clean up auth and platform types

This commit is contained in:
Devin Zuczek
2026-07-21 12:14:10 -04:00
parent 9cb1135a12
commit dd3bcf6868
5 changed files with 115 additions and 73 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-- Drop the platform identity from refresh_tokens. A refreshed access token now takes
-- `platform`/`platform_id` from the account, which is where the bound identity lives —
-- the copy stored at issue time was redundant, and went stale if the account's
-- identity changed mid-session. Kept in sync with REFRESH_SCHEMA_DDL in
-- src/refresh-db.ts.
ALTER TABLE refresh_tokens DROP COLUMN platform;
ALTER TABLE refresh_tokens DROP COLUMN platform_id;
+19 -30
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import {
json,
OAuthError,
PlatformIdsRequest,
PlatformType,
roleLookup,
TokenRequest,
TokenResponse,
@@ -45,26 +46,9 @@ import type { App } from './context'
const TOKEN_SCOPE =
'offline_access profile rn rn.accounts rn.accounts.gc rn.api rn.chat rn.clubs rn.commerce rn.match.read rn.match.write rn.notify rn.rooms rn.storage'
/** Platform-type enum names by value, used for the token's `platform` claim. */
const PLATFORM_TYPES: Record<number, string> = {
[-1]: 'All',
0: 'Steam',
1: 'Oculus',
2: 'PlayStation',
3: 'Xbox',
4: 'RecNet',
5: 'IOS',
6: 'GooglePlay',
7: 'Standalone',
8: 'Pico',
}
/** PlatformType for Oculus, which `/cachedlogin/forplatformid` currently stubs out. */
const OCULUS_PLATFORM = 1
/** The canned entry served for any Oculus cached-login lookup. See the route below. */
const FAKE_OCULUS_CACHED_LOGIN = {
platform: OCULUS_PLATFORM,
platform: PlatformType.Oculus,
platformId: '1',
accountId: 1,
lastLoginTime: '2026-07-19T17:13:29.225Z',
@@ -302,7 +286,7 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
// Oculus client gets past its login screen. `requirePassword` is true — unlike a
// genuine cached login there is no platform ticket behind this, so the client must
// prompt. Delete this branch once Oculus platform auth lands.
if (platformInt === OCULUS_PLATFORM) return c.json([FAKE_OCULUS_CACHED_LOGIN])
if (platformInt === PlatformType.Oculus) return c.json([FAKE_OCULUS_CACHED_LOGIN])
const accounts = await getAccountsByPlatformId(c.env.DB, id)
// Offer only accounts the `cached_login` grant will actually accept — same check.
return c.json(
@@ -406,10 +390,12 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
// `platform`/`platform_id` come from the body for a fresh login; a refresh
// grant overrides them below with what was stored when the token was issued.
let platformId = typeof body.platform_id === 'string' ? body.platform_id : ''
// `platform` is the PlatformType int → its enum name (e.g. 0 → "Steam").
const platformInt =
typeof body.platform === 'string' ? Number.parseInt(body.platform, 10) : NaN
let platform = Number.isNaN(platformInt) ? '' : (PLATFORM_TYPES[platformInt] ?? '')
// The token's `platform` claim is the PlatformType int. A grant that asserts no
// platform (a password login) falls back to Steam/0, the same default the account
// itself carries — see `accountPlatform`.
let platform = Number.isNaN(platformInt) ? PlatformType.Steam : platformInt
// The device this login came from. The client posts both on every grant; they're
// unverified (client-picked) so they're recorded on the account, never trusted as
@@ -440,7 +426,7 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
let verifiedSteamId: string | null = null
const platformAsserted = !Number.isNaN(platformInt)
if (grantType === 'cached_login' || (grantType === 'create_account' && platformAsserted)) {
if (platformInt !== 0) {
if (platformInt !== PlatformType.Steam) {
return c.json(
{
error: 'invalid_grant',
@@ -548,9 +534,10 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
400
)
}
accountId = String(refreshed.accountId)
platform = refreshed.platform
platformId = refreshed.platformId
// `platform`/`platform_id` aren't stored with the token — they're taken from
// the account below, so a refreshed token always reflects the identity the
// account is bound to now.
accountId = String(refreshed)
} else if (grantType === 'cached_login') {
// Platform-authenticated login into an already-linked account. The client posts
// the `account_id` it got from /cachedlogin/forplatformid together with the
@@ -629,6 +616,12 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
// /role/* lookups). One read of the just-resolved account; roles thus refresh on
// every login and every refresh_token grant.
const roleAccount = await getAccount(c.env.DB, Number(accountId))
// A refresh grant posts no platform of its own, so the identity comes off the
// account — the same read, and the only place the bound identity is authoritative.
