clean up auth, some storage improvements

This commit is contained in:
Devin Zuczek
2026-07-09 23:28:04 -04:00
parent 68d77ee4a4
commit 43c3bd93be
19 changed files with 90 additions and 278 deletions
+5 -3
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@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ Shared HS256 JWT helpers for the recflare workers. Single source of truth for
token validation and generation, so the same signing/verification code isn't
re-copied per worker.
`auth` signs tokens (`generateToken`); every worker validates the incoming
Bearer token (`validateAndGetAccountId`). Both take the signing key from the
shared `JWT_SECRET` binding (see each worker's `context.ts`).
`auth` signs tokens (`generateToken`); every worker validates a request and
resolves the caller's integer account id (`validateAndGetAccountId`, which takes
the whole `Request` so how auth is carried can change in one place). Both take
the signing key from the shared `JWT_SECRET` binding (see each worker's
`context.ts`).
+3
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@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
"check:lint": "run-oxlint",
"check:types": "run-tsc"
},
"dependencies": {
"hono": "4.12.27"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@cloudflare/workers-types": "4.20260630.1",
"@repo/tools": "workspace:*",
+55 -78
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@@ -1,66 +1,54 @@
/**
* Minimal HS256 JWT generation and validation.
* HS256 JWT generation and validation, built on Hono's `hono/jwt` helpers (Web
* Crypto under the hood) so we don't hand-roll signing, base64url, or claim
* (exp/nbf) checks.
*
* The signing key is supplied by the caller from the shared `JWT_SECRET` binding
* (a Cloudflare secret in deployed envs, `.dev.vars` locally) — see each worker's
* context.ts. `auth` signs tokens; every worker validates them with the same key.
*/
import { sign, verify } from 'hono/jwt'
/** Token lifetime in seconds (mirrored in the `expires_in` response field). */
export const TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 3600
function base64url(input: ArrayBuffer | string): string {
const bytes = typeof input === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(input) : new Uint8Array(input)
let binary = ''
for (const byte of bytes) {
binary += String.fromCharCode(byte)
}
return btoa(binary).replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '')
}
function base64urlToBytes(input: string): Uint8Array {
const padded = input.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/')
const binary = atob(padded + '='.repeat((4 - (padded.length % 4)) % 4))
const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)
for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)
return bytes
}
/**
* Validate an HS256 token and return its `sub` (account id) claim, or `null` when
* the token is malformed, has a bad signature, or is expired.
* the token is malformed, has a bad signature, or is expired/not-yet-valid.
* `verify` throws on all of those, so a rejection just means "no valid id".
* Internal — callers use {@link validateAndGetAccountId}, which takes the request.
*/
export async function validateAndGetAccountId(
token: string,
secret: string
): Promise<string | null> {
const parts = token.split('.')
if (parts.length !== 3) return null
const [header, payload, signature] = parts
const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
new TextEncoder().encode(secret),
{ name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },
false,
['verify']
)
const valid = await crypto.subtle.verify(
'HMAC',
key,
base64urlToBytes(signature),
new TextEncoder().encode(`${header}.${payload}`)
)
if (!valid) return null
let claims: { sub?: string; exp?: number }
async function getAccountIdFromToken(token: string, secret: string): Promise<string | null> {
try {
claims = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(base64urlToBytes(payload)))
const payload = await verify(token, secret, 'HS256') // checks exp/nbf/signature
return typeof payload.sub === 'string' ? payload.sub : null
} catch {
return null
}
if (typeof claims.exp === 'number' && claims.exp < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) return null
return claims.sub ?? null
}
/**
* Validate a request's auth and return the caller's integer account id, or `null`
* when it carries no valid credential. Today that means the `sub` claim of a
* bearer token in the `Authorization` header; taking the whole `Request` (rather
* than a pre-extracted header) keeps that detail here, so if how we carry auth
* changes (a cookie, a different header) callers don't. Returns `null` when there
* is no valid bearer token, the token is invalid/expired, or `sub` isn't an integer.
*/
export async function validateAndGetAccountId(
request: Request,
secret: string
): Promise<number | null> {
const authHeader = request.headers.get('Authorization')
if (!authHeader || !authHeader.toLowerCase().startsWith('bearer ')) return null
const token = authHeader.slice('bearer '.length)
const accountId = await getAccountIdFromToken(token, secret)
if (!accountId) return null
const id = Number.parseInt(accountId, 10)
return Number.isNaN(id) ? null : id
}
/** Scopes stamped onto every token (as a claim array). */
@@ -91,39 +79,28 @@ export async function generateToken(
secret: string
): Promise<string> {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
const header = { alg: 'HS256', typ: 'JWT' }
// The client reads `role`/`scope` (and expects a well-formed iss/aud) to
// authorize itself; a token with only `sub` is rejected before login finishes.
const payload = {
iss: 'https://auth.lapis.codes',
aud: 'https://auth.lapis.codes/resources',
nbf: now,
iat: now,
exp: now + TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS,
auth_time: now,
amr: 'cached_login',
client_id: 'recroom',
sub: accountId,
idp: 'local',
platform,
platform_id: platformId,
'rn.ver': '20210129',
'rn.plat': '0',
role: TOKEN_ROLES,
scope: TOKEN_SCOPES,
jti: crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '').toUpperCase(),
}
const signingInput = `${base64url(JSON.stringify(header))}.${base64url(JSON.stringify(payload))}`
const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
new TextEncoder().encode(secret),
{ name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },
false,
['sign']
return sign(
{
iss: 'https://auth.recflare.net',
aud: 'https://auth.recflare.net',
nbf: now,
iat: now,
exp: now + TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS,
auth_time: now,
amr: 'cached_login',
client_id: 'recroom',
sub: accountId,
idp: 'local',
platform,
platform_id: platformId,
'rn.ver': '20210129',
'rn.plat': '0',
role: TOKEN_ROLES,
scope: TOKEN_SCOPES,
jti: crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '').toUpperCase(),
},
secret
)
const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, new TextEncoder().encode(signingInput))
return `${signingInput}.${base64url(signature)}`
}