diff --git a/apps/auth/README.md b/apps/auth/README.md
index 9ada603..1a64c60 100644
--- a/apps/auth/README.md
+++ b/apps/auth/README.md
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ route without documenting it fails rather than silently shipping an incomplete s
 - **`password`** — the fallback for any unrecognised or absent `grant_type`. Identifies
   the account by `username` or numeric `account_id` and requires the matching password
   (PBKDF2-SHA256, `salt:hash`). An account with no stored hash cannot be logged into at
-  all, which is what closes id/username-only takeover.
+  all, which is what closes id/username-only takeover. When it also carries a verifying
+  `platform_auth`, that identity is **linked** to the account (see below).
 
 Access tokens live for 1 hour (`TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS` in `@repo/jwt`) and carry a `role`
 claim, so developer/moderator powers refresh on every login and every refresh grant.
@@ -72,16 +73,45 @@ asserts a platform) must be a platform we can verify. Two are:
   login at all without the app secret — an unset `META_APP_SECRET` answers 500 rather
   than falling back to trusting the client.
 
-Everything else is refused. Whichever platform, the value written to an account's
-`platformId` is the verified one, never the raw `platform_id` field.
+Everything else is refused. Whichever platform, the identity that gets bound or linked
+is the verified one, never the raw `platform_id` field.
+
+### One account, many platform identities
+
+An account can be reached from several platform identities — a player's PC and their
+headset both open the same account, with no password after the first time. The links
+live in the `platform_account` table (`src/platform-db.ts`, migration 0007), one row per
+(platform, platform id, account).
+
+That table is the **one source of truth** for both halves of a cached login: the picker
+(`/cachedlogin/forplatformid`) lists the accounts an identity links to, and the
+`cached_login` grant asks it whether the account it was handed is linked to the identity
+just proven. They used to be two separate checks over the account blob's single
+`platformId`, which could disagree — the client would be offered an account that then
+answered "no linked account" forever.
+
+A second device is linked by **logging in with a password there**: the client posts its
+`platform_auth` alongside the password, and a proof that verifies becomes a link. Only a
+verified identity is ever linked, since a link is a password-free way into the account.
+A proof that doesn't verify never fails the login — it just leaves that device without a
+cached login.
+
+The account blob keeps `platform`/`platformId` as the account's **primary** identity
+(the first one linked). It feeds the account DTO and a refreshed token's claims, and
+nothing authorizes off it.
 
 ## Signup caps
 
-`create_account` is capped on two independent arms, per verified platform id and per
-signup IP. The platform arm can't be spoofed or reset by changing networks; the IP arm
-is coarse and will produce false positives behind NAT, shared campus and mobile
+`create_account` is capped on two independent arms, per verified platform identity and
+per signup IP. The platform arm can't be spoofed or reset by changing networks; the IP
+arm is coarse and will produce false positives behind NAT, shared campus and mobile
 networks. Both default to 3.
 
+The platform arm also caps **linking**, or it wouldn't be a cap: an identity at the
+limit could otherwise have accounts created for it with a password and link its way into
+all of them. Hitting it never fails a password login — the account just doesn't get a
+cached login on that device.
+
 Override per environment via the root `.env` (`RECFLARE_MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_PLATFORM_ID`,
 `RECFLARE_MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_IP`), injected at deploy time so tuning them never means
 editing a versioned file. Setting an arm to `0` disables it — worth reaching for on a
@@ -89,12 +119,12 @@ small private server, or when a shared network is being locked out.
 
 ## Bindings
 
-| Binding              | Type          | Notes                                                  |
-| -------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ |
-| `DB`                 | D1            | Shared `recflare` database; this worker owns `account` |
-| `JWT_SECRET`         | Secrets Store | Shared HS256 signing key                               |
-| `META_APP_SECRET`    | Secrets Store | Meta app secret; only used to validate a login nonce   |
-| `MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_*` | vars          | Optional signup caps; read via `intVar`                |
+| Binding              | Type          | Notes                                                                                           |
+| -------------------- | ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `DB`                 | D1            | Shared `recflare` database; this worker owns `account`, `refresh_tokens` and `platform_account` |
+| `JWT_SECRET`         | Secrets Store | Shared HS256 signing key                                                                        |
+| `META_APP_SECRET`    | Secrets Store | Meta app secret; only used to validate a login nonce                                            |
+| `MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_*` | vars          | Optional signup caps; read via `intVar`                                                         |
 
 Migrations live in `migrations/` and are tracked in their own `d1_migrations_auth`
 table, so they stay independent of the `rooms` worker's migrations on the same
diff --git a/apps/auth/migrations/0007_platform_accounts.sql b/apps/auth/migrations/0007_platform_accounts.sql
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74a75b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/auth/migrations/0007_platform_accounts.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-- Let one account be linked to MORE THAN ONE platform identity, so a player with a
+-- PC and a headset gets a cached login on both. The account blob's single
+-- `platformId`/`platform` pair could only hold one, so logging in on the second
+-- device meant a password every time.
+--
+-- Links move into their own table, which becomes the one source of truth for both
+-- halves of a cached login (the picker and the `cached_login` grant). The blob fields
+-- stay as the account's *primary* identity — the first one linked — for the account
+-- DTO and the refresh grant's claims; nothing authorizes off them any more. Kept in
+-- sync with PLATFORM_SCHEMA_DDL in src/platform-db.ts.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_account (
+  account_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  platform INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  platform_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  linked_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+  PRIMARY KEY (platform, platform_id, account_id)
+  );
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_platform_account_account ON platform_account (account_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_platform_account_platform_id ON platform_account (platform_id);
+
+-- Backfill every identity already bound to an account. `platform` is COALESCEd to 0
+-- because nothing ever defaulted that field: an account can carry a platformId with no
+-- platform recorded, and back when Steam was the only verifiable platform an unset one
+-- *was* Steam. Without the COALESCE those accounts would lose their cached login at
+-- deploy. Mirrored as PLATFORM_BACKFILL_SQL in src/platform-db.ts, which is what the
+-- tests run.
+INSERT OR IGNORE INTO platform_account (account_id, platform, platform_id, linked_at)
+SELECT
+  account_id,
+  COALESCE(json_extract(data, '$.platform'), 0),
+  platform_id,
+  COALESCE(json_extract(data, '$.createdAt'), '1970-01-01T00:00:00Z')
+FROM account
+WHERE platform_id IS NOT NULL AND platform_id <> '';
diff --git a/apps/auth/src/auth.app.ts b/apps/auth/src/auth.app.ts
index 13f751e..f7b4efb 100644
--- a/apps/auth/src/auth.app.ts
+++ b/apps/auth/src/auth.app.ts
@@ -3,13 +3,12 @@ import { describeRoute, openAPIRouteHandler } from 'hono-openapi'
 import { useWorkersLogger } from 'workers-tagged-logger'
 
 import {
-	countAccountsByPlatformId,
 	countAccountsBySignupIp,
 	createAccount,
 	GAME_VERSION,
 	getAccount,
 	getAccountByUsername,
-	getAccountsByPlatformId,
+	getAccountsByIds,
 	getPasswordHash,
 	getRoomById,
 	hashPassword,
@@ -19,6 +18,7 @@ import {
 	setPasswordHash,
 	setPresence,
 	subRoomDataBlob,
+	updateAccount,
 	verifyPassword,
 } from '@repo/domain'
 import { intVar, logger, withCleanSpec, withNotFound, withOnError } from '@repo/hono-helpers'
@@ -38,12 +38,20 @@ import {
 	TokenRequest,
 	TokenResponse,
 } from './openapi'
+import {
+	countAccountsForPlatformIdentity,
+	getLinksForPlatformId,
+	getLinksForPlatformIdentity,
+	isPlatformIdentityLinked,
+	linkPlatformIdentity,
+} from './platform-db'
 import { consumeRefreshToken, issueRefreshToken } from './refresh-db'
 import { verifySteamTicket } from './steam-ticket'
 
 import type { Context } from 'hono'
 import type { Account } from '@repo/domain'
 import type { App } from './context'
+import type { PlatformLink } from './platform-db'
 
