// Tachyon voice-relay server: the NGO 1.x + Dissonance session logic, sitting on top of
// LiteNetLibPP (the LiteNetLib transport) plus the
// RecRoom 0x11 marker layer installed on the net_manager.
//
#include "crypto.h"
#include <lnl/net_event_listener.h>
#include <lnl/net_manager.h>
#include <array>
#include <cstdint>
#include <chrono>
#include <functional>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
#include <unordered_map>
#include <vector>
class tachyon_server : public lnl::net_event_listener {
public:
// Ordinal sort by FullName with Connection{Approved,Request} pulled to the front, matching
// NGO's NetworkMessageManager.PrioritizeMessageOrder. Sending this order in ConnectionApproved
// defines the message-id space for the rest of the session.
static constexpr std::array<const char*, 7> MESSAGE_ORDER = {
"Unity.Netcode.ConnectionApprovedMessage",
"Unity.Netcode.ConnectionRequestMessage",
"Unity.Netcode.DisconnectReasonMessage",
"Unity.Netcode.NamedMessage",
"Unity.Netcode.ServerLogMessage",
"Unity.Netcode.TimeSyncMessage",
"Unity.Netcode.UnnamedMessage",
};
static constexpr int TICK_RATE = 30;
bool fork = true; // Rec Room's 24-byte forked batch header
bool dissonance = true; // act as the Dissonance session server (answer handshake, relay)
int ds_count_width = 2; // list-count width in HandshakeResponse (2=u16, 1=byte) - unverified
tachyon_server();
int current_tick() const;
// Called once per loop iteration to emit TimeSync to approved clients on tick boundaries.
void pump_time_sync();
// Offline self-test: exercises the wire logic (packing, batch build<->parse, hashes) with no
// network. If hexfile is non-null it is also fed through the batch parser. Returns 0 on success.
int run_selftest(const char* hexfile);
// True while any client is connected. The main loop polls fast when busy and backs off when
// idle, so an empty server costs almost no CPU.
bool has_clients() const { return !m_clients.empty(); }
// Optional room resolver: AccountId -> room instance id. When set, the server scopes the
// Dissonance session/roster/relay per room (recflare enforcement). When unset, every client
// shares one session (the original single-room behaviour).
std::function<std::optional<uint64_t>(const std::string& account_id)> room_resolver;
// RSA private key matching the public key the client encrypts its wire blobs to. When set, the
// server decrypts AT/VB/CKA/CIA/CPK at handshake (logged at debug). Not owned.
const rsa_key* priv_key = nullptr;
protected:
void on_connection_request(std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_connection_request>& request) override;
void on_peer_connected(std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_peer>& peer) override;
void on_peer_disconnected(std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_peer>& peer, lnl::disconnect_info& info) override;
void on_network_receive(std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_peer>& peer, lnl::net_data_reader& reader,
uint8_t channel, lnl::DELIVERY_METHOD delivery) override;
private:
struct client_state {
std::shared_ptr<lnl::net_peer> peer;
uint64_t client_id = 0;
bool approved = false;
std::unordered_map<uint32_t, int> remote_versions;
std::vector<std::pair<uint32_t, int>> client_version_list; // wire order, echoed verbatim
uint16_t ds_client_id = 0;
std::vector<uint8_t> last_client_state; // replayed to newcomers for roster
std::string account_id; // Tachyon "AI" - stable across reconnects
uint64_t room = 0; // room instance id (recflare); 0 = unresolved
uint32_t session = 0; // Dissonance session id for this client's room
};
std::unordered_map<lnl::net_peer*, client_state> m_clients;
std::unordered_map<std::string, uint16_t> m_ds_id_by_account;
// The peer currently OWNING each Dissonance id. A reconnect-before-timeout reuses an id while
// the old peer is still live; the newest handshake becomes owner, so the old peer's later
// disconnect must not broadcast RemoveClient for an id now held by someone else.
std::unordered_map<uint16_t, lnl::net_peer*> m_ds_owner;
std::array<uint32_t, 7> m_hashes{};
std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point m_start;
int m_last_tick = -1;
uint64_t m_next_client_id = 1;
uint16_t m_next_ds_client_id = 1;
// One Dissonance session id per room, so a cross-room packet is dropped by the client's own
// Dissonance layer (wrong session) as well as by our scoped relay.
std::unordered_map<uint64_t, uint32_t> m_session_by_room;
uint64_t m_next_isolated_room = 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL; // unique rooms for unresolved clients
client_state* find(lnl::net_peer* p);
// Determine and cache this client's room + session (via room_resolver); isolates on failure/0.
void assign_room(client_state& st);
uint32_t session_for_room(uint64_t room);
// Reusable scratch buffers for the send path (all sends happen on the one poll_events thread),
// so relaying a voice packet does not churn the heap.
std::vector<uint8_t> m_wire_scratch;
std::vector<uint8_t> m_named_scratch;
void write_batch_header(uint8_t* d, size_t size, uint64_t hash) const;
// Build the full on-wire batch for one message into `out` (header + packed type/size + body).
void build_batch(const char* full_name, const std::vector<uint8_t>& body, std::vector<uint8_t>& out);
// receive
bool handle_batch(client_state& st, const uint8_t* data, size_t len); // true = parsed, hash ok
void handle_message(client_state& st, uint32_t type, const uint8_t* data, size_t off, size_t len);
void handle_connection_request(client_state& st, const uint8_t* data, size_t off, size_t len);
void handle_named_message(client_state& st, const uint8_t* data, size_t off, size_t len);
void handle_dissonance_to_server(client_state& st, const std::vector<uint8_t>& diss);
void handle_server_relay(client_state& st, const std::vector<uint8_t>& diss, lnl::DELIVERY_METHOD delivery);
// send
void send_connection_approved(client_state& st);
void send_handshake_response(client_state& st);
void send_remove_client(client_state& leaving);
void relay_dissonance(client_state& st, const std::vector<uint8_t>& diss, lnl::DELIVERY_METHOD delivery);
void send_dissonance_to_client(client_state& st, const std::vector<uint8_t>& diss, lnl::DELIVERY_METHOD delivery);
void send_time_sync(client_state& st, int tick);
void send_message(client_state& st, const char* full_name, const std::vector<uint8_t>& body,
lnl::DELIVERY_METHOD delivery);
int local_version(const char* full_name) const;
int index_of(const char* full_name) const;
};
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#pragma once
//
// NGO 1.x wire primitives (re-derived from the
// MIT-licensed com.unity.netcode.gameobjects sources, tag ngo/1.14.1).
//
// batch = [u16 magic=0x1160][u16 count][i32 size][u64 hash] then messages (stock layout);
// the Rec Room fork uses a 24-byte header instead (see tachyon_server.cpp).
// message = [bitpacked uint type][bitpacked uint size][payload]
// ints are LITTLE-ENDIAN; signed values are ZigZag-encoded before bit-packing.
//
#include <cstdint>
#include <cstddef>
#include <vector>
#include <string>
namespace wire {
inline constexpr uint16_t BATCH_MAGIC = 0x1160;
inline constexpr int BATCH_HEADER_SIZE = 16;
// hashing wrappers over the official single-header xxHash (seed 0), defined in hashing.cpp.
uint32_t xxh32(const void* data, size_t len);
uint64_t xxh64(const void* data, size_t len);
inline uint32_t message_hash(const std::string& full_name) {
return xxh32(full_name.data(), full_name.size());
}
inline uint64_t hash64(const uint8_t* data, size_t offset, size_t length) {
return xxh64(data + offset, length);
}
// ---- raw little-endian writers (append to a byte vector) ----
inline void put_u16(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, uint16_t v) {
b.push_back((uint8_t) v);
b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> 8));
}
inline void put_u32(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, uint32_t v) {
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> (i * 8)));
}
inline void put_i32(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, int32_t v) { put_u32(b, (uint32_t) v); }
inline void put_u64(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, uint64_t v) {
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> (i * 8)));
}
// ---- raw little-endian readers (advance pos) ----
inline uint16_t get_u16(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) {
uint16_t v = (uint16_t) (d[p] | (d[p + 1] << 8));
p += 2;
return v;
}
inline uint32_t get_u32(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) {
uint32_t v = (uint32_t) (d[p] | (d[p + 1] << 8) | (d[p + 2] << 16) | ((uint32_t) d[p + 3] << 24));
p += 4;
return v;
}
inline int32_t get_i32(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) { return (int32_t) get_u32(d, p); }
inline uint64_t get_u64(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) {
uint64_t v = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) v |= (uint64_t) d[p + i] << (i * 8);
p += 8;
return v;
}
// ---- ZigZag ----
inline uint32_t zigzag(int32_t v) { return (uint32_t) ((v << 1) ^ (v >> 31)); }
inline int32_t unzigzag(uint32_t v) { return (int32_t) (v >> 1) ^ -(int32_t) (v & 1); }
inline int used_byte_count(uint64_t v) {
int n = 0;
do { n++; v >>= 8; } while (v != 0);
return n;
}
// ---- bit-packed integers (BytePacker/ByteUnpacker) ----
inline void put_packed(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, uint32_t value) {
if (value > (1u << 29) - 1) {
b.push_back(5);
put_u32(b, value);
return;
}
uint64_t v = (uint64_t) value << 3;
int num = used_byte_count(v);
v |= (uint32_t) num;
for (int i = 0; i < num; i++) b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> (i * 8)));
}
inline void put_packed(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, uint64_t value) {
if (value > (1ULL << 60) - 1) {
b.push_back(9);
put_u64(b, value);
return;
}
uint64_t v = value << 4;
int num = used_byte_count(v);
v |= (uint32_t) num;
for (int i = 0; i < num; i++) b.push_back((uint8_t) (v >> (i * 8)));
}
inline void put_packed_i32(std::vector<uint8_t>& b, int32_t value) { put_packed(b, zigzag(value)); }
inline uint32_t get_packed_u32(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) {
uint8_t first = d[p];
int num = first & 0x07;
if (num == 5) { p++; return get_u32(d, p); }
uint64_t v = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < num; i++) v |= (uint64_t) d[p + i] << (i * 8);
p += num;
return (uint32_t) (v >> 3);
}
inline uint64_t get_packed_u64(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) {
uint8_t first = d[p];
int num = first & 0x0F;
if (num == 9) { p++; return get_u64(d, p); }
uint64_t v = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < num; i++) v |= (uint64_t) d[p + i] << (i * 8);
p += num;
return v >> 4;
}
inline int32_t get_packed_i32(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p) { return unzigzag(get_packed_u32(d, p)); }
// ---- bounds-checked readers (for untrusted UDP input) ----
// `end` is the absolute index one past the last readable byte. Each returns false (leaving p
// unchanged) rather than reading out of bounds.
inline bool try_get_u32(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p, size_t end, uint32_t& out) {
if (p + 4 > end) return false;
out = get_u32(d, p);
return true;
}
inline bool try_get_packed_u32(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p, size_t end, uint32_t& out) {
if (p >= end) return false;
int num = d[p] & 0x07;
if (num == 5) {
if (p + 5 > end) return false;
} else if (p + num > end) {
return false;
}
out = get_packed_u32(d, p);
return true;
}
inline bool try_get_packed_i32(const uint8_t* d, size_t& p, size_t end, int32_t& out) {
uint32_t u;
if (!try_get_packed_u32(d, p, end, u)) return false;
out = unzigzag(u);
return true;
}
} // namespace wire
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Tachyon config file. Load with: tachyon --config /etc/tachyon.conf
# Simple `key = value`; '#' starts a comment. CLI flags override these.
port = 7777
encrypt = true # RecRoom 0x11 marker layer
fork = true # 24-byte forked NGO batch header
dissonance = true # act as the Dissonance session server
log_level = info # error | warn | info | debug
# Room enforcement: resolve AccountId -> room instance via recflare.
rooms = true
room_url = https://match.recflare.net/tachyon
room_timeout_ms = 2000
# RSA private key (path to a file containing .NET RSAKeyValue XML). Its public half is the key
# the client encrypts AT/VB/CKA/CIA/CPK to; the server decrypts those blobs with this key.
# private_key = /etc/tachyon/private-key.xml
+6773
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@@ -0,0 +1,6773 @@
/*
* xxHash - Extremely Fast Hash algorithm
* Header File
* Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Yann Collet
*
* BSD 2-Clause License (https://www.opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php)
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
* met:
*
* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
* in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* You can contact the author at:
* - xxHash homepage: https://www.xxhash.com
* - xxHash source repository: https://github.com/Cyan4973/xxHash
*/
/*!
* @mainpage xxHash
*
* xxHash is an extremely fast non-cryptographic hash algorithm, working at RAM speed
* limits.
*
* It is proposed in four flavors, in three families:
* 1. @ref XXH32_family
* - Classic 32-bit hash function. Simple, compact, and runs on almost all
* 32-bit and 64-bit systems.
* 2. @ref XXH64_family
* - Classic 64-bit adaptation of XXH32. Just as simple, and runs well on most
* 64-bit systems (but _not_ 32-bit systems).
* 3. @ref XXH3_family
* - Modern 64-bit and 128-bit hash function family which features improved
* strength and performance across the board, especially on smaller data.
* It benefits greatly from SIMD and 64-bit without requiring it.
*
* Benchmarks
* ---
* The reference system uses an Intel i7-9700K CPU, and runs Ubuntu x64 20.04.
* The open source benchmark program is compiled with clang v10.0 using -O3 flag.
*
* | Hash Name | ISA ext | Width | Large Data Speed | Small Data Velocity |
* | -------------------- | ------- | ----: | ---------------: | ------------------: |
* | XXH3_64bits() | @b AVX2 | 64 | 59.4 GB/s | 133.1 |
* | MeowHash | AES-NI | 128 | 58.2 GB/s | 52.5 |
* | XXH3_128bits() | @b AVX2 | 128 | 57.9 GB/s | 118.1 |
* | CLHash | PCLMUL | 64 | 37.1 GB/s | 58.1 |
* | XXH3_64bits() | @b SSE2 | 64 | 31.5 GB/s | 133.1 |
* | XXH3_128bits() | @b SSE2 | 128 | 29.6 GB/s | 118.1 |
* | RAM sequential read | | N/A | 28.0 GB/s | N/A |
* | ahash | AES-NI | 64 | 22.5 GB/s | 107.2 |
* | City64 | | 64 | 22.0 GB/s | 76.6 |
* | T1ha2 | | 64 | 22.0 GB/s | 99.0 |
* | City128 | | 128 | 21.7 GB/s | 57.7 |
* | FarmHash | AES-NI | 64 | 21.3 GB/s | 71.9 |
* | XXH64() | | 64 | 19.4 GB/s | 71.0 |
* | SpookyHash | | 64 | 19.3 GB/s | 53.2 |
* | Mum | | 64 | 18.0 GB/s | 67.0 |
* | CRC32C | SSE4.2 | 32 | 13.0 GB/s | 57.9 |
* | XXH32() | | 32 | 9.7 GB/s | 71.9 |
* | City32 | | 32 | 9.1 GB/s | 66.0 |
* | Blake3* | @b AVX2 | 256 | 4.4 GB/s | 8.1 |
* | Murmur3 | | 32 | 3.9 GB/s | 56.1 |
* | SipHash* | | 64 | 3.0 GB/s | 43.2 |
* | Blake3* | @b SSE2 | 256 | 2.4 GB/s | 8.1 |
* | HighwayHash | | 64 | 1.4 GB/s | 6.0 |
* | FNV64 | | 64 | 1.2 GB/s | 62.7 |
* | Blake2* | | 256 | 1.1 GB/s | 5.1 |
* | SHA1* | | 160 | 0.8 GB/s | 5.6 |
* | MD5* | | 128 | 0.6 GB/s | 7.8 |
* @note
* - Hashes which require a specific ISA extension are noted. SSE2 is also noted,
* even though it is mandatory on x64.
* - Hashes with an asterisk are cryptographic. Note that MD5 is non-cryptographic
* by modern standards.
* - Small data velocity is a rough average of algorithm's efficiency for small
* data. For more accurate information, see the wiki.
* - More benchmarks and strength tests are found on the wiki:
* https://github.com/Cyan4973/xxHash/wiki
*
* Usage
* ------
* All xxHash variants use a similar API. Changing the algorithm is a trivial
* substitution.
*
* @pre
* For functions which take an input and length parameter, the following
* requirements are assumed:
* - The range from [`input`, `input + length`) is valid, readable memory.
* - The only exception is if the `length` is `0`, `input` may be `NULL`.
* - For C++, the objects must have the *TriviallyCopyable* property, as the
* functions access bytes directly as if it was an array of `unsigned char`.
*
* @anchor single_shot_example
* **Single Shot**
*
* These functions are stateless functions which hash a contiguous block of memory,
* immediately returning the result. They are the easiest and usually the fastest
* option.
*
* XXH32(), XXH64(), XXH3_64bits(), XXH3_128bits()
*
* @code{.c}
* #include <string.h>
* #include "xxhash.h"
*
* // Example for a function which hashes a null terminated string with XXH32().
* XXH32_hash_t hash_string(const char* string, XXH32_hash_t seed)
* {
* // NULL pointers are only valid if the length is zero
* size_t length = (string == NULL) ? 0 : strlen(string);
* return XXH32(string, length, seed);
* }
* @endcode
*
* @anchor streaming_example
* **Streaming**
*
* These groups of functions allow incremental hashing of unknown size, even
* more than what would fit in a size_t.
*
* XXH32_reset(), XXH64_reset(), XXH3_64bits_reset(), XXH3_128bits_reset()
*
* @code{.c}
* #include <stdio.h>
* #include <assert.h>
* #include "xxhash.h"
* // Example for a function which hashes a FILE incrementally with XXH3_64bits().
* XXH64_hash_t hashFile(FILE* f)
* {
* // Allocate a state struct. Do not just use malloc() or new.
* XXH3_state_t* state = XXH3_createState();
* assert(state != NULL && "Out of memory!");
* // Reset the state to start a new hashing session.
* XXH3_64bits_reset(state);
* char buffer[4096];
* size_t count;
* // Read the file in chunks
* while ((count = fread(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), f)) != 0) {
* // Run update() as many times as necessary to process the data
* XXH3_64bits_update(state, buffer, count);
* }
* // Retrieve the finalized hash. This will not change the state.
* XXH64_hash_t result = XXH3_64bits_digest(state);
* // Free the state. Do not use free().
* XXH3_freeState(state);
* return result;
* }
* @endcode
*
* @file xxhash.h
* xxHash prototypes and implementation
*/
#if defined (__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
/* ****************************
* INLINE mode
******************************/
/*!
* @defgroup public Public API
* Contains details on the public xxHash functions.
* @{
*/
#ifdef XXH_DOXYGEN
/*!
* @brief Gives access to internal state declaration, required for static allocation.
*
* Incompatible with dynamic linking, due to risks of ABI changes.
*
* Usage:
* @code{.c}
* #define XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY
* #include "xxhash.h"
* @endcode
*/
# define XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY
/* Do not undef XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY for Doxygen */
/*!
* @brief Gives access to internal definitions.
*
* Usage:
* @code{.c}
* #define XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY
* #define XXH_IMPLEMENTATION
* #include "xxhash.h"
* @endcode
*/
# define XXH_IMPLEMENTATION
/* Do not undef XXH_IMPLEMENTATION for Doxygen */
/*!
* @brief Exposes the implementation and marks all functions as `inline`.
*
* Use these build macros to inline xxhash into the target unit.
* Inlining improves performance on small inputs, especially when the length is
* expressed as a compile-time constant:
*
* https://fastcompression.blogspot.com/2018/03/xxhash-for-small-keys-impressive-power.html
*
* It also keeps xxHash symbols private to the unit, so they are not exported.
*
* Usage:
* @code{.c}
* #define XXH_INLINE_ALL
* #include "xxhash.h"
* @endcode
* Do not compile and link xxhash.o as a separate object, as it is not useful.
*/
# define XXH_INLINE_ALL
# undef XXH_INLINE_ALL
/*!
* @brief Exposes the implementation without marking functions as inline.
*/
# define XXH_PRIVATE_API
# undef XXH_PRIVATE_API
/*!
* @brief Emulate a namespace by transparently prefixing all symbols.
*
* If you want to include _and expose_ xxHash functions from within your own
* library, but also want to avoid symbol collisions with other libraries which
* may also include xxHash, you can use @ref XXH_NAMESPACE to automatically prefix
* any public symbol from xxhash library with the value of @ref XXH_NAMESPACE
* (therefore, avoid empty or numeric values).
*
* Note that no change is required within the calling program as long as it
* includes `xxhash.h`: Regular symbol names will be automatically translated
* by this header.
*/
# define XXH_NAMESPACE /* YOUR NAME HERE */
# undef XXH_NAMESPACE
#endif
#if (defined(XXH_INLINE_ALL) || defined(XXH_PRIVATE_API)) \
&& !defined(XXH_INLINE_ALL_31684351384)
/* this section should be traversed only once */
# define XXH_INLINE_ALL_31684351384
/* give access to the advanced API, required to compile implementations */
# undef XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY /* avoid macro redef */
# define XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY
/* make all functions private */
# undef XXH_PUBLIC_API
# if defined(__GNUC__)
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API static __inline __attribute__((unused))
# elif defined (__cplusplus) || (defined (__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) /* C99 */)
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API static inline
# elif defined(_MSC_VER)
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API static __inline
# else
/* note: this version may generate warnings for unused static functions */
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API static
# endif
/*
* This part deals with the special case where a unit wants to inline xxHash,
* but "xxhash.h" has previously been included without XXH_INLINE_ALL,
* such as part of some previously included *.h header file.
* Without further action, the new include would just be ignored,
* and functions would effectively _not_ be inlined (silent failure).
* The following macros solve this situation by prefixing all inlined names,
* avoiding naming collision with previous inclusions.
*/
/* Before that, we unconditionally #undef all symbols,
* in case they were already defined with XXH_NAMESPACE.
* They will then be redefined for XXH_INLINE_ALL
*/
# undef XXH_versionNumber
/* XXH32 */
# undef XXH32
# undef XXH32_createState
# undef XXH32_freeState
# undef XXH32_reset
# undef XXH32_update
# undef XXH32_digest
# undef XXH32_copyState
# undef XXH32_canonicalFromHash
# undef XXH32_hashFromCanonical
/* XXH64 */
# undef XXH64
# undef XXH64_createState
# undef XXH64_freeState
# undef XXH64_reset
# undef XXH64_update
# undef XXH64_digest
# undef XXH64_copyState
# undef XXH64_canonicalFromHash
# undef XXH64_hashFromCanonical
/* XXH3_64bits */
# undef XXH3_64bits
# undef XXH3_64bits_withSecret
# undef XXH3_64bits_withSeed
# undef XXH3_64bits_withSecretandSeed
# undef XXH3_createState
# undef XXH3_freeState
# undef XXH3_copyState
# undef XXH3_64bits_reset
# undef XXH3_64bits_reset_withSeed
# undef XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret
# undef XXH3_64bits_update
# undef XXH3_64bits_digest
# undef XXH3_generateSecret
/* XXH3_128bits */
# undef XXH128
# undef XXH3_128bits
# undef XXH3_128bits_withSeed
# undef XXH3_128bits_withSecret
# undef XXH3_128bits_reset
# undef XXH3_128bits_reset_withSeed
# undef XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecret
# undef XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecretandSeed
# undef XXH3_128bits_update
# undef XXH3_128bits_digest
# undef XXH128_isEqual
# undef XXH128_cmp
# undef XXH128_canonicalFromHash
# undef XXH128_hashFromCanonical
/* Finally, free the namespace itself */
# undef XXH_NAMESPACE
/* employ the namespace for XXH_INLINE_ALL */
# define XXH_NAMESPACE XXH_INLINE_
/*
* Some identifiers (enums, type names) are not symbols,
* but they must nonetheless be renamed to avoid redeclaration.
* Alternative solution: do not redeclare them.
* However, this requires some #ifdefs, and has a more dispersed impact.
* Meanwhile, renaming can be achieved in a single place.
*/
# define XXH_IPREF(Id) XXH_NAMESPACE ## Id
# define XXH_OK XXH_IPREF(XXH_OK)
# define XXH_ERROR XXH_IPREF(XXH_ERROR)
# define XXH_errorcode XXH_IPREF(XXH_errorcode)
# define XXH32_canonical_t XXH_IPREF(XXH32_canonical_t)
# define XXH64_canonical_t XXH_IPREF(XXH64_canonical_t)
# define XXH128_canonical_t XXH_IPREF(XXH128_canonical_t)
# define XXH32_state_s XXH_IPREF(XXH32_state_s)
# define XXH32_state_t XXH_IPREF(XXH32_state_t)
# define XXH64_state_s XXH_IPREF(XXH64_state_s)
# define XXH64_state_t XXH_IPREF(XXH64_state_t)
# define XXH3_state_s XXH_IPREF(XXH3_state_s)
# define XXH3_state_t XXH_IPREF(XXH3_state_t)
# define XXH128_hash_t XXH_IPREF(XXH128_hash_t)
/* Ensure the header is parsed again, even if it was previously included */
# undef XXHASH_H_5627135585666179
# undef XXHASH_H_STATIC_13879238742
#endif /* XXH_INLINE_ALL || XXH_PRIVATE_API */
/* ****************************************************************
* Stable API
*****************************************************************/
#ifndef XXHASH_H_5627135585666179
#define XXHASH_H_5627135585666179 1
/*! @brief Marks a global symbol. */
#if !defined(XXH_INLINE_ALL) && !defined(XXH_PRIVATE_API)
# if defined(WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(XXH_IMPORT) || defined(XXH_EXPORT))
# ifdef XXH_EXPORT
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API __declspec(dllexport)
# elif XXH_IMPORT
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API __declspec(dllimport)
# endif
# else
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API /* do nothing */
# endif
#endif
#ifdef XXH_NAMESPACE
# define XXH_CAT(A,B) A##B
# define XXH_NAME2(A,B) XXH_CAT(A,B)
# define XXH_versionNumber XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH_versionNumber)
/* XXH32 */
# define XXH32 XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32)
# define XXH32_createState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32_createState)
# define XXH32_freeState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32_freeState)
# define XXH32_reset XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32_reset)
# define XXH32_update XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32_update)
# define XXH32_digest XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32_digest)
# define XXH32_copyState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32_copyState)
# define XXH32_canonicalFromHash XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32_canonicalFromHash)
# define XXH32_hashFromCanonical XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH32_hashFromCanonical)
/* XXH64 */
# define XXH64 XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64)
# define XXH64_createState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64_createState)
# define XXH64_freeState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64_freeState)
# define XXH64_reset XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64_reset)
# define XXH64_update XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64_update)
# define XXH64_digest XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64_digest)
# define XXH64_copyState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64_copyState)
# define XXH64_canonicalFromHash XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64_canonicalFromHash)
# define XXH64_hashFromCanonical XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH64_hashFromCanonical)
/* XXH3_64bits */
# define XXH3_64bits XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits)
# define XXH3_64bits_withSecret XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_withSecret)
# define XXH3_64bits_withSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_withSeed)
# define XXH3_64bits_withSecretandSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_withSecretandSeed)
# define XXH3_createState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_createState)
# define XXH3_freeState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_freeState)
# define XXH3_copyState XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_copyState)
# define XXH3_64bits_reset XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_reset)
# define XXH3_64bits_reset_withSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_reset_withSeed)
# define XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret)
# define XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecretandSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecretandSeed)
# define XXH3_64bits_update XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_update)
# define XXH3_64bits_digest XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_64bits_digest)
# define XXH3_generateSecret XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_generateSecret)
# define XXH3_generateSecret_fromSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_generateSecret_fromSeed)
/* XXH3_128bits */
# define XXH128 XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH128)
# define XXH3_128bits XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits)
# define XXH3_128bits_withSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_withSeed)
# define XXH3_128bits_withSecret XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_withSecret)
# define XXH3_128bits_withSecretandSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_withSecretandSeed)
# define XXH3_128bits_reset XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_reset)
# define XXH3_128bits_reset_withSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_reset_withSeed)
# define XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecret XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecret)
# define XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecretandSeed XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecretandSeed)
# define XXH3_128bits_update XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_update)
# define XXH3_128bits_digest XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH3_128bits_digest)
# define XXH128_isEqual XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH128_isEqual)
# define XXH128_cmp XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH128_cmp)
# define XXH128_canonicalFromHash XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH128_canonicalFromHash)
# define XXH128_hashFromCanonical XXH_NAME2(XXH_NAMESPACE, XXH128_hashFromCanonical)
#endif
/* *************************************
* Compiler specifics
***************************************/
/* specific declaration modes for Windows */
#if !defined(XXH_INLINE_ALL) && !defined(XXH_PRIVATE_API)
# if defined(WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(XXH_IMPORT) || defined(XXH_EXPORT))
# ifdef XXH_EXPORT
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API __declspec(dllexport)
# elif XXH_IMPORT
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API __declspec(dllimport)
# endif
# else
# define XXH_PUBLIC_API /* do nothing */
# endif
#endif
#if defined (__GNUC__)
# define XXH_CONSTF __attribute__((const))
# define XXH_PUREF __attribute__((pure))
# define XXH_MALLOCF __attribute__((malloc))
#else
# define XXH_CONSTF /* disable */
# define XXH_PUREF
# define XXH_MALLOCF
#endif
/* *************************************
* Version
***************************************/
#define XXH_VERSION_MAJOR 0
#define XXH_VERSION_MINOR 8
#define XXH_VERSION_RELEASE 2
/*! @brief Version number, encoded as two digits each */
#define XXH_VERSION_NUMBER (XXH_VERSION_MAJOR *100*100 + XXH_VERSION_MINOR *100 + XXH_VERSION_RELEASE)
/*!
* @brief Obtains the xxHash version.
*
* This is mostly useful when xxHash is compiled as a shared library,
* since the returned value comes from the library, as opposed to header file.
*
* @return @ref XXH_VERSION_NUMBER of the invoked library.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_CONSTF unsigned XXH_versionNumber (void);
/* ****************************
* Common basic types
******************************/
#include <stddef.h> /* size_t */
/*!
* @brief Exit code for the streaming API.
*/
typedef enum {
XXH_OK = 0, /*!< OK */
XXH_ERROR /*!< Error */
} XXH_errorcode;
/*-**********************************************************************
* 32-bit hash
************************************************************************/
#if defined(XXH_DOXYGEN) /* Don't show <stdint.h> include */
/*!
* @brief An unsigned 32-bit integer.
*
* Not necessarily defined to `uint32_t` but functionally equivalent.
*/
typedef uint32_t XXH32_hash_t;
#elif !defined (__VMS) \
&& (defined (__cplusplus) \
|| (defined (__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) /* C99 */) )
# include <stdint.h>
typedef uint32_t XXH32_hash_t;
#else
# include <limits.h>
# if UINT_MAX == 0xFFFFFFFFUL
typedef unsigned int XXH32_hash_t;
# elif ULONG_MAX == 0xFFFFFFFFUL
typedef unsigned long XXH32_hash_t;
# else
# error "unsupported platform: need a 32-bit type"
# endif
#endif
/*!
* @}
*
* @defgroup XXH32_family XXH32 family
* @ingroup public
* Contains functions used in the classic 32-bit xxHash algorithm.
*
* @note
* XXH32 is useful for older platforms, with no or poor 64-bit performance.
* Note that the @ref XXH3_family provides competitive speed for both 32-bit
* and 64-bit systems, and offers true 64/128 bit hash results.
*
* @see @ref XXH64_family, @ref XXH3_family : Other xxHash families
* @see @ref XXH32_impl for implementation details
* @{
*/
/*!
* @brief Calculates the 32-bit hash of @p input using xxHash32.
*
* Speed on Core 2 Duo @ 3 GHz (single thread, SMHasher benchmark): 5.4 GB/s
*
* See @ref single_shot_example "Single Shot Example" for an example.
*
* @param input The block of data to be hashed, at least @p length bytes in size.
* @param length The length of @p input, in bytes.
* @param seed The 32-bit seed to alter the hash's output predictably.
