remove proxies and use native services w/cors

This commit is contained in:
Devin Zuczek
2026-08-05 11:13:15 -04:00
parent 9f4ce07aca
commit 079c889ccb
12 changed files with 702 additions and 684 deletions
+24 -129
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
import { authFailure } from './auth-messages'
import type { AuthAction, AuthFailure } from './auth-messages'
import type { Env } from './context'
/**
* The www worker is a backend-for-frontend (BFF): the browser only ever talks to
* www, and www forwards to the `auth` and `accounts` workers server-side. That
* keeps the JWT off other origins and sidesteps CORS (those workers set no CORS
* headers). Hosts are derived from the shared base domain (`auth.<DOMAIN>`,
* `accounts.<DOMAIN>`), matching how the workers are deployed.
* Where the other workers live. Derived from the shared base domain, matching how they
* are deployed. www serves these to the SPA (`/api/config`), which calls them DIRECTLY —
* the same endpoints the game uses, as rec.net's own site did. The only one www still
* calls itself is `auth`, for the Turnstile-gated signup grant (see `postAuthForm`).
*/
export const authBase = (env: Env): string => `https://auth.${env.DOMAIN}`
@@ -14,64 +16,26 @@ export const notifyBase = (env: Env): string => `https://notify.${env.DOMAIN}`
export const apiBase = (env: Env): string => `https://api.${env.DOMAIN}`
export const imgBase = (env: Env): string => `https://img.${env.DOMAIN}`
/**
* Send a form-urlencoded body to an upstream worker. The auth/accounts endpoints
* read their inputs via Hono's `parseBody()`, so they expect form fields (not
* JSON). `bearer`, when given, authenticates the caller.
*/
async function sendForm(
method: 'POST' | 'PUT',
url: string,
fields: Record<string, string>,
bearer?: string
): Promise<Response> {
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
}
if (bearer) headers.authorization = `Bearer ${bearer}`
return fetch(url, {
method,
headers,
body: new URLSearchParams(fields).toString(),
})
}
/** POST a form-urlencoded body to an upstream worker (see `sendForm`). */
export const postForm = (
url: string,
fields: Record<string, string>,
bearer?: string
): Promise<Response> => sendForm('POST', url, fields, bearer)
/**
* PUT a form-urlencoded body to an upstream worker (see `sendForm`). The accounts
* worker's profile mutations are split by verb — the username change is a PUT, and
* posting to it 404s rather than failing loudly.
*/
export const putForm = (
url: string,
fields: Record<string, string>,
bearer?: string
): Promise<Response> => sendForm('PUT', url, fields, bearer)
/**
* POST a form body to the `auth` worker, carrying the browser's real IP across.
*
* Every other upstream is reached over its public hostname, but auth can't be: it reads
* the caller's address from `CF-Connecting-IP` and counts it as the account's immutable
* `signupIp`, and a Worker subrequest to https://auth.<DOMAIN> re-enters the Cloudflare
* edge, which REPLACES that header with Cloudflare's own address. Every web signup
* therefore recorded one shared IP, and auth's per-IP cap — 3 accounts, never decaying —
* refused the fourth web account ever created, for everybody. The web path asserts no
* platform, so that arm was also the only cap actually in front of it.
* The browser could post `/connect/token` itself — it does exactly that to sign in — but
* not to SIGN UP: that grant is gated by Turnstile, whose secret key can't ship to a
* page. So signup goes through www, and www has to solve a problem the browser doesn't
* have: `auth` reads the caller's address from `CF-Connecting-IP` and records it as the
* account's immutable `signupIp`, and a Worker subrequest to https://auth.<DOMAIN>
* re-enters the Cloudflare edge, which REPLACES that header with Cloudflare's own
* address. Every web signup therefore recorded one shared IP, and auth's per-IP cap —
* 3 accounts, never decaying — refused the fourth web account ever created, for everybody.
*
* Going through the service binding skips the edge, so the header set here is the one
* auth reads. That is safe precisely because the edge does overwrite it on the public
* route: a game client posting `/connect/token` directly still cannot spoof its own IP,
* so no shared secret is needed to tell the two callers apart.
* route: a game client (or the SPA signing in) posting `/connect/token` directly still
* cannot spoof its own IP, so no shared secret is needed to tell the callers apart.
*
* `clientIp` is the caller's own edge-set `cf-connecting-ip`, and must never be anything
* a browser supplied. Omit it on calls that aren't IP-sensitive.