if (grantType === 'refresh_token' && roleAccount) {
platform = accountPlatform(roleAccount)
platformId = roleAccount.platformId ?? ''
}
const accessToken = await generateToken(
accountId,
platformId,
@@ -638,11 +631,7 @@ const app = new Hono<App>()
)
// Issue a fresh, persisted refresh token (single-use; the client redeems it via
// grant_type=refresh_token). A refresh grant thus rotates its token.
const refreshToken = await issueRefreshToken(c.env.DB, {
accountId: Number(accountId),
platform,
platformId,
})
const refreshToken = await issueRefreshToken(c.env.DB, Number(accountId))
return c.json({
access_token: accessToken,
+28 -7
View File
@@ -49,19 +49,40 @@ export function form(schema: z.ZodType, description: string): OpenAPIV3_1.Reques
}
/**
* PlatformType, by value. The `platform` form field is posted as the integer; the
* token's `platform` claim carries the name. Only Steam (0) can actually be
* verified — see the platform-auth notes on `POST /connect/token`.
* PlatformType, the client's platform enum. Declaration order is wire order, and is
* the single source for the schema and description below. The `platform` form field
* is posted as the integer; the token's `platform` claim carries the name.
*/
export const PlatformType = z
.union([z.literal(-1), z.int().min(0).max(8)])
export const PlatformType = {
All: -1,
Steam: 0,
Oculus: 1,
PlayStation: 2,
Xbox: 3,
RecNet: 4,
IOS: 5,
GooglePlay: 6,
Standalone: 7,
Pico: 8,
} as const
export type PlatformType = (typeof PlatformType)[keyof typeof PlatformType]
/**
* A PlatformType by value. Only Steam can actually be verified — see the
* platform-auth notes on `POST /connect/token`.
*/
export const PlatformTypeSchema = z
.union([z.literal(-1), z.int().min(0).max(Math.max(...Object.values(PlatformType)))])
.describe(
'-1 All, 0 Steam, 1 Oculus, 2 PlayStation, 3 Xbox, 4 RecNet, 5 IOS, 6 GooglePlay, 7 Standalone, 8 Pico'
Object.entries(PlatformType)
.map(([name, value]) => `${value} ${name}`)
.join(', ')
)
/** One entry on the client's login screen, from `toCachedLogin`. */
export const CachedLogin = z.object({
platform: PlatformType,
platform: PlatformTypeSchema,
platformId: z.string().describe('Platform-native id (a SteamID64 for Steam); "" if unlinked'),
accountId: z.int().describe('Post this back as `account_id` on a cached_login grant'),
lastLoginTime: z.iso.datetime().describe("Falls back to the account's createdAt"),
+17 -30
View File
@@ -1,21 +1,22 @@
/**
* Refresh-token storage on the shared `recflare` D1 database (owned by the `auth`
* worker, migration 0003). Only a SHA-256 hash of each token is stored — never the
* raw value — alongside the account + platform needed to re-mint an access token,
* and an absolute expiry. Tokens are single-use: redeeming one deletes it, so a
* fresh token is issued each refresh (rotation) and a replayed token stops working.
* raw value — alongside the account it logs in and an absolute expiry. Tokens are
* single-use: redeeming one deletes it, so a fresh token is issued each refresh
* (rotation) and a replayed token stops working.
*
* The platform identity is NOT kept here (dropped in 0006); a refreshed token takes
* it from the account, which is where the bound identity actually lives.
*/
/** Refresh tokens live this long (s) before the client must log in again. */
export const REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 // 30 days
/** Schema DDL (mirror of migrations/0003_refresh_tokens.sql). */
/** Schema DDL (mirror of migrations/0003_refresh_tokens.sql + 0006). */
export const REFRESH_SCHEMA_DDL: string[] = [
`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refresh_tokens (
token_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
account_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
platform TEXT NOT NULL,
platform_id TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL
)`,
@@ -23,13 +24,6 @@ export const REFRESH_SCHEMA_DDL: string[] = [
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_expires ON refresh_tokens (expires_at)`,
]
/** The login context needed to re-mint an access token from a refresh token. */
export interface RefreshContext {
accountId: number
platform: string
platformId: string
}
/** SHA-256 hex of the token. Tokens are high-entropy random, so no salt is needed. */
async function hashToken(token: string): Promise<string> {
const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(token))
@@ -37,47 +31,40 @@ async function hashToken(token: string): Promise<string> {
}
/**
* Mint and persist a new refresh token for the given login, returning the raw
* Mint and persist a new refresh token for the given account, returning the raw
* token — the only moment it exists in plaintext (only its hash is stored).