*
* @pre
* The memory between @p input and @p input + @p length must be valid,
* readable, contiguous memory. However, if @p length is `0`, @p input may be
* `NULL`. In C++, this also must be *TriviallyCopyable*.
*
* @return The calculated 32-bit hash value.
*
* @see
* XXH64(), XXH3_64bits_withSeed(), XXH3_128bits_withSeed(), XXH128():
* Direct equivalents for the other variants of xxHash.
* @see
* XXH32_createState(), XXH32_update(), XXH32_digest(): Streaming version.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH32_hash_t XXH32 (const void* input, size_t length, XXH32_hash_t seed);
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*!
* Streaming functions generate the xxHash value from an incremental input.
* This method is slower than single-call functions, due to state management.
* For small inputs, prefer `XXH32()` and `XXH64()`, which are better optimized.
*
* An XXH state must first be allocated using `XXH*_createState()`.
*
* Start a new hash by initializing the state with a seed using `XXH*_reset()`.
*
* Then, feed the hash state by calling `XXH*_update()` as many times as necessary.
*
* The function returns an error code, with 0 meaning OK, and any other value
* meaning there is an error.
*
* Finally, a hash value can be produced anytime, by using `XXH*_digest()`.
* This function returns the nn-bits hash as an int or long long.
*
* It's still possible to continue inserting input into the hash state after a
* digest, and generate new hash values later on by invoking `XXH*_digest()`.
*
* When done, release the state using `XXH*_freeState()`.
*
* @see streaming_example at the top of @ref xxhash.h for an example.
*/
/*!
* @typedef struct XXH32_state_s XXH32_state_t
* @brief The opaque state struct for the XXH32 streaming API.
*
* @see XXH32_state_s for details.
*/
typedef struct XXH32_state_s XXH32_state_t;
/*!
* @brief Allocates an @ref XXH32_state_t.
*
* Must be freed with XXH32_freeState().
* @return An allocated XXH32_state_t on success, `NULL` on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_MALLOCF XXH32_state_t* XXH32_createState(void);
/*!
* @brief Frees an @ref XXH32_state_t.
*
* Must be allocated with XXH32_createState().
* @param statePtr A pointer to an @ref XXH32_state_t allocated with @ref XXH32_createState().
* @return XXH_OK.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH32_freeState(XXH32_state_t* statePtr);
/*!
* @brief Copies one @ref XXH32_state_t to another.
*
* @param dst_state The state to copy to.
* @param src_state The state to copy from.
* @pre
* @p dst_state and @p src_state must not be `NULL` and must not overlap.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH32_copyState(XXH32_state_t* dst_state, const XXH32_state_t* src_state);
/*!
* @brief Resets an @ref XXH32_state_t to begin a new hash.
*
* This function resets and seeds a state. Call it before @ref XXH32_update().
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to reset.
* @param seed The 32-bit seed to alter the hash result predictably.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH32_reset (XXH32_state_t* statePtr, XXH32_hash_t seed);
/*!
* @brief Consumes a block of @p input to an @ref XXH32_state_t.
*
* Call this to incrementally consume blocks of data.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to update.
* @param input The block of data to be hashed, at least @p length bytes in size.
* @param length The length of @p input, in bytes.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
* @pre
* The memory between @p input and @p input + @p length must be valid,
* readable, contiguous memory. However, if @p length is `0`, @p input may be
* `NULL`. In C++, this also must be *TriviallyCopyable*.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH32_update (XXH32_state_t* statePtr, const void* input, size_t length);
/*!
* @brief Returns the calculated hash value from an @ref XXH32_state_t.
*
* @note
* Calling XXH32_digest() will not affect @p statePtr, so you can update,
* digest, and update again.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to calculate the hash from.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return The calculated xxHash32 value from that state.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH32_hash_t XXH32_digest (const XXH32_state_t* statePtr);
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
/******* Canonical representation *******/
/*
* The default return values from XXH functions are unsigned 32 and 64 bit
* integers.
* This the simplest and fastest format for further post-processing.
*
* However, this leaves open the question of what is the order on the byte level,
* since little and big endian conventions will store the same number differently.
*
* The canonical representation settles this issue by mandating big-endian
* convention, the same convention as human-readable numbers (large digits first).
*
* When writing hash values to storage, sending them over a network, or printing
* them, it's highly recommended to use the canonical representation to ensure
* portability across a wider range of systems, present and future.
*
* The following functions allow transformation of hash values to and from
* canonical format.
*/
/*!
* @brief Canonical (big endian) representation of @ref XXH32_hash_t.
*/
typedef struct {
unsigned char digest[4]; /*!< Hash bytes, big endian */
} XXH32_canonical_t;
/*!
* @brief Converts an @ref XXH32_hash_t to a big endian @ref XXH32_canonical_t.
*
* @param dst The @ref XXH32_canonical_t pointer to be stored to.
* @param hash The @ref XXH32_hash_t to be converted.
*
* @pre
* @p dst must not be `NULL`.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH32_canonicalFromHash(XXH32_canonical_t* dst, XXH32_hash_t hash);
/*!
* @brief Converts an @ref XXH32_canonical_t to a native @ref XXH32_hash_t.
*
* @param src The @ref XXH32_canonical_t to convert.
*
* @pre
* @p src must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return The converted hash.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH32_hash_t XXH32_hashFromCanonical(const XXH32_canonical_t* src);
/*! @cond Doxygen ignores this part */
#ifdef __has_attribute
# define XXH_HAS_ATTRIBUTE(x) __has_attribute(x)
#else
# define XXH_HAS_ATTRIBUTE(x) 0
#endif
/*! @endcond */
/*! @cond Doxygen ignores this part */
/*
* C23 __STDC_VERSION__ number hasn't been specified yet. For now
* leave as `201711L` (C17 + 1).
* TODO: Update to correct value when its been specified.
*/
#define XXH_C23_VN 201711L
/*! @endcond */
/*! @cond Doxygen ignores this part */
/* C-language Attributes are added in C23. */
#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= XXH_C23_VN) && defined(__has_c_attribute)
# define XXH_HAS_C_ATTRIBUTE(x) __has_c_attribute(x)
#else
# define XXH_HAS_C_ATTRIBUTE(x) 0
#endif
/*! @endcond */
/*! @cond Doxygen ignores this part */
#if defined(__cplusplus) && defined(__has_cpp_attribute)
# define XXH_HAS_CPP_ATTRIBUTE(x) __has_cpp_attribute(x)
#else
# define XXH_HAS_CPP_ATTRIBUTE(x) 0
#endif
/*! @endcond */
/*! @cond Doxygen ignores this part */
/*
* Define XXH_FALLTHROUGH macro for annotating switch case with the 'fallthrough' attribute
* introduced in CPP17 and C23.
* CPP17 : https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/language/attributes/fallthrough
* C23 : https://en.cppreference.com/w/c/language/attributes/fallthrough
*/
#if XXH_HAS_C_ATTRIBUTE(fallthrough) || XXH_HAS_CPP_ATTRIBUTE(fallthrough)
# define XXH_FALLTHROUGH [[fallthrough]]
#elif XXH_HAS_ATTRIBUTE(__fallthrough__)
# define XXH_FALLTHROUGH __attribute__ ((__fallthrough__))
#else
# define XXH_FALLTHROUGH /* fallthrough */
#endif
/*! @endcond */
/*! @cond Doxygen ignores this part */
/*
* Define XXH_NOESCAPE for annotated pointers in public API.
* https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AttributeReference.html#noescape
* As of writing this, only supported by clang.
*/
#if XXH_HAS_ATTRIBUTE(noescape)
# define XXH_NOESCAPE __attribute__((noescape))
#else
# define XXH_NOESCAPE
#endif
/*! @endcond */
/*!
* @}
* @ingroup public
* @{
*/
#ifndef XXH_NO_LONG_LONG
/*-**********************************************************************
* 64-bit hash
************************************************************************/
#if defined(XXH_DOXYGEN) /* don't include <stdint.h> */
/*!
* @brief An unsigned 64-bit integer.
*
* Not necessarily defined to `uint64_t` but functionally equivalent.
*/
typedef uint64_t XXH64_hash_t;
#elif !defined (__VMS) \
&& (defined (__cplusplus) \
|| (defined (__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) /* C99 */) )
# include <stdint.h>
typedef uint64_t XXH64_hash_t;
#else
# include <limits.h>
# if defined(__LP64__) && ULONG_MAX == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
/* LP64 ABI says uint64_t is unsigned long */
typedef unsigned long XXH64_hash_t;
# else
/* the following type must have a width of 64-bit */
typedef unsigned long long XXH64_hash_t;
# endif
#endif
/*!
* @}
*
* @defgroup XXH64_family XXH64 family
* @ingroup public
* @{
* Contains functions used in the classic 64-bit xxHash algorithm.
*
* @note
* XXH3 provides competitive speed for both 32-bit and 64-bit systems,
* and offers true 64/128 bit hash results.
* It provides better speed for systems with vector processing capabilities.
*/
/*!
* @brief Calculates the 64-bit hash of @p input using xxHash64.
*
* This function usually runs faster on 64-bit systems, but slower on 32-bit
* systems (see benchmark).
*
* @param input The block of data to be hashed, at least @p length bytes in size.
* @param length The length of @p input, in bytes.
* @param seed The 64-bit seed to alter the hash's output predictably.
*
* @pre
* The memory between @p input and @p input + @p length must be valid,
* readable, contiguous memory. However, if @p length is `0`, @p input may be
* `NULL`. In C++, this also must be *TriviallyCopyable*.
*
* @return The calculated 64-bit hash.
*
* @see
* XXH32(), XXH3_64bits_withSeed(), XXH3_128bits_withSeed(), XXH128():
* Direct equivalents for the other variants of xxHash.
* @see
* XXH64_createState(), XXH64_update(), XXH64_digest(): Streaming version.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t XXH64(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length, XXH64_hash_t seed);
/******* Streaming *******/
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*!
* @brief The opaque state struct for the XXH64 streaming API.
*
* @see XXH64_state_s for details.
*/
typedef struct XXH64_state_s XXH64_state_t; /* incomplete type */
/*!
* @brief Allocates an @ref XXH64_state_t.
*
* Must be freed with XXH64_freeState().
* @return An allocated XXH64_state_t on success, `NULL` on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_MALLOCF XXH64_state_t* XXH64_createState(void);
/*!
* @brief Frees an @ref XXH64_state_t.
*
* Must be allocated with XXH64_createState().
* @param statePtr A pointer to an @ref XXH64_state_t allocated with @ref XXH64_createState().
* @return XXH_OK.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH64_freeState(XXH64_state_t* statePtr);
/*!
* @brief Copies one @ref XXH64_state_t to another.
*
* @param dst_state The state to copy to.
* @param src_state The state to copy from.
* @pre
* @p dst_state and @p src_state must not be `NULL` and must not overlap.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH64_copyState(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH64_state_t* dst_state, const XXH64_state_t* src_state);
/*!
* @brief Resets an @ref XXH64_state_t to begin a new hash.
*
* This function resets and seeds a state. Call it before @ref XXH64_update().
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to reset.
* @param seed The 64-bit seed to alter the hash result predictably.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH64_reset (XXH_NOESCAPE XXH64_state_t* statePtr, XXH64_hash_t seed);
/*!
* @brief Consumes a block of @p input to an @ref XXH64_state_t.
*
* Call this to incrementally consume blocks of data.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to update.
* @param input The block of data to be hashed, at least @p length bytes in size.
* @param length The length of @p input, in bytes.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
* @pre
* The memory between @p input and @p input + @p length must be valid,
* readable, contiguous memory. However, if @p length is `0`, @p input may be
* `NULL`. In C++, this also must be *TriviallyCopyable*.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH64_update (XXH_NOESCAPE XXH64_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length);
/*!
* @brief Returns the calculated hash value from an @ref XXH64_state_t.
*
* @note
* Calling XXH64_digest() will not affect @p statePtr, so you can update,
* digest, and update again.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to calculate the hash from.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return The calculated xxHash64 value from that state.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t XXH64_digest (XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH64_state_t* statePtr);
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
/******* Canonical representation *******/
/*!
* @brief Canonical (big endian) representation of @ref XXH64_hash_t.
*/
typedef struct { unsigned char digest[sizeof(XXH64_hash_t)]; } XXH64_canonical_t;
/*!
* @brief Converts an @ref XXH64_hash_t to a big endian @ref XXH64_canonical_t.
*
* @param dst The @ref XXH64_canonical_t pointer to be stored to.
* @param hash The @ref XXH64_hash_t to be converted.
*
* @pre
* @p dst must not be `NULL`.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH64_canonicalFromHash(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH64_canonical_t* dst, XXH64_hash_t hash);
/*!
* @brief Converts an @ref XXH64_canonical_t to a native @ref XXH64_hash_t.
*
* @param src The @ref XXH64_canonical_t to convert.
*
* @pre
* @p src must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return The converted hash.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t XXH64_hashFromCanonical(XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH64_canonical_t* src);
#ifndef XXH_NO_XXH3
/*!
* @}
* ************************************************************************
* @defgroup XXH3_family XXH3 family
* @ingroup public
* @{
*
* XXH3 is a more recent hash algorithm featuring:
* - Improved speed for both small and large inputs
* - True 64-bit and 128-bit outputs
* - SIMD acceleration
* - Improved 32-bit viability
*
* Speed analysis methodology is explained here:
*
* https://fastcompression.blogspot.com/2019/03/presenting-xxh3.html
*
* Compared to XXH64, expect XXH3 to run approximately
* ~2x faster on large inputs and >3x faster on small ones,
* exact differences vary depending on platform.
*
* XXH3's speed benefits greatly from SIMD and 64-bit arithmetic,
* but does not require it.
* Most 32-bit and 64-bit targets that can run XXH32 smoothly can run XXH3
* at competitive speeds, even without vector support. Further details are
* explained in the implementation.
*
* XXH3 has a fast scalar implementation, but it also includes accelerated SIMD
* implementations for many common platforms:
* - AVX512
* - AVX2
* - SSE2
* - ARM NEON
* - WebAssembly SIMD128
* - POWER8 VSX
* - s390x ZVector
* This can be controlled via the @ref XXH_VECTOR macro, but it automatically
* selects the best version according to predefined macros. For the x86 family, an
* automatic runtime dispatcher is included separately in @ref xxh_x86dispatch.c.
*
* XXH3 implementation is portable:
* it has a generic C90 formulation that can be compiled on any platform,
* all implementations generate exactly the same hash value on all platforms.
* Starting from v0.8.0, it's also labelled "stable", meaning that
* any future version will also generate the same hash value.
*
* XXH3 offers 2 variants, _64bits and _128bits.
*
* When only 64 bits are needed, prefer invoking the _64bits variant, as it
* reduces the amount of mixing, resulting in faster speed on small inputs.
* It's also generally simpler to manipulate a scalar return type than a struct.
*
* The API supports one-shot hashing, streaming mode, and custom secrets.
*/
/*-**********************************************************************
* XXH3 64-bit variant
************************************************************************/
/*!
* @brief 64-bit unseeded variant of XXH3.
*
* This is equivalent to @ref XXH3_64bits_withSeed() with a seed of 0, however
* it may have slightly better performance due to constant propagation of the
* defaults.
*
* @see
* XXH32(), XXH64(), XXH3_128bits(): equivalent for the other xxHash algorithms
* @see
* XXH3_64bits_withSeed(), XXH3_64bits_withSecret(): other seeding variants
* @see
* XXH3_64bits_reset(), XXH3_64bits_update(), XXH3_64bits_digest(): Streaming version.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t XXH3_64bits(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length);
/*!
* @brief 64-bit seeded variant of XXH3
*
* This variant generates a custom secret on the fly based on default secret
* altered using the `seed` value.
*
* While this operation is decently fast, note that it's not completely free.
*
* @note
* seed == 0 produces the same results as @ref XXH3_64bits().
*
* @param input The data to hash
* @param length The length
* @param seed The 64-bit seed to alter the state.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t XXH3_64bits_withSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length, XXH64_hash_t seed);
/*!
* The bare minimum size for a custom secret.
*
* @see
* XXH3_64bits_withSecret(), XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret(),
* XXH3_128bits_withSecret(), XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecret().
*/
#define XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN 136
/*!
* @brief 64-bit variant of XXH3 with a custom "secret".
*
* It's possible to provide any blob of bytes as a "secret" to generate the hash.
* This makes it more difficult for an external actor to prepare an intentional collision.
* The main condition is that secretSize *must* be large enough (>= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN).
* However, the quality of the secret impacts the dispersion of the hash algorithm.
* Therefore, the secret _must_ look like a bunch of random bytes.
* Avoid "trivial" or structured data such as repeated sequences or a text document.
* Whenever in doubt about the "randomness" of the blob of bytes,
* consider employing "XXH3_generateSecret()" instead (see below).
* It will generate a proper high entropy secret derived from the blob of bytes.
* Another advantage of using XXH3_generateSecret() is that
* it guarantees that all bits within the initial blob of bytes
* will impact every bit of the output.
* This is not necessarily the case when using the blob of bytes directly
* because, when hashing _small_ inputs, only a portion of the secret is employed.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t XXH3_64bits_withSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* data, size_t len, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize);
/******* Streaming *******/
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*
* Streaming requires state maintenance.
* This operation costs memory and CPU.
* As a consequence, streaming is slower than one-shot hashing.
* For better performance, prefer one-shot functions whenever applicable.
*/
/*!
* @brief The state struct for the XXH3 streaming API.
*
* @see XXH3_state_s for details.
*/
typedef struct XXH3_state_s XXH3_state_t;
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_MALLOCF XXH3_state_t* XXH3_createState(void);
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_freeState(XXH3_state_t* statePtr);
/*!
* @brief Copies one @ref XXH3_state_t to another.
*
* @param dst_state The state to copy to.
* @param src_state The state to copy from.
* @pre
* @p dst_state and @p src_state must not be `NULL` and must not overlap.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH3_copyState(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* dst_state, XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH3_state_t* src_state);
/*!
* @brief Resets an @ref XXH3_state_t to begin a new hash.
*
* This function resets `statePtr` and generate a secret with default parameters. Call it before @ref XXH3_64bits_update().
* Digest will be equivalent to `XXH3_64bits()`.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to reset.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_64bits_reset(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr);
/*!
* @brief Resets an @ref XXH3_state_t with 64-bit seed to begin a new hash.
*
* This function resets `statePtr` and generate a secret from `seed`. Call it before @ref XXH3_64bits_update().
* Digest will be equivalent to `XXH3_64bits_withSeed()`.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to reset.
* @param seed The 64-bit seed to alter the state.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_64bits_reset_withSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH64_hash_t seed);
/*!
* XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret():
* `secret` is referenced, it _must outlive_ the hash streaming session.
* Similar to one-shot API, `secretSize` must be >= `XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN`,
* and the quality of produced hash values depends on secret's entropy
* (secret's content should look like a bunch of random bytes).
* When in doubt about the randomness of a candidate `secret`,
* consider employing `XXH3_generateSecret()` instead (see below).
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize);
/*!
* @brief Consumes a block of @p input to an @ref XXH3_state_t.
*
* Call this to incrementally consume blocks of data.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to update.
* @param input The block of data to be hashed, at least @p length bytes in size.
* @param length The length of @p input, in bytes.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
* @pre
* The memory between @p input and @p input + @p length must be valid,
* readable, contiguous memory. However, if @p length is `0`, @p input may be
* `NULL`. In C++, this also must be *TriviallyCopyable*.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_64bits_update (XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length);
/*!
* @brief Returns the calculated XXH3 64-bit hash value from an @ref XXH3_state_t.
*
* @note
* Calling XXH3_64bits_digest() will not affect @p statePtr, so you can update,
* digest, and update again.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to calculate the hash from.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return The calculated XXH3 64-bit hash value from that state.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t XXH3_64bits_digest (XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH3_state_t* statePtr);
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
/* note : canonical representation of XXH3 is the same as XXH64
* since they both produce XXH64_hash_t values */
/*-**********************************************************************
* XXH3 128-bit variant
************************************************************************/
/*!
* @brief The return value from 128-bit hashes.
*
* Stored in little endian order, although the fields themselves are in native
* endianness.
*/
typedef struct {
XXH64_hash_t low64; /*!< `value & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF` */
XXH64_hash_t high64; /*!< `value >> 64` */
} XXH128_hash_t;
/*!
* @brief Unseeded 128-bit variant of XXH3
*
* The 128-bit variant of XXH3 has more strength, but it has a bit of overhead
* for shorter inputs.
*
* This is equivalent to @ref XXH3_128bits_withSeed() with a seed of 0, however
* it may have slightly better performance due to constant propagation of the
* defaults.
*
* @see
* XXH32(), XXH64(), XXH3_64bits(): equivalent for the other xxHash algorithms
* @see
* XXH3_128bits_withSeed(), XXH3_128bits_withSecret(): other seeding variants
* @see
* XXH3_128bits_reset(), XXH3_128bits_update(), XXH3_128bits_digest(): Streaming version.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t XXH3_128bits(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* data, size_t len);
/*! @brief Seeded 128-bit variant of XXH3. @see XXH3_64bits_withSeed(). */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t XXH3_128bits_withSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* data, size_t len, XXH64_hash_t seed);
/*! @brief Custom secret 128-bit variant of XXH3. @see XXH3_64bits_withSecret(). */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t XXH3_128bits_withSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* data, size_t len, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize);
/******* Streaming *******/
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*
* Streaming requires state maintenance.
* This operation costs memory and CPU.
* As a consequence, streaming is slower than one-shot hashing.
* For better performance, prefer one-shot functions whenever applicable.
*
* XXH3_128bits uses the same XXH3_state_t as XXH3_64bits().
* Use already declared XXH3_createState() and XXH3_freeState().
*
* All reset and streaming functions have same meaning as their 64-bit counterpart.
*/
/*!
* @brief Resets an @ref XXH3_state_t to begin a new hash.
*
* This function resets `statePtr` and generate a secret with default parameters. Call it before @ref XXH3_128bits_update().
* Digest will be equivalent to `XXH3_128bits()`.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to reset.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_128bits_reset(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr);
/*!
* @brief Resets an @ref XXH3_state_t with 64-bit seed to begin a new hash.
*
* This function resets `statePtr` and generate a secret from `seed`. Call it before @ref XXH3_128bits_update().
* Digest will be equivalent to `XXH3_128bits_withSeed()`.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to reset.
* @param seed The 64-bit seed to alter the state.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_128bits_reset_withSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH64_hash_t seed);
/*! @brief Custom secret 128-bit variant of XXH3. @see XXH_64bits_reset_withSecret(). */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize);
/*!
* @brief Consumes a block of @p input to an @ref XXH3_state_t.
*
* Call this to incrementally consume blocks of data.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to update.
* @param input The block of data to be hashed, at least @p length bytes in size.
* @param length The length of @p input, in bytes.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
* @pre
* The memory between @p input and @p input + @p length must be valid,
* readable, contiguous memory. However, if @p length is `0`, @p input may be
* `NULL`. In C++, this also must be *TriviallyCopyable*.
*
* @return @ref XXH_OK on success, @ref XXH_ERROR on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_128bits_update (XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length);
/*!
* @brief Returns the calculated XXH3 128-bit hash value from an @ref XXH3_state_t.
*
* @note
* Calling XXH3_128bits_digest() will not affect @p statePtr, so you can update,
* digest, and update again.
*
* @param statePtr The state struct to calculate the hash from.
*
* @pre
* @p statePtr must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return The calculated XXH3 128-bit hash value from that state.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t XXH3_128bits_digest (XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH3_state_t* statePtr);
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
/* Following helper functions make it possible to compare XXH128_hast_t values.
* Since XXH128_hash_t is a structure, this capability is not offered by the language.
* Note: For better performance, these functions can be inlined using XXH_INLINE_ALL */
/*!
* XXH128_isEqual():
* Return: 1 if `h1` and `h2` are equal, 0 if they are not.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF int XXH128_isEqual(XXH128_hash_t h1, XXH128_hash_t h2);
/*!
* @brief Compares two @ref XXH128_hash_t
* This comparator is compatible with stdlib's `qsort()`/`bsearch()`.
*
* @return: >0 if *h128_1 > *h128_2
* =0 if *h128_1 == *h128_2
* <0 if *h128_1 < *h128_2
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF int XXH128_cmp(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* h128_1, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* h128_2);
/******* Canonical representation *******/
typedef struct { unsigned char digest[sizeof(XXH128_hash_t)]; } XXH128_canonical_t;
/*!
* @brief Converts an @ref XXH128_hash_t to a big endian @ref XXH128_canonical_t.
*
* @param dst The @ref XXH128_canonical_t pointer to be stored to.
* @param hash The @ref XXH128_hash_t to be converted.
*
* @pre
* @p dst must not be `NULL`.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH128_canonicalFromHash(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH128_canonical_t* dst, XXH128_hash_t hash);
/*!
* @brief Converts an @ref XXH128_canonical_t to a native @ref XXH128_hash_t.
*
* @param src The @ref XXH128_canonical_t to convert.
*
* @pre
* @p src must not be `NULL`.
*
* @return The converted hash.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t XXH128_hashFromCanonical(XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH128_canonical_t* src);
#endif /* !XXH_NO_XXH3 */
#endif /* XXH_NO_LONG_LONG */
/*!
* @}
*/
#endif /* XXHASH_H_5627135585666179 */
#if defined(XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY) && !defined(XXHASH_H_STATIC_13879238742)
#define XXHASH_H_STATIC_13879238742
/* ****************************************************************************
* This section contains declarations which are not guaranteed to remain stable.
* They may change in future versions, becoming incompatible with a different
* version of the library.
* These declarations should only be used with static linking.
* Never use them in association with dynamic linking!
***************************************************************************** */
/*
* These definitions are only present to allow static allocation
* of XXH states, on stack or in a struct, for example.
* Never **ever** access their members directly.
*/
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Structure for XXH32 streaming API.
*
* @note This is only defined when @ref XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY,
* @ref XXH_INLINE_ALL, or @ref XXH_IMPLEMENTATION is defined. Otherwise it is
* an opaque type. This allows fields to safely be changed.
*
* Typedef'd to @ref XXH32_state_t.
* Do not access the members of this struct directly.
* @see XXH64_state_s, XXH3_state_s
*/
struct XXH32_state_s {
XXH32_hash_t total_len_32; /*!< Total length hashed, modulo 2^32 */
XXH32_hash_t large_len; /*!< Whether the hash is >= 16 (handles @ref total_len_32 overflow) */
XXH32_hash_t v[4]; /*!< Accumulator lanes */
XXH32_hash_t mem32[4]; /*!< Internal buffer for partial reads. Treated as unsigned char[16]. */
XXH32_hash_t memsize; /*!< Amount of data in @ref mem32 */
XXH32_hash_t reserved; /*!< Reserved field. Do not read nor write to it. */
}; /* typedef'd to XXH32_state_t */
#ifndef XXH_NO_LONG_LONG /* defined when there is no 64-bit support */
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Structure for XXH64 streaming API.
*
* @note This is only defined when @ref XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY,
* @ref XXH_INLINE_ALL, or @ref XXH_IMPLEMENTATION is defined. Otherwise it is
* an opaque type. This allows fields to safely be changed.
*
* Typedef'd to @ref XXH64_state_t.
* Do not access the members of this struct directly.
* @see XXH32_state_s, XXH3_state_s
*/
struct XXH64_state_s {
XXH64_hash_t total_len; /*!< Total length hashed. This is always 64-bit. */
XXH64_hash_t v[4]; /*!< Accumulator lanes */
XXH64_hash_t mem64[4]; /*!< Internal buffer for partial reads. Treated as unsigned char[32]. */
XXH32_hash_t memsize; /*!< Amount of data in @ref mem64 */
XXH32_hash_t reserved32; /*!< Reserved field, needed for padding anyways*/
XXH64_hash_t reserved64; /*!< Reserved field. Do not read or write to it. */
}; /* typedef'd to XXH64_state_t */
#ifndef XXH_NO_XXH3
#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L) /* >= C11 */
# include <stdalign.h>
# define XXH_ALIGN(n) alignas(n)
#elif defined(__cplusplus) && (__cplusplus >= 201103L) /* >= C++11 */
/* In C++ alignas() is a keyword */
# define XXH_ALIGN(n) alignas(n)
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
# define XXH_ALIGN(n) __attribute__ ((aligned(n)))
#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
# define XXH_ALIGN(n) __declspec(align(n))
#else
# define XXH_ALIGN(n) /* disabled */
#endif
/* Old GCC versions only accept the attribute after the type in structures. */
#if !(defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L)) /* C11+ */ \
&& ! (defined(__cplusplus) && (__cplusplus >= 201103L)) /* >= C++11 */ \
&& defined(__GNUC__)
# define XXH_ALIGN_MEMBER(align, type) type XXH_ALIGN(align)
#else
# define XXH_ALIGN_MEMBER(align, type) XXH_ALIGN(align) type
#endif
/*!
* @brief The size of the internal XXH3 buffer.
*
* This is the optimal update size for incremental hashing.
*
* @see XXH3_64b_update(), XXH3_128b_update().
*/
#define XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE 256
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Default size of the secret buffer (and @ref XXH3_kSecret).
*
* This is the size used in @ref XXH3_kSecret and the seeded functions.
*
* Not to be confused with @ref XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN.
*/
#define XXH3_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE 192
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Structure for XXH3 streaming API.
*
* @note This is only defined when @ref XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY,
* @ref XXH_INLINE_ALL, or @ref XXH_IMPLEMENTATION is defined.
* Otherwise it is an opaque type.
* Never use this definition in combination with dynamic library.
* This allows fields to safely be changed in the future.
*
* @note ** This structure has a strict alignment requirement of 64 bytes!! **
* Do not allocate this with `malloc()` or `new`,
* it will not be sufficiently aligned.
* Use @ref XXH3_createState() and @ref XXH3_freeState(), or stack allocation.
*
* Typedef'd to @ref XXH3_state_t.
* Do never access the members of this struct directly.
*
* @see XXH3_INITSTATE() for stack initialization.
* @see XXH3_createState(), XXH3_freeState().
* @see XXH32_state_s, XXH64_state_s
*/
struct XXH3_state_s {
XXH_ALIGN_MEMBER(64, XXH64_hash_t acc[8]);
/*!< The 8 accumulators. See @ref XXH32_state_s::v and @ref XXH64_state_s::v */
XXH_ALIGN_MEMBER(64, unsigned char customSecret[XXH3_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE]);
/*!< Used to store a custom secret generated from a seed. */
XXH_ALIGN_MEMBER(64, unsigned char buffer[XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE]);
/*!< The internal buffer. @see XXH32_state_s::mem32 */
XXH32_hash_t bufferedSize;
/*!< The amount of memory in @ref buffer, @see XXH32_state_s::memsize */
XXH32_hash_t useSeed;
/*!< Reserved field. Needed for padding on 64-bit. */
size_t nbStripesSoFar;
/*!< Number or stripes processed. */
XXH64_hash_t totalLen;
/*!< Total length hashed. 64-bit even on 32-bit targets. */
size_t nbStripesPerBlock;
/*!< Number of stripes per block. */
size_t secretLimit;
/*!< Size of @ref customSecret or @ref extSecret */
XXH64_hash_t seed;
/*!< Seed for _withSeed variants. Must be zero otherwise, @see XXH3_INITSTATE() */
XXH64_hash_t reserved64;
/*!< Reserved field. */
const unsigned char* extSecret;
/*!< Reference to an external secret for the _withSecret variants, NULL
* for other variants. */
/* note: there may be some padding at the end due to alignment on 64 bytes */
}; /* typedef'd to XXH3_state_t */
#undef XXH_ALIGN_MEMBER
/*!
* @brief Initializes a stack-allocated `XXH3_state_s`.
*
* When the @ref XXH3_state_t structure is merely emplaced on stack,
* it should be initialized with XXH3_INITSTATE() or a memset()
* in case its first reset uses XXH3_NNbits_reset_withSeed().
* This init can be omitted if the first reset uses default or _withSecret mode.