 /** OAuth scopes granted by `/connect/token`. */
 const TOKEN_SCOPE =
@@ -165,42 +173,147 @@ function accountPlatform(account: Pick<Account, 'platform'>): number {
 	return account.platform ?? 0
 }
 
-/**
- * Whether an account is the one linked to a given platform identity — the single
- * check behind both the cached-login picker and the `cached_login` grant. It lives in
- * one place on purpose: if the picker offers an account the grant then rejects, the
- * client is handed an `account_id` it can never log into ("no linked account for this
- * platform identity" on every attempt).
- *
- * `platformId` must be the *proven* identity — the SteamID64 read out of a verified
- * Steam ticket, or the Meta user id a validated nonce was issued to — never the raw
- * client-supplied `platform_id` field.
- */
-export function isLinkedToPlatformIdentity(
-	account: Pick<Account, 'platform' | 'platformId'>,
-	platform: number,
-	platformId: string
-): boolean {
-	if (!account.platformId || platformId === '') return false
-	return account.platformId === platformId && accountPlatform(account) === platform
-}
-
 /**
  * Project a linked account into the client's CachedLogin DTO — the account-picker
  * entry on the login screen. The client posts the chosen `accountId` back as a
  * `grant_type=cached_login`. `requirePassword` is false because platform ownership
  * (the verified `platform_auth`) is the credential for a cached login — no prompt.
+ *
+ * The platform and id come from the LINK, not from the account: an account linked to
+ * both a Steam and a Meta identity appears in both pickers, and each has to report the
+ * identity that picker was asked about — that's what the client posts back, and what
+ * the grant then checks the link against.
  */
-function toCachedLogin(account: Account) {
+function toCachedLogin(account: Account, link: PlatformLink) {
 	return {
-		platform: accountPlatform(account),
-		platformId: account.platformId ?? '',
+		platform: link.platform,
+		platformId: link.platformId,
 		accountId: account.accountId,
 		lastLoginTime: account.lastLoginTime ?? account.createdAt,
 		requirePassword: false,
 	}
 }
 
+/**
+ * Project a set of links into picker entries, dropping any whose account no longer
+ * exists. One batched account read rather than one per link.
+ *
+ * Order follows the links (oldest first), so the picker is stable between launches.
+ */
+async function toCachedLogins(db: D1Database, links: PlatformLink[]) {
+	if (links.length === 0) return []
+	const accounts = await getAccountsByIds(db, [...new Set(links.map((l) => l.accountId))])
+	const byId = new Map(accounts.map((a) => [a.accountId, a]))
+	return links.flatMap((link) => {
+		const account = byId.get(link.accountId)
+		return account ? [toCachedLogin(account, link)] : []
+	})
+}
+
+/**
+ * Link the platform identity a password login proved to the account it logged into,
+ * so the next launch on that device is a cached login. Called only with a VERIFIED
+ * identity — a link is a password-free way into the account.
+ *
+ * Already linked is the common case (every subsequent login on that device) and costs
+ * one read and nothing else.
+ *
+ * The per-identity cap applies here as well as at signup, or it wouldn't be a cap:
+ * an identity could otherwise sit at the limit, have accounts created for it with a
+ * password, and link its way into all of them. Reaching it does NOT fail the login —
+ * the password was valid — it just leaves the account without a cached login, so the
+ * player types their password each time rather than being locked out.
+ *
+ * The first identity linked also becomes the account's primary (the blob's
+ * `platform`/`platformId`), which is what the account DTO and the refresh grant's
+ * claims report. Later platforms link without disturbing it.
+ */
+async function linkLoginIdentity(
+	db: D1Database,
+	accountId: number,
+	platform: number,
+	platformId: string,
+	maxAccountsPerIdentity: number
+): Promise<void> {
+	if (await isPlatformIdentityLinked(db, accountId, platform, platformId)) return
+
+	if (
+		maxAccountsPerIdentity > 0 &&
+		(await countAccountsForPlatformIdentity(db, platform, platformId)) >= maxAccountsPerIdentity
+	) {
+		logger.info('platform link refused: account limit reached for this platform identity', {
+			accountId,
+			platform,
+			platformId,
+		})
+		return
+	}
+
+	if (!(await linkPlatformIdentity(db, accountId, platform, platformId))) return
+	logger.info('linked platform identity to account', { accountId, platform, platformId })
+
+	const account = await getAccount(db, accountId)
+	if (account && !account.platformId) {
+		await updateAccount(db, accountId, { platform, platformId })
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * What a login's `platform_auth` proved, if anything. Failures are split because the
+ * callers act on them differently: a grant that authenticates BY platform identity has
+ * to refuse, while a password grant — which has already proven who it is — carries on
+ * and just doesn't link.
+ *
+ * `unconfigured` is an operator problem (no META_APP_SECRET), not a bad credential,
+ * and is the one case that warrants a 5xx.
+ */
+type PlatformProof =
+	/** Nothing was checked — the login offered no proof, so there is nothing to report. */
+	| { status: 'none' }
+	| { status: 'verified'; platform: number; platformId: string }
+	| { status: 'unsupported' }
+	| { status: 'unconfigured' }
+	| { status: 'rejected'; reason: string }
+
+/**
+ * Verify a login's `platform_auth` and return the identity it proves.
+ *
+ * The two verifiable platforms prove the id in opposite directions, which is why they
+ * can't share a code path: Steam's ticket *carries* a SteamID64 we read out and trust,
+ * so the posted `platform_id` is discarded. Meta's nonce carries nothing — it is
+ * validated *against* the posted `platform_id`, so that field is an input, and a
+ * spoofed one fails validation rather than being ignored. Either way the id that comes
+ * back is proven, never the raw client-supplied field, and only a proven id is ever
+ * written to an account or linked to one.
+ */
+async function verifyPlatformProof(
+	env: App['Bindings'],
+	platform: number,
+	platformAuth: string,
+	postedPlatformId: string
+): Promise<PlatformProof> {
+	if (platform === PlatformType.Steam) {
+		const verified = platformAuth ? await verifySteamTicket(platformAuth) : null
+		if (!verified) return { status: 'rejected', reason: 'invalid or missing Steam ticket' }
+		return { status: 'verified', platform: PlatformType.Steam, platformId: verified.steamId }
+	}
+	if (platform === PlatformType.Oculus) {
+		// `.get()` throws when the secret doesn't exist in the store at all (as opposed to
+		// holding an empty/placeholder value) — the same misconfiguration from the player's
+		// side, so it takes the same branch.
+		const appSecret = await env.META_APP_SECRET.get().catch(() => '')
+		if (appSecret === '') return { status: 'unconfigured' }
+		const verified = await verifyMetaNonce(platformAuth, postedPlatformId, appSecret)
+		if (!verified.ok) return { status: 'rejected', reason: verified.reason }
+		return {
+			status: 'verified',
+			platform: PlatformType.Oculus,
+			platformId: verified.identity.userId,
+		}
+	}
+	return { status: 'unsupported' }
+}
+
 const app = new Hono<App>()
 	.use(
 		'*',
@@ -243,17 +356,18 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 			tags: ['Cached login'],
 			summary: 'Accounts linked to a platform id',
 			description: [
-				'Accounts the client may offer on its login screen for this platform identity.',
-				'Filtered to those a `cached_login` grant would actually accept, so an entry here',
-				'is always redeemable. An unknown id yields `[]` (not a 404) and the client falls',
-				'back to a fresh login or create_account.',
+				'Accounts the client may offer on its login screen for this platform identity —',
+				'the links this identity has, so an entry here is always redeemable by a',
+				'`cached_login` grant (both read the same table). An account linked to several',
+				'platforms appears in each of their pickers. An unknown id yields `[]` (not a 404)',
+				'and the client falls back to a fresh login or create_account.',
 			].join(' '),
 			parameters: [
 				{
 					name: 'platform',
 					in: 'path',
 					required: true,
-					description: 'PlatformType integer. A non-numeric value disables the link filter.',
+					description: 'PlatformType integer. A non-numeric value matches the id on any platform.',
 					schema: { type: 'string' },
 				},
 				{
@@ -272,15 +386,13 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 			const { platform, id } = c.req.param()
 			logger.info('cached login lookup', { platform, id })
 			const platformInt = Number.parseInt(platform, 10)
-			const accounts = await getAccountsByPlatformId(c.env.DB, id)
-			// Offer only accounts the `cached_login` grant will actually accept — same check.
-			return c.json(
-				accounts
-					.filter(
-						(a) => Number.isNaN(platformInt) || isLinkedToPlatformIdentity(a, platformInt, id)
-					)
-					.map(toCachedLogin)
-			)
+			// Listed straight from the link table, which is also what the `cached_login`
+			// grant authorizes against — so the picker can't offer an account the grant
+			// then refuses.
+			const links = Number.isNaN(platformInt)
+				? await getLinksForPlatformId(c.env.DB, id)
+				: await getLinksForPlatformIdentity(c.env.DB, platformInt, id)
+			return c.json(await toCachedLogins(c.env.DB, links))
 		}
 	)
 