* a browser supplied. Absent, no header is sent at all — auth's `clientIp` then reads
* empty, which SKIPS the cap rather than counting every such signup together.
*
* Falls back to the public hostname when the binding is absent (local `vite dev` — see
* `Env.AUTH`); the edge then overwrites the header again, which is the old behaviour.
@@ -96,69 +60,11 @@ export async function postAuthForm(
return env.AUTH ? env.AUTH.fetch(request) : fetch(request)
}
/** Which grant www was making, so a shared refusal reads right on either form. */
export type AuthAction = 'signup' | 'login'
/** A rejected `/connect/token` grant, translated for the browser. */
export interface AuthFailure {
/** The sentence to put in front of the player. */
message: string
/** 400 when the grant was refused, 502 when `auth` itself couldn't proceed. */
status: 400 | 502
/** The raw `error`/`error_description` pair, for the operator's log line only. */
upstream: string
}
/**
* What each of auth's `error_description`s means to somebody filling in a form.
*
* Keyed on the exact string auth sends (see its `/connect/token` handler). Only a few
* are reachable from the web — signup posts `create_account` with no platform, login
* posts `password` with no `platform_auth` — but the platform arms are mapped anyway so
* a future web flow that does assert one can't regress to a bare code.
*/
const AUTH_MESSAGES: Record<string, string> = {
'too many accounts created from this network':
'Too many accounts have already been created from your network. Try again later, or from a different connection.',
'account limit reached for this platform account':
'This platform account has already created as many accounts as it is allowed.',
'invalid account_id or password': 'That username or password is incorrect.',
'account_id or username is required': 'Username and password are required.',
'invalid or missing platform_auth': 'Your platform sign-in could not be verified.',
'unsupported platform; only Steam and Meta can be verified':
'That platform cannot be verified — only Steam and Meta are supported.',
'no linked account for this platform identity':
'No account is linked to this platform sign-in yet. Sign in with your password once to link it.',
'refresh_token is invalid or expired': 'Your session has expired. Please sign in again.',
}
/** Fallbacks when nothing above matched, so a player never reads an OAuth code. */
const GENERIC_MESSAGES: Record<AuthAction, { rejected: string; broken: string }> = {
signup: {
rejected: 'Your account could not be created. Please check your details and try again.',
broken:
'Accounts cannot be created right now. This is a problem on our end — please try again later.',
},
login: {
rejected: 'You could not be signed in. Please check your details and try again.',
broken:
'Sign-in is unavailable right now. This is a problem on our end — please try again later.',
},
}
/** Message for an `auth` that couldn't be reached at all (the fetch itself threw). */
export const authUnreachable = (action: AuthAction): string => GENERIC_MESSAGES[action].broken
/**
* Read a failed `auth` `/connect/token` response into something worth showing.
*
* auth answers the OAuth shape — `{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: … }` —
* where `error` is one of three machine codes and the DESCRIPTION carries the actual
* reason. Relaying that body verbatim put "invalid_grant" on screen for every failure,
* including the ones a player can act on (the per-network signup cap), so the
* description is matched to a sentence here instead. An unrecognised body — or a
* non-JSON one from something in front of auth — falls back to the generic line for
* the action rather than leaking whatever it did say.
* Read a failed `auth` response into something worth showing. The translation itself is
* shared with the browser (see `auth-messages.ts`); this only unpacks the body. A
* non-JSON one — from something in front of auth, like an edge error page — falls
* through to the generic line for the action.
*/
export async function readAuthError(res: Response, action: AuthAction): Promise<AuthFailure> {
const parsed = (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as {
@@ -169,16 +75,5 @@ export async function readAuthError(res: Response, action: AuthAction): Promise<
const code = typeof body.error === 'string' ? body.error : ''
const description = typeof body.error_description === 'string' ? body.error_description : ''
// A 5xx (or a `server_error`) is an operator misconfiguration — an unset JWT_SECRET,
// an unset META_APP_SECRET — not something the player got wrong. Don't send them back
// to re-check a form that was fine; the real reason is in auth's log, not theirs.
const broken = res.status >= 500 || code === 'server_error'
const generic = GENERIC_MESSAGES[action]
return {
message:
(!broken && AUTH_MESSAGES[description]) || (broken ? generic.broken : generic.rejected),
status: broken ? 502 : 400,
upstream: description ? `${code || 'unknown'}: ${description}` : code || `HTTP ${res.status}`,
}
return authFailure(action, res.status, code, description)
}