* This operation isn't necessary when the state is created with XXH3_createState().
* Note that this doesn't prepare the state for a streaming operation,
* it's still necessary to use XXH3_NNbits_reset*() afterwards.
*/
#define XXH3_INITSTATE(XXH3_state_ptr) \
do { \
XXH3_state_t* tmp_xxh3_state_ptr = (XXH3_state_ptr); \
tmp_xxh3_state_ptr->seed = 0; \
tmp_xxh3_state_ptr->extSecret = NULL; \
} while(0)
/*!
* simple alias to pre-selected XXH3_128bits variant
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t XXH128(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* data, size_t len, XXH64_hash_t seed);
/* === Experimental API === */
/* Symbols defined below must be considered tied to a specific library version. */
/*!
* XXH3_generateSecret():
*
* Derive a high-entropy secret from any user-defined content, named customSeed.
* The generated secret can be used in combination with `*_withSecret()` functions.
* The `_withSecret()` variants are useful to provide a higher level of protection
* than 64-bit seed, as it becomes much more difficult for an external actor to
* guess how to impact the calculation logic.
*
* The function accepts as input a custom seed of any length and any content,
* and derives from it a high-entropy secret of length @p secretSize into an
* already allocated buffer @p secretBuffer.
*
* The generated secret can then be used with any `*_withSecret()` variant.
* The functions @ref XXH3_128bits_withSecret(), @ref XXH3_64bits_withSecret(),
* @ref XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecret() and @ref XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret()
* are part of this list. They all accept a `secret` parameter
* which must be large enough for implementation reasons (>= @ref XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN)
* _and_ feature very high entropy (consist of random-looking bytes).
* These conditions can be a high bar to meet, so @ref XXH3_generateSecret() can
* be employed to ensure proper quality.
*
* @p customSeed can be anything. It can have any size, even small ones,
* and its content can be anything, even "poor entropy" sources such as a bunch
* of zeroes. The resulting `secret` will nonetheless provide all required qualities.
*
* @pre
* - @p secretSize must be >= @ref XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN
* - When @p customSeedSize > 0, supplying NULL as customSeed is undefined behavior.
*
* Example code:
* @code{.c}
* #include <stdio.h>
* #include <stdlib.h>
* #include <string.h>
* #define XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY // expose unstable API
* #include "xxhash.h"
* // Hashes argv[2] using the entropy from argv[1].
* int main(int argc, char* argv[])
* {
* char secret[XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN];
* if (argv != 3) { return 1; }
* XXH3_generateSecret(secret, sizeof(secret), argv[1], strlen(argv[1]));
* XXH64_hash_t h = XXH3_64bits_withSecret(
* argv[2], strlen(argv[2]),
* secret, sizeof(secret)
* );
* printf("%016llx\n", (unsigned long long) h);
* }
* @endcode
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_generateSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE void* secretBuffer, size_t secretSize, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* customSeed, size_t customSeedSize);
/*!
* @brief Generate the same secret as the _withSeed() variants.
*
* The generated secret can be used in combination with
*`*_withSecret()` and `_withSecretandSeed()` variants.
*
* Example C++ `std::string` hash class:
* @code{.cpp}
* #include <string>
* #define XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY // expose unstable API
* #include "xxhash.h"
* // Slow, seeds each time
* class HashSlow {
* XXH64_hash_t seed;
* public:
* HashSlow(XXH64_hash_t s) : seed{s} {}
* size_t operator()(const std::string& x) const {
* return size_t{XXH3_64bits_withSeed(x.c_str(), x.length(), seed)};
* }
* };
* // Fast, caches the seeded secret for future uses.
* class HashFast {
* unsigned char secret[XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN];
* public:
* HashFast(XXH64_hash_t s) {
* XXH3_generateSecret_fromSeed(secret, seed);
* }
* size_t operator()(const std::string& x) const {
* return size_t{
* XXH3_64bits_withSecret(x.c_str(), x.length(), secret, sizeof(secret))
* };
* }
* };
* @endcode
* @param secretBuffer A writable buffer of @ref XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN bytes
* @param seed The seed to seed the state.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH3_generateSecret_fromSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE void* secretBuffer, XXH64_hash_t seed);
/*!
* These variants generate hash values using either
* @p seed for "short" keys (< XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX = 240 bytes)
* or @p secret for "large" keys (>= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX).
*
* This generally benefits speed, compared to `_withSeed()` or `_withSecret()`.
* `_withSeed()` has to generate the secret on the fly for "large" keys.
* It's fast, but can be perceptible for "not so large" keys (< 1 KB).
* `_withSecret()` has to generate the masks on the fly for "small" keys,
* which requires more instructions than _withSeed() variants.
* Therefore, _withSecretandSeed variant combines the best of both worlds.
*
* When @p secret has been generated by XXH3_generateSecret_fromSeed(),
* this variant produces *exactly* the same results as `_withSeed()` variant,
* hence offering only a pure speed benefit on "large" input,
* by skipping the need to regenerate the secret for every large input.
*
* Another usage scenario is to hash the secret to a 64-bit hash value,
* for example with XXH3_64bits(), which then becomes the seed,
* and then employ both the seed and the secret in _withSecretandSeed().
* On top of speed, an added benefit is that each bit in the secret
* has a 50% chance to swap each bit in the output, via its impact to the seed.
*
* This is not guaranteed when using the secret directly in "small data" scenarios,
* because only portions of the secret are employed for small data.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_64bits_withSecretandSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* data, size_t len,
XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH64_hash_t seed);
/*! @copydoc XXH3_64bits_withSecretandSeed() */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_128bits_withSecretandSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length,
XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH64_hash_t seed64);
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*! @copydoc XXH3_64bits_withSecretandSeed() */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecretandSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr,
XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH64_hash_t seed64);
/*! @copydoc XXH3_64bits_withSecretandSeed() */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecretandSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr,
XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH64_hash_t seed64);
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
#endif /* !XXH_NO_XXH3 */
#endif /* XXH_NO_LONG_LONG */
#if defined(XXH_INLINE_ALL) || defined(XXH_PRIVATE_API)
# define XXH_IMPLEMENTATION
#endif
#endif /* defined(XXH_STATIC_LINKING_ONLY) && !defined(XXHASH_H_STATIC_13879238742) */
/* ======================================================================== */
/* ======================================================================== */
/* ======================================================================== */
/*-**********************************************************************
* xxHash implementation
*-**********************************************************************
* xxHash's implementation used to be hosted inside xxhash.c.
*
* However, inlining requires implementation to be visible to the compiler,
* hence be included alongside the header.
* Previously, implementation was hosted inside xxhash.c,
* which was then #included when inlining was activated.
* This construction created issues with a few build and install systems,
* as it required xxhash.c to be stored in /include directory.
*
* xxHash implementation is now directly integrated within xxhash.h.
* As a consequence, xxhash.c is no longer needed in /include.
*
* xxhash.c is still available and is still useful.
* In a "normal" setup, when xxhash is not inlined,
* xxhash.h only exposes the prototypes and public symbols,
* while xxhash.c can be built into an object file xxhash.o
* which can then be linked into the final binary.
************************************************************************/
#if ( defined(XXH_INLINE_ALL) || defined(XXH_PRIVATE_API) \
|| defined(XXH_IMPLEMENTATION) ) && !defined(XXH_IMPLEM_13a8737387)
# define XXH_IMPLEM_13a8737387
/* *************************************
* Tuning parameters
***************************************/
/*!
* @defgroup tuning Tuning parameters
* @{
*
* Various macros to control xxHash's behavior.
*/
#ifdef XXH_DOXYGEN
/*!
* @brief Define this to disable 64-bit code.
*
* Useful if only using the @ref XXH32_family and you have a strict C90 compiler.
*/
# define XXH_NO_LONG_LONG
# undef XXH_NO_LONG_LONG /* don't actually */
/*!
* @brief Controls how unaligned memory is accessed.
*
* By default, access to unaligned memory is controlled by `memcpy()`, which is
* safe and portable.
*
* Unfortunately, on some target/compiler combinations, the generated assembly
* is sub-optimal.
*
* The below switch allow selection of a different access method
* in the search for improved performance.
*
* @par Possible options:
*
* - `XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS=0` (default): `memcpy`
* @par
* Use `memcpy()`. Safe and portable. Note that most modern compilers will
* eliminate the function call and treat it as an unaligned access.
*
* - `XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS=1`: `__attribute__((aligned(1)))`
* @par
* Depends on compiler extensions and is therefore not portable.
* This method is safe _if_ your compiler supports it,
* and *generally* as fast or faster than `memcpy`.
*
* - `XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS=2`: Direct cast
* @par
* Casts directly and dereferences. This method doesn't depend on the
* compiler, but it violates the C standard as it directly dereferences an
* unaligned pointer. It can generate buggy code on targets which do not
* support unaligned memory accesses, but in some circumstances, it's the
* only known way to get the most performance.
*
* - `XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS=3`: Byteshift
* @par
* Also portable. This can generate the best code on old compilers which don't
* inline small `memcpy()` calls, and it might also be faster on big-endian
* systems which lack a native byteswap instruction. However, some compilers
* will emit literal byteshifts even if the target supports unaligned access.
*
*
* @warning
* Methods 1 and 2 rely on implementation-defined behavior. Use these with
* care, as what works on one compiler/platform/optimization level may cause
* another to read garbage data or even crash.
*
* See https://fastcompression.blogspot.com/2015/08/accessing-unaligned-memory.html for details.
*
* Prefer these methods in priority order (0 > 3 > 1 > 2)
*/
# define XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS 0
/*!
* @def XXH_SIZE_OPT
* @brief Controls how much xxHash optimizes for size.
*
* xxHash, when compiled, tends to result in a rather large binary size. This
* is mostly due to heavy usage to forced inlining and constant folding of the
* @ref XXH3_family to increase performance.
*
* However, some developers prefer size over speed. This option can
* significantly reduce the size of the generated code. When using the `-Os`
* or `-Oz` options on GCC or Clang, this is defined to 1 by default,
* otherwise it is defined to 0.
*
* Most of these size optimizations can be controlled manually.
*
* This is a number from 0-2.
* - `XXH_SIZE_OPT` == 0: Default. xxHash makes no size optimizations. Speed
* comes first.
* - `XXH_SIZE_OPT` == 1: Default for `-Os` and `-Oz`. xxHash is more
* conservative and disables hacks that increase code size. It implies the
* options @ref XXH_NO_INLINE_HINTS == 1, @ref XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK == 0,
* and @ref XXH3_NEON_LANES == 8 if they are not already defined.
* - `XXH_SIZE_OPT` == 2: xxHash tries to make itself as small as possible.
* Performance may cry. For example, the single shot functions just use the
* streaming API.
*/
# define XXH_SIZE_OPT 0
/*!
* @def XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK
* @brief If defined to non-zero, adds a special path for aligned inputs (XXH32()
* and XXH64() only).
*
* This is an important performance trick for architectures without decent
* unaligned memory access performance.
*
* It checks for input alignment, and when conditions are met, uses a "fast
* path" employing direct 32-bit/64-bit reads, resulting in _dramatically
* faster_ read speed.
*
* The check costs one initial branch per hash, which is generally negligible,
* but not zero.
*
* Moreover, it's not useful to generate an additional code path if memory
* access uses the same instruction for both aligned and unaligned
* addresses (e.g. x86 and aarch64).
*
* In these cases, the alignment check can be removed by setting this macro to 0.
* Then the code will always use unaligned memory access.
* Align check is automatically disabled on x86, x64, ARM64, and some ARM chips
* which are platforms known to offer good unaligned memory accesses performance.
*
* It is also disabled by default when @ref XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 1.
*
* This option does not affect XXH3 (only XXH32 and XXH64).
*/
# define XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK 0
/*!
* @def XXH_NO_INLINE_HINTS
* @brief When non-zero, sets all functions to `static`.
*
* By default, xxHash tries to force the compiler to inline almost all internal
* functions.
*
* This can usually improve performance due to reduced jumping and improved
* constant folding, but significantly increases the size of the binary which
* might not be favorable.
*
* Additionally, sometimes the forced inlining can be detrimental to performance,
* depending on the architecture.
*
* XXH_NO_INLINE_HINTS marks all internal functions as static, giving the
* compiler full control on whether to inline or not.
*
* When not optimizing (-O0), using `-fno-inline` with GCC or Clang, or if
* @ref XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 1, this will automatically be defined.
*/
# define XXH_NO_INLINE_HINTS 0
/*!
* @def XXH3_INLINE_SECRET
* @brief Determines whether to inline the XXH3 withSecret code.
*
* When the secret size is known, the compiler can improve the performance
* of XXH3_64bits_withSecret() and XXH3_128bits_withSecret().
*
* However, if the secret size is not known, it doesn't have any benefit. This
* happens when xxHash is compiled into a global symbol. Therefore, if
* @ref XXH_INLINE_ALL is *not* defined, this will be defined to 0.
*
* Additionally, this defaults to 0 on GCC 12+, which has an issue with function pointers
* that are *sometimes* force inline on -Og, and it is impossible to automatically
* detect this optimization level.
*/
# define XXH3_INLINE_SECRET 0
/*!
* @def XXH32_ENDJMP
* @brief Whether to use a jump for `XXH32_finalize`.
*
* For performance, `XXH32_finalize` uses multiple branches in the finalizer.
* This is generally preferable for performance,
* but depending on exact architecture, a jmp may be preferable.
*
* This setting is only possibly making a difference for very small inputs.
*/
# define XXH32_ENDJMP 0
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Redefines old internal names.
*
* For compatibility with code that uses xxHash's internals before the names
* were changed to improve namespacing. There is no other reason to use this.
*/
# define XXH_OLD_NAMES
# undef XXH_OLD_NAMES /* don't actually use, it is ugly. */
/*!
* @def XXH_NO_STREAM
* @brief Disables the streaming API.
*
* When xxHash is not inlined and the streaming functions are not used, disabling
* the streaming functions can improve code size significantly, especially with
* the @ref XXH3_family which tends to make constant folded copies of itself.
*/
# define XXH_NO_STREAM
# undef XXH_NO_STREAM /* don't actually */
#endif /* XXH_DOXYGEN */
/*!
* @}
*/
#ifndef XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS /* can be defined externally, on command line for example */
/* prefer __packed__ structures (method 1) for GCC
* < ARMv7 with unaligned access (e.g. Raspbian armhf) still uses byte shifting, so we use memcpy
* which for some reason does unaligned loads. */
# if defined(__GNUC__) && !(defined(__ARM_ARCH) && __ARM_ARCH < 7 && defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED))
# define XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS 1
# endif
#endif
#ifndef XXH_SIZE_OPT
/* default to 1 for -Os or -Oz */
# if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__)
# define XXH_SIZE_OPT 1
# else
# define XXH_SIZE_OPT 0
# endif
#endif
#ifndef XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK /* can be defined externally */
/* don't check on sizeopt, x86, aarch64, or arm when unaligned access is available */
# if XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 1 || \
defined(__i386) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED) \
|| defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM) /* visual */
# define XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK 0
# else
# define XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK 1
# endif
#endif
#ifndef XXH_NO_INLINE_HINTS
# if XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 1 || defined(__NO_INLINE__) /* -O0, -fno-inline */
# define XXH_NO_INLINE_HINTS 1
# else
# define XXH_NO_INLINE_HINTS 0
# endif
#endif
#ifndef XXH3_INLINE_SECRET
# if (defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) && __GNUC__ >= 12) \
|| !defined(XXH_INLINE_ALL)
# define XXH3_INLINE_SECRET 0
# else
# define XXH3_INLINE_SECRET 1
# endif
#endif
#ifndef XXH32_ENDJMP
/* generally preferable for performance */
# define XXH32_ENDJMP 0
#endif
/*!
* @defgroup impl Implementation
* @{
*/
/* *************************************
* Includes & Memory related functions
***************************************/
#if defined(XXH_NO_STREAM)
/* nothing */
#elif defined(XXH_NO_STDLIB)
/* When requesting to disable any mention of stdlib,
* the library loses the ability to invoked malloc / free.
* In practice, it means that functions like `XXH*_createState()`
* will always fail, and return NULL.
* This flag is useful in situations where
* xxhash.h is integrated into some kernel, embedded or limited environment
* without access to dynamic allocation.
*/
static XXH_CONSTF void* XXH_malloc(size_t s) { (void)s; return NULL; }
static void XXH_free(void* p) { (void)p; }
#else
/*
* Modify the local functions below should you wish to use
* different memory routines for malloc() and free()
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Modify this function to use a different routine than malloc().
*/
static XXH_MALLOCF void* XXH_malloc(size_t s) { return malloc(s); }
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Modify this function to use a different routine than free().
*/
static void XXH_free(void* p) { free(p); }
#endif /* XXH_NO_STDLIB */
#include <string.h>
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Modify this function to use a different routine than memcpy().
*/
static void* XXH_memcpy(void* dest, const void* src, size_t size)
{
return memcpy(dest,src,size);
}
#include <limits.h> /* ULLONG_MAX */
/* *************************************
* Compiler Specific Options
***************************************/
#ifdef _MSC_VER /* Visual Studio warning fix */
# pragma warning(disable : 4127) /* disable: C4127: conditional expression is constant */
#endif
#if XXH_NO_INLINE_HINTS /* disable inlining hints */
# if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
# define XXH_FORCE_INLINE static __attribute__((unused))
# else
# define XXH_FORCE_INLINE static
# endif
# define XXH_NO_INLINE static
/* enable inlining hints */
#elif defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
# define XXH_FORCE_INLINE static __inline__ __attribute__((always_inline, unused))
# define XXH_NO_INLINE static __attribute__((noinline))
#elif defined(_MSC_VER) /* Visual Studio */
# define XXH_FORCE_INLINE static __forceinline
# define XXH_NO_INLINE static __declspec(noinline)
#elif defined (__cplusplus) \
|| (defined (__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L)) /* C99 */
# define XXH_FORCE_INLINE static inline
# define XXH_NO_INLINE static
#else
# define XXH_FORCE_INLINE static
# define XXH_NO_INLINE static
#endif
#if XXH3_INLINE_SECRET
# define XXH3_WITH_SECRET_INLINE XXH_FORCE_INLINE
#else
# define XXH3_WITH_SECRET_INLINE XXH_NO_INLINE
#endif
/* *************************************
* Debug
***************************************/
/*!
* @ingroup tuning
* @def XXH_DEBUGLEVEL
* @brief Sets the debugging level.
*
* XXH_DEBUGLEVEL is expected to be defined externally, typically via the
* compiler's command line options. The value must be a number.
*/
#ifndef XXH_DEBUGLEVEL
# ifdef DEBUGLEVEL /* backwards compat */
# define XXH_DEBUGLEVEL DEBUGLEVEL
# else
# define XXH_DEBUGLEVEL 0
# endif
#endif
#if (XXH_DEBUGLEVEL>=1)
# include <assert.h> /* note: can still be disabled with NDEBUG */
# define XXH_ASSERT(c) assert(c)
#else
# if defined(__INTEL_COMPILER)
# define XXH_ASSERT(c) XXH_ASSUME((unsigned char) (c))
# else
# define XXH_ASSERT(c) XXH_ASSUME(c)
# endif
#endif
/* note: use after variable declarations */
#ifndef XXH_STATIC_ASSERT
# if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L) /* C11 */
# define XXH_STATIC_ASSERT_WITH_MESSAGE(c,m) do { _Static_assert((c),m); } while(0)
# elif defined(__cplusplus) && (__cplusplus >= 201103L) /* C++11 */
# define XXH_STATIC_ASSERT_WITH_MESSAGE(c,m) do { static_assert((c),m); } while(0)
# else
# define XXH_STATIC_ASSERT_WITH_MESSAGE(c,m) do { struct xxh_sa { char x[(c) ? 1 : -1]; }; } while(0)
# endif
# define XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(c) XXH_STATIC_ASSERT_WITH_MESSAGE((c),#c)
#endif
/*!
* @internal
* @def XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(var)
* @brief Used to prevent unwanted optimizations for @p var.
*
* It uses an empty GCC inline assembly statement with a register constraint
* which forces @p var into a general purpose register (eg eax, ebx, ecx
* on x86) and marks it as modified.
*
* This is used in a few places to avoid unwanted autovectorization (e.g.
* XXH32_round()). All vectorization we want is explicit via intrinsics,
* and _usually_ isn't wanted elsewhere.
*
* We also use it to prevent unwanted constant folding for AArch64 in
* XXH3_initCustomSecret_scalar().
*/
#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
# define XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(var) __asm__("" : "+r" (var))
#else
# define XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(var) ((void)0)
#endif
/* Specifically for NEON vectors which use the "w" constraint, on
* Clang. */
#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__ARM_ARCH) && !defined(__wasm__)
# define XXH_COMPILER_GUARD_CLANG_NEON(var) __asm__("" : "+w" (var))
#else
# define XXH_COMPILER_GUARD_CLANG_NEON(var) ((void)0)
#endif
/* *************************************
* Basic Types
***************************************/
#if !defined (__VMS) \
&& (defined (__cplusplus) \
|| (defined (__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) /* C99 */) )
# include <stdint.h>
typedef uint8_t xxh_u8;
#else
typedef unsigned char xxh_u8;
#endif
typedef XXH32_hash_t xxh_u32;
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
# warning "XXH_OLD_NAMES is planned to be removed starting v0.9. If the program depends on it, consider moving away from it by employing newer type names directly"
# define BYTE xxh_u8
# define U8 xxh_u8
# define U32 xxh_u32
#endif
/* *** Memory access *** */
/*!
* @internal
* @fn xxh_u32 XXH_read32(const void* ptr)
* @brief Reads an unaligned 32-bit integer from @p ptr in native endianness.
*
* Affected by @ref XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS.
*
* @param ptr The pointer to read from.
* @return The 32-bit native endian integer from the bytes at @p ptr.
*/
/*!
* @internal
* @fn xxh_u32 XXH_readLE32(const void* ptr)
* @brief Reads an unaligned 32-bit little endian integer from @p ptr.
*
* Affected by @ref XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS.
*
* @param ptr The pointer to read from.
* @return The 32-bit little endian integer from the bytes at @p ptr.
*/
/*!
* @internal
* @fn xxh_u32 XXH_readBE32(const void* ptr)
* @brief Reads an unaligned 32-bit big endian integer from @p ptr.
*
* Affected by @ref XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS.
*
* @param ptr The pointer to read from.
* @return The 32-bit big endian integer from the bytes at @p ptr.
*/
/*!
* @internal
* @fn xxh_u32 XXH_readLE32_align(const void* ptr, XXH_alignment align)
* @brief Like @ref XXH_readLE32(), but has an option for aligned reads.
*
* Affected by @ref XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS.
* Note that when @ref XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK == 0, the @p align parameter is
* always @ref XXH_alignment::XXH_unaligned.
*
* @param ptr The pointer to read from.
* @param align Whether @p ptr is aligned.
* @pre
* If @p align == @ref XXH_alignment::XXH_aligned, @p ptr must be 4 byte
* aligned.
* @return The 32-bit little endian integer from the bytes at @p ptr.
*/
#if (defined(XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS) && (XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==3))
/*
* Manual byteshift. Best for old compilers which don't inline memcpy.
* We actually directly use XXH_readLE32 and XXH_readBE32.
*/
#elif (defined(XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS) && (XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==2))
/*
* Force direct memory access. Only works on CPU which support unaligned memory
* access in hardware.
*/
static xxh_u32 XXH_read32(const void* memPtr) { return *(const xxh_u32*) memPtr; }
#elif (defined(XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS) && (XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==1))
/*
* __attribute__((aligned(1))) is supported by gcc and clang. Originally the
* documentation claimed that it only increased the alignment, but actually it
* can decrease it on gcc, clang, and icc:
* https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=69502,
* https://gcc.godbolt.org/z/xYez1j67Y.
*/
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
typedef union { xxh_u32 u32; } __attribute__((packed)) unalign;
#endif
static xxh_u32 XXH_read32(const void* ptr)
{
typedef __attribute__((aligned(1))) xxh_u32 xxh_unalign32;
return *((const xxh_unalign32*)ptr);
}
#else
/*
* Portable and safe solution. Generally efficient.
* see: https://fastcompression.blogspot.com/2015/08/accessing-unaligned-memory.html
*/
static xxh_u32 XXH_read32(const void* memPtr)
{
xxh_u32 val;
XXH_memcpy(&val, memPtr, sizeof(val));
return val;
}
#endif /* XXH_FORCE_DIRECT_MEMORY_ACCESS */
/* *** Endianness *** */
/*!
* @ingroup tuning
* @def XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
* @brief Whether the target is little endian.
*
* Defined to 1 if the target is little endian, or 0 if it is big endian.
* It can be defined externally, for example on the compiler command line.
*
* If it is not defined,
* a runtime check (which is usually constant folded) is used instead.
*
* @note
* This is not necessarily defined to an integer constant.
*
* @see XXH_isLittleEndian() for the runtime check.
*/
#ifndef XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
/*
* Try to detect endianness automatically, to avoid the nonstandard behavior
* in `XXH_isLittleEndian()`
*/
# if defined(_WIN32) /* Windows is always little endian */ \
|| defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) \
|| (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
# define XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN 1
# elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) \
|| (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__)
# define XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN 0
# else
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Runtime check for @ref XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN.
*
* Most compilers will constant fold this.
*/
static int XXH_isLittleEndian(void)
{
/*
* Portable and well-defined behavior.
* Don't use static: it is detrimental to performance.
*/
const union { xxh_u32 u; xxh_u8 c[4]; } one = { 1 };
return one.c[0];
}
# define XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN XXH_isLittleEndian()
# endif
#endif
/* ****************************************
* Compiler-specific Functions and Macros
******************************************/
#define XXH_GCC_VERSION (__GNUC__ * 100 + __GNUC_MINOR__)
#ifdef __has_builtin
# define XXH_HAS_BUILTIN(x) __has_builtin(x)
#else
# define XXH_HAS_BUILTIN(x) 0
#endif
/*
* C23 and future versions have standard "unreachable()".
* Once it has been implemented reliably we can add it as an
* additional case:
*
* ```
* #if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= XXH_C23_VN)
* # include <stddef.h>
* # ifdef unreachable
* # define XXH_UNREACHABLE() unreachable()
* # endif
* #endif
* ```
*
* Note C++23 also has std::unreachable() which can be detected
* as follows:
* ```
* #if defined(__cpp_lib_unreachable) && (__cpp_lib_unreachable >= 202202L)
* # include <utility>
* # define XXH_UNREACHABLE() std::unreachable()
* #endif
* ```
* NB: `__cpp_lib_unreachable` is defined in the `<version>` header.
* We don't use that as including `<utility>` in `extern "C"` blocks
* doesn't work on GCC12
*/
#if XXH_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_unreachable)
# define XXH_UNREACHABLE() __builtin_unreachable()
#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
# define XXH_UNREACHABLE() __assume(0)
#else
# define XXH_UNREACHABLE()
#endif
#if XXH_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_assume)
# define XXH_ASSUME(c) __builtin_assume(c)
#else
# define XXH_ASSUME(c) if (!(c)) { XXH_UNREACHABLE(); }
#endif
/*!
* @internal
* @def XXH_rotl32(x,r)
* @brief 32-bit rotate left.
*
* @param x The 32-bit integer to be rotated.
* @param r The number of bits to rotate.
* @pre
* @p r > 0 && @p r < 32
* @note
* @p x and @p r may be evaluated multiple times.
* @return The rotated result.
*/
#if !defined(NO_CLANG_BUILTIN) && XXH_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_rotateleft32) \
&& XXH_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_rotateleft64)
# define XXH_rotl32 __builtin_rotateleft32
# define XXH_rotl64 __builtin_rotateleft64
/* Note: although _rotl exists for minGW (GCC under windows), performance seems poor */
#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
# define XXH_rotl32(x,r) _rotl(x,r)
# define XXH_rotl64(x,r) _rotl64(x,r)
#else
# define XXH_rotl32(x,r) (((x) << (r)) | ((x) >> (32 - (r))))
# define XXH_rotl64(x,r) (((x) << (r)) | ((x) >> (64 - (r))))
#endif
/*!
* @internal
* @fn xxh_u32 XXH_swap32(xxh_u32 x)
* @brief A 32-bit byteswap.
*
* @param x The 32-bit integer to byteswap.
* @return @p x, byteswapped.
*/
#if defined(_MSC_VER) /* Visual Studio */
# define XXH_swap32 _byteswap_ulong
#elif XXH_GCC_VERSION >= 403
# define XXH_swap32 __builtin_bswap32
#else
static xxh_u32 XXH_swap32 (xxh_u32 x)
{
return ((x << 24) & 0xff000000 ) |
((x << 8) & 0x00ff0000 ) |
((x >> 8) & 0x0000ff00 ) |
((x >> 24) & 0x000000ff );
}
#endif
/* ***************************
* Memory reads
*****************************/
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Enum to indicate whether a pointer is aligned.
*/
typedef enum {
XXH_aligned, /*!< Aligned */
XXH_unaligned /*!< Possibly unaligned */
} XXH_alignment;
/*
* XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==3 is an endian-independent byteshift load.
*
* This is ideal for older compilers which don't inline memcpy.
*/
#if (defined(XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS) && (XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==3))
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u32 XXH_readLE32(const void* memPtr)
{
const xxh_u8* bytePtr = (const xxh_u8 *)memPtr;
return bytePtr[0]
| ((xxh_u32)bytePtr[1] << 8)
| ((xxh_u32)bytePtr[2] << 16)
| ((xxh_u32)bytePtr[3] << 24);
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u32 XXH_readBE32(const void* memPtr)
{
const xxh_u8* bytePtr = (const xxh_u8 *)memPtr;
return bytePtr[3]
| ((xxh_u32)bytePtr[2] << 8)
| ((xxh_u32)bytePtr[1] << 16)
| ((xxh_u32)bytePtr[0] << 24);
}
#else
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u32 XXH_readLE32(const void* ptr)
{
return XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN ? XXH_read32(ptr) : XXH_swap32(XXH_read32(ptr));
}
static xxh_u32 XXH_readBE32(const void* ptr)
{
return XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN ? XXH_swap32(XXH_read32(ptr)) : XXH_read32(ptr);
}
#endif
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u32
XXH_readLE32_align(const void* ptr, XXH_alignment align)
{
if (align==XXH_unaligned) {
return XXH_readLE32(ptr);
} else {
return XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN ? *(const xxh_u32*)ptr : XXH_swap32(*(const xxh_u32*)ptr);
}
}
/* *************************************
* Misc
***************************************/
/*! @ingroup public */
XXH_PUBLIC_API unsigned XXH_versionNumber (void) { return XXH_VERSION_NUMBER; }
/* *******************************************************************
* 32-bit hash functions
*********************************************************************/
/*!
* @}
* @defgroup XXH32_impl XXH32 implementation
* @ingroup impl
*
* Details on the XXH32 implementation.
* @{
*/
/* #define instead of static const, to be used as initializers */
#define XXH_PRIME32_1 0x9E3779B1U /*!< 0b10011110001101110111100110110001 */
#define XXH_PRIME32_2 0x85EBCA77U /*!< 0b10000101111010111100101001110111 */
#define XXH_PRIME32_3 0xC2B2AE3DU /*!< 0b11000010101100101010111000111101 */
#define XXH_PRIME32_4 0x27D4EB2FU /*!< 0b00100111110101001110101100101111 */
#define XXH_PRIME32_5 0x165667B1U /*!< 0b00010110010101100110011110110001 */
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
# define PRIME32_1 XXH_PRIME32_1
# define PRIME32_2 XXH_PRIME32_2
# define PRIME32_3 XXH_PRIME32_3
# define PRIME32_4 XXH_PRIME32_4
# define PRIME32_5 XXH_PRIME32_5
#endif
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Normal stripe processing routine.
*
* This shuffles the bits so that any bit from @p input impacts several bits in
* @p acc.
*
* @param acc The accumulator lane.
* @param input The stripe of input to mix.
* @return The mixed accumulator lane.