@@ -294,8 +406,8 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 			description: [
 				'Resolves many platform ids at once. Results are flattened across all ids, so the',
 				'response cannot be mapped back to a specific input id — the client uses each',
-				'entry’s own `platformId`. Unlike the single-id route, results are NOT filtered to',
-				'redeemable accounts. Unknown ids contribute nothing; a body with no `id` yields `[]`.',
+				'entry’s own `platformId`. No platform accompanies these ids, so each matches on',
+				'any platform. Unknown ids contribute nothing; a body with no `id` yields `[]`.',
 			].join(' '),
 			requestBody: form(PlatformIdsRequest, 'Repeated `id=` form fields'),
 			responses: { 200: json(CachedLogin.array(), 'Flattened accounts across every id') },
@@ -306,7 +418,8 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 			const ids = (Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : raw != null ? [raw] : []).map(String)
 			const out: Array<ReturnType<typeof toCachedLogin>> = []
 			for (const pid of ids) {
-				out.push(...(await getAccountsByPlatformId(c.env.DB, pid)).map(toCachedLogin))
+				// No platform accompanies these ids, so they match on any platform.
+				out.push(...(await toCachedLogins(c.env.DB, await getLinksForPlatformId(c.env.DB, pid))))
 			}
 			return c.json(out)
 		}
@@ -332,8 +445,8 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 				'',
 				'**`cached_login`** — logs into an already-linked account using platform ownership as',
 				'the credential; no password. Requires a verifying `platform_auth`, and the posted',
-				'`account_id` must be linked to exactly the identity it proves. An account',
-				'with no stored platform identity cannot be cached-logged-into.',
+				'`account_id` must be LINKED to exactly the identity it proves. An account with no',
+				'link for that identity cannot be cached-logged-into.',
 				'',
 				'**`refresh_token`** — redeems a stored single-use refresh token, rotating it. The',
 				'platform and platform id come from what was stored at issue time, not the body.',
@@ -341,17 +454,22 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 				'**`password`** (the fallback for any unrecognised or absent `grant_type`) —',
 				'identifies the account by `username` or numeric `account_id` and requires the',
 				'matching `password`. An account with no stored hash cannot be logged into at all,',
-				'which is what closes id/username-only takeover.',
+				'which is what closes id/username-only takeover. When it also posts a `platform_auth`',
+				'that verifies, that identity is LINKED to the account — this is how a player who',
+				'signed up on one platform gets a cached login on a second device. The login is',
+				'never failed over the link: an unverifiable proof (or one over the per-identity',
+				'cap) just leaves the account without a cached login there.',
 				'',
-				'**Platform verification.** Two platforms can be verified, so any grant',
-				'authenticating by platform identity must be one of them, and only a verified id is',
-				'ever written to an account. Steam (`0`) posts a Steam-signed `platform_auth` ticket,',
-				'checked offline; the SteamID64 it carries replaces the client-supplied `platform_id`.',
-				'Meta/Oculus (`1`) posts `platform_auth` as `{"Nonce":…,"AppId":…}`, which recflare',
-				'sends to Meta together with the posted `platform_id` — validation is what binds the',
-				'nonce to that user id, so a spoofed id fails. Meta logins therefore need the app',
-				'secret (`META_APP_SECRET`) and answer 500 when it is unset. Password and refresh',
-				'grants carry their own credential and are not gated this way.',
+				'**Platform identity.** An account can be reached from several platform identities;',
+				'the links are the one thing both the picker and `cached_login` consult, and only a',
+				'VERIFIED identity is ever linked. Two platforms can be verified. Steam (`0`) posts a',
+				'Steam-signed `platform_auth` ticket, checked offline; the SteamID64 it carries',
+				'replaces the client-supplied `platform_id`. Meta/Oculus (`1`) posts `platform_auth`',
+				'as `{"Nonce":…,"AppId":…}`, which recflare sends to Meta together with the posted',
+				'`platform_id` — validation is what binds the nonce to that user id, so a spoofed id',
+				'fails. Meta logins therefore need the app secret (`META_APP_SECRET`) and answer 500',
+				'when it is unset. The first identity linked also becomes the account’s primary',
+				'(what the account DTO and a refreshed token report); later ones only link.',
 				'',
 				'**Roles.** The token embeds a `role` claim from the account, so developer/moderator',
 				'powers refresh on every login and every refresh grant.',
@@ -412,82 +530,53 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 
 			// A platform-authenticated login proves who you are with the platform itself, and
 			// we can verify exactly two: Steam (0), from its Steam-signed platform_auth ticket,
-			// and Meta/Oculus (1), by asking Meta to validate the nonce in platform_auth. So
-			// those logins must be one of those two:
-			//   - cached_login authenticates purely by platform identity → always gated.
-			//   - create_account that asserts a platform is rejected unless we can verify that
-			//     platform, since we won't bind an identity we can't prove. (create_account
-			//     with NO platform is the password-account path — allowed, but binds no
-			//     platformId.)
-			// The verified id is the ONLY value ever written to an account's `platformId`.
-			// Credential (password) and refresh_token grants carry their own credential and
-			// aren't gated here.
+			// and Meta/Oculus (1), by asking Meta to validate the nonce in platform_auth (see
+			// verifyPlatformProof). Only a verified identity is ever bound or linked.
 			//
-			// The two platforms prove the id in opposite directions, which is why they can't
-			// share a code path: Steam's ticket *carries* a SteamID64 we read out and trust,
-			// so the posted `platform_id` is discarded. Meta's nonce carries nothing — it is
-			// validated *against* the posted `platform_id`, so that field is an input, and a
-			// spoofed one fails validation rather than being ignored. Either way what lands in
-			// `platformId` below is proven, never the raw client-supplied field.
+			// Two grants are GATED on it — they have no other credential, so an unverifiable
+			// platform is fatal:
+			//   - cached_login authenticates purely by platform identity.
+			//   - create_account that asserts a platform: we won't bind an identity we can't
+			//     prove. (create_account with NO platform is the password-account path —
+			//     allowed, but binds no platformId.)
+			//
+			// A password grant is NOT gated: the password already proved who it is. It posts
+			// its platform proof too, and if that verifies we LINK the identity to the account
+			// (see below), which is how a player who created an account on Steam gets a cached
+			// login on their headset. If it doesn't verify, the login still succeeds — it just
+			// links nothing, because a link is a password-free way into the account and must
+			// never rest on an unproven id.
+			const platformAuth = typeof body.platform_auth === 'string' ? body.platform_auth : ''
+			const platformAsserted = !Number.isNaN(platformInt)
+			const gatedOnPlatform =
+				grantType === 'cached_login' || (grantType === 'create_account' && platformAsserted)
+			// The password grant only spends a verification when the client actually offered
+			// one; the rest of the time there is nothing to link.
+			const proof: PlatformProof =
+				gatedOnPlatform || (platformAsserted && platformAuth !== '')
+					? await verifyPlatformProof(c.env, platformInt, platformAuth, platformId)
+					: { status: 'none' }
+
 			let verifiedPlatformId: string | null = null
 			let verifiedPlatform: number | null = null
-			const platformAsserted = !Number.isNaN(platformInt)
-			if (grantType === 'cached_login' || (grantType === 'create_account' && platformAsserted)) {
-				const platformAuth = typeof body.platform_auth === 'string' ? body.platform_auth : ''
-				if (platformInt === PlatformType.Steam) {
-					const verified = platformAuth ? await verifySteamTicket(platformAuth) : null
-					if (!verified) {
-						return c.json(
-							{
-								error: 'invalid_grant',
-								error_description: 'invalid or missing platform_auth ticket',
-							},
-							400
-						)
-					}
-					verifiedPlatform = PlatformType.Steam
-					verifiedPlatformId = verified.steamId
-				} else if (platformInt === PlatformType.Oculus) {
-					// Verifying a Meta login needs the app secret. Without it every Meta player is
-					// locked out, which is an operator misconfiguration and not the client's fault
-					// — so it answers 500, the same way an unset JWT_SECRET does below, rather than
-					// blaming the credential. (We never fall back to trusting the posted id: that
-					// would let anyone log into any Meta-linked account by naming its user id.)
-					// `.get()` throws when the secret doesn't exist in the store at all (as
-					// opposed to holding an empty/placeholder value) — the same misconfiguration
-					// from the player's side, so it takes the same branch rather than a 500 from
-					// the error handler with nothing useful in it.
-					const appSecret = await c.env.META_APP_SECRET.get().catch(() => '')
-					if (appSecret === '') {
-						logger.error('refusing a Meta login: META_APP_SECRET is empty')
-						return c.json(
-							{
-								error: 'server_error',
-								error_description: 'Meta platform verification is not configured',
-							},
-							500
-						)
-					}
-					const verified = await verifyMetaNonce(platformAuth, platformId, appSecret)
-					if (!verified.ok) {
-						// The reason is for the operator; the client is told only that it was
-						// rejected. A wrong app secret and a stale nonce look identical from the
-						// client side, so this log is the only way to tell them apart.
-						logger.info('meta nonce verification failed', {
-							platformId,
-							reason: verified.reason,
-						})
-						return c.json(
-							{
-								error: 'invalid_grant',
-								error_description: 'invalid or missing platform_auth nonce',
-							},
-							400
-						)
-					}
-					verifiedPlatform = PlatformType.Oculus
-					verifiedPlatformId = verified.identity.userId
-				} else {
+			if (proof.status === 'verified') {
+				verifiedPlatform = proof.platform
+				verifiedPlatformId = proof.platformId
+			} else if (proof.status !== 'none') {
+				// Log every failure, including the ones a password grant shrugs off: a player
+				// who silently never gets a cached login on their headset has no other symptom,
+				// and this line is where "Meta rejected the nonce" becomes visible.
+				logger.info('platform_auth not verified', {
+					platform: platformInt,
+					platformId,
+					grantType,
+					status: proof.status,
+					reason: proof.status === 'rejected' ? proof.reason : undefined,
+				})
+			}
+
+			if (gatedOnPlatform && proof.status !== 'verified') {
+				if (proof.status === 'unsupported') {
 					return c.json(
 						{
 							error: 'invalid_grant',
@@ -496,9 +585,34 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 						400
 					)
 				}
-				platformId = verifiedPlatformId
+				if (proof.status === 'unconfigured') {
+					// An operator misconfiguration, not the client's fault: without the app secret
+					// every Meta player is locked out, so it answers 500 the way an unset
+					// JWT_SECRET does below rather than blaming the credential. (We never fall
+					// back to trusting the posted id — that would let anyone log into any
+					// Meta-linked account by naming its user id.)
+					logger.error('refusing a Meta login: META_APP_SECRET is empty')
+					return c.json(
+						{
+							error: 'server_error',
+							error_description: 'Meta platform verification is not configured',
+						},
+						500
+					)
+				}
+				// The reason is for the operator; the client is told only that it was rejected.
+				// A wrong app secret and a stale nonce look identical from the client side.
+				return c.json(
+					{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'invalid or missing platform_auth' },
+					400
+				)
 			}
 