*/
export async function issueRefreshToken(db: D1Database, ctx: RefreshContext): Promise<string> {
export async function issueRefreshToken(db: D1Database, accountId: number): Promise<string> {
const token = `${crypto.randomUUID()}`
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
await db
.prepare(
`INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (token_hash, account_id, platform, platform_id, created_at, expires_at)
VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6)`
)
.bind(
await hashToken(token),
ctx.accountId,
ctx.platform,
ctx.platformId,
now,
now + REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS
`INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (token_hash, account_id, created_at, expires_at)
VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4)`
)
.bind(await hashToken(token), accountId, now, now + REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS)
.run()
return token
}
/**
* Redeem a refresh token: if it exists and hasn't expired, delete it (single-use
* rotation) and return its login context; otherwise return null. The delete is
* rotation) and return the account it logs in; otherwise return null. The delete is
* atomic (`DELETE ... RETURNING`), so a token can't be redeemed twice — a
* concurrent second attempt finds no row. An expired token is deleted and rejected.
*/
export async function consumeRefreshToken(
db: D1Database,
token: string
): Promise<RefreshContext | null> {
): Promise<number | null> {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
const row = await db
.prepare(
`DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1
RETURNING account_id AS accountId, platform, platform_id AS platformId, expires_at AS expiresAt`
RETURNING account_id AS accountId, expires_at AS expiresAt`
)
.bind(await hashToken(token))
.first<{ accountId: number; platform: string; platformId: string; expiresAt: number }>()
.first<{ accountId: number; expiresAt: number }>()
if (!row || row.expiresAt < now) return null
return { accountId: row.accountId, platform: row.platform, platformId: row.platformId }
return row.accountId
}
+43 -6
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@@ -512,9 +512,17 @@ describe('auth worker routes', () => {
})
})
test('POST /connect/token maps the platform int to its enum name', async () => {
const payload = await tokenFor(`account_id=42&platform=0&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}`)
expect(payload.platform).toBe('Steam')
test('POST /connect/token carries the platform int on the token', async () => {
const payload = await tokenFor(`account_id=42&platform=5&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}`)
expect(payload.platform).toBe(5)
// `rn.plat` is the same int, not a pinned 0.
expect(payload['rn.plat']).toBe(5)
})
test('POST /connect/token defaults the platform claim when none is posted', async () => {
const payload = await tokenFor(`account_id=42&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}`)
expect(payload.platform).toBe(0)
expect(payload['rn.plat']).toBe(0)
})
test('POST /connect/token returns a refresh_token that redeems for a new token', async () => {
@@ -530,15 +538,44 @@ describe('auth worker routes', () => {
`grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=${encodeURIComponent(refreshToken)}`
)
expect(refreshed.status).toBe(200)
// A fresh access token for the same account, carrying the stored platform.
const payload = decodePayload(refreshed.json.access_token as string)
expect(payload.sub).toBe('42')
expect(payload.platform).toBe('Steam')
expect(payload.platform_id).toBe('steam-123')
// The platform identity comes off the account, not the refresh token. Account 42
// has none bound (the posted `platform_id` above was never Steam-verified, so it
// was never written), so the refreshed token carries no identity either.
expect(payload.platform).toBe(0)
expect(payload.platform_id).toBe('')
// The refresh token is rotated (single-use), so a new one is returned.
expect(refreshed.json.refresh_token).not.toBe(refreshToken)
})
test('a refreshed token carries the identity bound to the account', async () => {
// A Steam-bound account: only a verified ticket writes `platformId`, so seed it
// directly rather than posting an (unverified) platform_id on the login.
await env.DB.prepare('INSERT OR IGNORE INTO account (data) VALUES (?1)')
.bind(
JSON.stringify({
accountId: 43,
username: 'Player43',
passwordHash: await hashPassword(LOGIN_PASSWORD),
platform: 0,
platformId: 'steam-123',
})
)
.run()
const login = await postToken(`account_id=43&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}`)
expect(login.status).toBe(200)
const refreshed = await postToken(
`grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=${encodeURIComponent(login.json.refresh_token as string)}`
)
expect(refreshed.status).toBe(200)
const payload = decodePayload(refreshed.json.access_token as string)
expect(payload.sub).toBe('43')
expect(payload.platform).toBe(0)
expect(payload.platform_id).toBe('steam-123')
})
test('POST /connect/token refresh_token is single-use (rejected on reuse)', async () => {
const login = await postToken(`account_id=77&platform=0&password=${LOGIN_PASSWORD}`)
const refreshToken = login.json.refresh_token as string