*/
static xxh_u32 XXH32_round(xxh_u32 acc, xxh_u32 input)
{
acc += input * XXH_PRIME32_2;
acc = XXH_rotl32(acc, 13);
acc *= XXH_PRIME32_1;
#if (defined(__SSE4_1__) || defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__wasm_simd128__)) && !defined(XXH_ENABLE_AUTOVECTORIZE)
/*
* UGLY HACK:
* A compiler fence is the only thing that prevents GCC and Clang from
* autovectorizing the XXH32 loop (pragmas and attributes don't work for some
* reason) without globally disabling SSE4.1.
*
* The reason we want to avoid vectorization is because despite working on
* 4 integers at a time, there are multiple factors slowing XXH32 down on
* SSE4:
* - There's a ridiculous amount of lag from pmulld (10 cycles of latency on
* newer chips!) making it slightly slower to multiply four integers at
* once compared to four integers independently. Even when pmulld was
* fastest, Sandy/Ivy Bridge, it is still not worth it to go into SSE
* just to multiply unless doing a long operation.
*
* - Four instructions are required to rotate,
* movqda tmp, v // not required with VEX encoding
* pslld tmp, 13 // tmp <<= 13
* psrld v, 19 // x >>= 19
* por v, tmp // x |= tmp
* compared to one for scalar:
* roll v, 13 // reliably fast across the board
* shldl v, v, 13 // Sandy Bridge and later prefer this for some reason
*
* - Instruction level parallelism is actually more beneficial here because
* the SIMD actually serializes this operation: While v1 is rotating, v2
* can load data, while v3 can multiply. SSE forces them to operate
* together.
*
* This is also enabled on AArch64, as Clang is *very aggressive* in vectorizing
* the loop. NEON is only faster on the A53, and with the newer cores, it is less
* than half the speed.
*
* Additionally, this is used on WASM SIMD128 because it JITs to the same
* SIMD instructions and has the same issue.
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(acc);
#endif
return acc;
}
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Mixes all bits to finalize the hash.
*
* The final mix ensures that all input bits have a chance to impact any bit in
* the output digest, resulting in an unbiased distribution.
*
* @param hash The hash to avalanche.
* @return The avalanched hash.
*/
static xxh_u32 XXH32_avalanche(xxh_u32 hash)
{
hash ^= hash >> 15;
hash *= XXH_PRIME32_2;
hash ^= hash >> 13;
hash *= XXH_PRIME32_3;
hash ^= hash >> 16;
return hash;
}
#define XXH_get32bits(p) XXH_readLE32_align(p, align)
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Processes the last 0-15 bytes of @p ptr.
*
* There may be up to 15 bytes remaining to consume from the input.
* This final stage will digest them to ensure that all input bytes are present
* in the final mix.
*
* @param hash The hash to finalize.
* @param ptr The pointer to the remaining input.
* @param len The remaining length, modulo 16.
* @param align Whether @p ptr is aligned.
* @return The finalized hash.
* @see XXH64_finalize().
*/
static XXH_PUREF xxh_u32
XXH32_finalize(xxh_u32 hash, const xxh_u8* ptr, size_t len, XXH_alignment align)
{
#define XXH_PROCESS1 do { \
hash += (*ptr++) * XXH_PRIME32_5; \
hash = XXH_rotl32(hash, 11) * XXH_PRIME32_1; \
} while (0)
#define XXH_PROCESS4 do { \
hash += XXH_get32bits(ptr) * XXH_PRIME32_3; \
ptr += 4; \
hash = XXH_rotl32(hash, 17) * XXH_PRIME32_4; \
} while (0)
if (ptr==NULL) XXH_ASSERT(len == 0);
/* Compact rerolled version; generally faster */
if (!XXH32_ENDJMP) {
len &= 15;
while (len >= 4) {
XXH_PROCESS4;
len -= 4;
}
while (len > 0) {
XXH_PROCESS1;
--len;
}
return XXH32_avalanche(hash);
} else {
switch(len&15) /* or switch(bEnd - p) */ {
case 12: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 8: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 4: XXH_PROCESS4;
return XXH32_avalanche(hash);
case 13: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 9: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 5: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_PROCESS1;
return XXH32_avalanche(hash);
case 14: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 10: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 6: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_PROCESS1;
XXH_PROCESS1;
return XXH32_avalanche(hash);
case 15: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 11: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 7: XXH_PROCESS4;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 3: XXH_PROCESS1;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 2: XXH_PROCESS1;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 1: XXH_PROCESS1;
XXH_FALLTHROUGH; /* fallthrough */
case 0: return XXH32_avalanche(hash);
}
XXH_ASSERT(0);
return hash; /* reaching this point is deemed impossible */
}
}
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
# define PROCESS1 XXH_PROCESS1
# define PROCESS4 XXH_PROCESS4
#else
# undef XXH_PROCESS1
# undef XXH_PROCESS4
#endif
/*!
* @internal
* @brief The implementation for @ref XXH32().
*
* @param input , len , seed Directly passed from @ref XXH32().
* @param align Whether @p input is aligned.
* @return The calculated hash.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF xxh_u32
XXH32_endian_align(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, xxh_u32 seed, XXH_alignment align)
{
xxh_u32 h32;
if (input==NULL) XXH_ASSERT(len == 0);
if (len>=16) {
const xxh_u8* const bEnd = input + len;
const xxh_u8* const limit = bEnd - 15;
xxh_u32 v1 = seed + XXH_PRIME32_1 + XXH_PRIME32_2;
xxh_u32 v2 = seed + XXH_PRIME32_2;
xxh_u32 v3 = seed + 0;
xxh_u32 v4 = seed - XXH_PRIME32_1;
do {
v1 = XXH32_round(v1, XXH_get32bits(input)); input += 4;
v2 = XXH32_round(v2, XXH_get32bits(input)); input += 4;
v3 = XXH32_round(v3, XXH_get32bits(input)); input += 4;
v4 = XXH32_round(v4, XXH_get32bits(input)); input += 4;
} while (input < limit);
h32 = XXH_rotl32(v1, 1) + XXH_rotl32(v2, 7)
+ XXH_rotl32(v3, 12) + XXH_rotl32(v4, 18);
} else {
h32 = seed + XXH_PRIME32_5;
}
h32 += (xxh_u32)len;
return XXH32_finalize(h32, input, len&15, align);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH32_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH32_hash_t XXH32 (const void* input, size_t len, XXH32_hash_t seed)
{
#if !defined(XXH_NO_STREAM) && XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 2
/* Simple version, good for code maintenance, but unfortunately slow for small inputs */
XXH32_state_t state;
XXH32_reset(&state, seed);
XXH32_update(&state, (const xxh_u8*)input, len);
return XXH32_digest(&state);
#else
if (XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK) {
if ((((size_t)input) & 3) == 0) { /* Input is 4-bytes aligned, leverage the speed benefit */
return XXH32_endian_align((const xxh_u8*)input, len, seed, XXH_aligned);
} }
return XXH32_endian_align((const xxh_u8*)input, len, seed, XXH_unaligned);
#endif
}
/******* Hash streaming *******/
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*! @ingroup XXH32_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH32_state_t* XXH32_createState(void)
{
return (XXH32_state_t*)XXH_malloc(sizeof(XXH32_state_t));
}
/*! @ingroup XXH32_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH32_freeState(XXH32_state_t* statePtr)
{
XXH_free(statePtr);
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH32_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH32_copyState(XXH32_state_t* dstState, const XXH32_state_t* srcState)
{
XXH_memcpy(dstState, srcState, sizeof(*dstState));
}
/*! @ingroup XXH32_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH32_reset(XXH32_state_t* statePtr, XXH32_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(statePtr != NULL);
memset(statePtr, 0, sizeof(*statePtr));
statePtr->v[0] = seed + XXH_PRIME32_1 + XXH_PRIME32_2;
statePtr->v[1] = seed + XXH_PRIME32_2;
statePtr->v[2] = seed + 0;
statePtr->v[3] = seed - XXH_PRIME32_1;
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH32_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH32_update(XXH32_state_t* state, const void* input, size_t len)
{
if (input==NULL) {
XXH_ASSERT(len == 0);
return XXH_OK;
}
{ const xxh_u8* p = (const xxh_u8*)input;
const xxh_u8* const bEnd = p + len;
state->total_len_32 += (XXH32_hash_t)len;
state->large_len |= (XXH32_hash_t)((len>=16) | (state->total_len_32>=16));
if (state->memsize + len < 16) { /* fill in tmp buffer */
XXH_memcpy((xxh_u8*)(state->mem32) + state->memsize, input, len);
state->memsize += (XXH32_hash_t)len;
return XXH_OK;
}
if (state->memsize) { /* some data left from previous update */
XXH_memcpy((xxh_u8*)(state->mem32) + state->memsize, input, 16-state->memsize);
{ const xxh_u32* p32 = state->mem32;
state->v[0] = XXH32_round(state->v[0], XXH_readLE32(p32)); p32++;
state->v[1] = XXH32_round(state->v[1], XXH_readLE32(p32)); p32++;
state->v[2] = XXH32_round(state->v[2], XXH_readLE32(p32)); p32++;
state->v[3] = XXH32_round(state->v[3], XXH_readLE32(p32));
}
p += 16-state->memsize;
state->memsize = 0;
}
if (p <= bEnd-16) {
const xxh_u8* const limit = bEnd - 16;
do {
state->v[0] = XXH32_round(state->v[0], XXH_readLE32(p)); p+=4;
state->v[1] = XXH32_round(state->v[1], XXH_readLE32(p)); p+=4;
state->v[2] = XXH32_round(state->v[2], XXH_readLE32(p)); p+=4;
state->v[3] = XXH32_round(state->v[3], XXH_readLE32(p)); p+=4;
} while (p<=limit);
}
if (p < bEnd) {
XXH_memcpy(state->mem32, p, (size_t)(bEnd-p));
state->memsize = (unsigned)(bEnd-p);
}
}
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH32_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH32_hash_t XXH32_digest(const XXH32_state_t* state)
{
xxh_u32 h32;
if (state->large_len) {
h32 = XXH_rotl32(state->v[0], 1)
+ XXH_rotl32(state->v[1], 7)
+ XXH_rotl32(state->v[2], 12)
+ XXH_rotl32(state->v[3], 18);
} else {
h32 = state->v[2] /* == seed */ + XXH_PRIME32_5;
}
h32 += state->total_len_32;
return XXH32_finalize(h32, (const xxh_u8*)state->mem32, state->memsize, XXH_aligned);
}
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
/******* Canonical representation *******/
/*!
* @ingroup XXH32_family
* The default return values from XXH functions are unsigned 32 and 64 bit
* integers.
*
* The canonical representation uses big endian convention, the same convention
* as human-readable numbers (large digits first).
*
* This way, hash values can be written into a file or buffer, remaining
* comparable across different systems.
*
* The following functions allow transformation of hash values to and from their
* canonical format.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH32_canonicalFromHash(XXH32_canonical_t* dst, XXH32_hash_t hash)
{
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(XXH32_canonical_t) == sizeof(XXH32_hash_t));
if (XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) hash = XXH_swap32(hash);
XXH_memcpy(dst, &hash, sizeof(*dst));
}
/*! @ingroup XXH32_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH32_hash_t XXH32_hashFromCanonical(const XXH32_canonical_t* src)
{
return XXH_readBE32(src);
}
#ifndef XXH_NO_LONG_LONG
/* *******************************************************************
* 64-bit hash functions
*********************************************************************/
/*!
* @}
* @ingroup impl
* @{
*/
/******* Memory access *******/
typedef XXH64_hash_t xxh_u64;
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
# define U64 xxh_u64
#endif
#if (defined(XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS) && (XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==3))
/*
* Manual byteshift. Best for old compilers which don't inline memcpy.
* We actually directly use XXH_readLE64 and XXH_readBE64.
*/
#elif (defined(XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS) && (XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==2))
/* Force direct memory access. Only works on CPU which support unaligned memory access in hardware */
static xxh_u64 XXH_read64(const void* memPtr)
{
return *(const xxh_u64*) memPtr;
}
#elif (defined(XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS) && (XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==1))
/*
* __attribute__((aligned(1))) is supported by gcc and clang. Originally the
* documentation claimed that it only increased the alignment, but actually it
* can decrease it on gcc, clang, and icc:
* https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=69502,
* https://gcc.godbolt.org/z/xYez1j67Y.
*/
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
typedef union { xxh_u32 u32; xxh_u64 u64; } __attribute__((packed)) unalign64;
#endif
static xxh_u64 XXH_read64(const void* ptr)
{
typedef __attribute__((aligned(1))) xxh_u64 xxh_unalign64;
return *((const xxh_unalign64*)ptr);
}
#else
/*
* Portable and safe solution. Generally efficient.
* see: https://fastcompression.blogspot.com/2015/08/accessing-unaligned-memory.html
*/
static xxh_u64 XXH_read64(const void* memPtr)
{
xxh_u64 val;
XXH_memcpy(&val, memPtr, sizeof(val));
return val;
}
#endif /* XXH_FORCE_DIRECT_MEMORY_ACCESS */
#if defined(_MSC_VER) /* Visual Studio */
# define XXH_swap64 _byteswap_uint64
#elif XXH_GCC_VERSION >= 403
# define XXH_swap64 __builtin_bswap64
#else
static xxh_u64 XXH_swap64(xxh_u64 x)
{
return ((x << 56) & 0xff00000000000000ULL) |
((x << 40) & 0x00ff000000000000ULL) |
((x << 24) & 0x0000ff0000000000ULL) |
((x << 8) & 0x000000ff00000000ULL) |
((x >> 8) & 0x00000000ff000000ULL) |
((x >> 24) & 0x0000000000ff0000ULL) |
((x >> 40) & 0x000000000000ff00ULL) |
((x >> 56) & 0x00000000000000ffULL);
}
#endif
/* XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==3 is an endian-independent byteshift load. */
#if (defined(XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS) && (XXH_FORCE_MEMORY_ACCESS==3))
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64 XXH_readLE64(const void* memPtr)
{
const xxh_u8* bytePtr = (const xxh_u8 *)memPtr;
return bytePtr[0]
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[1] << 8)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[2] << 16)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[3] << 24)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[4] << 32)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[5] << 40)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[6] << 48)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[7] << 56);
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64 XXH_readBE64(const void* memPtr)
{
const xxh_u8* bytePtr = (const xxh_u8 *)memPtr;
return bytePtr[7]
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[6] << 8)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[5] << 16)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[4] << 24)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[3] << 32)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[2] << 40)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[1] << 48)
| ((xxh_u64)bytePtr[0] << 56);
}
#else
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64 XXH_readLE64(const void* ptr)
{
return XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN ? XXH_read64(ptr) : XXH_swap64(XXH_read64(ptr));
}
static xxh_u64 XXH_readBE64(const void* ptr)
{
return XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN ? XXH_swap64(XXH_read64(ptr)) : XXH_read64(ptr);
}
#endif
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64
XXH_readLE64_align(const void* ptr, XXH_alignment align)
{
if (align==XXH_unaligned)
return XXH_readLE64(ptr);
else
return XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN ? *(const xxh_u64*)ptr : XXH_swap64(*(const xxh_u64*)ptr);
}
/******* xxh64 *******/
/*!
* @}
* @defgroup XXH64_impl XXH64 implementation
* @ingroup impl
*
* Details on the XXH64 implementation.
* @{
*/
/* #define rather that static const, to be used as initializers */
#define XXH_PRIME64_1 0x9E3779B185EBCA87ULL /*!< 0b1001111000110111011110011011000110000101111010111100101010000111 */
#define XXH_PRIME64_2 0xC2B2AE3D27D4EB4FULL /*!< 0b1100001010110010101011100011110100100111110101001110101101001111 */
#define XXH_PRIME64_3 0x165667B19E3779F9ULL /*!< 0b0001011001010110011001111011000110011110001101110111100111111001 */
#define XXH_PRIME64_4 0x85EBCA77C2B2AE63ULL /*!< 0b1000010111101011110010100111011111000010101100101010111001100011 */
#define XXH_PRIME64_5 0x27D4EB2F165667C5ULL /*!< 0b0010011111010100111010110010111100010110010101100110011111000101 */
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
# define PRIME64_1 XXH_PRIME64_1
# define PRIME64_2 XXH_PRIME64_2
# define PRIME64_3 XXH_PRIME64_3
# define PRIME64_4 XXH_PRIME64_4
# define PRIME64_5 XXH_PRIME64_5
#endif
/*! @copydoc XXH32_round */
static xxh_u64 XXH64_round(xxh_u64 acc, xxh_u64 input)
{
acc += input * XXH_PRIME64_2;
acc = XXH_rotl64(acc, 31);
acc *= XXH_PRIME64_1;
return acc;
}
static xxh_u64 XXH64_mergeRound(xxh_u64 acc, xxh_u64 val)
{
val = XXH64_round(0, val);
acc ^= val;
acc = acc * XXH_PRIME64_1 + XXH_PRIME64_4;
return acc;
}
/*! @copydoc XXH32_avalanche */
static xxh_u64 XXH64_avalanche(xxh_u64 hash)
{
hash ^= hash >> 33;
hash *= XXH_PRIME64_2;
hash ^= hash >> 29;
hash *= XXH_PRIME64_3;
hash ^= hash >> 32;
return hash;
}
#define XXH_get64bits(p) XXH_readLE64_align(p, align)
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Processes the last 0-31 bytes of @p ptr.
*
* There may be up to 31 bytes remaining to consume from the input.
* This final stage will digest them to ensure that all input bytes are present
* in the final mix.
*
* @param hash The hash to finalize.
* @param ptr The pointer to the remaining input.
* @param len The remaining length, modulo 32.
* @param align Whether @p ptr is aligned.
* @return The finalized hash
* @see XXH32_finalize().
*/
static XXH_PUREF xxh_u64
XXH64_finalize(xxh_u64 hash, const xxh_u8* ptr, size_t len, XXH_alignment align)
{
if (ptr==NULL) XXH_ASSERT(len == 0);
len &= 31;
while (len >= 8) {
xxh_u64 const k1 = XXH64_round(0, XXH_get64bits(ptr));
ptr += 8;
hash ^= k1;
hash = XXH_rotl64(hash,27) * XXH_PRIME64_1 + XXH_PRIME64_4;
len -= 8;
}
if (len >= 4) {
hash ^= (xxh_u64)(XXH_get32bits(ptr)) * XXH_PRIME64_1;
ptr += 4;
hash = XXH_rotl64(hash, 23) * XXH_PRIME64_2 + XXH_PRIME64_3;
len -= 4;
}
while (len > 0) {
hash ^= (*ptr++) * XXH_PRIME64_5;
hash = XXH_rotl64(hash, 11) * XXH_PRIME64_1;
--len;
}
return XXH64_avalanche(hash);
}
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
# define PROCESS1_64 XXH_PROCESS1_64
# define PROCESS4_64 XXH_PROCESS4_64
# define PROCESS8_64 XXH_PROCESS8_64
#else
# undef XXH_PROCESS1_64
# undef XXH_PROCESS4_64
# undef XXH_PROCESS8_64
#endif
/*!
* @internal
* @brief The implementation for @ref XXH64().
*
* @param input , len , seed Directly passed from @ref XXH64().
* @param align Whether @p input is aligned.
* @return The calculated hash.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF xxh_u64
XXH64_endian_align(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, xxh_u64 seed, XXH_alignment align)
{
xxh_u64 h64;
if (input==NULL) XXH_ASSERT(len == 0);
if (len>=32) {
const xxh_u8* const bEnd = input + len;
const xxh_u8* const limit = bEnd - 31;
xxh_u64 v1 = seed + XXH_PRIME64_1 + XXH_PRIME64_2;
xxh_u64 v2 = seed + XXH_PRIME64_2;
xxh_u64 v3 = seed + 0;
xxh_u64 v4 = seed - XXH_PRIME64_1;
do {
v1 = XXH64_round(v1, XXH_get64bits(input)); input+=8;
v2 = XXH64_round(v2, XXH_get64bits(input)); input+=8;
v3 = XXH64_round(v3, XXH_get64bits(input)); input+=8;
v4 = XXH64_round(v4, XXH_get64bits(input)); input+=8;
} while (input<limit);
h64 = XXH_rotl64(v1, 1) + XXH_rotl64(v2, 7) + XXH_rotl64(v3, 12) + XXH_rotl64(v4, 18);
h64 = XXH64_mergeRound(h64, v1);
h64 = XXH64_mergeRound(h64, v2);
h64 = XXH64_mergeRound(h64, v3);
h64 = XXH64_mergeRound(h64, v4);
} else {
h64 = seed + XXH_PRIME64_5;
}
h64 += (xxh_u64) len;
return XXH64_finalize(h64, input, len, align);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_hash_t XXH64 (XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
#if !defined(XXH_NO_STREAM) && XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 2
/* Simple version, good for code maintenance, but unfortunately slow for small inputs */
XXH64_state_t state;
XXH64_reset(&state, seed);
XXH64_update(&state, (const xxh_u8*)input, len);
return XXH64_digest(&state);
#else
if (XXH_FORCE_ALIGN_CHECK) {
if ((((size_t)input) & 7)==0) { /* Input is aligned, let's leverage the speed advantage */
return XXH64_endian_align((const xxh_u8*)input, len, seed, XXH_aligned);
} }
return XXH64_endian_align((const xxh_u8*)input, len, seed, XXH_unaligned);
#endif
}
/******* Hash Streaming *******/
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_state_t* XXH64_createState(void)
{
return (XXH64_state_t*)XXH_malloc(sizeof(XXH64_state_t));
}
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH64_freeState(XXH64_state_t* statePtr)
{
XXH_free(statePtr);
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH64_copyState(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH64_state_t* dstState, const XXH64_state_t* srcState)
{
XXH_memcpy(dstState, srcState, sizeof(*dstState));
}
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH64_reset(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH64_state_t* statePtr, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(statePtr != NULL);
memset(statePtr, 0, sizeof(*statePtr));
statePtr->v[0] = seed + XXH_PRIME64_1 + XXH_PRIME64_2;
statePtr->v[1] = seed + XXH_PRIME64_2;
statePtr->v[2] = seed + 0;
statePtr->v[3] = seed - XXH_PRIME64_1;
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH64_update (XXH_NOESCAPE XXH64_state_t* state, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len)
{
if (input==NULL) {
XXH_ASSERT(len == 0);
return XXH_OK;
}
{ const xxh_u8* p = (const xxh_u8*)input;
const xxh_u8* const bEnd = p + len;
state->total_len += len;
if (state->memsize + len < 32) { /* fill in tmp buffer */
XXH_memcpy(((xxh_u8*)state->mem64) + state->memsize, input, len);
state->memsize += (xxh_u32)len;
return XXH_OK;
}
if (state->memsize) { /* tmp buffer is full */
XXH_memcpy(((xxh_u8*)state->mem64) + state->memsize, input, 32-state->memsize);
state->v[0] = XXH64_round(state->v[0], XXH_readLE64(state->mem64+0));
state->v[1] = XXH64_round(state->v[1], XXH_readLE64(state->mem64+1));
state->v[2] = XXH64_round(state->v[2], XXH_readLE64(state->mem64+2));
state->v[3] = XXH64_round(state->v[3], XXH_readLE64(state->mem64+3));
p += 32 - state->memsize;
state->memsize = 0;
}
if (p+32 <= bEnd) {
const xxh_u8* const limit = bEnd - 32;
do {
state->v[0] = XXH64_round(state->v[0], XXH_readLE64(p)); p+=8;
state->v[1] = XXH64_round(state->v[1], XXH_readLE64(p)); p+=8;
state->v[2] = XXH64_round(state->v[2], XXH_readLE64(p)); p+=8;
state->v[3] = XXH64_round(state->v[3], XXH_readLE64(p)); p+=8;
} while (p<=limit);
}
if (p < bEnd) {
XXH_memcpy(state->mem64, p, (size_t)(bEnd-p));
state->memsize = (unsigned)(bEnd-p);
}
}
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_hash_t XXH64_digest(XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH64_state_t* state)
{
xxh_u64 h64;
if (state->total_len >= 32) {
h64 = XXH_rotl64(state->v[0], 1) + XXH_rotl64(state->v[1], 7) + XXH_rotl64(state->v[2], 12) + XXH_rotl64(state->v[3], 18);
h64 = XXH64_mergeRound(h64, state->v[0]);
h64 = XXH64_mergeRound(h64, state->v[1]);
h64 = XXH64_mergeRound(h64, state->v[2]);
h64 = XXH64_mergeRound(h64, state->v[3]);
} else {
h64 = state->v[2] /*seed*/ + XXH_PRIME64_5;
}
h64 += (xxh_u64) state->total_len;
return XXH64_finalize(h64, (const xxh_u8*)state->mem64, (size_t)state->total_len, XXH_aligned);
}
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
/******* Canonical representation *******/
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API void XXH64_canonicalFromHash(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH64_canonical_t* dst, XXH64_hash_t hash)
{
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(XXH64_canonical_t) == sizeof(XXH64_hash_t));
if (XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) hash = XXH_swap64(hash);
XXH_memcpy(dst, &hash, sizeof(*dst));
}
/*! @ingroup XXH64_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_hash_t XXH64_hashFromCanonical(XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH64_canonical_t* src)
{
return XXH_readBE64(src);
}
#ifndef XXH_NO_XXH3
/* *********************************************************************
* XXH3
* New generation hash designed for speed on small keys and vectorization
************************************************************************ */
/*!
* @}
* @defgroup XXH3_impl XXH3 implementation
* @ingroup impl
* @{
*/
/* === Compiler specifics === */
#if ((defined(sun) || defined(__sun)) && __cplusplus) /* Solaris includes __STDC_VERSION__ with C++. Tested with GCC 5.5 */
# define XXH_RESTRICT /* disable */
#elif defined (__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L /* >= C99 */
# define XXH_RESTRICT restrict
#elif (defined (__GNUC__) && ((__GNUC__ > 3) || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))) \
|| (defined (__clang__)) \
|| (defined (_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER >= 1400)) \
|| (defined (__INTEL_COMPILER) && (__INTEL_COMPILER >= 1300))
/*
* There are a LOT more compilers that recognize __restrict but this
* covers the major ones.
*/
# define XXH_RESTRICT __restrict
#else
# define XXH_RESTRICT /* disable */
#endif
#if (defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 3)) \
|| (defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) && (__INTEL_COMPILER >= 800)) \
|| defined(__clang__)
# define XXH_likely(x) __builtin_expect(x, 1)
# define XXH_unlikely(x) __builtin_expect(x, 0)
#else
# define XXH_likely(x) (x)
# define XXH_unlikely(x) (x)
#endif
#ifndef XXH_HAS_INCLUDE
# ifdef __has_include
# define XXH_HAS_INCLUDE(x) __has_include(x)
# else
# define XXH_HAS_INCLUDE(x) 0
# endif
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
# if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SVE)
# include <arm_sve.h>
# endif
# if defined(__ARM_NEON__) || defined(__ARM_NEON) \
|| (defined(_M_ARM) && _M_ARM >= 7) \
|| defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC) \
|| (defined(__wasm_simd128__) && XXH_HAS_INCLUDE(<arm_neon.h>)) /* WASM SIMD128 via SIMDe */
# define inline __inline__ /* circumvent a clang bug */
# include <arm_neon.h>
# undef inline
# elif defined(__AVX2__)
# include <immintrin.h>
# elif defined(__SSE2__)
# include <emmintrin.h>
# endif
#endif
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
# include <intrin.h>
#endif
/*
* One goal of XXH3 is to make it fast on both 32-bit and 64-bit, while
* remaining a true 64-bit/128-bit hash function.
*
* This is done by prioritizing a subset of 64-bit operations that can be
* emulated without too many steps on the average 32-bit machine.
*
* For example, these two lines seem similar, and run equally fast on 64-bit:
*
* xxh_u64 x;
* x ^= (x >> 47); // good
* x ^= (x >> 13); // bad
*
* However, to a 32-bit machine, there is a major difference.
*
* x ^= (x >> 47) looks like this:
*
* x.lo ^= (x.hi >> (47 - 32));
*
* while x ^= (x >> 13) looks like this:
*
* // note: funnel shifts are not usually cheap.
* x.lo ^= (x.lo >> 13) | (x.hi << (32 - 13));
* x.hi ^= (x.hi >> 13);
*
* The first one is significantly faster than the second, simply because the
* shift is larger than 32. This means:
* - All the bits we need are in the upper 32 bits, so we can ignore the lower
* 32 bits in the shift.
* - The shift result will always fit in the lower 32 bits, and therefore,
* we can ignore the upper 32 bits in the xor.
*
* Thanks to this optimization, XXH3 only requires these features to be efficient:
*
* - Usable unaligned access
* - A 32-bit or 64-bit ALU
* - If 32-bit, a decent ADC instruction
* - A 32 or 64-bit multiply with a 64-bit result
* - For the 128-bit variant, a decent byteswap helps short inputs.
*
* The first two are already required by XXH32, and almost all 32-bit and 64-bit
* platforms which can run XXH32 can run XXH3 efficiently.
*
* Thumb-1, the classic 16-bit only subset of ARM's instruction set, is one
* notable exception.
*
* First of all, Thumb-1 lacks support for the UMULL instruction which
* performs the important long multiply. This means numerous __aeabi_lmul
* calls.
*
* Second of all, the 8 functional registers are just not enough.
* Setup for __aeabi_lmul, byteshift loads, pointers, and all arithmetic need
* Lo registers, and this shuffling results in thousands more MOVs than A32.
*
* A32 and T32 don't have this limitation. They can access all 14 registers,
* do a 32->64 multiply with UMULL, and the flexible operand allowing free
* shifts is helpful, too.
*
* Therefore, we do a quick sanity check.
*
* If compiling Thumb-1 for a target which supports ARM instructions, we will
* emit a warning, as it is not a "sane" platform to compile for.
*
* Usually, if this happens, it is because of an accident and you probably need
* to specify -march, as you likely meant to compile for a newer architecture.
*
* Credit: large sections of the vectorial and asm source code paths
* have been contributed by @easyaspi314
*/
#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) && defined(__ARM_ARCH_ISA_ARM)
# warning "XXH3 is highly inefficient without ARM or Thumb-2."
#endif
/* ==========================================
* Vectorization detection
* ========================================== */
#ifdef XXH_DOXYGEN
/*!
* @ingroup tuning
* @brief Overrides the vectorization implementation chosen for XXH3.
*
* Can be defined to 0 to disable SIMD or any of the values mentioned in
* @ref XXH_VECTOR_TYPE.
*
* If this is not defined, it uses predefined macros to determine the best
* implementation.
*/
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_SCALAR
/*!
* @ingroup tuning
* @brief Possible values for @ref XXH_VECTOR.
*
* Note that these are actually implemented as macros.
*
* If this is not defined, it is detected automatically.
* internal macro XXH_X86DISPATCH overrides this.
*/
enum XXH_VECTOR_TYPE /* fake enum */ {
XXH_SCALAR = 0, /*!< Portable scalar version */
XXH_SSE2 = 1, /*!<
* SSE2 for Pentium 4, Opteron, all x86_64.
*
* @note SSE2 is also guaranteed on Windows 10, macOS, and
* Android x86.
*/
XXH_AVX2 = 2, /*!< AVX2 for Haswell and Bulldozer */
XXH_AVX512 = 3, /*!< AVX512 for Skylake and Icelake */
XXH_NEON = 4, /*!<
* NEON for most ARMv7-A, all AArch64, and WASM SIMD128
* via the SIMDeverywhere polyfill provided with the
* Emscripten SDK.
*/
XXH_VSX = 5, /*!< VSX and ZVector for POWER8/z13 (64-bit) */
XXH_SVE = 6, /*!< SVE for some ARMv8-A and ARMv9-A */
};
/*!
* @ingroup tuning
* @brief Selects the minimum alignment for XXH3's accumulators.
*
* When using SIMD, this should match the alignment required for said vector
* type, so, for example, 32 for AVX2.
*
* Default: Auto detected.