+			// From here on `platformId` is the PROVEN identity wherever there is one — the
+			// SteamID64 out of the ticket or the Meta user id the nonce validated against,
+			// never the raw client-supplied field.
+			if (verifiedPlatformId !== null) platformId = verifiedPlatformId
+
 			// Resolve the account this token is for:
 			//  - create_account: mint + persist a brand-new account (auto-assigned random
 			//    username — players don't pick one initially); the token's `sub` is its id.
@@ -526,7 +640,11 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 				if (
 					maxPerPlatformId > 0 &&
 					verifiedPlatformId !== null &&
-					(await countAccountsByPlatformId(c.env.DB, verifiedPlatformId)) >= maxPerPlatformId
+					(await countAccountsForPlatformIdentity(
+						c.env.DB,
+						verifiedPlatform ?? 0,
+						verifiedPlatformId
+					)) >= maxPerPlatformId
 				) {
 					logger.info('signup rejected: platform account limit', {
 						platformId: verifiedPlatformId,
@@ -555,9 +673,10 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 				}
 
 				// Bind the platform identity ONLY when the platform proved it (a Steam ticket or
-				// a Meta-validated nonce). That bound `platformId` is what a later cached login
-				// is checked against, so only that platform user can log back into the account.
-				// A password/anonymous create_account (no platform) binds no platformId.
+				// a Meta-validated nonce). A password/anonymous create_account (no platform)
+				// binds nothing. The account blob keeps this first identity as its PRIMARY one
+				// (for the account DTO and the refresh grant's claims); the link written just
+				// below is what a later cached login is actually authorized against.
 				const account = await createAccount(c.env.DB, {
 					platforms: platformInt || 0,
 					platform: verifiedPlatform ?? undefined,
@@ -569,6 +688,14 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 					lastLoginIp: clientIp || undefined,
 				})
 				accountId = String(account.accountId)
+				if (verifiedPlatformId !== null) {
+					await linkPlatformIdentity(
+						c.env.DB,
+						account.accountId,
+						verifiedPlatform ?? 0,
+						verifiedPlatformId
+					)
+				}
 				// Establish the login password when one is posted (raw password never stored).
 				const password = typeof body.password === 'string' ? body.password : ''
 				if (password !== '') {
@@ -592,11 +719,14 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 			} else if (grantType === 'cached_login') {
 				// Platform-authenticated login into an already-linked account. The client posts
 				// the `account_id` it got from /cachedlogin/forplatformid together with the
-				// `platform_id` its platform_auth ticket vouches for. Authorize ONLY when that
-				// account is linked to exactly this platform identity — this is the check that
-				// keeps anyone but platform user `platform_id` out of the account (platform
-				// ownership is the credential; no password needed). An account with no stored
-				// platform identity can't be cached-logged-into and must use a fresh login.
+				// `platform_id` its platform_auth vouches for. Authorize ONLY when the link
+				// table says that account is linked to exactly this platform identity — this is
+				// the check that keeps anyone but that platform user out of the account
+				// (platform ownership is the credential; no password needed). An account with no
+				// link for the presented identity must use a password.
+				//
+				// The picker lists straight from the same table, so it can only offer accounts
+				// this check accepts.
 				//
 				// NB: `platform_id` here is the verified identity set above — the SteamID64 from
 				// the ticket, or the Meta user id the nonce validated against — never the raw
@@ -604,7 +734,10 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 				//
 				const postedId = typeof body.account_id === 'string' ? body.account_id.trim() : ''
 				const account = /^\d+$/.test(postedId) ? await getAccount(c.env.DB, Number(postedId)) : null
-				if (!account || !isLinkedToPlatformIdentity(account, platformInt, platformId)) {
+				const linked =
+					account !== null &&
+					(await isPlatformIdentityLinked(c.env.DB, account.accountId, platformInt, platformId))
+				if (!account || !linked) {
 					return c.json(
 						{
 							error: 'invalid_grant',
@@ -646,6 +779,19 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
 					)
 				}
 				accountId = String(resolvedId)
+				// The password proved the account; the platform proof (when the client sent one
+				// and it verified) proves the device's platform identity. Linking the two is
+				// what gives a player who signed up on Steam a cached login on their headset —
+				// they type their password once there, and never again.
+				if (verifiedPlatformId !== null) {
+					await linkLoginIdentity(
+						c.env.DB,
+						resolvedId,
+						verifiedPlatform ?? 0,
+						verifiedPlatformId,
+						intVar(c.env.MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_PLATFORM_ID, DEFAULT_MAX_ACCOUNTS_PER_PLATFORM_ID)
+					)
+				}
 				await setLastLoginTime(c.env.DB, resolvedId, new Date().toISOString())
 				await setLoginContext(c.env.DB, resolvedId, { deviceId, deviceClass, ip: clientIp })
 			}
diff --git a/apps/auth/src/openapi.ts b/apps/auth/src/openapi.ts
index 6757527..79436de 100644
--- a/apps/auth/src/openapi.ts
+++ b/apps/auth/src/openapi.ts
@@ -73,19 +73,29 @@ export type PlatformType = (typeof PlatformType)[keyof typeof PlatformType]
  * see the platform-auth notes on `POST /connect/token`.
  */
 export const PlatformTypeSchema = z
-	.union([z.literal(-1), z.int().min(0).max(Math.max(...Object.values(PlatformType)))])
+	.union([
+		z.literal(-1),
+		z
+			.int()
+			.min(0)
+			.max(Math.max(...Object.values(PlatformType))),
+	])
 	.describe(
 		Object.entries(PlatformType)
 			.map(([name, value]) => `${value} ${name}`)
 			.join(', ')
 	)
 
-/** One entry on the client's login screen, from `toCachedLogin`. */
+/**
+ * One entry on the client's login screen, from `toCachedLogin` — an account ↔ platform
+ * identity LINK, not an account. An account linked to two platforms yields one entry in
+ * each of their pickers, each reporting the identity that picker was asked about.
+ */
 export const CachedLogin = z.object({
 	platform: PlatformTypeSchema,
 	platformId: z
 		.string()
-		.describe('Platform-native id (a SteamID64 for Steam, a user id for Meta); "" if unlinked'),
+		.describe('The linked platform-native id — a SteamID64 for Steam, a user id for Meta'),
 	accountId: z.int().describe('Post this back as `account_id` on a cached_login grant'),
 	lastLoginTime: z.iso.datetime().describe("Falls back to the account's createdAt"),
 	requirePassword: z
@@ -141,8 +151,9 @@ export const TokenRequest = z.object({
 		.string()
 		.optional()
 		.describe(
-			'Platform proof, required for cached_login and platform create_account. Steam: ' +
-				'`{"Ticket":"<hex>","AppId":…}`. Meta: `{"Nonce":…,"AppId":…,"Source":…}`'
+			'Platform proof, required for cached_login and platform create_account, and used to ' +
+				'link the identity on a password grant. Steam: `{"Ticket":"<hex>","AppId":…}`. ' +
+				'Meta: `{"Nonce":…,"AppId":…,"Source":…}`'
 		),
 	refresh_token: z.string().optional().describe('Required on a refresh_token grant'),
 	device_id: z
diff --git a/apps/auth/src/platform-db.ts b/apps/auth/src/platform-db.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4fbcc30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/auth/src/platform-db.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/**
+ * Platform identity links on the shared `recflare` D1 database (owned by the `auth`