*/
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 8
#endif
/* Actual definition */
#ifndef XXH_DOXYGEN
# define XXH_SCALAR 0
# define XXH_SSE2 1
# define XXH_AVX2 2
# define XXH_AVX512 3
# define XXH_NEON 4
# define XXH_VSX 5
# define XXH_SVE 6
#endif
#ifndef XXH_VECTOR /* can be defined on command line */
# if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SVE)
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_SVE
# elif ( \
defined(__ARM_NEON__) || defined(__ARM_NEON) /* gcc */ \
|| defined(_M_ARM) || defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC) /* msvc */ \
|| (defined(__wasm_simd128__) && XXH_HAS_INCLUDE(<arm_neon.h>)) /* wasm simd128 via SIMDe */ \
) && ( \
defined(_WIN32) || defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) /* little endian only */ \
|| (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) \
)
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_NEON
# elif defined(__AVX512F__)
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_AVX512
# elif defined(__AVX2__)
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_AVX2
# elif defined(__SSE2__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || (defined(_M_IX86_FP) && (_M_IX86_FP == 2))
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_SSE2
# elif (defined(__PPC64__) && defined(__POWER8_VECTOR__)) \
|| (defined(__s390x__) && defined(__VEC__)) \
&& defined(__GNUC__) /* TODO: IBM XL */
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_VSX
# else
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_SCALAR
# endif
#endif
/* __ARM_FEATURE_SVE is only supported by GCC & Clang. */
#if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SVE) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SVE)
# ifdef _MSC_VER
# pragma warning(once : 4606)
# else
# warning "__ARM_FEATURE_SVE isn't supported. Use SCALAR instead."
# endif
# undef XXH_VECTOR
# define XXH_VECTOR XXH_SCALAR
#endif
/*
* Controls the alignment of the accumulator,
* for compatibility with aligned vector loads, which are usually faster.
*/
#ifndef XXH_ACC_ALIGN
# if defined(XXH_X86DISPATCH)
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 64 /* for compatibility with avx512 */
# elif XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SCALAR /* scalar */
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 8
# elif XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SSE2 /* sse2 */
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 16
# elif XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX2 /* avx2 */
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 32
# elif XXH_VECTOR == XXH_NEON /* neon */
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 16
# elif XXH_VECTOR == XXH_VSX /* vsx */
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 16
# elif XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX512 /* avx512 */
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 64
# elif XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SVE /* sve */
# define XXH_ACC_ALIGN 64
# endif
#endif
#if defined(XXH_X86DISPATCH) || XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SSE2 \
|| XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX2 || XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX512
# define XXH_SEC_ALIGN XXH_ACC_ALIGN
#elif XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SVE
# define XXH_SEC_ALIGN XXH_ACC_ALIGN
#else
# define XXH_SEC_ALIGN 8
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
# define XXH_ALIASING __attribute__((may_alias))
#else
# define XXH_ALIASING /* nothing */
#endif
/*
* UGLY HACK:
* GCC usually generates the best code with -O3 for xxHash.
*
* However, when targeting AVX2, it is overzealous in its unrolling resulting
* in code roughly 3/4 the speed of Clang.
*
* There are other issues, such as GCC splitting _mm256_loadu_si256 into
* _mm_loadu_si128 + _mm256_inserti128_si256. This is an optimization which
* only applies to Sandy and Ivy Bridge... which don't even support AVX2.
*
* That is why when compiling the AVX2 version, it is recommended to use either
* -O2 -mavx2 -march=haswell
* or
* -O2 -mavx2 -mno-avx256-split-unaligned-load
* for decent performance, or to use Clang instead.
*
* Fortunately, we can control the first one with a pragma that forces GCC into
* -O2, but the other one we can't control without "failed to inline always
* inline function due to target mismatch" warnings.
*/
#if XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX2 /* AVX2 */ \
&& defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) /* GCC, not Clang */ \
&& defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && XXH_SIZE_OPT <= 0 /* respect -O0 and -Os */
# pragma GCC push_options
# pragma GCC optimize("-O2")
#endif
#if XXH_VECTOR == XXH_NEON
/*
* UGLY HACK: While AArch64 GCC on Linux does not seem to care, on macOS, GCC -O3
* optimizes out the entire hashLong loop because of the aliasing violation.
*
* However, GCC is also inefficient at load-store optimization with vld1q/vst1q,
* so the only option is to mark it as aliasing.
*/
typedef uint64x2_t xxh_aliasing_uint64x2_t XXH_ALIASING;
/*!
* @internal
* @brief `vld1q_u64` but faster and alignment-safe.
*
* On AArch64, unaligned access is always safe, but on ARMv7-a, it is only
* *conditionally* safe (`vld1` has an alignment bit like `movdq[ua]` in x86).
*
* GCC for AArch64 sees `vld1q_u8` as an intrinsic instead of a load, so it
* prohibits load-store optimizations. Therefore, a direct dereference is used.
*
* Otherwise, `vld1q_u8` is used with `vreinterpretq_u8_u64` to do a safe
* unaligned load.
*/
#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__)
XXH_FORCE_INLINE uint64x2_t XXH_vld1q_u64(void const* ptr) /* silence -Wcast-align */
{
return *(xxh_aliasing_uint64x2_t const *)ptr;
}
#else
XXH_FORCE_INLINE uint64x2_t XXH_vld1q_u64(void const* ptr)
{
return vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vld1q_u8((uint8_t const*)ptr));
}
#endif
/*!
* @internal
* @brief `vmlal_u32` on low and high halves of a vector.
*
* This is a workaround for AArch64 GCC < 11 which implemented arm_neon.h with
* inline assembly and were therefore incapable of merging the `vget_{low, high}_u32`
* with `vmlal_u32`.
*/
#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) && __GNUC__ < 11
XXH_FORCE_INLINE uint64x2_t
XXH_vmlal_low_u32(uint64x2_t acc, uint32x4_t lhs, uint32x4_t rhs)
{
/* Inline assembly is the only way */
__asm__("umlal %0.2d, %1.2s, %2.2s" : "+w" (acc) : "w" (lhs), "w" (rhs));
return acc;
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE uint64x2_t
XXH_vmlal_high_u32(uint64x2_t acc, uint32x4_t lhs, uint32x4_t rhs)
{
/* This intrinsic works as expected */
return vmlal_high_u32(acc, lhs, rhs);
}
#else
/* Portable intrinsic versions */
XXH_FORCE_INLINE uint64x2_t
XXH_vmlal_low_u32(uint64x2_t acc, uint32x4_t lhs, uint32x4_t rhs)
{
return vmlal_u32(acc, vget_low_u32(lhs), vget_low_u32(rhs));
}
/*! @copydoc XXH_vmlal_low_u32
* Assume the compiler converts this to vmlal_high_u32 on aarch64 */
XXH_FORCE_INLINE uint64x2_t
XXH_vmlal_high_u32(uint64x2_t acc, uint32x4_t lhs, uint32x4_t rhs)
{
return vmlal_u32(acc, vget_high_u32(lhs), vget_high_u32(rhs));
}
#endif
/*!
* @ingroup tuning
* @brief Controls the NEON to scalar ratio for XXH3
*
* This can be set to 2, 4, 6, or 8.
*
* ARM Cortex CPUs are _very_ sensitive to how their pipelines are used.
*
* For example, the Cortex-A73 can dispatch 3 micro-ops per cycle, but only 2 of those
* can be NEON. If you are only using NEON instructions, you are only using 2/3 of the CPU
* bandwidth.
*
* This is even more noticeable on the more advanced cores like the Cortex-A76 which
* can dispatch 8 micro-ops per cycle, but still only 2 NEON micro-ops at once.
*
* Therefore, to make the most out of the pipeline, it is beneficial to run 6 NEON lanes
* and 2 scalar lanes, which is chosen by default.
*
* This does not apply to Apple processors or 32-bit processors, which run better with
* full NEON. These will default to 8. Additionally, size-optimized builds run 8 lanes.
*
* This change benefits CPUs with large micro-op buffers without negatively affecting
* most other CPUs:
*
* | Chipset | Dispatch type | NEON only | 6:2 hybrid | Diff. |
* |:----------------------|:--------------------|----------:|-----------:|------:|
* | Snapdragon 730 (A76) | 2 NEON/8 micro-ops | 8.8 GB/s | 10.1 GB/s | ~16% |
* | Snapdragon 835 (A73) | 2 NEON/3 micro-ops | 5.1 GB/s | 5.3 GB/s | ~5% |
* | Marvell PXA1928 (A53) | In-order dual-issue | 1.9 GB/s | 1.9 GB/s | 0% |
* | Apple M1 | 4 NEON/8 micro-ops | 37.3 GB/s | 36.1 GB/s | ~-3% |
*
* It also seems to fix some bad codegen on GCC, making it almost as fast as clang.
*
* When using WASM SIMD128, if this is 2 or 6, SIMDe will scalarize 2 of the lanes meaning
* it effectively becomes worse 4.
*
* @see XXH3_accumulate_512_neon()
*/
# ifndef XXH3_NEON_LANES
# if (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__arm64__) || defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC)) \
&& !defined(__APPLE__) && XXH_SIZE_OPT <= 0
# define XXH3_NEON_LANES 6
# else
# define XXH3_NEON_LANES XXH_ACC_NB
# endif
# endif
#endif /* XXH_VECTOR == XXH_NEON */
/*
* VSX and Z Vector helpers.
*
* This is very messy, and any pull requests to clean this up are welcome.
*
* There are a lot of problems with supporting VSX and s390x, due to
* inconsistent intrinsics, spotty coverage, and multiple endiannesses.
*/
#if XXH_VECTOR == XXH_VSX
/* Annoyingly, these headers _may_ define three macros: `bool`, `vector`,
* and `pixel`. This is a problem for obvious reasons.
*
* These keywords are unnecessary; the spec literally says they are
* equivalent to `__bool`, `__vector`, and `__pixel` and may be undef'd
* after including the header.
*
* We use pragma push_macro/pop_macro to keep the namespace clean. */
# pragma push_macro("bool")
# pragma push_macro("vector")
# pragma push_macro("pixel")
/* silence potential macro redefined warnings */
# undef bool
# undef vector
# undef pixel
# if defined(__s390x__)
# include <s390intrin.h>
# else
# include <altivec.h>
# endif
/* Restore the original macro values, if applicable. */
# pragma pop_macro("pixel")
# pragma pop_macro("vector")
# pragma pop_macro("bool")
typedef __vector unsigned long long xxh_u64x2;
typedef __vector unsigned char xxh_u8x16;
typedef __vector unsigned xxh_u32x4;
/*
* UGLY HACK: Similar to aarch64 macOS GCC, s390x GCC has the same aliasing issue.
*/
typedef xxh_u64x2 xxh_aliasing_u64x2 XXH_ALIASING;
# ifndef XXH_VSX_BE
# if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) \
|| (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__)
# define XXH_VSX_BE 1
# elif defined(__VEC_ELEMENT_REG_ORDER__) && __VEC_ELEMENT_REG_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
# warning "-maltivec=be is not recommended. Please use native endianness."
# define XXH_VSX_BE 1
# else
# define XXH_VSX_BE 0
# endif
# endif /* !defined(XXH_VSX_BE) */
# if XXH_VSX_BE
# if defined(__POWER9_VECTOR__) || (defined(__clang__) && defined(__s390x__))
# define XXH_vec_revb vec_revb
# else
/*!
* A polyfill for POWER9's vec_revb().
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64x2 XXH_vec_revb(xxh_u64x2 val)
{
xxh_u8x16 const vByteSwap = { 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
0x0F, 0x0E, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0x0A, 0x09, 0x08 };
return vec_perm(val, val, vByteSwap);
}
# endif
# endif /* XXH_VSX_BE */
/*!
* Performs an unaligned vector load and byte swaps it on big endian.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64x2 XXH_vec_loadu(const void *ptr)
{
xxh_u64x2 ret;
XXH_memcpy(&ret, ptr, sizeof(xxh_u64x2));
# if XXH_VSX_BE
ret = XXH_vec_revb(ret);
# endif
return ret;
}
/*
* vec_mulo and vec_mule are very problematic intrinsics on PowerPC
*
* These intrinsics weren't added until GCC 8, despite existing for a while,
* and they are endian dependent. Also, their meaning swap depending on version.
* */
# if defined(__s390x__)
/* s390x is always big endian, no issue on this platform */
# define XXH_vec_mulo vec_mulo
# define XXH_vec_mule vec_mule
# elif defined(__clang__) && XXH_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_altivec_vmuleuw) && !defined(__ibmxl__)
/* Clang has a better way to control this, we can just use the builtin which doesn't swap. */
/* The IBM XL Compiler (which defined __clang__) only implements the vec_* operations */
# define XXH_vec_mulo __builtin_altivec_vmulouw
# define XXH_vec_mule __builtin_altivec_vmuleuw
# else
/* gcc needs inline assembly */
/* Adapted from https://github.com/google/highwayhash/blob/master/highwayhash/hh_vsx.h. */
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64x2 XXH_vec_mulo(xxh_u32x4 a, xxh_u32x4 b)
{
xxh_u64x2 result;
__asm__("vmulouw %0, %1, %2" : "=v" (result) : "v" (a), "v" (b));
return result;
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64x2 XXH_vec_mule(xxh_u32x4 a, xxh_u32x4 b)
{
xxh_u64x2 result;
__asm__("vmuleuw %0, %1, %2" : "=v" (result) : "v" (a), "v" (b));
return result;
}
# endif /* XXH_vec_mulo, XXH_vec_mule */
#endif /* XXH_VECTOR == XXH_VSX */
#if XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SVE
#define ACCRND(acc, offset) \
do { \
svuint64_t input_vec = svld1_u64(mask, xinput + offset); \
svuint64_t secret_vec = svld1_u64(mask, xsecret + offset); \
svuint64_t mixed = sveor_u64_x(mask, secret_vec, input_vec); \
svuint64_t swapped = svtbl_u64(input_vec, kSwap); \
svuint64_t mixed_lo = svextw_u64_x(mask, mixed); \
svuint64_t mixed_hi = svlsr_n_u64_x(mask, mixed, 32); \
svuint64_t mul = svmad_u64_x(mask, mixed_lo, mixed_hi, swapped); \
acc = svadd_u64_x(mask, acc, mul); \
} while (0)
#endif /* XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SVE */
/* prefetch
* can be disabled, by declaring XXH_NO_PREFETCH build macro */
#if defined(XXH_NO_PREFETCH)
# define XXH_PREFETCH(ptr) (void)(ptr) /* disabled */
#else
# if XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 1
# define XXH_PREFETCH(ptr) (void)(ptr)
# elif defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_IX86)) /* _mm_prefetch() not defined outside of x86/x64 */
# include <mmintrin.h> /* https://msdn.microsoft.com/fr-fr/library/84szxsww(v=vs.90).aspx */
# define XXH_PREFETCH(ptr) _mm_prefetch((const char*)(ptr), _MM_HINT_T0)
# elif defined(__GNUC__) && ( (__GNUC__ >= 4) || ( (__GNUC__ == 3) && (__GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1) ) )
# define XXH_PREFETCH(ptr) __builtin_prefetch((ptr), 0 /* rw==read */, 3 /* locality */)
# else
# define XXH_PREFETCH(ptr) (void)(ptr) /* disabled */
# endif
#endif /* XXH_NO_PREFETCH */
/* ==========================================
* XXH3 default settings
* ========================================== */
#define XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE 192 /* minimum XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN */
#if (XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE < XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN)
# error "default keyset is not large enough"
#endif
/*! Pseudorandom secret taken directly from FARSH. */
XXH_ALIGN(64) static const xxh_u8 XXH3_kSecret[XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE] = {
0xb8, 0xfe, 0x6c, 0x39, 0x23, 0xa4, 0x4b, 0xbe, 0x7c, 0x01, 0x81, 0x2c, 0xf7, 0x21, 0xad, 0x1c,
0xde, 0xd4, 0x6d, 0xe9, 0x83, 0x90, 0x97, 0xdb, 0x72, 0x40, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0xb7, 0xb3, 0x67, 0x1f,
0xcb, 0x79, 0xe6, 0x4e, 0xcc, 0xc0, 0xe5, 0x78, 0x82, 0x5a, 0xd0, 0x7d, 0xcc, 0xff, 0x72, 0x21,
0xb8, 0x08, 0x46, 0x74, 0xf7, 0x43, 0x24, 0x8e, 0xe0, 0x35, 0x90, 0xe6, 0x81, 0x3a, 0x26, 0x4c,
0x3c, 0x28, 0x52, 0xbb, 0x91, 0xc3, 0x00, 0xcb, 0x88, 0xd0, 0x65, 0x8b, 0x1b, 0x53, 0x2e, 0xa3,
0x71, 0x64, 0x48, 0x97, 0xa2, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x19, 0xef, 0x46, 0xa9, 0xde, 0xac, 0xd8,
0xa8, 0xfa, 0x76, 0x3f, 0xe3, 0x9c, 0x34, 0x3f, 0xf9, 0xdc, 0xbb, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x0b, 0x4f, 0x1d,
0x8a, 0x51, 0xe0, 0x4b, 0xcd, 0xb4, 0x59, 0x31, 0xc8, 0x9f, 0x7e, 0xc9, 0xd9, 0x78, 0x73, 0x64,
0xea, 0xc5, 0xac, 0x83, 0x34, 0xd3, 0xeb, 0xc3, 0xc5, 0x81, 0xa0, 0xff, 0xfa, 0x13, 0x63, 0xeb,
0x17, 0x0d, 0xdd, 0x51, 0xb7, 0xf0, 0xda, 0x49, 0xd3, 0x16, 0x55, 0x26, 0x29, 0xd4, 0x68, 0x9e,
0x2b, 0x16, 0xbe, 0x58, 0x7d, 0x47, 0xa1, 0xfc, 0x8f, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xd1, 0x7a, 0xd0, 0x31, 0xce,
0x45, 0xcb, 0x3a, 0x8f, 0x95, 0x16, 0x04, 0x28, 0xaf, 0xd7, 0xfb, 0xca, 0xbb, 0x4b, 0x40, 0x7e,
};
static const xxh_u64 PRIME_MX1 = 0x165667919E3779F9ULL; /*!< 0b0001011001010110011001111001000110011110001101110111100111111001 */
static const xxh_u64 PRIME_MX2 = 0x9FB21C651E98DF25ULL; /*!< 0b1001111110110010000111000110010100011110100110001101111100100101 */
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
# define kSecret XXH3_kSecret
#endif
#ifdef XXH_DOXYGEN
/*!
* @brief Calculates a 32-bit to 64-bit long multiply.
*
* Implemented as a macro.
*
* Wraps `__emulu` on MSVC x86 because it tends to call `__allmul` when it doesn't
* need to (but it shouldn't need to anyways, it is about 7 instructions to do
* a 64x64 multiply...). Since we know that this will _always_ emit `MULL`, we
* use that instead of the normal method.
*
* If you are compiling for platforms like Thumb-1 and don't have a better option,
* you may also want to write your own long multiply routine here.
*
* @param x, y Numbers to be multiplied
* @return 64-bit product of the low 32 bits of @p x and @p y.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64
XXH_mult32to64(xxh_u64 x, xxh_u64 y)
{
return (x & 0xFFFFFFFF) * (y & 0xFFFFFFFF);
}
#elif defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)
# define XXH_mult32to64(x, y) __emulu((unsigned)(x), (unsigned)(y))
#else
/*
* Downcast + upcast is usually better than masking on older compilers like
* GCC 4.2 (especially 32-bit ones), all without affecting newer compilers.
*
* The other method, (x & 0xFFFFFFFF) * (y & 0xFFFFFFFF), will AND both operands
* and perform a full 64x64 multiply -- entirely redundant on 32-bit.
*/
# define XXH_mult32to64(x, y) ((xxh_u64)(xxh_u32)(x) * (xxh_u64)(xxh_u32)(y))
#endif
/*!
* @brief Calculates a 64->128-bit long multiply.
*
* Uses `__uint128_t` and `_umul128` if available, otherwise uses a scalar
* version.
*
* @param lhs , rhs The 64-bit integers to be multiplied
* @return The 128-bit result represented in an @ref XXH128_hash_t.
*/
static XXH128_hash_t
XXH_mult64to128(xxh_u64 lhs, xxh_u64 rhs)
{
/*
* GCC/Clang __uint128_t method.
*
* On most 64-bit targets, GCC and Clang define a __uint128_t type.
* This is usually the best way as it usually uses a native long 64-bit
* multiply, such as MULQ on x86_64 or MUL + UMULH on aarch64.
*
* Usually.
*
* Despite being a 32-bit platform, Clang (and emscripten) define this type
* despite not having the arithmetic for it. This results in a laggy
* compiler builtin call which calculates a full 128-bit multiply.
* In that case it is best to use the portable one.
* https://github.com/Cyan4973/xxHash/issues/211#issuecomment-515575677
*/
#if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && !defined(__wasm__) \
&& defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) \
|| (defined(_INTEGRAL_MAX_BITS) && _INTEGRAL_MAX_BITS >= 128)
__uint128_t const product = (__uint128_t)lhs * (__uint128_t)rhs;
XXH128_hash_t r128;
r128.low64 = (xxh_u64)(product);
r128.high64 = (xxh_u64)(product >> 64);
return r128;
/*
* MSVC for x64's _umul128 method.
*
* xxh_u64 _umul128(xxh_u64 Multiplier, xxh_u64 Multiplicand, xxh_u64 *HighProduct);
*
* This compiles to single operand MUL on x64.
*/
#elif (defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_IA64)) && !defined(_M_ARM64EC)
#ifndef _MSC_VER
# pragma intrinsic(_umul128)
#endif
xxh_u64 product_high;
xxh_u64 const product_low = _umul128(lhs, rhs, &product_high);
XXH128_hash_t r128;
r128.low64 = product_low;
r128.high64 = product_high;
return r128;
/*
* MSVC for ARM64's __umulh method.
*
* This compiles to the same MUL + UMULH as GCC/Clang's __uint128_t method.
*/
#elif defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC)
#ifndef _MSC_VER
# pragma intrinsic(__umulh)
#endif
XXH128_hash_t r128;
r128.low64 = lhs * rhs;
r128.high64 = __umulh(lhs, rhs);
return r128;
#else
/*
* Portable scalar method. Optimized for 32-bit and 64-bit ALUs.
*
* This is a fast and simple grade school multiply, which is shown below
* with base 10 arithmetic instead of base 0x100000000.
*
* 9 3 // D2 lhs = 93
* x 7 5 // D2 rhs = 75
* ----------
* 1 5 // D2 lo_lo = (93 % 10) * (75 % 10) = 15
* 4 5 | // D2 hi_lo = (93 / 10) * (75 % 10) = 45
* 2 1 | // D2 lo_hi = (93 % 10) * (75 / 10) = 21
* + 6 3 | | // D2 hi_hi = (93 / 10) * (75 / 10) = 63
* ---------
* 2 7 | // D2 cross = (15 / 10) + (45 % 10) + 21 = 27
* + 6 7 | | // D2 upper = (27 / 10) + (45 / 10) + 63 = 67
* ---------
* 6 9 7 5 // D4 res = (27 * 10) + (15 % 10) + (67 * 100) = 6975
*
* The reasons for adding the products like this are:
* 1. It avoids manual carry tracking. Just like how
* (9 * 9) + 9 + 9 = 99, the same applies with this for UINT64_MAX.
* This avoids a lot of complexity.
*
* 2. It hints for, and on Clang, compiles to, the powerful UMAAL
* instruction available in ARM's Digital Signal Processing extension
* in 32-bit ARMv6 and later, which is shown below:
*
* void UMAAL(xxh_u32 *RdLo, xxh_u32 *RdHi, xxh_u32 Rn, xxh_u32 Rm)
* {
* xxh_u64 product = (xxh_u64)*RdLo * (xxh_u64)*RdHi + Rn + Rm;
* *RdLo = (xxh_u32)(product & 0xFFFFFFFF);
* *RdHi = (xxh_u32)(product >> 32);
* }
*
* This instruction was designed for efficient long multiplication, and
* allows this to be calculated in only 4 instructions at speeds
* comparable to some 64-bit ALUs.
*
* 3. It isn't terrible on other platforms. Usually this will be a couple
* of 32-bit ADD/ADCs.
*/
/* First calculate all of the cross products. */
xxh_u64 const lo_lo = XXH_mult32to64(lhs & 0xFFFFFFFF, rhs & 0xFFFFFFFF);
xxh_u64 const hi_lo = XXH_mult32to64(lhs >> 32, rhs & 0xFFFFFFFF);
xxh_u64 const lo_hi = XXH_mult32to64(lhs & 0xFFFFFFFF, rhs >> 32);
xxh_u64 const hi_hi = XXH_mult32to64(lhs >> 32, rhs >> 32);
/* Now add the products together. These will never overflow. */
xxh_u64 const cross = (lo_lo >> 32) + (hi_lo & 0xFFFFFFFF) + lo_hi;
xxh_u64 const upper = (hi_lo >> 32) + (cross >> 32) + hi_hi;
xxh_u64 const lower = (cross << 32) | (lo_lo & 0xFFFFFFFF);
XXH128_hash_t r128;
r128.low64 = lower;
r128.high64 = upper;
return r128;
#endif
}
/*!
* @brief Calculates a 64-bit to 128-bit multiply, then XOR folds it.
*
* The reason for the separate function is to prevent passing too many structs
* around by value. This will hopefully inline the multiply, but we don't force it.
*
* @param lhs , rhs The 64-bit integers to multiply
* @return The low 64 bits of the product XOR'd by the high 64 bits.
* @see XXH_mult64to128()
*/
static xxh_u64
XXH3_mul128_fold64(xxh_u64 lhs, xxh_u64 rhs)
{
XXH128_hash_t product = XXH_mult64to128(lhs, rhs);
return product.low64 ^ product.high64;
}
/*! Seems to produce slightly better code on GCC for some reason. */
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_CONSTF xxh_u64 XXH_xorshift64(xxh_u64 v64, int shift)
{
XXH_ASSERT(0 <= shift && shift < 64);
return v64 ^ (v64 >> shift);
}
/*
* This is a fast avalanche stage,
* suitable when input bits are already partially mixed
*/
static XXH64_hash_t XXH3_avalanche(xxh_u64 h64)
{
h64 = XXH_xorshift64(h64, 37);
h64 *= PRIME_MX1;
h64 = XXH_xorshift64(h64, 32);
return h64;
}
/*
* This is a stronger avalanche,
* inspired by Pelle Evensen's rrmxmx
* preferable when input has not been previously mixed
*/
static XXH64_hash_t XXH3_rrmxmx(xxh_u64 h64, xxh_u64 len)
{
/* this mix is inspired by Pelle Evensen's rrmxmx */
h64 ^= XXH_rotl64(h64, 49) ^ XXH_rotl64(h64, 24);
h64 *= PRIME_MX2;
h64 ^= (h64 >> 35) + len ;
h64 *= PRIME_MX2;
return XXH_xorshift64(h64, 28);
}
/* ==========================================
* Short keys
* ==========================================
* One of the shortcomings of XXH32 and XXH64 was that their performance was
* sub-optimal on short lengths. It used an iterative algorithm which strongly
* favored lengths that were a multiple of 4 or 8.
*
* Instead of iterating over individual inputs, we use a set of single shot
* functions which piece together a range of lengths and operate in constant time.
*
* Additionally, the number of multiplies has been significantly reduced. This
* reduces latency, especially when emulating 64-bit multiplies on 32-bit.
*
* Depending on the platform, this may or may not be faster than XXH32, but it
* is almost guaranteed to be faster than XXH64.
*/
/*
* At very short lengths, there isn't enough input to fully hide secrets, or use
* the entire secret.
*
* There is also only a limited amount of mixing we can do before significantly
* impacting performance.
*
* Therefore, we use different sections of the secret and always mix two secret
* samples with an XOR. This should have no effect on performance on the
* seedless or withSeed variants because everything _should_ be constant folded
* by modern compilers.
*
* The XOR mixing hides individual parts of the secret and increases entropy.
*
* This adds an extra layer of strength for custom secrets.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_len_1to3_64b(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(input != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(1 <= len && len <= 3);
XXH_ASSERT(secret != NULL);
/*
* len = 1: combined = { input[0], 0x01, input[0], input[0] }
* len = 2: combined = { input[1], 0x02, input[0], input[1] }
* len = 3: combined = { input[2], 0x03, input[0], input[1] }
*/
{ xxh_u8 const c1 = input[0];
xxh_u8 const c2 = input[len >> 1];
xxh_u8 const c3 = input[len - 1];
xxh_u32 const combined = ((xxh_u32)c1 << 16) | ((xxh_u32)c2 << 24)
| ((xxh_u32)c3 << 0) | ((xxh_u32)len << 8);
xxh_u64 const bitflip = (XXH_readLE32(secret) ^ XXH_readLE32(secret+4)) + seed;
xxh_u64 const keyed = (xxh_u64)combined ^ bitflip;
return XXH64_avalanche(keyed);
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_len_4to8_64b(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(input != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(secret != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(4 <= len && len <= 8);
seed ^= (xxh_u64)XXH_swap32((xxh_u32)seed) << 32;
{ xxh_u32 const input1 = XXH_readLE32(input);
xxh_u32 const input2 = XXH_readLE32(input + len - 4);
xxh_u64 const bitflip = (XXH_readLE64(secret+8) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+16)) - seed;
xxh_u64 const input64 = input2 + (((xxh_u64)input1) << 32);
xxh_u64 const keyed = input64 ^ bitflip;
return XXH3_rrmxmx(keyed, len);
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_len_9to16_64b(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(input != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(secret != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(9 <= len && len <= 16);
{ xxh_u64 const bitflip1 = (XXH_readLE64(secret+24) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+32)) + seed;
xxh_u64 const bitflip2 = (XXH_readLE64(secret+40) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+48)) - seed;
xxh_u64 const input_lo = XXH_readLE64(input) ^ bitflip1;
xxh_u64 const input_hi = XXH_readLE64(input + len - 8) ^ bitflip2;
xxh_u64 const acc = len
+ XXH_swap64(input_lo) + input_hi
+ XXH3_mul128_fold64(input_lo, input_hi);
return XXH3_avalanche(acc);
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_len_0to16_64b(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(len <= 16);
{ if (XXH_likely(len > 8)) return XXH3_len_9to16_64b(input, len, secret, seed);
if (XXH_likely(len >= 4)) return XXH3_len_4to8_64b(input, len, secret, seed);
if (len) return XXH3_len_1to3_64b(input, len, secret, seed);
return XXH64_avalanche(seed ^ (XXH_readLE64(secret+56) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+64)));
}
}
/*
* DISCLAIMER: There are known *seed-dependent* multicollisions here due to
* multiplication by zero, affecting hashes of lengths 17 to 240.
*
* However, they are very unlikely.
*
* Keep this in mind when using the unseeded XXH3_64bits() variant: As with all
* unseeded non-cryptographic hashes, it does not attempt to defend itself
* against specially crafted inputs, only random inputs.
*
* Compared to classic UMAC where a 1 in 2^31 chance of 4 consecutive bytes
* cancelling out the secret is taken an arbitrary number of times (addressed
* in XXH3_accumulate_512), this collision is very unlikely with random inputs
* and/or proper seeding:
*
* This only has a 1 in 2^63 chance of 8 consecutive bytes cancelling out, in a
* function that is only called up to 16 times per hash with up to 240 bytes of
* input.
*
* This is not too bad for a non-cryptographic hash function, especially with
* only 64 bit outputs.
*
* The 128-bit variant (which trades some speed for strength) is NOT affected
* by this, although it is always a good idea to use a proper seed if you care
* about strength.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64 XXH3_mix16B(const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, xxh_u64 seed64)
{
#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) /* GCC, not Clang */ \
&& defined(__i386__) && defined(__SSE2__) /* x86 + SSE2 */ \
&& !defined(XXH_ENABLE_AUTOVECTORIZE) /* Define to disable like XXH32 hack */
/*
* UGLY HACK:
* GCC for x86 tends to autovectorize the 128-bit multiply, resulting in
* slower code.
*
* By forcing seed64 into a register, we disrupt the cost model and
* cause it to scalarize. See `XXH32_round()`
*
* FIXME: Clang's output is still _much_ faster -- On an AMD Ryzen 3600,
* XXH3_64bits @ len=240 runs at 4.6 GB/s with Clang 9, but 3.3 GB/s on
* GCC 9.2, despite both emitting scalar code.
*
* GCC generates much better scalar code than Clang for the rest of XXH3,
* which is why finding a more optimal codepath is an interest.
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(seed64);
#endif
{ xxh_u64 const input_lo = XXH_readLE64(input);
xxh_u64 const input_hi = XXH_readLE64(input+8);
return XXH3_mul128_fold64(
input_lo ^ (XXH_readLE64(secret) + seed64),
input_hi ^ (XXH_readLE64(secret+8) - seed64)
);
}
}
/* For mid range keys, XXH3 uses a Mum-hash variant. */
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_len_17to128_64b(const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN); (void)secretSize;
XXH_ASSERT(16 < len && len <= 128);
{ xxh_u64 acc = len * XXH_PRIME64_1;
#if XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 1
/* Smaller and cleaner, but slightly slower. */
unsigned int i = (unsigned int)(len - 1) / 32;
do {
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+16 * i, secret+32*i, seed);
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+len-16*(i+1), secret+32*i+16, seed);
} while (i-- != 0);
#else
if (len > 32) {
if (len > 64) {
if (len > 96) {
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+48, secret+96, seed);
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+len-64, secret+112, seed);
}
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+32, secret+64, seed);
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+len-48, secret+80, seed);
}
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+16, secret+32, seed);
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+len-32, secret+48, seed);
}
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+0, secret+0, seed);
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+len-16, secret+16, seed);
#endif
return XXH3_avalanche(acc);
}
}
#define XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX 240
XXH_NO_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_len_129to240_64b(const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN); (void)secretSize;
XXH_ASSERT(128 < len && len <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX);
#define XXH3_MIDSIZE_STARTOFFSET 3
#define XXH3_MIDSIZE_LASTOFFSET 17
{ xxh_u64 acc = len * XXH_PRIME64_1;
xxh_u64 acc_end;
unsigned int const nbRounds = (unsigned int)len / 16;
unsigned int i;
XXH_ASSERT(128 < len && len <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX);
for (i=0; i<8; i++) {
acc += XXH3_mix16B(input+(16*i), secret+(16*i), seed);
}
/* last bytes */
acc_end = XXH3_mix16B(input + len - 16, secret + XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN - XXH3_MIDSIZE_LASTOFFSET, seed);
XXH_ASSERT(nbRounds >= 8);
acc = XXH3_avalanche(acc);
#if defined(__clang__) /* Clang */ \
&& (defined(__ARM_NEON) || defined(__ARM_NEON__)) /* NEON */ \
&& !defined(XXH_ENABLE_AUTOVECTORIZE) /* Define to disable */
/*
* UGLY HACK:
* Clang for ARMv7-A tries to vectorize this loop, similar to GCC x86.
* In everywhere else, it uses scalar code.
*
* For 64->128-bit multiplies, even if the NEON was 100% optimal, it
* would still be slower than UMAAL (see XXH_mult64to128).
*
* Unfortunately, Clang doesn't handle the long multiplies properly and
* converts them to the nonexistent "vmulq_u64" intrinsic, which is then
* scalarized into an ugly mess of VMOV.32 instructions.
*
* This mess is difficult to avoid without turning autovectorization
* off completely, but they are usually relatively minor and/or not
* worth it to fix.
*
* This loop is the easiest to fix, as unlike XXH32, this pragma
* _actually works_ because it is a loop vectorization instead of an
* SLP vectorization.
*/
#pragma clang loop vectorize(disable)
#endif
for (i=8 ; i < nbRounds; i++) {
/*
* Prevents clang for unrolling the acc loop and interleaving with this one.
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(acc);
acc_end += XXH3_mix16B(input+(16*i), secret+(16*(i-8)) + XXH3_MIDSIZE_STARTOFFSET, seed);
}
return XXH3_avalanche(acc + acc_end);
}
}
/* ======= Long Keys ======= */
#define XXH_STRIPE_LEN 64
#define XXH_SECRET_CONSUME_RATE 8 /* nb of secret bytes consumed at each accumulation */
#define XXH_ACC_NB (XXH_STRIPE_LEN / sizeof(xxh_u64))
#ifdef XXH_OLD_NAMES
# define STRIPE_LEN XXH_STRIPE_LEN
# define ACC_NB XXH_ACC_NB
#endif
#ifndef XXH_PREFETCH_DIST
# ifdef __clang__
# define XXH_PREFETCH_DIST 320
# else
# if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX512)
# define XXH_PREFETCH_DIST 512
# else
# define XXH_PREFETCH_DIST 384
# endif
# endif /* __clang__ */
#endif /* XXH_PREFETCH_DIST */
/*
* These macros are to generate an XXH3_accumulate() function.
* The two arguments select the name suffix and target attribute.
*
* The name of this symbol is XXH3_accumulate_<name>() and it calls
* XXH3_accumulate_512_<name>().
*
* It may be useful to hand implement this function if the compiler fails to
* optimize the inline function.
*/
#define XXH3_ACCUMULATE_TEMPLATE(name) \
void \
XXH3_accumulate_##name(xxh_u64* XXH_RESTRICT acc, \
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input, \
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, \
size_t nbStripes) \
{ \
size_t n; \
for (n = 0; n < nbStripes; n++ ) { \
const xxh_u8* const in = input + n*XXH_STRIPE_LEN; \
XXH_PREFETCH(in + XXH_PREFETCH_DIST); \
XXH3_accumulate_512_##name( \
acc, \
in, \
secret + n*XXH_SECRET_CONSUME_RATE); \
} \
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void XXH_writeLE64(void* dst, xxh_u64 v64)
{
if (!XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) v64 = XXH_swap64(v64);
XXH_memcpy(dst, &v64, sizeof(v64));
}
/* Several intrinsic functions below are supposed to accept __int64 as argument,
* as documented in https://software.intel.com/sites/landingpage/IntrinsicsGuide/ .
* However, several environments do not define __int64 type,
* requiring a workaround.
*/
#if !defined (__VMS) \
&& (defined (__cplusplus) \
|| (defined (__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) /* C99 */) )
typedef int64_t xxh_i64;
#else
/* the following type must have a width of 64-bit */
typedef long long xxh_i64;
#endif
/*
* XXH3_accumulate_512 is the tightest loop for long inputs, and it is the most optimized.
*
* It is a hardened version of UMAC, based off of FARSH's implementation.
*
* This was chosen because it adapts quite well to 32-bit, 64-bit, and SIMD
* implementations, and it is ridiculously fast.
*
* We harden it by mixing the original input to the accumulators as well as the product.
*
* This means that in the (relatively likely) case of a multiply by zero, the
* original input is preserved.
*
* On 128-bit inputs, we swap 64-bit pairs when we add the input to improve
* cross-pollination, as otherwise the upper and lower halves would be
* essentially independent.
*
* This doesn't matter on 64-bit hashes since they all get merged together in
* the end, so we skip the extra step.
*
* Both XXH3_64bits and XXH3_128bits use this subroutine.
*/
#if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX512) \
|| (defined(XXH_DISPATCH_AVX512) && XXH_DISPATCH_AVX512 != 0)
#ifndef XXH_TARGET_AVX512
# define XXH_TARGET_AVX512 /* disable attribute target */
#endif
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_AVX512 void
XXH3_accumulate_512_avx512(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
__m512i* const xacc = (__m512i *) acc;
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 63) == 0);
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(XXH_STRIPE_LEN == sizeof(__m512i));
{
/* data_vec = input[0]; */
__m512i const data_vec = _mm512_loadu_si512 (input);
/* key_vec = secret[0]; */
__m512i const key_vec = _mm512_loadu_si512 (secret);
/* data_key = data_vec ^ key_vec; */
__m512i const data_key = _mm512_xor_si512 (data_vec, key_vec);
/* data_key_lo = data_key >> 32; */
__m512i const data_key_lo = _mm512_srli_epi64 (data_key, 32);
/* product = (data_key & 0xffffffff) * (data_key_lo & 0xffffffff); */
__m512i const product = _mm512_mul_epu32 (data_key, data_key_lo);
/* xacc[0] += swap(data_vec); */
__m512i const data_swap = _mm512_shuffle_epi32(data_vec, (_MM_PERM_ENUM)_MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2));
__m512i const sum = _mm512_add_epi64(*xacc, data_swap);
/* xacc[0] += product; */
*xacc = _mm512_add_epi64(product, sum);
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_AVX512 XXH3_ACCUMULATE_TEMPLATE(avx512)
/*
* XXH3_scrambleAcc: Scrambles the accumulators to improve mixing.
*
* Multiplication isn't perfect, as explained by Google in HighwayHash:
*
* // Multiplication mixes/scrambles bytes 0-7 of the 64-bit result to
* // varying degrees. In descending order of goodness, bytes
* // 3 4 2 5 1 6 0 7 have quality 228 224 164 160 100 96 36 32.
* // As expected, the upper and lower bytes are much worse.
*
* Source: https://github.com/google/highwayhash/blob/0aaf66b/highwayhash/hh_avx2.h#L291
*
* Since our algorithm uses a pseudorandom secret to add some variance into the
* mix, we don't need to (or want to) mix as often or as much as HighwayHash does.
*
* This isn't as tight as XXH3_accumulate, but still written in SIMD to avoid
* extraction.
*
* Both XXH3_64bits and XXH3_128bits use this subroutine.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_AVX512 void
XXH3_scrambleAcc_avx512(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 63) == 0);
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(XXH_STRIPE_LEN == sizeof(__m512i));
{ __m512i* const xacc = (__m512i*) acc;
const __m512i prime32 = _mm512_set1_epi32((int)XXH_PRIME32_1);
/* xacc[0] ^= (xacc[0] >> 47) */
__m512i const acc_vec = *xacc;
__m512i const shifted = _mm512_srli_epi64 (acc_vec, 47);
/* xacc[0] ^= secret; */
__m512i const key_vec = _mm512_loadu_si512 (secret);
__m512i const data_key = _mm512_ternarylogic_epi32(key_vec, acc_vec, shifted, 0x96 /* key_vec ^ acc_vec ^ shifted */);
/* xacc[0] *= XXH_PRIME32_1; */
__m512i const data_key_hi = _mm512_srli_epi64 (data_key, 32);
__m512i const prod_lo = _mm512_mul_epu32 (data_key, prime32);
__m512i const prod_hi = _mm512_mul_epu32 (data_key_hi, prime32);
*xacc = _mm512_add_epi64(prod_lo, _mm512_slli_epi64(prod_hi, 32));
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_AVX512 void
XXH3_initCustomSecret_avx512(void* XXH_RESTRICT customSecret, xxh_u64 seed64)
{
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT((XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE & 63) == 0);
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(XXH_SEC_ALIGN == 64);
XXH_ASSERT(((size_t)customSecret & 63) == 0);
(void)(&XXH_writeLE64);
{ int const nbRounds = XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE / sizeof(__m512i);
__m512i const seed_pos = _mm512_set1_epi64((xxh_i64)seed64);
__m512i const seed = _mm512_mask_sub_epi64(seed_pos, 0xAA, _mm512_set1_epi8(0), seed_pos);
const __m512i* const src = (const __m512i*) ((const void*) XXH3_kSecret);
__m512i* const dest = ( __m512i*) customSecret;
int i;
XXH_ASSERT(((size_t)src & 63) == 0); /* control alignment */
XXH_ASSERT(((size_t)dest & 63) == 0);
for (i=0; i < nbRounds; ++i) {
dest[i] = _mm512_add_epi64(_mm512_load_si512(src + i), seed);
} }
}
#endif
#if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX2) \
|| (defined(XXH_DISPATCH_AVX2) && XXH_DISPATCH_AVX2 != 0)
#ifndef XXH_TARGET_AVX2
# define XXH_TARGET_AVX2 /* disable attribute target */
#endif
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_AVX2 void
XXH3_accumulate_512_avx2( void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 31) == 0);
{ __m256i* const xacc = (__m256i *) acc;
/* Unaligned. This is mainly for pointer arithmetic, and because
* _mm256_loadu_si256 requires a const __m256i * pointer for some reason. */
const __m256i* const xinput = (const __m256i *) input;
/* Unaligned. This is mainly for pointer arithmetic, and because
* _mm256_loadu_si256 requires a const __m256i * pointer for some reason. */
const __m256i* const xsecret = (const __m256i *) secret;
size_t i;
for (i=0; i < XXH_STRIPE_LEN/sizeof(__m256i); i++) {
/* data_vec = xinput[i]; */
__m256i const data_vec = _mm256_loadu_si256 (xinput+i);
/* key_vec = xsecret[i]; */
__m256i const key_vec = _mm256_loadu_si256 (xsecret+i);
/* data_key = data_vec ^ key_vec; */
__m256i const data_key = _mm256_xor_si256 (data_vec, key_vec);
/* data_key_lo = data_key >> 32; */
__m256i const data_key_lo = _mm256_srli_epi64 (data_key, 32);
/* product = (data_key & 0xffffffff) * (data_key_lo & 0xffffffff); */
__m256i const product = _mm256_mul_epu32 (data_key, data_key_lo);
/* xacc[i] += swap(data_vec); */
__m256i const data_swap = _mm256_shuffle_epi32(data_vec, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2));
__m256i const sum = _mm256_add_epi64(xacc[i], data_swap);
/* xacc[i] += product; */
xacc[i] = _mm256_add_epi64(product, sum);
} }
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_AVX2 XXH3_ACCUMULATE_TEMPLATE(avx2)
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_AVX2 void
XXH3_scrambleAcc_avx2(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 31) == 0);
{ __m256i* const xacc = (__m256i*) acc;
/* Unaligned. This is mainly for pointer arithmetic, and because
* _mm256_loadu_si256 requires a const __m256i * pointer for some reason. */
const __m256i* const xsecret = (const __m256i *) secret;
const __m256i prime32 = _mm256_set1_epi32((int)XXH_PRIME32_1);
size_t i;
for (i=0; i < XXH_STRIPE_LEN/sizeof(__m256i); i++) {
/* xacc[i] ^= (xacc[i] >> 47) */
__m256i const acc_vec = xacc[i];
__m256i const shifted = _mm256_srli_epi64 (acc_vec, 47);
__m256i const data_vec = _mm256_xor_si256 (acc_vec, shifted);
/* xacc[i] ^= xsecret; */
__m256i const key_vec = _mm256_loadu_si256 (xsecret+i);
__m256i const data_key = _mm256_xor_si256 (data_vec, key_vec);
/* xacc[i] *= XXH_PRIME32_1; */
__m256i const data_key_hi = _mm256_srli_epi64 (data_key, 32);
__m256i const prod_lo = _mm256_mul_epu32 (data_key, prime32);
__m256i const prod_hi = _mm256_mul_epu32 (data_key_hi, prime32);
xacc[i] = _mm256_add_epi64(prod_lo, _mm256_slli_epi64(prod_hi, 32));
}
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_AVX2 void XXH3_initCustomSecret_avx2(void* XXH_RESTRICT customSecret, xxh_u64 seed64)
{
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT((XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE & 31) == 0);
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT((XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE / sizeof(__m256i)) == 6);
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(XXH_SEC_ALIGN <= 64);
(void)(&XXH_writeLE64);
XXH_PREFETCH(customSecret);
{ __m256i const seed = _mm256_set_epi64x((xxh_i64)(0U - seed64), (xxh_i64)seed64, (xxh_i64)(0U - seed64), (xxh_i64)seed64);
const __m256i* const src = (const __m256i*) ((const void*) XXH3_kSecret);
__m256i* dest = ( __m256i*) customSecret;
# if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
/*
* On GCC & Clang, marking 'dest' as modified will cause the compiler:
* - do not extract the secret from sse registers in the internal loop
* - use less common registers, and avoid pushing these reg into stack
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(dest);
# endif
XXH_ASSERT(((size_t)src & 31) == 0); /* control alignment */
XXH_ASSERT(((size_t)dest & 31) == 0);
/* GCC -O2 need unroll loop manually */
dest[0] = _mm256_add_epi64(_mm256_load_si256(src+0), seed);
dest[1] = _mm256_add_epi64(_mm256_load_si256(src+1), seed);
dest[2] = _mm256_add_epi64(_mm256_load_si256(src+2), seed);
dest[3] = _mm256_add_epi64(_mm256_load_si256(src+3), seed);
dest[4] = _mm256_add_epi64(_mm256_load_si256(src+4), seed);
dest[5] = _mm256_add_epi64(_mm256_load_si256(src+5), seed);
}
}
#endif
/* x86dispatch always generates SSE2 */
#if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SSE2) || defined(XXH_X86DISPATCH)
#ifndef XXH_TARGET_SSE2
# define XXH_TARGET_SSE2 /* disable attribute target */
#endif
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_SSE2 void
XXH3_accumulate_512_sse2( void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
/* SSE2 is just a half-scale version of the AVX2 version. */
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 15) == 0);
{ __m128i* const xacc = (__m128i *) acc;
/* Unaligned. This is mainly for pointer arithmetic, and because
* _mm_loadu_si128 requires a const __m128i * pointer for some reason. */
const __m128i* const xinput = (const __m128i *) input;
/* Unaligned. This is mainly for pointer arithmetic, and because
* _mm_loadu_si128 requires a const __m128i * pointer for some reason. */
const __m128i* const xsecret = (const __m128i *) secret;
size_t i;
for (i=0; i < XXH_STRIPE_LEN/sizeof(__m128i); i++) {
/* data_vec = xinput[i]; */
__m128i const data_vec = _mm_loadu_si128 (xinput+i);
/* key_vec = xsecret[i]; */
__m128i const key_vec = _mm_loadu_si128 (xsecret+i);
/* data_key = data_vec ^ key_vec; */
__m128i const data_key = _mm_xor_si128 (data_vec, key_vec);
/* data_key_lo = data_key >> 32; */
__m128i const data_key_lo = _mm_shuffle_epi32 (data_key, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 0, 1));
/* product = (data_key & 0xffffffff) * (data_key_lo & 0xffffffff); */
__m128i const product = _mm_mul_epu32 (data_key, data_key_lo);
/* xacc[i] += swap(data_vec); */
__m128i const data_swap = _mm_shuffle_epi32(data_vec, _MM_SHUFFLE(1,0,3,2));
__m128i const sum = _mm_add_epi64(xacc[i], data_swap);
/* xacc[i] += product; */
xacc[i] = _mm_add_epi64(product, sum);
} }
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_SSE2 XXH3_ACCUMULATE_TEMPLATE(sse2)
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_SSE2 void
XXH3_scrambleAcc_sse2(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 15) == 0);
{ __m128i* const xacc = (__m128i*) acc;
/* Unaligned. This is mainly for pointer arithmetic, and because
* _mm_loadu_si128 requires a const __m128i * pointer for some reason. */
const __m128i* const xsecret = (const __m128i *) secret;
const __m128i prime32 = _mm_set1_epi32((int)XXH_PRIME32_1);
size_t i;
for (i=0; i < XXH_STRIPE_LEN/sizeof(__m128i); i++) {
/* xacc[i] ^= (xacc[i] >> 47) */
__m128i const acc_vec = xacc[i];
__m128i const shifted = _mm_srli_epi64 (acc_vec, 47);
__m128i const data_vec = _mm_xor_si128 (acc_vec, shifted);
/* xacc[i] ^= xsecret[i]; */
__m128i const key_vec = _mm_loadu_si128 (xsecret+i);
__m128i const data_key = _mm_xor_si128 (data_vec, key_vec);
/* xacc[i] *= XXH_PRIME32_1; */
__m128i const data_key_hi = _mm_shuffle_epi32 (data_key, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 0, 1));
__m128i const prod_lo = _mm_mul_epu32 (data_key, prime32);
__m128i const prod_hi = _mm_mul_epu32 (data_key_hi, prime32);
xacc[i] = _mm_add_epi64(prod_lo, _mm_slli_epi64(prod_hi, 32));
}
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_TARGET_SSE2 void XXH3_initCustomSecret_sse2(void* XXH_RESTRICT customSecret, xxh_u64 seed64)
{
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT((XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE & 15) == 0);
(void)(&XXH_writeLE64);
{ int const nbRounds = XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE / sizeof(__m128i);
# if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86) && _MSC_VER < 1900
/* MSVC 32bit mode does not support _mm_set_epi64x before 2015 */
XXH_ALIGN(16) const xxh_i64 seed64x2[2] = { (xxh_i64)seed64, (xxh_i64)(0U - seed64) };
__m128i const seed = _mm_load_si128((__m128i const*)seed64x2);
# else
__m128i const seed = _mm_set_epi64x((xxh_i64)(0U - seed64), (xxh_i64)seed64);
# endif
int i;
const void* const src16 = XXH3_kSecret;
__m128i* dst16 = (__m128i*) customSecret;
# if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
/*
* On GCC & Clang, marking 'dest' as modified will cause the compiler:
* - do not extract the secret from sse registers in the internal loop
* - use less common registers, and avoid pushing these reg into stack
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(dst16);
# endif
XXH_ASSERT(((size_t)src16 & 15) == 0); /* control alignment */
XXH_ASSERT(((size_t)dst16 & 15) == 0);
for (i=0; i < nbRounds; ++i) {
dst16[i] = _mm_add_epi64(_mm_load_si128((const __m128i *)src16+i), seed);
} }
}
#endif
#if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_NEON)
/* forward declarations for the scalar routines */
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_scalarRound(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc, void const* XXH_RESTRICT input,
void const* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t lane);
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_scalarScrambleRound(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
void const* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t lane);
/*!
* @internal
* @brief The bulk processing loop for NEON and WASM SIMD128.
*
* The NEON code path is actually partially scalar when running on AArch64. This
* is to optimize the pipelining and can have up to 15% speedup depending on the
* CPU, and it also mitigates some GCC codegen issues.
*
* @see XXH3_NEON_LANES for configuring this and details about this optimization.
*
* NEON's 32-bit to 64-bit long multiply takes a half vector of 32-bit
* integers instead of the other platforms which mask full 64-bit vectors,
* so the setup is more complicated than just shifting right.
*
* Additionally, there is an optimization for 4 lanes at once noted below.
*
* Since, as stated, the most optimal amount of lanes for Cortexes is 6,
* there needs to be *three* versions of the accumulate operation used
* for the remaining 2 lanes.
*
* WASM's SIMD128 uses SIMDe's arm_neon.h polyfill because the intrinsics overlap
* nearly perfectly.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_accumulate_512_neon( void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 15) == 0);
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(XXH3_NEON_LANES > 0 && XXH3_NEON_LANES <= XXH_ACC_NB && XXH3_NEON_LANES % 2 == 0);
{ /* GCC for darwin arm64 does not like aliasing here */
xxh_aliasing_uint64x2_t* const xacc = (xxh_aliasing_uint64x2_t*) acc;
/* We don't use a uint32x4_t pointer because it causes bus errors on ARMv7. */
uint8_t const* xinput = (const uint8_t *) input;
uint8_t const* xsecret = (const uint8_t *) secret;
size_t i;
#ifdef __wasm_simd128__
/*
* On WASM SIMD128, Clang emits direct address loads when XXH3_kSecret
* is constant propagated, which results in it converting it to this
* inside the loop:
*
* a = v128.load(XXH3_kSecret + 0 + $secret_offset, offset = 0)
* b = v128.load(XXH3_kSecret + 16 + $secret_offset, offset = 0)
* ...
*
* This requires a full 32-bit address immediate (and therefore a 6 byte
* instruction) as well as an add for each offset.
*
* Putting an asm guard prevents it from folding (at the cost of losing
* the alignment hint), and uses the free offset in `v128.load` instead
* of adding secret_offset each time which overall reduces code size by
* about a kilobyte and improves performance.
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(xsecret);
#endif
/* Scalar lanes use the normal scalarRound routine */
for (i = XXH3_NEON_LANES; i < XXH_ACC_NB; i++) {
XXH3_scalarRound(acc, input, secret, i);
}
i = 0;
/* 4 NEON lanes at a time. */
for (; i+1 < XXH3_NEON_LANES / 2; i+=2) {
/* data_vec = xinput[i]; */
uint64x2_t data_vec_1 = XXH_vld1q_u64(xinput + (i * 16));
uint64x2_t data_vec_2 = XXH_vld1q_u64(xinput + ((i+1) * 16));
/* key_vec = xsecret[i]; */
uint64x2_t key_vec_1 = XXH_vld1q_u64(xsecret + (i * 16));
uint64x2_t key_vec_2 = XXH_vld1q_u64(xsecret + ((i+1) * 16));
/* data_swap = swap(data_vec) */
uint64x2_t data_swap_1 = vextq_u64(data_vec_1, data_vec_1, 1);
uint64x2_t data_swap_2 = vextq_u64(data_vec_2, data_vec_2, 1);
/* data_key = data_vec ^ key_vec; */
uint64x2_t data_key_1 = veorq_u64(data_vec_1, key_vec_1);
uint64x2_t data_key_2 = veorq_u64(data_vec_2, key_vec_2);
/*
* If we reinterpret the 64x2 vectors as 32x4 vectors, we can use a
* de-interleave operation for 4 lanes in 1 step with `vuzpq_u32` to
* get one vector with the low 32 bits of each lane, and one vector
* with the high 32 bits of each lane.
*
* The intrinsic returns a double vector because the original ARMv7-a
* instruction modified both arguments in place. AArch64 and SIMD128 emit
* two instructions from this intrinsic.
*
* [ dk11L | dk11H | dk12L | dk12H ] -> [ dk11L | dk12L | dk21L | dk22L ]
* [ dk21L | dk21H | dk22L | dk22H ] -> [ dk11H | dk12H | dk21H | dk22H ]
*/
uint32x4x2_t unzipped = vuzpq_u32(
vreinterpretq_u32_u64(data_key_1),
vreinterpretq_u32_u64(data_key_2)
);
/* data_key_lo = data_key & 0xFFFFFFFF */
uint32x4_t data_key_lo = unzipped.val[0];
/* data_key_hi = data_key >> 32 */
uint32x4_t data_key_hi = unzipped.val[1];
/*
* Then, we can split the vectors horizontally and multiply which, as for most
* widening intrinsics, have a variant that works on both high half vectors
* for free on AArch64. A similar instruction is available on SIMD128.
*
* sum = data_swap + (u64x2) data_key_lo * (u64x2) data_key_hi
*/
uint64x2_t sum_1 = XXH_vmlal_low_u32(data_swap_1, data_key_lo, data_key_hi);
uint64x2_t sum_2 = XXH_vmlal_high_u32(data_swap_2, data_key_lo, data_key_hi);
/*
* Clang reorders
* a += b * c; // umlal swap.2d, dkl.2s, dkh.2s
* c += a; // add acc.2d, acc.2d, swap.2d
* to
* c += a; // add acc.2d, acc.2d, swap.2d
* c += b * c; // umlal acc.2d, dkl.2s, dkh.2s
*
* While it would make sense in theory since the addition is faster,
* for reasons likely related to umlal being limited to certain NEON
* pipelines, this is worse. A compiler guard fixes this.
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD_CLANG_NEON(sum_1);
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD_CLANG_NEON(sum_2);
/* xacc[i] = acc_vec + sum; */
xacc[i] = vaddq_u64(xacc[i], sum_1);
xacc[i+1] = vaddq_u64(xacc[i+1], sum_2);
}
/* Operate on the remaining NEON lanes 2 at a time. */
for (; i < XXH3_NEON_LANES / 2; i++) {
/* data_vec = xinput[i]; */
uint64x2_t data_vec = XXH_vld1q_u64(xinput + (i * 16));
/* key_vec = xsecret[i]; */
uint64x2_t key_vec = XXH_vld1q_u64(xsecret + (i * 16));
/* acc_vec_2 = swap(data_vec) */
uint64x2_t data_swap = vextq_u64(data_vec, data_vec, 1);
/* data_key = data_vec ^ key_vec; */
uint64x2_t data_key = veorq_u64(data_vec, key_vec);
/* For two lanes, just use VMOVN and VSHRN. */
/* data_key_lo = data_key & 0xFFFFFFFF; */
uint32x2_t data_key_lo = vmovn_u64(data_key);
/* data_key_hi = data_key >> 32; */
uint32x2_t data_key_hi = vshrn_n_u64(data_key, 32);
/* sum = data_swap + (u64x2) data_key_lo * (u64x2) data_key_hi; */
uint64x2_t sum = vmlal_u32(data_swap, data_key_lo, data_key_hi);
/* Same Clang workaround as before */
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD_CLANG_NEON(sum);
/* xacc[i] = acc_vec + sum; */
xacc[i] = vaddq_u64 (xacc[i], sum);
}
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH3_ACCUMULATE_TEMPLATE(neon)
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_scrambleAcc_neon(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 15) == 0);
{ xxh_aliasing_uint64x2_t* xacc = (xxh_aliasing_uint64x2_t*) acc;
uint8_t const* xsecret = (uint8_t const*) secret;
size_t i;
/* WASM uses operator overloads and doesn't need these. */
#ifndef __wasm_simd128__
/* { prime32_1, prime32_1 } */
uint32x2_t const kPrimeLo = vdup_n_u32(XXH_PRIME32_1);
/* { 0, prime32_1, 0, prime32_1 } */
uint32x4_t const kPrimeHi = vreinterpretq_u32_u64(vdupq_n_u64((xxh_u64)XXH_PRIME32_1 << 32));
#endif
/* AArch64 uses both scalar and neon at the same time */
for (i = XXH3_NEON_LANES; i < XXH_ACC_NB; i++) {
XXH3_scalarScrambleRound(acc, secret, i);
}
for (i=0; i < XXH3_NEON_LANES / 2; i++) {
/* xacc[i] ^= (xacc[i] >> 47); */
uint64x2_t acc_vec = xacc[i];
uint64x2_t shifted = vshrq_n_u64(acc_vec, 47);
uint64x2_t data_vec = veorq_u64(acc_vec, shifted);
/* xacc[i] ^= xsecret[i]; */
uint64x2_t key_vec = XXH_vld1q_u64(xsecret + (i * 16));
uint64x2_t data_key = veorq_u64(data_vec, key_vec);
/* xacc[i] *= XXH_PRIME32_1 */
#ifdef __wasm_simd128__
/* SIMD128 has multiply by u64x2, use it instead of expanding and scalarizing */
xacc[i] = data_key * XXH_PRIME32_1;
#else
/*
* Expanded version with portable NEON intrinsics
*
* lo(x) * lo(y) + (hi(x) * lo(y) << 32)
*
* prod_hi = hi(data_key) * lo(prime) << 32
*
* Since we only need 32 bits of this multiply a trick can be used, reinterpreting the vector
* as a uint32x4_t and multiplying by { 0, prime, 0, prime } to cancel out the unwanted bits
* and avoid the shift.