+ * worker, migration 0007). One row per (platform, platform id, account): the Steam
+ * user 76561…211 is linked to account 42, the Meta user 27061… is linked to account
+ * 42 as well, and both let that player into that account without a password.
+ *
+ * This table replaced the single `platformId`/`platform` pair on the account blob as
+ * the thing logins are decided from, because that pair could only hold ONE identity —
+ * a player with a PC and a headset had to pick which device got a cached login. The
+ * blob fields are kept as the account's *primary* identity (the first one linked) for
+ * the account DTO and the refresh grant's claims; nothing authorizes off them.
+ *
+ * It is deliberately the ONE source of truth for both halves of a cached login: the
+ * picker (`/cachedlogin/forplatformid`) lists the accounts this table links to an
+ * identity, and the `cached_login` grant asks this table whether the account it was
+ * handed is linked to the identity that was proven. When those two disagreed the
+ * client was offered an account it could never log into — see the regression test.
+ *
+ * A link is only ever written from a VERIFIED identity (a Steam-signed ticket or a
+ * Meta-validated nonce). It is what turns "this platform user" into "may enter this
+ * account with no password", so an unproven `platform_id` must never reach it.
+ */
+
+/** Schema DDL (mirror of migrations/0007_platform_accounts.sql, sans the backfill). */
+export const PLATFORM_SCHEMA_DDL: string[] = [
+	`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_account (
+		account_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
+		platform INTEGER NOT NULL,
+		platform_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+		linked_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+		PRIMARY KEY (platform, platform_id, account_id)
+	)`,
+	// The picker's lookup: "which accounts does this identity open?". Covered by the
+	// primary key's leading columns, so no separate index is needed for it.
+	`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_platform_account_account ON platform_account (account_id)`,
+	// Lookup by bare platform id, across platforms — the bulk (friends) route, which
+	// resolves ids it has no platform for.
+	`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_platform_account_platform_id ON platform_account (platform_id)`,
+]
+
+/**
+ * The one-time backfill 0007 runs after creating the table: every identity already
+ * bound to an account becomes a link, so nobody loses their cached login at deploy.
+ * Exported so a test can run exactly the statement the migration does.
+ *
+ * `platform` is COALESCEd to 0 because nothing ever defaulted that field — an account
+ * can carry a platformId with no platform recorded, and back when Steam was the only
+ * verifiable platform an unset one *was* Steam.
+ */
+export const PLATFORM_BACKFILL_SQL = `INSERT OR IGNORE INTO platform_account (account_id, platform, platform_id, linked_at)
+	SELECT
+		account_id,
+		COALESCE(json_extract(data, '$.platform'), 0),
+		platform_id,
+		COALESCE(json_extract(data, '$.createdAt'), '1970-01-01T00:00:00Z')
+	FROM account
+	WHERE platform_id IS NOT NULL AND platform_id <> ''`
+
+/** One account ↔ platform identity link. */
+export interface PlatformLink {
+	accountId: number
+	platform: number
+	platformId: string
+	/** ISO-8601 time the link was made. */
+	linkedAt: string
+}
+
+interface LinkRow {
+	accountId: number
+	platform: number
+	platformId: string
+	linkedAt: string
+}
+
+const SELECT_LINK = `SELECT account_id AS accountId, platform, platform_id AS platformId,
+	linked_at AS linkedAt FROM platform_account`
+
+/**
+ * Link a verified platform identity to an account. Idempotent — re-logging in on the
+ * same platform doesn't churn the row, and `linkedAt` keeps the time of the FIRST
+ * link. Returns true when this created a new link.
+ *
+ * Callers must pass an identity the platform itself proved. Nothing in here can tell
+ * a verified id from a spoofed one.
+ */
+export async function linkPlatformIdentity(
+	db: D1Database,
+	accountId: number,
+	platform: number,
+	platformId: string
+): Promise<boolean> {
+	if (platformId === '') return false
+	const res = await db
+		.prepare(
+			`INSERT OR IGNORE INTO platform_account (account_id, platform, platform_id, linked_at)
+			 VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4)`
+		)
+		.bind(accountId, platform, platformId, new Date().toISOString())
+		.run()
+	return res.meta.changes > 0
+}
+
+/**
+ * The accounts a platform identity opens — what the login-screen picker lists.
+ * Ordered oldest link first so the list is stable between launches (D1 row order
+ * isn't). Empty id yields nothing rather than matching every link.
+ */
+export async function getLinksForPlatformIdentity(
+	db: D1Database,
+	platform: number,
+	platformId: string
+): Promise<PlatformLink[]> {
+	if (platformId === '') return []
+	const { results } = await db
+		.prepare(
+			`${SELECT_LINK} WHERE platform = ?1 AND platform_id = ?2 ORDER BY linked_at, account_id`
+		)
+		.bind(platform, platformId)
+		.all<LinkRow>()
+	return results
+}
+
+/**
+ * Links for a bare platform id, whatever platform it belongs to. For the bulk
+ * (friends-resolution) lookup, which posts ids with no platform alongside them, and
+ * for the single-id route when the client sends a non-numeric platform.
+ */
+export async function getLinksForPlatformId(
+	db: D1Database,
+	platformId: string
+): Promise<PlatformLink[]> {
+	if (platformId === '') return []
+	const { results } = await db
+		.prepare(`${SELECT_LINK} WHERE platform_id = ?1 ORDER BY linked_at, account_id`)
+		.bind(platformId)
+		.all<LinkRow>()
+	return results
+}
+
+/** Every platform identity linked to an account (a player's PC and headset, say). */
+export async function getLinksForAccount(
+	db: D1Database,
+	accountId: number
+): Promise<PlatformLink[]> {
+	const { results } = await db
+		.prepare(`${SELECT_LINK} WHERE account_id = ?1 ORDER BY linked_at, platform`)
+		.bind(accountId)
+		.all<LinkRow>()
+	return results
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether this account is linked to this platform identity — the single check the
+ * `cached_login` grant authorizes on. An account with no link for the presented
+ * identity cannot be cached-logged-into and must use a password.
+ */
+export async function isPlatformIdentityLinked(
+	db: D1Database,
+	accountId: number,
+	platform: number,
+	platformId: string
+): Promise<boolean> {
+	if (platformId === '') return false
+	const row = await db
+		.prepare(
+			`SELECT 1 AS ok FROM platform_account
+			 WHERE account_id = ?1 AND platform = ?2 AND platform_id = ?3`
+		)
+		.bind(accountId, platform, platformId)
+		.first<{ ok: number }>()
+	return row !== null
+}
+
+/**
+ * How many accounts one platform identity already opens — the count both signup caps
+ * and link caps are enforced against, so an identity can't accumulate accounts by
+ * creating them under the cap and then linking more in.
+ */
+export async function countAccountsForPlatformIdentity(
+	db: D1Database,
+	platform: number,
+	platformId: string
+): Promise<number> {
+	if (platformId === '') return 0
+	const row = await db
+		.prepare(`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM platform_account WHERE platform = ?1 AND platform_id = ?2`)
+		.bind(platform, platformId)
+		.first<{ n: number }>()
+	return row?.n ?? 0
+}
diff --git a/apps/auth/src/test/integration/api.test.ts b/apps/auth/src/test/integration/api.test.ts
index 94f1be2..a6e5658 100644
--- a/apps/auth/src/test/integration/api.test.ts
+++ b/apps/auth/src/test/integration/api.test.ts
@@ -14,7 +14,12 @@ import {
 	SUBROOM_SCHEMA_DDL,
 } from '@repo/domain'
 