*/
uint32x4_t prod_hi = vmulq_u32 (vreinterpretq_u32_u64(data_key), kPrimeHi);
/* Extract low bits for vmlal_u32 */
uint32x2_t data_key_lo = vmovn_u64(data_key);
/* xacc[i] = prod_hi + lo(data_key) * XXH_PRIME32_1; */
xacc[i] = vmlal_u32(vreinterpretq_u64_u32(prod_hi), data_key_lo, kPrimeLo);
#endif
}
}
}
#endif
#if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_VSX)
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_accumulate_512_vsx( void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
/* presumed aligned */
xxh_aliasing_u64x2* const xacc = (xxh_aliasing_u64x2*) acc;
xxh_u8 const* const xinput = (xxh_u8 const*) input; /* no alignment restriction */
xxh_u8 const* const xsecret = (xxh_u8 const*) secret; /* no alignment restriction */
xxh_u64x2 const v32 = { 32, 32 };
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < XXH_STRIPE_LEN / sizeof(xxh_u64x2); i++) {
/* data_vec = xinput[i]; */
xxh_u64x2 const data_vec = XXH_vec_loadu(xinput + 16*i);
/* key_vec = xsecret[i]; */
xxh_u64x2 const key_vec = XXH_vec_loadu(xsecret + 16*i);
xxh_u64x2 const data_key = data_vec ^ key_vec;
/* shuffled = (data_key << 32) | (data_key >> 32); */
xxh_u32x4 const shuffled = (xxh_u32x4)vec_rl(data_key, v32);
/* product = ((xxh_u64x2)data_key & 0xFFFFFFFF) * ((xxh_u64x2)shuffled & 0xFFFFFFFF); */
xxh_u64x2 const product = XXH_vec_mulo((xxh_u32x4)data_key, shuffled);
/* acc_vec = xacc[i]; */
xxh_u64x2 acc_vec = xacc[i];
acc_vec += product;
/* swap high and low halves */
#ifdef __s390x__
acc_vec += vec_permi(data_vec, data_vec, 2);
#else
acc_vec += vec_xxpermdi(data_vec, data_vec, 2);
#endif
xacc[i] = acc_vec;
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH3_ACCUMULATE_TEMPLATE(vsx)
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_scrambleAcc_vsx(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & 15) == 0);
{ xxh_aliasing_u64x2* const xacc = (xxh_aliasing_u64x2*) acc;
const xxh_u8* const xsecret = (const xxh_u8*) secret;
/* constants */
xxh_u64x2 const v32 = { 32, 32 };
xxh_u64x2 const v47 = { 47, 47 };
xxh_u32x4 const prime = { XXH_PRIME32_1, XXH_PRIME32_1, XXH_PRIME32_1, XXH_PRIME32_1 };
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < XXH_STRIPE_LEN / sizeof(xxh_u64x2); i++) {
/* xacc[i] ^= (xacc[i] >> 47); */
xxh_u64x2 const acc_vec = xacc[i];
xxh_u64x2 const data_vec = acc_vec ^ (acc_vec >> v47);
/* xacc[i] ^= xsecret[i]; */
xxh_u64x2 const key_vec = XXH_vec_loadu(xsecret + 16*i);
xxh_u64x2 const data_key = data_vec ^ key_vec;
/* xacc[i] *= XXH_PRIME32_1 */
/* prod_lo = ((xxh_u64x2)data_key & 0xFFFFFFFF) * ((xxh_u64x2)prime & 0xFFFFFFFF); */
xxh_u64x2 const prod_even = XXH_vec_mule((xxh_u32x4)data_key, prime);
/* prod_hi = ((xxh_u64x2)data_key >> 32) * ((xxh_u64x2)prime >> 32); */
xxh_u64x2 const prod_odd = XXH_vec_mulo((xxh_u32x4)data_key, prime);
xacc[i] = prod_odd + (prod_even << v32);
} }
}
#endif
#if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SVE)
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_accumulate_512_sve( void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
uint64_t *xacc = (uint64_t *)acc;
const uint64_t *xinput = (const uint64_t *)(const void *)input;
const uint64_t *xsecret = (const uint64_t *)(const void *)secret;
svuint64_t kSwap = sveor_n_u64_z(svptrue_b64(), svindex_u64(0, 1), 1);
uint64_t element_count = svcntd();
if (element_count >= 8) {
svbool_t mask = svptrue_pat_b64(SV_VL8);
svuint64_t vacc = svld1_u64(mask, xacc);
ACCRND(vacc, 0);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc, vacc);
} else if (element_count == 2) { /* sve128 */
svbool_t mask = svptrue_pat_b64(SV_VL2);
svuint64_t acc0 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 0);
svuint64_t acc1 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 2);
svuint64_t acc2 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 4);
svuint64_t acc3 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 6);
ACCRND(acc0, 0);
ACCRND(acc1, 2);
ACCRND(acc2, 4);
ACCRND(acc3, 6);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 0, acc0);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 2, acc1);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 4, acc2);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 6, acc3);
} else {
svbool_t mask = svptrue_pat_b64(SV_VL4);
svuint64_t acc0 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 0);
svuint64_t acc1 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 4);
ACCRND(acc0, 0);
ACCRND(acc1, 4);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 0, acc0);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 4, acc1);
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_accumulate_sve(xxh_u64* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret,
size_t nbStripes)
{
if (nbStripes != 0) {
uint64_t *xacc = (uint64_t *)acc;
const uint64_t *xinput = (const uint64_t *)(const void *)input;
const uint64_t *xsecret = (const uint64_t *)(const void *)secret;
svuint64_t kSwap = sveor_n_u64_z(svptrue_b64(), svindex_u64(0, 1), 1);
uint64_t element_count = svcntd();
if (element_count >= 8) {
svbool_t mask = svptrue_pat_b64(SV_VL8);
svuint64_t vacc = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 0);
do {
/* svprfd(svbool_t, void *, enum svfprop); */
svprfd(mask, xinput + 128, SV_PLDL1STRM);
ACCRND(vacc, 0);
xinput += 8;
xsecret += 1;
nbStripes--;
} while (nbStripes != 0);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 0, vacc);
} else if (element_count == 2) { /* sve128 */
svbool_t mask = svptrue_pat_b64(SV_VL2);
svuint64_t acc0 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 0);
svuint64_t acc1 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 2);
svuint64_t acc2 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 4);
svuint64_t acc3 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 6);
do {
svprfd(mask, xinput + 128, SV_PLDL1STRM);
ACCRND(acc0, 0);
ACCRND(acc1, 2);
ACCRND(acc2, 4);
ACCRND(acc3, 6);
xinput += 8;
xsecret += 1;
nbStripes--;
} while (nbStripes != 0);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 0, acc0);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 2, acc1);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 4, acc2);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 6, acc3);
} else {
svbool_t mask = svptrue_pat_b64(SV_VL4);
svuint64_t acc0 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 0);
svuint64_t acc1 = svld1_u64(mask, xacc + 4);
do {
svprfd(mask, xinput + 128, SV_PLDL1STRM);
ACCRND(acc0, 0);
ACCRND(acc1, 4);
xinput += 8;
xsecret += 1;
nbStripes--;
} while (nbStripes != 0);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 0, acc0);
svst1_u64(mask, xacc + 4, acc1);
}
}
}
#endif
/* scalar variants - universal */
#if defined(__aarch64__) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
/*
* In XXH3_scalarRound(), GCC and Clang have a similar codegen issue, where they
* emit an excess mask and a full 64-bit multiply-add (MADD X-form).
*
* While this might not seem like much, as AArch64 is a 64-bit architecture, only
* big Cortex designs have a full 64-bit multiplier.
*
* On the little cores, the smaller 32-bit multiplier is used, and full 64-bit
* multiplies expand to 2-3 multiplies in microcode. This has a major penalty
* of up to 4 latency cycles and 2 stall cycles in the multiply pipeline.
*
* Thankfully, AArch64 still provides the 32-bit long multiply-add (UMADDL) which does
* not have this penalty and does the mask automatically.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64
XXH_mult32to64_add64(xxh_u64 lhs, xxh_u64 rhs, xxh_u64 acc)
{
xxh_u64 ret;
/* note: %x = 64-bit register, %w = 32-bit register */
__asm__("umaddl %x0, %w1, %w2, %x3" : "=r" (ret) : "r" (lhs), "r" (rhs), "r" (acc));
return ret;
}
#else
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64
XXH_mult32to64_add64(xxh_u64 lhs, xxh_u64 rhs, xxh_u64 acc)
{
return XXH_mult32to64((xxh_u32)lhs, (xxh_u32)rhs) + acc;
}
#endif
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Scalar round for @ref XXH3_accumulate_512_scalar().
*
* This is extracted to its own function because the NEON path uses a combination
* of NEON and scalar.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_scalarRound(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
void const* XXH_RESTRICT input,
void const* XXH_RESTRICT secret,
size_t lane)
{
xxh_u64* xacc = (xxh_u64*) acc;
xxh_u8 const* xinput = (xxh_u8 const*) input;
xxh_u8 const* xsecret = (xxh_u8 const*) secret;
XXH_ASSERT(lane < XXH_ACC_NB);
XXH_ASSERT(((size_t)acc & (XXH_ACC_ALIGN-1)) == 0);
{
xxh_u64 const data_val = XXH_readLE64(xinput + lane * 8);
xxh_u64 const data_key = data_val ^ XXH_readLE64(xsecret + lane * 8);
xacc[lane ^ 1] += data_val; /* swap adjacent lanes */
xacc[lane] = XXH_mult32to64_add64(data_key /* & 0xFFFFFFFF */, data_key >> 32, xacc[lane]);
}
}
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Processes a 64 byte block of data using the scalar path.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_accumulate_512_scalar(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT input,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
size_t i;
/* ARM GCC refuses to unroll this loop, resulting in a 24% slowdown on ARMv6. */
#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) \
&& (defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb2__)) \
&& defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED) /* no unaligned access just wastes bytes */ \
&& XXH_SIZE_OPT <= 0
# pragma GCC unroll 8
#endif
for (i=0; i < XXH_ACC_NB; i++) {
XXH3_scalarRound(acc, input, secret, i);
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH3_ACCUMULATE_TEMPLATE(scalar)
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Scalar scramble step for @ref XXH3_scrambleAcc_scalar().
*
* This is extracted to its own function because the NEON path uses a combination
* of NEON and scalar.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_scalarScrambleRound(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
void const* XXH_RESTRICT secret,
size_t lane)
{
xxh_u64* const xacc = (xxh_u64*) acc; /* presumed aligned */
const xxh_u8* const xsecret = (const xxh_u8*) secret; /* no alignment restriction */
XXH_ASSERT((((size_t)acc) & (XXH_ACC_ALIGN-1)) == 0);
XXH_ASSERT(lane < XXH_ACC_NB);
{
xxh_u64 const key64 = XXH_readLE64(xsecret + lane * 8);
xxh_u64 acc64 = xacc[lane];
acc64 = XXH_xorshift64(acc64, 47);
acc64 ^= key64;
acc64 *= XXH_PRIME32_1;
xacc[lane] = acc64;
}
}
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Scrambles the accumulators after a large chunk has been read
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_scrambleAcc_scalar(void* XXH_RESTRICT acc, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
size_t i;
for (i=0; i < XXH_ACC_NB; i++) {
XXH3_scalarScrambleRound(acc, secret, i);
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_initCustomSecret_scalar(void* XXH_RESTRICT customSecret, xxh_u64 seed64)
{
/*
* We need a separate pointer for the hack below,
* which requires a non-const pointer.
* Any decent compiler will optimize this out otherwise.
*/
const xxh_u8* kSecretPtr = XXH3_kSecret;
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT((XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE & 15) == 0);
#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__aarch64__)
/*
* UGLY HACK:
* GCC and Clang generate a bunch of MOV/MOVK pairs for aarch64, and they are
* placed sequentially, in order, at the top of the unrolled loop.
*
* While MOVK is great for generating constants (2 cycles for a 64-bit
* constant compared to 4 cycles for LDR), it fights for bandwidth with
* the arithmetic instructions.
*
* I L S
* MOVK
* MOVK
* MOVK
* MOVK
* ADD
* SUB STR
* STR
* By forcing loads from memory (as the asm line causes the compiler to assume
* that XXH3_kSecretPtr has been changed), the pipelines are used more
* efficiently:
* I L S
* LDR
* ADD LDR
* SUB STR
* STR
*
* See XXH3_NEON_LANES for details on the pipsline.
*
* XXH3_64bits_withSeed, len == 256, Snapdragon 835
* without hack: 2654.4 MB/s
* with hack: 3202.9 MB/s
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(kSecretPtr);
#endif
{ int const nbRounds = XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE / 16;
int i;
for (i=0; i < nbRounds; i++) {
/*
* The asm hack causes the compiler to assume that kSecretPtr aliases with
* customSecret, and on aarch64, this prevented LDP from merging two
* loads together for free. Putting the loads together before the stores
* properly generates LDP.
*/
xxh_u64 lo = XXH_readLE64(kSecretPtr + 16*i) + seed64;
xxh_u64 hi = XXH_readLE64(kSecretPtr + 16*i + 8) - seed64;
XXH_writeLE64((xxh_u8*)customSecret + 16*i, lo);
XXH_writeLE64((xxh_u8*)customSecret + 16*i + 8, hi);
} }
}
typedef void (*XXH3_f_accumulate)(xxh_u64* XXH_RESTRICT, const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT, const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT, size_t);
typedef void (*XXH3_f_scrambleAcc)(void* XXH_RESTRICT, const void*);
typedef void (*XXH3_f_initCustomSecret)(void* XXH_RESTRICT, xxh_u64);
#if (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX512)
#define XXH3_accumulate_512 XXH3_accumulate_512_avx512
#define XXH3_accumulate XXH3_accumulate_avx512
#define XXH3_scrambleAcc XXH3_scrambleAcc_avx512
#define XXH3_initCustomSecret XXH3_initCustomSecret_avx512
#elif (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX2)
#define XXH3_accumulate_512 XXH3_accumulate_512_avx2
#define XXH3_accumulate XXH3_accumulate_avx2
#define XXH3_scrambleAcc XXH3_scrambleAcc_avx2
#define XXH3_initCustomSecret XXH3_initCustomSecret_avx2
#elif (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SSE2)
#define XXH3_accumulate_512 XXH3_accumulate_512_sse2
#define XXH3_accumulate XXH3_accumulate_sse2
#define XXH3_scrambleAcc XXH3_scrambleAcc_sse2
#define XXH3_initCustomSecret XXH3_initCustomSecret_sse2
#elif (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_NEON)
#define XXH3_accumulate_512 XXH3_accumulate_512_neon
#define XXH3_accumulate XXH3_accumulate_neon
#define XXH3_scrambleAcc XXH3_scrambleAcc_neon
#define XXH3_initCustomSecret XXH3_initCustomSecret_scalar
#elif (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_VSX)
#define XXH3_accumulate_512 XXH3_accumulate_512_vsx
#define XXH3_accumulate XXH3_accumulate_vsx
#define XXH3_scrambleAcc XXH3_scrambleAcc_vsx
#define XXH3_initCustomSecret XXH3_initCustomSecret_scalar
#elif (XXH_VECTOR == XXH_SVE)
#define XXH3_accumulate_512 XXH3_accumulate_512_sve
#define XXH3_accumulate XXH3_accumulate_sve
#define XXH3_scrambleAcc XXH3_scrambleAcc_scalar
#define XXH3_initCustomSecret XXH3_initCustomSecret_scalar
#else /* scalar */
#define XXH3_accumulate_512 XXH3_accumulate_512_scalar
#define XXH3_accumulate XXH3_accumulate_scalar
#define XXH3_scrambleAcc XXH3_scrambleAcc_scalar
#define XXH3_initCustomSecret XXH3_initCustomSecret_scalar
#endif
#if XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 1 /* don't do SIMD for initialization */
# undef XXH3_initCustomSecret
# define XXH3_initCustomSecret XXH3_initCustomSecret_scalar
#endif
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_hashLong_internal_loop(xxh_u64* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH3_f_accumulate f_acc,
XXH3_f_scrambleAcc f_scramble)
{
size_t const nbStripesPerBlock = (secretSize - XXH_STRIPE_LEN) / XXH_SECRET_CONSUME_RATE;
size_t const block_len = XXH_STRIPE_LEN * nbStripesPerBlock;
size_t const nb_blocks = (len - 1) / block_len;
size_t n;
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN);
for (n = 0; n < nb_blocks; n++) {
f_acc(acc, input + n*block_len, secret, nbStripesPerBlock);
f_scramble(acc, secret + secretSize - XXH_STRIPE_LEN);
}
/* last partial block */
XXH_ASSERT(len > XXH_STRIPE_LEN);
{ size_t const nbStripes = ((len - 1) - (block_len * nb_blocks)) / XXH_STRIPE_LEN;
XXH_ASSERT(nbStripes <= (secretSize / XXH_SECRET_CONSUME_RATE));
f_acc(acc, input + nb_blocks*block_len, secret, nbStripes);
/* last stripe */
{ const xxh_u8* const p = input + len - XXH_STRIPE_LEN;
#define XXH_SECRET_LASTACC_START 7 /* not aligned on 8, last secret is different from acc & scrambler */
XXH3_accumulate_512(acc, p, secret + secretSize - XXH_STRIPE_LEN - XXH_SECRET_LASTACC_START);
} }
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE xxh_u64
XXH3_mix2Accs(const xxh_u64* XXH_RESTRICT acc, const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret)
{
return XXH3_mul128_fold64(
acc[0] ^ XXH_readLE64(secret),
acc[1] ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+8) );
}
static XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_mergeAccs(const xxh_u64* XXH_RESTRICT acc, const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, xxh_u64 start)
{
xxh_u64 result64 = start;
size_t i = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
result64 += XXH3_mix2Accs(acc+2*i, secret + 16*i);
#if defined(__clang__) /* Clang */ \
&& (defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__)) /* ARMv7 */ \
&& (defined(__ARM_NEON) || defined(__ARM_NEON__)) /* NEON */ \
&& !defined(XXH_ENABLE_AUTOVECTORIZE) /* Define to disable */
/*
* UGLY HACK:
* Prevent autovectorization on Clang ARMv7-a. Exact same problem as
* the one in XXH3_len_129to240_64b. Speeds up shorter keys > 240b.
* XXH3_64bits, len == 256, Snapdragon 835:
* without hack: 2063.7 MB/s
* with hack: 2560.7 MB/s
*/
XXH_COMPILER_GUARD(result64);
#endif
}
return XXH3_avalanche(result64);
}
#define XXH3_INIT_ACC { XXH_PRIME32_3, XXH_PRIME64_1, XXH_PRIME64_2, XXH_PRIME64_3, \
XXH_PRIME64_4, XXH_PRIME32_2, XXH_PRIME64_5, XXH_PRIME32_1 }
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_64b_internal(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH3_f_accumulate f_acc,
XXH3_f_scrambleAcc f_scramble)
{
XXH_ALIGN(XXH_ACC_ALIGN) xxh_u64 acc[XXH_ACC_NB] = XXH3_INIT_ACC;
XXH3_hashLong_internal_loop(acc, (const xxh_u8*)input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, secretSize, f_acc, f_scramble);
/* converge into final hash */
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(acc) == 64);
/* do not align on 8, so that the secret is different from the accumulator */
#define XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START 11
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= sizeof(acc) + XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START);
return XXH3_mergeAccs(acc, (const xxh_u8*)secret + XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START, (xxh_u64)len * XXH_PRIME64_1);
}
/*
* It's important for performance to transmit secret's size (when it's static)
* so that the compiler can properly optimize the vectorized loop.
* This makes a big performance difference for "medium" keys (<1 KB) when using AVX instruction set.
* When the secret size is unknown, or on GCC 12 where the mix of NO_INLINE and FORCE_INLINE
* breaks -Og, this is XXH_NO_INLINE.
*/
XXH3_WITH_SECRET_INLINE XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_64b_withSecret(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed64, const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLen)
{
(void)seed64;
return XXH3_hashLong_64b_internal(input, len, secret, secretLen, XXH3_accumulate, XXH3_scrambleAcc);
}
/*
* It's preferable for performance that XXH3_hashLong is not inlined,
* as it results in a smaller function for small data, easier to the instruction cache.
* Note that inside this no_inline function, we do inline the internal loop,
* and provide a statically defined secret size to allow optimization of vector loop.
*/
XXH_NO_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_64b_default(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed64, const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLen)
{
(void)seed64; (void)secret; (void)secretLen;
return XXH3_hashLong_64b_internal(input, len, XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret), XXH3_accumulate, XXH3_scrambleAcc);
}
/*
* XXH3_hashLong_64b_withSeed():
* Generate a custom key based on alteration of default XXH3_kSecret with the seed,
* and then use this key for long mode hashing.
*
* This operation is decently fast but nonetheless costs a little bit of time.
* Try to avoid it whenever possible (typically when seed==0).
*
* It's important for performance that XXH3_hashLong is not inlined. Not sure
* why (uop cache maybe?), but the difference is large and easily measurable.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_64b_withSeed_internal(const void* input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed,
XXH3_f_accumulate f_acc,
XXH3_f_scrambleAcc f_scramble,
XXH3_f_initCustomSecret f_initSec)
{
#if XXH_SIZE_OPT <= 0
if (seed == 0)
return XXH3_hashLong_64b_internal(input, len,
XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret),
f_acc, f_scramble);
#endif
{ XXH_ALIGN(XXH_SEC_ALIGN) xxh_u8 secret[XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE];
f_initSec(secret, seed);
return XXH3_hashLong_64b_internal(input, len, secret, sizeof(secret),
f_acc, f_scramble);
}
}
/*
* It's important for performance that XXH3_hashLong is not inlined.
*/
XXH_NO_INLINE XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_64b_withSeed(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed, const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLen)
{
(void)secret; (void)secretLen;
return XXH3_hashLong_64b_withSeed_internal(input, len, seed,
XXH3_accumulate, XXH3_scrambleAcc, XXH3_initCustomSecret);
}
typedef XXH64_hash_t (*XXH3_hashLong64_f)(const void* XXH_RESTRICT, size_t,
XXH64_hash_t, const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT, size_t);
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_64bits_internal(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed64, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLen,
XXH3_hashLong64_f f_hashLong)
{
XXH_ASSERT(secretLen >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN);
/*
* If an action is to be taken if `secretLen` condition is not respected,
* it should be done here.
* For now, it's a contract pre-condition.
* Adding a check and a branch here would cost performance at every hash.
* Also, note that function signature doesn't offer room to return an error.
*/
if (len <= 16)
return XXH3_len_0to16_64b((const xxh_u8*)input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, seed64);
if (len <= 128)
return XXH3_len_17to128_64b((const xxh_u8*)input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, secretLen, seed64);
if (len <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX)
return XXH3_len_129to240_64b((const xxh_u8*)input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, secretLen, seed64);
return f_hashLong(input, len, seed64, (const xxh_u8*)secret, secretLen);
}
/* === Public entry point === */
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_hash_t XXH3_64bits(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length)
{
return XXH3_64bits_internal(input, length, 0, XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret), XXH3_hashLong_64b_default);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_64bits_withSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize)
{
return XXH3_64bits_internal(input, length, 0, secret, secretSize, XXH3_hashLong_64b_withSecret);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_64bits_withSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
return XXH3_64bits_internal(input, length, seed, XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret), XXH3_hashLong_64b_withSeed);
}
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_hash_t
XXH3_64bits_withSecretandSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t length, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
if (length <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX)
return XXH3_64bits_internal(input, length, seed, XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret), NULL);
return XXH3_hashLong_64b_withSecret(input, length, seed, (const xxh_u8*)secret, secretSize);
}
/* === XXH3 streaming === */
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*
* Malloc's a pointer that is always aligned to align.
*
* This must be freed with `XXH_alignedFree()`.
*
* malloc typically guarantees 16 byte alignment on 64-bit systems and 8 byte
* alignment on 32-bit. This isn't enough for the 32 byte aligned loads in AVX2
* or on 32-bit, the 16 byte aligned loads in SSE2 and NEON.
*
* This underalignment previously caused a rather obvious crash which went
* completely unnoticed due to XXH3_createState() not actually being tested.
* Credit to RedSpah for noticing this bug.
*
* The alignment is done manually: Functions like posix_memalign or _mm_malloc
* are avoided: To maintain portability, we would have to write a fallback
* like this anyways, and besides, testing for the existence of library
* functions without relying on external build tools is impossible.
*
* The method is simple: Overallocate, manually align, and store the offset
* to the original behind the returned pointer.
*
* Align must be a power of 2 and 8 <= align <= 128.
*/
static XXH_MALLOCF void* XXH_alignedMalloc(size_t s, size_t align)
{
XXH_ASSERT(align <= 128 && align >= 8); /* range check */
XXH_ASSERT((align & (align-1)) == 0); /* power of 2 */
XXH_ASSERT(s != 0 && s < (s + align)); /* empty/overflow */
{ /* Overallocate to make room for manual realignment and an offset byte */
xxh_u8* base = (xxh_u8*)XXH_malloc(s + align);
if (base != NULL) {
/*
* Get the offset needed to align this pointer.
*
* Even if the returned pointer is aligned, there will always be
* at least one byte to store the offset to the original pointer.
*/
size_t offset = align - ((size_t)base & (align - 1)); /* base % align */
/* Add the offset for the now-aligned pointer */
xxh_u8* ptr = base + offset;
XXH_ASSERT((size_t)ptr % align == 0);
/* Store the offset immediately before the returned pointer. */
ptr[-1] = (xxh_u8)offset;
return ptr;
}
return NULL;
}
}
/*
* Frees an aligned pointer allocated by XXH_alignedMalloc(). Don't pass
* normal malloc'd pointers, XXH_alignedMalloc has a specific data layout.
*/
static void XXH_alignedFree(void* p)
{
if (p != NULL) {
xxh_u8* ptr = (xxh_u8*)p;
/* Get the offset byte we added in XXH_malloc. */
xxh_u8 offset = ptr[-1];
/* Free the original malloc'd pointer */
xxh_u8* base = ptr - offset;
XXH_free(base);
}
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
/*!
* @brief Allocate an @ref XXH3_state_t.
*
* Must be freed with XXH3_freeState().
* @return An allocated XXH3_state_t on success, `NULL` on failure.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH3_state_t* XXH3_createState(void)
{
XXH3_state_t* const state = (XXH3_state_t*)XXH_alignedMalloc(sizeof(XXH3_state_t), 64);
if (state==NULL) return NULL;
XXH3_INITSTATE(state);
return state;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
/*!
* @brief Frees an @ref XXH3_state_t.
*
* Must be allocated with XXH3_createState().
* @param statePtr A pointer to an @ref XXH3_state_t allocated with @ref XXH3_createState().
* @return XXH_OK.
*/
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode XXH3_freeState(XXH3_state_t* statePtr)
{
XXH_alignedFree(statePtr);
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API void
XXH3_copyState(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* dst_state, XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH3_state_t* src_state)
{
XXH_memcpy(dst_state, src_state, sizeof(*dst_state));
}
static void
XXH3_reset_internal(XXH3_state_t* statePtr,
XXH64_hash_t seed,
const void* secret, size_t secretSize)
{
size_t const initStart = offsetof(XXH3_state_t, bufferedSize);
size_t const initLength = offsetof(XXH3_state_t, nbStripesPerBlock) - initStart;
XXH_ASSERT(offsetof(XXH3_state_t, nbStripesPerBlock) > initStart);
XXH_ASSERT(statePtr != NULL);
/* set members from bufferedSize to nbStripesPerBlock (excluded) to 0 */
memset((char*)statePtr + initStart, 0, initLength);
statePtr->acc[0] = XXH_PRIME32_3;
statePtr->acc[1] = XXH_PRIME64_1;
statePtr->acc[2] = XXH_PRIME64_2;
statePtr->acc[3] = XXH_PRIME64_3;
statePtr->acc[4] = XXH_PRIME64_4;
statePtr->acc[5] = XXH_PRIME32_2;
statePtr->acc[6] = XXH_PRIME64_5;
statePtr->acc[7] = XXH_PRIME32_1;
statePtr->seed = seed;
statePtr->useSeed = (seed != 0);
statePtr->extSecret = (const unsigned char*)secret;
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN);
statePtr->secretLimit = secretSize - XXH_STRIPE_LEN;
statePtr->nbStripesPerBlock = statePtr->secretLimit / XXH_SECRET_CONSUME_RATE;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_64bits_reset(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr)
{
if (statePtr == NULL) return XXH_ERROR;
XXH3_reset_internal(statePtr, 0, XXH3_kSecret, XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE);
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize)
{
if (statePtr == NULL) return XXH_ERROR;
XXH3_reset_internal(statePtr, 0, secret, secretSize);
if (secret == NULL) return XXH_ERROR;
if (secretSize < XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN) return XXH_ERROR;
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_64bits_reset_withSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
if (statePtr == NULL) return XXH_ERROR;
if (seed==0) return XXH3_64bits_reset(statePtr);
if ((seed != statePtr->seed) || (statePtr->extSecret != NULL))
XXH3_initCustomSecret(statePtr->customSecret, seed);
XXH3_reset_internal(statePtr, seed, NULL, XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE);
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecretandSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize, XXH64_hash_t seed64)
{
if (statePtr == NULL) return XXH_ERROR;
if (secret == NULL) return XXH_ERROR;
if (secretSize < XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN) return XXH_ERROR;
XXH3_reset_internal(statePtr, seed64, secret, secretSize);
statePtr->useSeed = 1; /* always, even if seed64==0 */
return XXH_OK;
}
/*!
* @internal
* @brief Processes a large input for XXH3_update() and XXH3_digest_long().
*
* Unlike XXH3_hashLong_internal_loop(), this can process data that overlaps a block.
*
* @param acc Pointer to the 8 accumulator lanes
* @param nbStripesSoFarPtr In/out pointer to the number of leftover stripes in the block*
* @param nbStripesPerBlock Number of stripes in a block
* @param input Input pointer
* @param nbStripes Number of stripes to process
* @param secret Secret pointer
* @param secretLimit Offset of the last block in @p secret
* @param f_acc Pointer to an XXH3_accumulate implementation
* @param f_scramble Pointer to an XXH3_scrambleAcc implementation
* @return Pointer past the end of @p input after processing
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE const xxh_u8 *
XXH3_consumeStripes(xxh_u64* XXH_RESTRICT acc,
size_t* XXH_RESTRICT nbStripesSoFarPtr, size_t nbStripesPerBlock,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t nbStripes,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLimit,
XXH3_f_accumulate f_acc,
XXH3_f_scrambleAcc f_scramble)
{
const xxh_u8* initialSecret = secret + *nbStripesSoFarPtr * XXH_SECRET_CONSUME_RATE;
/* Process full blocks */
if (nbStripes >= (nbStripesPerBlock - *nbStripesSoFarPtr)) {
/* Process the initial partial block... */
size_t nbStripesThisIter = nbStripesPerBlock - *nbStripesSoFarPtr;
do {
/* Accumulate and scramble */
f_acc(acc, input, initialSecret, nbStripesThisIter);
f_scramble(acc, secret + secretLimit);
input += nbStripesThisIter * XXH_STRIPE_LEN;
nbStripes -= nbStripesThisIter;
/* Then continue the loop with the full block size */
nbStripesThisIter = nbStripesPerBlock;
initialSecret = secret;
} while (nbStripes >= nbStripesPerBlock);
*nbStripesSoFarPtr = 0;
}
/* Process a partial block */
if (nbStripes > 0) {
f_acc(acc, input, initialSecret, nbStripes);
input += nbStripes * XXH_STRIPE_LEN;
*nbStripesSoFarPtr += nbStripes;
}
/* Return end pointer */
return input;
}
#ifndef XXH3_STREAM_USE_STACK
# if XXH_SIZE_OPT <= 0 && !defined(__clang__) /* clang doesn't need additional stack space */
# define XXH3_STREAM_USE_STACK 1
# endif
#endif
/*
* Both XXH3_64bits_update and XXH3_128bits_update use this routine.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_errorcode
XXH3_update(XXH3_state_t* XXH_RESTRICT const state,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
XXH3_f_accumulate f_acc,
XXH3_f_scrambleAcc f_scramble)
{
if (input==NULL) {
XXH_ASSERT(len == 0);
return XXH_OK;
}
XXH_ASSERT(state != NULL);
{ const xxh_u8* const bEnd = input + len;
const unsigned char* const secret = (state->extSecret == NULL) ? state->customSecret : state->extSecret;
#if defined(XXH3_STREAM_USE_STACK) && XXH3_STREAM_USE_STACK >= 1
/* For some reason, gcc and MSVC seem to suffer greatly
* when operating accumulators directly into state.
* Operating into stack space seems to enable proper optimization.
* clang, on the other hand, doesn't seem to need this trick */
XXH_ALIGN(XXH_ACC_ALIGN) xxh_u64 acc[8];
XXH_memcpy(acc, state->acc, sizeof(acc));
#else
xxh_u64* XXH_RESTRICT const acc = state->acc;
#endif
state->totalLen += len;
XXH_ASSERT(state->bufferedSize <= XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE);
/* small input : just fill in tmp buffer */
if (len <= XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE - state->bufferedSize) {
XXH_memcpy(state->buffer + state->bufferedSize, input, len);
state->bufferedSize += (XXH32_hash_t)len;
return XXH_OK;
}
/* total input is now > XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE */
#define XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_STRIPES (XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE / XXH_STRIPE_LEN)
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE % XXH_STRIPE_LEN == 0); /* clean multiple */
/*
* Internal buffer is partially filled (always, except at beginning)
* Complete it, then consume it.
*/
if (state->bufferedSize) {
size_t const loadSize = XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE - state->bufferedSize;
XXH_memcpy(state->buffer + state->bufferedSize, input, loadSize);
input += loadSize;
XXH3_consumeStripes(acc,
&state->nbStripesSoFar, state->nbStripesPerBlock,
state->buffer, XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_STRIPES,
secret, state->secretLimit,
f_acc, f_scramble);
state->bufferedSize = 0;
}
XXH_ASSERT(input < bEnd);
if (bEnd - input > XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE) {
size_t nbStripes = (size_t)(bEnd - 1 - input) / XXH_STRIPE_LEN;
input = XXH3_consumeStripes(acc,
&state->nbStripesSoFar, state->nbStripesPerBlock,
input, nbStripes,
secret, state->secretLimit,
f_acc, f_scramble);
XXH_memcpy(state->buffer + sizeof(state->buffer) - XXH_STRIPE_LEN, input - XXH_STRIPE_LEN, XXH_STRIPE_LEN);
}
/* Some remaining input (always) : buffer it */
XXH_ASSERT(input < bEnd);
XXH_ASSERT(bEnd - input <= XXH3_INTERNALBUFFER_SIZE);
XXH_ASSERT(state->bufferedSize == 0);
XXH_memcpy(state->buffer, input, (size_t)(bEnd-input));
state->bufferedSize = (XXH32_hash_t)(bEnd-input);
#if defined(XXH3_STREAM_USE_STACK) && XXH3_STREAM_USE_STACK >= 1
/* save stack accumulators into state */
XXH_memcpy(state->acc, acc, sizeof(acc));
#endif
}
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_64bits_update(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* state, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len)
{
return XXH3_update(state, (const xxh_u8*)input, len,
XXH3_accumulate, XXH3_scrambleAcc);
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void
XXH3_digest_long (XXH64_hash_t* acc,
const XXH3_state_t* state,
const unsigned char* secret)
{
xxh_u8 lastStripe[XXH_STRIPE_LEN];
const xxh_u8* lastStripePtr;
/*
* Digest on a local copy. This way, the state remains unaltered, and it can
* continue ingesting more input afterwards.
*/
XXH_memcpy(acc, state->acc, sizeof(state->acc));
if (state->bufferedSize >= XXH_STRIPE_LEN) {
/* Consume remaining stripes then point to remaining data in buffer */
size_t const nbStripes = (state->bufferedSize - 1) / XXH_STRIPE_LEN;
size_t nbStripesSoFar = state->nbStripesSoFar;
XXH3_consumeStripes(acc,
&nbStripesSoFar, state->nbStripesPerBlock,
state->buffer, nbStripes,
secret, state->secretLimit,
XXH3_accumulate, XXH3_scrambleAcc);
lastStripePtr = state->buffer + state->bufferedSize - XXH_STRIPE_LEN;
} else { /* bufferedSize < XXH_STRIPE_LEN */
/* Copy to temp buffer */
size_t const catchupSize = XXH_STRIPE_LEN - state->bufferedSize;
XXH_ASSERT(state->bufferedSize > 0); /* there is always some input buffered */
XXH_memcpy(lastStripe, state->buffer + sizeof(state->buffer) - catchupSize, catchupSize);
XXH_memcpy(lastStripe + catchupSize, state->buffer, state->bufferedSize);
lastStripePtr = lastStripe;
}
/* Last stripe */
XXH3_accumulate_512(acc,
lastStripePtr,
secret + state->secretLimit - XXH_SECRET_LASTACC_START);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH64_hash_t XXH3_64bits_digest (XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH3_state_t* state)
{
const unsigned char* const secret = (state->extSecret == NULL) ? state->customSecret : state->extSecret;
if (state->totalLen > XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX) {
XXH_ALIGN(XXH_ACC_ALIGN) XXH64_hash_t acc[XXH_ACC_NB];
XXH3_digest_long(acc, state, secret);
return XXH3_mergeAccs(acc,
secret + XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START,
(xxh_u64)state->totalLen * XXH_PRIME64_1);
}
/* totalLen <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX: digesting a short input */
if (state->useSeed)
return XXH3_64bits_withSeed(state->buffer, (size_t)state->totalLen, state->seed);
return XXH3_64bits_withSecret(state->buffer, (size_t)(state->totalLen),
secret, state->secretLimit + XXH_STRIPE_LEN);
}
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
/* ==========================================
* XXH3 128 bits (a.k.a XXH128)
* ==========================================
* XXH3's 128-bit variant has better mixing and strength than the 64-bit variant,
* even without counting the significantly larger output size.
*
* For example, extra steps are taken to avoid the seed-dependent collisions
* in 17-240 byte inputs (See XXH3_mix16B and XXH128_mix32B).
*
* This strength naturally comes at the cost of some speed, especially on short
* lengths. Note that longer hashes are about as fast as the 64-bit version
* due to it using only a slight modification of the 64-bit loop.
*
* XXH128 is also more oriented towards 64-bit machines. It is still extremely
* fast for a _128-bit_ hash on 32-bit (it usually clears XXH64).
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_len_1to3_128b(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
/* A doubled version of 1to3_64b with different constants. */
XXH_ASSERT(input != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(1 <= len && len <= 3);
XXH_ASSERT(secret != NULL);
/*
* len = 1: combinedl = { input[0], 0x01, input[0], input[0] }
* len = 2: combinedl = { input[1], 0x02, input[0], input[1] }
* len = 3: combinedl = { input[2], 0x03, input[0], input[1] }
*/
{ xxh_u8 const c1 = input[0];
xxh_u8 const c2 = input[len >> 1];
xxh_u8 const c3 = input[len - 1];
xxh_u32 const combinedl = ((xxh_u32)c1 <<16) | ((xxh_u32)c2 << 24)
| ((xxh_u32)c3 << 0) | ((xxh_u32)len << 8);
xxh_u32 const combinedh = XXH_rotl32(XXH_swap32(combinedl), 13);
xxh_u64 const bitflipl = (XXH_readLE32(secret) ^ XXH_readLE32(secret+4)) + seed;
xxh_u64 const bitfliph = (XXH_readLE32(secret+8) ^ XXH_readLE32(secret+12)) - seed;
xxh_u64 const keyed_lo = (xxh_u64)combinedl ^ bitflipl;
xxh_u64 const keyed_hi = (xxh_u64)combinedh ^ bitfliph;
XXH128_hash_t h128;
h128.low64 = XXH64_avalanche(keyed_lo);
h128.high64 = XXH64_avalanche(keyed_hi);
return h128;
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_len_4to8_128b(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(input != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(secret != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(4 <= len && len <= 8);
seed ^= (xxh_u64)XXH_swap32((xxh_u32)seed) << 32;
{ xxh_u32 const input_lo = XXH_readLE32(input);
xxh_u32 const input_hi = XXH_readLE32(input + len - 4);
xxh_u64 const input_64 = input_lo + ((xxh_u64)input_hi << 32);
xxh_u64 const bitflip = (XXH_readLE64(secret+16) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+24)) + seed;
xxh_u64 const keyed = input_64 ^ bitflip;
/* Shift len to the left to ensure it is even, this avoids even multiplies. */
XXH128_hash_t m128 = XXH_mult64to128(keyed, XXH_PRIME64_1 + (len << 2));
m128.high64 += (m128.low64 << 1);
m128.low64 ^= (m128.high64 >> 3);
m128.low64 = XXH_xorshift64(m128.low64, 35);
m128.low64 *= PRIME_MX2;
m128.low64 = XXH_xorshift64(m128.low64, 28);
m128.high64 = XXH3_avalanche(m128.high64);
return m128;
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_len_9to16_128b(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(input != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(secret != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(9 <= len && len <= 16);
{ xxh_u64 const bitflipl = (XXH_readLE64(secret+32) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+40)) - seed;
xxh_u64 const bitfliph = (XXH_readLE64(secret+48) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+56)) + seed;
xxh_u64 const input_lo = XXH_readLE64(input);
xxh_u64 input_hi = XXH_readLE64(input + len - 8);
XXH128_hash_t m128 = XXH_mult64to128(input_lo ^ input_hi ^ bitflipl, XXH_PRIME64_1);
/*
* Put len in the middle of m128 to ensure that the length gets mixed to
* both the low and high bits in the 128x64 multiply below.
*/
m128.low64 += (xxh_u64)(len - 1) << 54;
input_hi ^= bitfliph;
/*
* Add the high 32 bits of input_hi to the high 32 bits of m128, then
* add the long product of the low 32 bits of input_hi and XXH_PRIME32_2 to
* the high 64 bits of m128.
*
* The best approach to this operation is different on 32-bit and 64-bit.
*/
if (sizeof(void *) < sizeof(xxh_u64)) { /* 32-bit */
/*
* 32-bit optimized version, which is more readable.
*
* On 32-bit, it removes an ADC and delays a dependency between the two
* halves of m128.high64, but it generates an extra mask on 64-bit.
*/
m128.high64 += (input_hi & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL) + XXH_mult32to64((xxh_u32)input_hi, XXH_PRIME32_2);
} else {
/*
* 64-bit optimized (albeit more confusing) version.
*
* Uses some properties of addition and multiplication to remove the mask:
*
* Let:
* a = input_hi.lo = (input_hi & 0x00000000FFFFFFFF)
* b = input_hi.hi = (input_hi & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000)
* c = XXH_PRIME32_2
*
* a + (b * c)
* Inverse Property: x + y - x == y
* a + (b * (1 + c - 1))
* Distributive Property: x * (y + z) == (x * y) + (x * z)
* a + (b * 1) + (b * (c - 1))
* Identity Property: x * 1 == x
* a + b + (b * (c - 1))
*
* Substitute a, b, and c:
* input_hi.hi + input_hi.lo + ((xxh_u64)input_hi.lo * (XXH_PRIME32_2 - 1))
*
* Since input_hi.hi + input_hi.lo == input_hi, we get this:
* input_hi + ((xxh_u64)input_hi.lo * (XXH_PRIME32_2 - 1))
*/
m128.high64 += input_hi + XXH_mult32to64((xxh_u32)input_hi, XXH_PRIME32_2 - 1);
}
/* m128 ^= XXH_swap64(m128 >> 64); */
m128.low64 ^= XXH_swap64(m128.high64);
{ /* 128x64 multiply: h128 = m128 * XXH_PRIME64_2; */
XXH128_hash_t h128 = XXH_mult64to128(m128.low64, XXH_PRIME64_2);
h128.high64 += m128.high64 * XXH_PRIME64_2;
h128.low64 = XXH3_avalanche(h128.low64);
h128.high64 = XXH3_avalanche(h128.high64);
return h128;
} }
}
/*
* Assumption: `secret` size is >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_len_0to16_128b(const xxh_u8* input, size_t len, const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(len <= 16);
{ if (len > 8) return XXH3_len_9to16_128b(input, len, secret, seed);
if (len >= 4) return XXH3_len_4to8_128b(input, len, secret, seed);
if (len) return XXH3_len_1to3_128b(input, len, secret, seed);
{ XXH128_hash_t h128;
xxh_u64 const bitflipl = XXH_readLE64(secret+64) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+72);
xxh_u64 const bitfliph = XXH_readLE64(secret+80) ^ XXH_readLE64(secret+88);
h128.low64 = XXH64_avalanche(seed ^ bitflipl);
h128.high64 = XXH64_avalanche( seed ^ bitfliph);
return h128;
} }
}
/*
* A bit slower than XXH3_mix16B, but handles multiply by zero better.
*/
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH128_hash_t
XXH128_mix32B(XXH128_hash_t acc, const xxh_u8* input_1, const xxh_u8* input_2,
const xxh_u8* secret, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
acc.low64 += XXH3_mix16B (input_1, secret+0, seed);
acc.low64 ^= XXH_readLE64(input_2) + XXH_readLE64(input_2 + 8);
acc.high64 += XXH3_mix16B (input_2, secret+16, seed);
acc.high64 ^= XXH_readLE64(input_1) + XXH_readLE64(input_1 + 8);
return acc;
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_len_17to128_128b(const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN); (void)secretSize;
XXH_ASSERT(16 < len && len <= 128);
{ XXH128_hash_t acc;
acc.low64 = len * XXH_PRIME64_1;
acc.high64 = 0;
#if XXH_SIZE_OPT >= 1
{
/* Smaller, but slightly slower. */
unsigned int i = (unsigned int)(len - 1) / 32;
do {
acc = XXH128_mix32B(acc, input+16*i, input+len-16*(i+1), secret+32*i, seed);
} while (i-- != 0);
}
#else
if (len > 32) {
if (len > 64) {
if (len > 96) {
acc = XXH128_mix32B(acc, input+48, input+len-64, secret+96, seed);
}
acc = XXH128_mix32B(acc, input+32, input+len-48, secret+64, seed);
}
acc = XXH128_mix32B(acc, input+16, input+len-32, secret+32, seed);
}
acc = XXH128_mix32B(acc, input, input+len-16, secret, seed);
#endif
{ XXH128_hash_t h128;
h128.low64 = acc.low64 + acc.high64;
h128.high64 = (acc.low64 * XXH_PRIME64_1)
+ (acc.high64 * XXH_PRIME64_4)
+ ((len - seed) * XXH_PRIME64_2);
h128.low64 = XXH3_avalanche(h128.low64);
h128.high64 = (XXH64_hash_t)0 - XXH3_avalanche(h128.high64);
return h128;
}
}
}
XXH_NO_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_len_129to240_128b(const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN); (void)secretSize;
XXH_ASSERT(128 < len && len <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX);
{ XXH128_hash_t acc;
unsigned i;
acc.low64 = len * XXH_PRIME64_1;
acc.high64 = 0;
/*
* We set as `i` as offset + 32. We do this so that unchanged
* `len` can be used as upper bound. This reaches a sweet spot
* where both x86 and aarch64 get simple agen and good codegen
* for the loop.
*/
for (i = 32; i < 160; i += 32) {
acc = XXH128_mix32B(acc,
input + i - 32,
input + i - 16,
secret + i - 32,
seed);
}
acc.low64 = XXH3_avalanche(acc.low64);
acc.high64 = XXH3_avalanche(acc.high64);
/*
* NB: `i <= len` will duplicate the last 32-bytes if
* len % 32 was zero. This is an unfortunate necessity to keep
* the hash result stable.
*/
for (i=160; i <= len; i += 32) {
acc = XXH128_mix32B(acc,
input + i - 32,
input + i - 16,
secret + XXH3_MIDSIZE_STARTOFFSET + i - 160,
seed);
}
/* last bytes */
acc = XXH128_mix32B(acc,
input + len - 16,
input + len - 32,
secret + XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN - XXH3_MIDSIZE_LASTOFFSET - 16,
(XXH64_hash_t)0 - seed);
{ XXH128_hash_t h128;
h128.low64 = acc.low64 + acc.high64;
h128.high64 = (acc.low64 * XXH_PRIME64_1)
+ (acc.high64 * XXH_PRIME64_4)
+ ((len - seed) * XXH_PRIME64_2);
h128.low64 = XXH3_avalanche(h128.low64);
h128.high64 = (XXH64_hash_t)0 - XXH3_avalanche(h128.high64);
return h128;
}
}
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_128b_internal(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
const xxh_u8* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretSize,
XXH3_f_accumulate f_acc,
XXH3_f_scrambleAcc f_scramble)
{
XXH_ALIGN(XXH_ACC_ALIGN) xxh_u64 acc[XXH_ACC_NB] = XXH3_INIT_ACC;
XXH3_hashLong_internal_loop(acc, (const xxh_u8*)input, len, secret, secretSize, f_acc, f_scramble);
/* converge into final hash */
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(acc) == 64);
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= sizeof(acc) + XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START);
{ XXH128_hash_t h128;
h128.low64 = XXH3_mergeAccs(acc,
secret + XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START,
(xxh_u64)len * XXH_PRIME64_1);
h128.high64 = XXH3_mergeAccs(acc,
secret + secretSize
- sizeof(acc) - XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START,
~((xxh_u64)len * XXH_PRIME64_2));
return h128;
}
}
/*
* It's important for performance that XXH3_hashLong() is not inlined.
*/
XXH_NO_INLINE XXH_PUREF XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_128b_default(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed64,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLen)
{
(void)seed64; (void)secret; (void)secretLen;
return XXH3_hashLong_128b_internal(input, len, XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret),
XXH3_accumulate, XXH3_scrambleAcc);
}
/*
* It's important for performance to pass @p secretLen (when it's static)
* to the compiler, so that it can properly optimize the vectorized loop.
*
* When the secret size is unknown, or on GCC 12 where the mix of NO_INLINE and FORCE_INLINE
* breaks -Og, this is XXH_NO_INLINE.
*/
XXH3_WITH_SECRET_INLINE XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_128b_withSecret(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed64,
const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLen)
{
(void)seed64;
return XXH3_hashLong_128b_internal(input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, secretLen,
XXH3_accumulate, XXH3_scrambleAcc);
}
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_128b_withSeed_internal(const void* XXH_RESTRICT input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed64,
XXH3_f_accumulate f_acc,
XXH3_f_scrambleAcc f_scramble,
XXH3_f_initCustomSecret f_initSec)
{
if (seed64 == 0)
return XXH3_hashLong_128b_internal(input, len,
XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret),
f_acc, f_scramble);
{ XXH_ALIGN(XXH_SEC_ALIGN) xxh_u8 secret[XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE];
f_initSec(secret, seed64);
return XXH3_hashLong_128b_internal(input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, sizeof(secret),
f_acc, f_scramble);
}
}
/*
* It's important for performance that XXH3_hashLong is not inlined.
*/
XXH_NO_INLINE XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_hashLong_128b_withSeed(const void* input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed64, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLen)
{
(void)secret; (void)secretLen;
return XXH3_hashLong_128b_withSeed_internal(input, len, seed64,
XXH3_accumulate, XXH3_scrambleAcc, XXH3_initCustomSecret);
}
typedef XXH128_hash_t (*XXH3_hashLong128_f)(const void* XXH_RESTRICT, size_t,
XXH64_hash_t, const void* XXH_RESTRICT, size_t);
XXH_FORCE_INLINE XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_128bits_internal(const void* input, size_t len,
XXH64_hash_t seed64, const void* XXH_RESTRICT secret, size_t secretLen,
XXH3_hashLong128_f f_hl128)
{
XXH_ASSERT(secretLen >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN);
/*
* If an action is to be taken if `secret` conditions are not respected,
* it should be done here.
* For now, it's a contract pre-condition.
* Adding a check and a branch here would cost performance at every hash.
*/
if (len <= 16)
return XXH3_len_0to16_128b((const xxh_u8*)input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, seed64);
if (len <= 128)
return XXH3_len_17to128_128b((const xxh_u8*)input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, secretLen, seed64);
if (len <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX)
return XXH3_len_129to240_128b((const xxh_u8*)input, len, (const xxh_u8*)secret, secretLen, seed64);
return f_hl128(input, len, seed64, secret, secretLen);
}
/* === Public XXH128 API === */
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH128_hash_t XXH3_128bits(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len)
{
return XXH3_128bits_internal(input, len, 0,
XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret),
XXH3_hashLong_128b_default);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_128bits_withSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize)
{
return XXH3_128bits_internal(input, len, 0,
(const xxh_u8*)secret, secretSize,
XXH3_hashLong_128b_withSecret);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_128bits_withSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
return XXH3_128bits_internal(input, len, seed,
XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret),
XXH3_hashLong_128b_withSeed);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH128_hash_t
XXH3_128bits_withSecretandSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
if (len <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX)
return XXH3_128bits_internal(input, len, seed, XXH3_kSecret, sizeof(XXH3_kSecret), NULL);
return XXH3_hashLong_128b_withSecret(input, len, seed, secret, secretSize);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH128_hash_t
XXH128(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
return XXH3_128bits_withSeed(input, len, seed);
}
/* === XXH3 128-bit streaming === */
#ifndef XXH_NO_STREAM
/*
* All initialization and update functions are identical to 64-bit streaming variant.
* The only difference is the finalization routine.
*/
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_128bits_reset(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr)
{
return XXH3_64bits_reset(statePtr);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize)
{
return XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecret(statePtr, secret, secretSize);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_128bits_reset_withSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
return XXH3_64bits_reset_withSeed(statePtr, seed);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_128bits_reset_withSecretandSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* statePtr, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* secret, size_t secretSize, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
return XXH3_64bits_reset_withSecretandSeed(statePtr, secret, secretSize, seed);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_128bits_update(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH3_state_t* state, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* input, size_t len)
{
return XXH3_64bits_update(state, input, len);
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH128_hash_t XXH3_128bits_digest (XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH3_state_t* state)
{
const unsigned char* const secret = (state->extSecret == NULL) ? state->customSecret : state->extSecret;
if (state->totalLen > XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX) {
XXH_ALIGN(XXH_ACC_ALIGN) XXH64_hash_t acc[XXH_ACC_NB];
XXH3_digest_long(acc, state, secret);
XXH_ASSERT(state->secretLimit + XXH_STRIPE_LEN >= sizeof(acc) + XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START);
{ XXH128_hash_t h128;
h128.low64 = XXH3_mergeAccs(acc,
secret + XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START,
(xxh_u64)state->totalLen * XXH_PRIME64_1);
h128.high64 = XXH3_mergeAccs(acc,
secret + state->secretLimit + XXH_STRIPE_LEN
- sizeof(acc) - XXH_SECRET_MERGEACCS_START,
~((xxh_u64)state->totalLen * XXH_PRIME64_2));
return h128;
}
}
/* len <= XXH3_MIDSIZE_MAX : short code */
if (state->seed)
return XXH3_128bits_withSeed(state->buffer, (size_t)state->totalLen, state->seed);
return XXH3_128bits_withSecret(state->buffer, (size_t)(state->totalLen),
secret, state->secretLimit + XXH_STRIPE_LEN);
}
#endif /* !XXH_NO_STREAM */
/* 128-bit utility functions */
#include <string.h> /* memcmp, memcpy */
/* return : 1 is equal, 0 if different */
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API int XXH128_isEqual(XXH128_hash_t h1, XXH128_hash_t h2)
{
/* note : XXH128_hash_t is compact, it has no padding byte */
return !(memcmp(&h1, &h2, sizeof(h1)));
}
/* This prototype is compatible with stdlib's qsort().
* @return : >0 if *h128_1 > *h128_2
* <0 if *h128_1 < *h128_2
* =0 if *h128_1 == *h128_2 */
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API int XXH128_cmp(XXH_NOESCAPE const void* h128_1, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* h128_2)
{
XXH128_hash_t const h1 = *(const XXH128_hash_t*)h128_1;
XXH128_hash_t const h2 = *(const XXH128_hash_t*)h128_2;
int const hcmp = (h1.high64 > h2.high64) - (h2.high64 > h1.high64);
/* note : bets that, in most cases, hash values are different */
if (hcmp) return hcmp;
return (h1.low64 > h2.low64) - (h2.low64 > h1.low64);
}
/*====== Canonical representation ======*/
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API void
XXH128_canonicalFromHash(XXH_NOESCAPE XXH128_canonical_t* dst, XXH128_hash_t hash)
{
XXH_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(XXH128_canonical_t) == sizeof(XXH128_hash_t));
if (XXH_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
hash.high64 = XXH_swap64(hash.high64);
hash.low64 = XXH_swap64(hash.low64);
}
XXH_memcpy(dst, &hash.high64, sizeof(hash.high64));
XXH_memcpy((char*)dst + sizeof(hash.high64), &hash.low64, sizeof(hash.low64));
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH128_hash_t
XXH128_hashFromCanonical(XXH_NOESCAPE const XXH128_canonical_t* src)
{
XXH128_hash_t h;
h.high64 = XXH_readBE64(src);
h.low64 = XXH_readBE64(src->digest + 8);
return h;
}
/* ==========================================
* Secret generators
* ==========================================
*/
#define XXH_MIN(x, y) (((x) > (y)) ? (y) : (x))
XXH_FORCE_INLINE void XXH3_combine16(void* dst, XXH128_hash_t h128)
{
XXH_writeLE64( dst, XXH_readLE64(dst) ^ h128.low64 );
XXH_writeLE64( (char*)dst+8, XXH_readLE64((char*)dst+8) ^ h128.high64 );
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API XXH_errorcode
XXH3_generateSecret(XXH_NOESCAPE void* secretBuffer, size_t secretSize, XXH_NOESCAPE const void* customSeed, size_t customSeedSize)
{
#if (XXH_DEBUGLEVEL >= 1)
XXH_ASSERT(secretBuffer != NULL);
XXH_ASSERT(secretSize >= XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN);
#else
/* production mode, assert() are disabled */
if (secretBuffer == NULL) return XXH_ERROR;
if (secretSize < XXH3_SECRET_SIZE_MIN) return XXH_ERROR;
#endif
if (customSeedSize == 0) {
customSeed = XXH3_kSecret;
customSeedSize = XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE;
}
#if (XXH_DEBUGLEVEL >= 1)
XXH_ASSERT(customSeed != NULL);
#else
if (customSeed == NULL) return XXH_ERROR;
#endif
/* Fill secretBuffer with a copy of customSeed - repeat as needed */
{ size_t pos = 0;
while (pos < secretSize) {
size_t const toCopy = XXH_MIN((secretSize - pos), customSeedSize);
memcpy((char*)secretBuffer + pos, customSeed, toCopy);
pos += toCopy;
} }
{ size_t const nbSeg16 = secretSize / 16;
size_t n;
XXH128_canonical_t scrambler;
XXH128_canonicalFromHash(&scrambler, XXH128(customSeed, customSeedSize, 0));
for (n=0; n<nbSeg16; n++) {
XXH128_hash_t const h128 = XXH128(&scrambler, sizeof(scrambler), n);
XXH3_combine16((char*)secretBuffer + n*16, h128);
}
/* last segment */
XXH3_combine16((char*)secretBuffer + secretSize - 16, XXH128_hashFromCanonical(&scrambler));
}
return XXH_OK;
}
/*! @ingroup XXH3_family */
XXH_PUBLIC_API void
XXH3_generateSecret_fromSeed(XXH_NOESCAPE void* secretBuffer, XXH64_hash_t seed)
{
XXH_ALIGN(XXH_SEC_ALIGN) xxh_u8 secret[XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE];
XXH3_initCustomSecret(secret, seed);
XXH_ASSERT(secretBuffer != NULL);
memcpy(secretBuffer, secret, XXH_SECRET_DEFAULT_SIZE);
}
/* Pop our optimization override from above */
#if XXH_VECTOR == XXH_AVX2 /* AVX2 */ \
&& defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) /* GCC, not Clang */ \
&& defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && XXH_SIZE_OPT <= 0 /* respect -O0 and -Os */
# pragma GCC pop_options
#endif
#endif /* XXH_NO_LONG_LONG */
#endif /* XXH_NO_XXH3 */
/*!
* @}
*/
#endif /* XXH_IMPLEMENTATION */
#if defined (__cplusplus)
} /* extern "C" */
#endif
+104
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Decode a hex-dump capture of LiteNetLib 1.x traffic.
Input format: alternating timestamp lines and lowercase hex payload lines
(one UDP payload per line), which is what the in-game capture produces.
./tools/decode_lnl.py traffic.txt
"""
import re, sys, struct, collections
PROP = {0:'Unreliable',1:'Channeled',2:'Ack',3:'Ping',4:'Pong',5:'ConnectRequest',
6:'ConnectAccept',7:'Disconnect',8:'UnconnectedMessage',9:'MtuCheck',10:'MtuOk',
11:'Broadcast',12:'Merged',13:'ShutdownOk',14:'PeerNotFound',15:'InvalidProtocol',
16:'NatMessage',17:'Empty'}
BATCH_MAGIC = 0x1160
def read_packed_uint(d, p):
n = d[p] & 0x07
if n == 5:
return struct.unpack_from('<I', d, p + 1)[0], p + 5
v = int.from_bytes(d[p:p + n], 'little')
return v >> 3, p + n
def decode_ngo(payload):
"""Decode an NGO batch riding inside a Channeled/Unreliable LiteNetLib payload."""
if len(payload) < 16:
return " (too short for a batch header)"
magic, count, size = struct.unpack_from('<HHi', payload, 0)
bhash = struct.unpack_from('<Q', payload, 8)[0]
if magic != BATCH_MAGIC:
return f" not an NGO batch (magic 0x{magic:04x})"
out = [f" NGO batch: count={count} size={size} len={len(payload)} hash=0x{bhash:016x}"]
p = 16
for i in range(count):
if p >= len(payload):
break
mtype, p = read_packed_uint(payload, p)
msize, p = read_packed_uint(payload, p)
out.append(f" [{mtype}] {msize} bytes: {payload[p:p+min(msize,32)].hex()}")
p += msize
return "\n".join(out)
def main(path):
lines = open(path).read().splitlines()
events, ts = [], None
for l in lines:
l = l.strip()
if re.match(r'^\d{4}-\d\d-\d\d', l):
ts = l
elif re.fullmatch(r'[0-9a-f]+', l) and len(l) >= 2:
events.append((ts, bytes.fromhex(l)))
hist = collections.Counter()
for ts, b in events:
prop = b[0] & 0x1f
name = PROP.get(prop, f'?{prop}')
hist[name] += 1
t = ts.split()[1][:12] if ts else ''
detail = ''
if name == 'ConnectRequest':
pid = struct.unpack_from('<i', b, 1)[0]
ct = struct.unpack_from('<q', b, 5)[0]
asz = b[17]
addr = b[18:18 + asz]
port = struct.unpack_from('>H', addr, 2)[0]
ip = '.'.join(str(x) for x in addr[4:8])
detail = (f"protocolId={pid} ct={ct} target={ip}:{port} "
f"connectData={b[18+asz:].hex()}")
elif name == 'ConnectAccept':
# [1..8] connectionTime, [9] connectionNumber, [10] isReused, [11..14] peerId
detail = (f"ct={struct.unpack_from('<q', b, 1)[0]} "
f"connNum={b[9]} reused={b[10]} "
f"peerId={struct.unpack_from('<i', b, 11)[0]}")
elif name in ('Ping', 'Pong'):
detail = f"seq={struct.unpack_from('<H', b, 1)[0]}"
elif name == 'MtuCheck':
detail = f"mtu={struct.unpack_from('<i', b, 1)[0]}"
print(f"{t:13} {name:16} {len(b):5} {detail}")
if name in ('Channeled', 'Unreliable'):
# Channeled carries a 4-byte LNL header, Unreliable a 1-byte one.
print(decode_ngo(b[4:] if name == 'Channeled' else b[1:]))
print("\nhistogram:")
for k, v in hist.most_common():
print(f" {k:16} {v}")
if not hist['Channeled'] and not hist['Unreliable']:
print("\n NOTE: no data packets at all - the NGO layer never got a chance to speak.")
if hist['Ping'] and not hist['Pong']:
print(" NOTE: pings with no pongs. These captures carry no direction or port info, so"
"\n note the pings are most likely the SERVER's: it accepted the connection"
"\n and started pinging, while the client is still in Outgoing state and so"
"\n never pongs. Expect a DisconnectTimeout (~5s) loop on the server.")
if hist['ConnectRequest'] > 3 and hist['ConnectAccept']:
print(" NOTE: repeated ConnectRequests answered by ConnectAccepts. If the connectionTime"
"\n is identical across them it is ONE attempt being resent - the client is"
"\n not acting on the accept. Capture with tcpdump to see if it arrives.")
if __name__ == '__main__':
main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else 'traffic.txt')