-import { isLinkedToPlatformIdentity } from '../../auth.app'
+import {
+	getLinksForAccount,
+	linkPlatformIdentity,
+	PLATFORM_BACKFILL_SQL,
+	PLATFORM_SCHEMA_DDL,
+} from '../../platform-db'
 import { REFRESH_SCHEMA_DDL } from '../../refresh-db'
 
 import type { Env } from '../../context'
@@ -51,6 +56,9 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
 	metaSecretId = await adminSecretsStore(env.META_APP_SECRET).create(META_APP_SECRET)
 	for (const stmt of SCHEMA_DDL) await env.DB.prepare(stmt).run()
 	for (const stmt of REFRESH_SCHEMA_DDL) await env.DB.prepare(stmt).run()
+	// Platform identity links — one account can hold several (a PC and a headset), and
+	// this table is what both the picker and the cached_login grant read.
+	for (const stmt of PLATFORM_SCHEMA_DDL) await env.DB.prepare(stmt).run()
 	// Presence table (owned by the rooms worker) — signup seeds the Orientation row.
 	for (const stmt of PRESENCE_SCHEMA_DDL) await env.DB.prepare(stmt).run()
 
@@ -137,6 +145,19 @@ async function metaLogin(
 	}
 }
 
+/** GET a JSON route on the worker and parse the body as `T`. */
+async function getJson<T>(path: string): Promise<T> {
+	const res = await exports.default.fetch(`${ORIGIN}${path}`)
+	return (await res.json()) as T
+}
+
+/** The picker entries a platform identity yields, as the client sees them. */
+function cachedLogins(platform: number, id: string) {
+	return getJson<Array<Record<string, unknown> & { accountId: number; platform: number }>>(
+		`/cachedlogin/forplatformid/${platform}/${id}`
+	)
+}
+
 /** The `platform_auth` payload a Meta client posts, as observed from a live login. */
 function metaPlatformAuth(): string {
 	return JSON.stringify({ Nonce: META_NONCE, AppId: META_APP_ID, Source: 'logged in user' })
@@ -251,10 +272,7 @@ describe('auth worker routes', () => {
 		// cached-login picker offer it, and the cached_login grant accept it.
 		const payload = decodePayload(res.json.access_token as string)
 		const accountId = Number(payload.sub)
-		const lookup = await exports.default.fetch(
-			`${ORIGIN}/cachedlogin/forplatformid/1/${META_USER_ID}`
-		)
-		const linked = (await lookup.json()) as Array<Record<string, unknown>>
+		const linked = await cachedLogins(1, META_USER_ID)
 		expect(linked).toContainEqual(
 			expect.objectContaining({ accountId, platform: 1, platformId: META_USER_ID })
 		)
@@ -285,6 +303,7 @@ describe('auth worker routes', () => {
 				})
 			)
 			.run()
+		await linkPlatformIdentity(env.DB, 5150, 1, userId)
 		const res = await metaLogin(
 			`grant_type=cached_login&account_id=5150&platform=1&platform_id=${userId}` +
 				`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`,
@@ -298,8 +317,8 @@ describe('auth worker routes', () => {
 
 	test('a Meta user id cannot log into an account it is not linked to', async () => {
 		// The Meta account seeded above, claimed by a different (but genuinely proven)
-		// Meta user. Even with a nonce Meta vouches for, the identity has to match the
-		// account's stored one.
+		// Meta user. Even with a nonce Meta vouches for, the identity has to be one the
+		// account is actually linked to.
 		const res = await metaLogin(
 			`grant_type=cached_login&account_id=5150&platform=1&platform_id=${META_USER_ID}` +
 				`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`,
@@ -345,6 +364,7 @@ describe('auth worker routes', () => {
 				})
 			)
 			.run()
+		await linkPlatformIdentity(env.DB, 31380, 0, steamId)
 		const res = await exports.default.fetch(`${ORIGIN}/cachedlogin/forplatformid/0/${steamId}`)
 		expect(res.status).toBe(200)
 		expect(await res.json()).toEqual([
@@ -358,32 +378,69 @@ describe('auth worker routes', () => {
 		])
 	})
 
-	test('a Steam-linked account with no stored `platform` field still cached-logs in', async () => {
-		// Regression: nothing defaults an account's `platform` (see defaultAccount), so a
-		// Steam-linked account can carry a platformId with no platform. The picker offered
-		// such an account (it treats a missing platform as Steam) while the cached_login
-		// grant rejected it — "no linked account for this platform identity" forever.
-		// Both now run the same check.
+	test('one account, a Steam and a Meta identity: both pickers offer it', async () => {
+		// The point of the link table. The same account is reachable from the PC and from
+		// the headset, and each picker reports the identity IT was asked about — that's
+		// what the client posts back on the cached_login grant.
+		const steamId = '76561197962463777'
+		const metaId = '27061366730207777'
+		await env.DB.prepare('INSERT OR IGNORE INTO account (data) VALUES (?1)')
+			.bind(
+				JSON.stringify({
+					accountId: 6200,
+					username: 'CrossPlatform',
+					platform: 0,
+					platformId: steamId,
+					lastLoginTime: '2026-08-01T10:00:00.000Z',
+				})
+			)
+			.run()
+		await linkPlatformIdentity(env.DB, 6200, 0, steamId)
+		await linkPlatformIdentity(env.DB, 6200, 1, metaId)
+
+		const onSteam = await cachedLogins(0, steamId)
+		const onMeta = await cachedLogins(1, metaId)
+
+		expect(onSteam).toEqual([
+			expect.objectContaining({ accountId: 6200, platform: 0, platformId: steamId }),
+		])
+		expect(onMeta).toEqual([
+			expect.objectContaining({ accountId: 6200, platform: 1, platformId: metaId }),
+		])
+
+		// And the grant accepts both, without a password.
+		const viaMeta = await metaLogin(
+			`grant_type=cached_login&account_id=6200&platform=1&platform_id=${metaId}` +
+				`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`,
+			true
+		)
+		expect(viaMeta.status).toBe(200)
+		expect(decodePayload(viaMeta.json.access_token as string).sub).toBe('6200')
+	})
+
+	test('the picker and the cached_login grant read the same table', async () => {
+		// Regression: the picker used to derive links from the account blob (treating a
+		// missing `platform` as Steam) while the grant ran its own check, so the client
+		// could be handed an account_id that answered "no linked account" forever. Both
+		// now read platform_account, which is why an account with a stale blob identity
+		// is NOT offered — and, since it isn't offered, never rejected either.
 		const steamId = '76561197962463211'
-		const account = { platformId: steamId } // no `platform` field
-
-		// The grant now accepts it — this is what was returning invalid_grant.
-		expect(isLinkedToPlatformIdentity(account, 0, steamId)).toBe(true)
-
-		// The identity is still the credential: another SteamID, an account with no
-		// platform identity, and an account bound to a different platform are all refused.
-		expect(isLinkedToPlatformIdentity(account, 0, '76561197962463299')).toBe(false)
-		expect(isLinkedToPlatformIdentity({}, 0, steamId)).toBe(false)
-		expect(isLinkedToPlatformIdentity({ ...account, platform: 3 }, 0, steamId)).toBe(false)
-
-		// And the picker offers exactly the accounts the grant accepts.
 		await env.DB.prepare('INSERT OR IGNORE INTO account (data) VALUES (?1)')
 			.bind(JSON.stringify({ accountId: 8, username: 'SteamOnly', platformId: steamId }))
 			.run()
-		const res = await exports.default.fetch(`${ORIGIN}/cachedlogin/forplatformid/0/${steamId}`)
-		const offered = (await res.json()) as Array<{ accountId: number; platform: number }>
-		expect(offered.map((a) => a.accountId)).toContain(8)
-		expect(offered.find((a) => a.accountId === 8)?.platform).toBe(0)
+
+		// No link row yet: not offered.
+		const before = await cachedLogins(0, steamId)
+		expect(before.map((a) => a.accountId)).not.toContain(8)
+
+		// The 0007 backfill is what gives accounts like this one — bound before the link
+		// table existed, and carrying no `platform` field at all — their link.
+		await env.DB.prepare(PLATFORM_BACKFILL_SQL).run()
+
+		const after = await cachedLogins(0, steamId)
+		expect(after.map((a) => a.accountId)).toContain(8)
+		// COALESCEd to Steam, which is what an unset platform meant.
+		expect(after.find((a) => a.accountId === 8)?.platform).toBe(0)
 	})
 
 	test('POST /connect/token issues a bearer token with role/scope claims', async () => {
@@ -720,6 +777,137 @@ describe('auth worker routes', () => {
 		expect(payload.platform_id).toBe('steam-123')
 	})
 
+	// A password login is how a player who already has an account signs in on a NEW
+	// device. The client posts its platform proof alongside the password, and linking
+	// the two is what turns the next launch on that device into a cached login.
+	describe('password grant links the platform identity it proves', () => {
+		/** Seed an account with LOGIN_PASSWORD set and no platform identity at all. */
+		async function seedPasswordAccount(id: number, username: string) {
+			await env.DB.prepare('INSERT OR IGNORE INTO account (data) VALUES (?1)')
+				.bind(
+					JSON.stringify({
+						accountId: id,
+						username,
+						passwordHash: await hashPassword(LOGIN_PASSWORD),
+					})
+				)
+				.run()
+		}
+
+		test('a verified Meta login on an existing account links it, and cached login follows', async () => {
+			// Exactly the client's flow: an account made elsewhere, signed into on a headset
+			// with username + password, with the Meta nonce riding along.
+			await seedPasswordAccount(7100, 'djdevin')
+			const metaId = '27061366730201234'
+			const login = await metaLogin(
+				`grant_type=password&username=djdevin&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}` +
+					`&platform=1&platform_id=${metaId}` +
+					`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`,
+				true
+			)
+			expect(login.status).toBe(200)
+			expect(decodePayload(login.json.access_token as string).sub).toBe('7100')
+			// The nonce was validated against the id being linked — an unproven id is never
+			// linked, since a link is a password-free way into the account.
+			expect(login.graphCalls[0].get('user_id')).toBe(metaId)
+
+			// The headset now gets a cached login: offered by the picker…
+			const offered = await cachedLogins(1, metaId)
+			expect(offered.map((a) => a.accountId)).toContain(7100)
+
+			// …and accepted by the grant, with no password.
+			const cached = await metaLogin(
+				`grant_type=cached_login&account_id=7100&platform=1&platform_id=${metaId}` +
+					`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`,
+				true
+			)
+			expect(cached.status).toBe(200)
+		})
+
+		test('the first identity linked becomes the account primary; later ones just link', async () => {
+			await seedPasswordAccount(7101, 'multiplatform')
+			const metaId = '27061366730205678'
+			await metaLogin(
+				`grant_type=password&username=multiplatform&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}` +
+					`&platform=1&platform_id=${metaId}` +
+					`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`,
+				true
+			)
+			// The blob's primary identity was empty, so the first link fills it in — this is
+			// what the account DTO and the refresh grant's claims report.
+			const account = (await env.DB.prepare(
+				'SELECT data FROM account WHERE account_id = 7101'
+			).first<{ data: string }>())!
+			expect(JSON.parse(account.data)).toMatchObject({ platform: 1, platformId: metaId })
+
+			// A second identity on another platform links without disturbing the primary.
+			await linkPlatformIdentity(env.DB, 7101, 0, '76561197962465678')
+			const links = await getLinksForAccount(env.DB, 7101)
+			expect(links.map((l) => [l.platform, l.platformId])).toEqual([
+				[1, metaId],
+				[0, '76561197962465678'],
+			])
+		})
+
+		test('an unverified platform_auth logs in but links nothing', async () => {
+			// The password already proved who this is, so the login stands — but a link is a
+			// password-free way in, and this identity was never proven, so none is written.
+			await seedPasswordAccount(7102, 'unproven')
+			const metaId = '27061366730209876'
+			const login = await metaLogin(
+				`grant_type=password&username=unproven&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}` +
+					`&platform=1&platform_id=${metaId}` +
+					`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`,
+				false // Meta rejects the nonce
+			)
+			expect(login.status).toBe(200)
+			expect(await getLinksForAccount(env.DB, 7102)).toEqual([])
+		})
+
+		test('a login with no platform_auth links nothing and asks Meta nothing', async () => {
+			await seedPasswordAccount(7103, 'noproof')
+			const login = await metaLogin(
+				`grant_type=password&username=noproof&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}` +
+					`&platform=1&platform_id=27061366730204321`,
+				true
+			)
+			expect(login.status).toBe(200)
+			expect(login.graphCalls).toHaveLength(0)
+			expect(await getLinksForAccount(env.DB, 7103)).toEqual([])
+		})
+
+		test('linking obeys the per-identity account cap, without failing the login', async () => {
+			// Otherwise the signup cap would be trivially bypassable: create accounts with a
+			// password, then link the capped identity into all of them.
+			const metaId = '27061366730203333'
+			for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) await linkPlatformIdentity(env.DB, 8000 + i, 1, metaId)
+
+			await seedPasswordAccount(8100, 'overcap')
+			const login = await metaLogin(
+				`grant_type=password&username=overcap&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}` +
+					`&platform=1&platform_id=${metaId}` +
+					`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`,
+				true
+			)
+			// The password was valid, so the player is logged in — they just don't get a
+			// cached login on this account.
+			expect(login.status).toBe(200)
+			expect(await getLinksForAccount(env.DB, 8100)).toEqual([])
+		})
+
+		test('re-logging in on the same device does not duplicate the link', async () => {
+			await seedPasswordAccount(7104, 'repeatlogin')
+			const metaId = '27061366730207654'
+			const body =
+				`grant_type=password&username=repeatlogin&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}` +
+				`&platform=1&platform_id=${metaId}` +
+				`&platform_auth=${encodeURIComponent(metaPlatformAuth())}`
+			await metaLogin(body, true)
+			await metaLogin(body, true)
+			expect(await getLinksForAccount(env.DB, 7104)).toHaveLength(1)
+		})
+	})
+
 	test('POST /connect/token refresh_token is single-use (rejected on reuse)', async () => {
 		const login = await postToken(`account_id=77&platform=0&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}`)
 		const refreshToken = login.json.refresh_token as string
diff --git a/packages/domain/src/accounts-db.ts b/packages/domain/src/accounts-db.ts
index 019b073..3173910 100644
--- a/packages/domain/src/accounts-db.ts
+++ b/packages/domain/src/accounts-db.ts
@@ -37,12 +37,14 @@ export interface Account {
 	identityFlags: number
 	createdAt: string
 	/**
-	 * The platform-native identity linked to this account (e.g. a SteamID64 for
-	 * platform 0). Stored as a STRING on purpose — a SteamID64 exceeds 2^53 and
-	 * would lose precision as a JS number. Set at account creation from the login's
-	 * `platform_id`. A cached login is authorized ONLY to the account whose stored
-	 * `platformId` matches the (platform_auth-ticket-proven) platform id presented,
-	 * so no one but that platform user can log into the account.
+	 * The account's PRIMARY platform identity — the first one linked (e.g. a SteamID64
+	 * for platform 0). Stored as a STRING on purpose: a SteamID64 exceeds 2^53 and
+	 * would lose precision as a JS number.
+	 *
+	 * An account can be reachable from SEVERAL platform identities (a PC and a headset),
+	 * and those live in the `auth` worker's `platform_account` table — NOT here. Logins
+	 * are authorized against that table alone; this pair is what the account DTO and a
+	 * refreshed token's claims report, and it never gains a second value.
 	 */
 	platformId?: string
 	/** PlatformType int (0 = Steam) that `platformId` belongs to. */
@@ -216,23 +218,6 @@ export async function searchAccounts(
 	return parseAll(results)
 }
 
-/**
- * Accounts linked to a platform-native id (e.g. a SteamID64), for the cached-login
- * account picker. Backed by the indexed `platform_id` generated column. Empty id
- * yields no matches (avoids matching every account whose `platformId` is null).
- */
-export async function getAccountsByPlatformId(
-	db: D1Database,
-	platformId: string
-): Promise<Account[]> {
-	if (platformId === '') return []
-	const { results } = await db
-		.prepare('SELECT data FROM account WHERE platform_id = ?1')
-		.bind(platformId)
-		.all<AccountRow>()
-	return parseAll(results)
-}
-
 /**
  * Accounts last seen on a given device (the client-supplied `device_id` auth records
  * at login). An empty id yields no matches (avoids matching every account with no
@@ -258,7 +243,9 @@ export async function getAccountsByDeviceId(db: D1Database, deviceId: string): P
 /** Record the account's most recent successful login time (ISO-8601). */
 export async function setLastLoginTime(db: D1Database, id: number, time: string): Promise<void> {
 	await db
-		.prepare("UPDATE account SET data = json_set(data, '$.lastLoginTime', ?2) WHERE account_id = ?1")
+		.prepare(
+			"UPDATE account SET data = json_set(data, '$.lastLoginTime', ?2) WHERE account_id = ?1"
+		)
 		.bind(id, time)
 		.run()
 }
@@ -295,9 +282,7 @@ export async function setLoginContext(
 	}
 	if (sets.length === 0) return
 	await db
-		.prepare(
-			`UPDATE account SET data = json_set(data, ${sets.join(', ')}) WHERE account_id = ?1`
-		)
+		.prepare(`UPDATE account SET data = json_set(data, ${sets.join(', ')}) WHERE account_id = ?1`)
 		.bind(id, ...binds)
 		.run()
 }
@@ -324,21 +309,6 @@ export async function countAccountsBySignupIp(db: D1Database, ip: string): Promi
 	return row?.n ?? 0
 }
 
-/**
- * How many accounts are linked to a platform-native id (e.g. one SteamID64) — the
- * count a per-platform signup cap is enforced against. Backed by the indexed
- * `platform_id` generated column. An empty id counts 0 (accounts with no platform
- * identity aren't attributable to a platform user).
- */
-export async function countAccountsByPlatformId(db: D1Database, platformId: string): Promise<number> {
-	if (platformId === '') return 0
-	const row = await db
-		.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM account WHERE platform_id = ?1')
-		.bind(platformId)
-		.first<{ n: number }>()
-	return row?.n ?? 0
-}
-
 /** Look up multiple accounts by AccountId (order not guaranteed). */
 export async function getAccountsByIds(db: D1Database, ids: number[]): Promise<Account[]> {
 	if (ids.length === 0) return []
@@ -411,9 +381,7 @@ export async function getPasswordHash(db: D1Database, id: number): Promise<strin
 /** Persist the account's password hash. Returns false when no such account exists. */
 export async function setPasswordHash(db: D1Database, id: number, hash: string): Promise<boolean> {
 	const { meta } = await db
-		.prepare(
-			"UPDATE account SET data = json_set(data, '$.passwordHash', ?2) WHERE account_id = ?1"
-		)
+		.prepare("UPDATE account SET data = json_set(data, '$.passwordHash', ?2) WHERE account_id = ?1")
 		.bind(id, hash)
 		.run()
 	return meta.changes > 0