{
	"$schema": "node_modules/wrangler/config-schema.json",
	"name": "www",
	"main": "src/www.app.ts",
	"compatibility_date": "2026-06-16",
	"compatibility_flags": ["nodejs_compat"],
	"routes": [],
	// The shared `recflare` D1. Read for the public `/server-status` head-count and the
	// benefits claim; WRITTEN by the claim (`hasPlus`) and by the staff moderation panel,
	// which files reports and hands down bans on the `report` table (see src/staff.ts) and
	// records every ban and lift on `audit_log`.
	// The schema is owned by the workers that write it (presence lives in
	// apps/rooms/migrations, `report` and `audit_log` in apps/api/migrations), so no migrations_dir: www
	// never migrates. The "local" placeholder is spliced with RECFLARE_D1 at deploy time,
	// as it is for every other worker.
	"d1_databases": [
		{
			"binding": "DB",
			"database_name": "recflare",
			"database_id": "local"
		}
	],
	// React SPA client build (Vite emits it to dist/www/client). Static assets are
	// served directly; any non-asset request falls through to the Worker, which
	// serves API routes and returns index.html for client-side routes (SPA).
	//
	// `run_worker_first` (an ARRAY) is an EXCLUSIVE allowlist: it replaces the default
	// routing entirely, so the Worker runs ONLY for the listed patterns and every other
	// path is served assets-first (with the SPA fallback → index.html). It must therefore
	// list EVERY route the Worker handles, not just the new ones — otherwise `/api/*`
	// falls through to index.html and both signup and the site config break (the SPA
	// reads the other workers' hostnames from `/api/config`). Why it's needed at all: with
	// SPA `not_found_handling`, a top-level *navigation* to a non-asset path (browsers
	// send `Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate`) is served index.html WITHOUT invoking the Worker,
	// so a browser hitting `/docs` got the homepage. Keep this in sync with the Worker's
	// routes (`/api/*`, `/docs*`, `/privacy` and `/server-status`).
	// `/docs/scalar.standalone.js` is
	// deliberately excluded so it's served directly as the static asset it is.
	//
	// `/privacy` is here for the same reason `/docs` is, and it matters more: the Meta
	// Horizon Store re-fetches the privacy policy URL to confirm it's live, and dropping
	// it from this list would serve that fetch the SPA shell instead of the policy.
	"assets": {
		"binding": "ASSETS",
		"not_found_handling": "single-page-application",
		"run_worker_first": ["/api/*", "/docs", "/docs/openapi/*", "/privacy", "/server-status"]
	},
	// The Turnstile keypair guarding web signup, out of the same account-level Secrets
	// Store every other worker binds for JWT_SECRET — values live there, never in this
	// file. The "local" store_id placeholder is replaced with RECFLARE_SECRETS_STORE at
	// deploy time, exactly as it is for the other workers.
	//
	//   wrangler secrets-store secret create <store-id> --name TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY \
	//     --scopes workers --remote
	//   wrangler secrets-store secret create <store-id> --name TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY \
	//     --scopes workers --remote
	//
	// Creating both is what OPENS signup; if either can't be resolved it stays closed, so
	// an operator who skips this gets no signup rather than an unprotected one. The SITE
	// key is public (it ships to the browser to render the widget) and is kept here beside
	// its secret so one place configures signup. See src/turnstile.ts.
	"secrets_store_secrets": [
		{
			"binding": "TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY",
			"store_id": "local",
			"secret_name": "TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY"
		},
		{
			"binding": "TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY",
			"store_id": "local",
			"secret_name": "TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY"
		},
		// The shared HS256 signing key, bound here for the ONE www route that acts on a
		// specific account: the benefits claim writes `hasPlus` onto the caller's row, so it
		// has to verify which account is calling rather than trust the SPA.
		{
			"binding": "JWT_SECRET",
			"store_id": "local",
			"secret_name": "JWT_SECRET"
		},
		// The Discord OAuth2 application behind the benefits claim. Same store, same
		// public-key-beside-its-secret arrangement as the Turnstile pair: the client id
		// ships to the browser to build the authorize URL, the secret never leaves the
		// worker (see src/discord.ts).
		//
		//   wrangler secrets-store secret create <store-id> --name DISCORD_CLIENT_ID \
		//     --scopes workers --remote
		//   wrangler secrets-store secret create <store-id> --name DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET \
		//     --scopes workers --remote
		//
		// These two PLUS the DISCORD_GUILD_ID / DISCORD_BENEFITS_ROLE_IDS vars below are what
		// OPENS the claim; with any of the four missing it stays closed, so an operator who
		// skips this gets no claim rather than one that grants Plus without checking.
		{
			"binding": "DISCORD_CLIENT_ID",
			"store_id": "local",
			"secret_name": "DISCORD_CLIENT_ID"
		},
		{
			"binding": "DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET",
			"store_id": "local",
			"secret_name": "DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET"
		},
		// The bot user's token, for the scheduled role refresh (see `triggers` below and
		// src/discord-roles.ts). Unlike the pair above it is not part of the claim: it lets
		// the worker re-read a claimed member's roles WITHOUT that member's own OAuth token,
		// which is the one thing the claim's design cannot do. Add a bot to the same Discord
		// application (Bot → Reset Token), invite it to the guild with no permissions — reading
		// a member needs none — and:
		//
		//   wrangler secrets-store secret create <store-id> --name DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN \
		//     --scopes workers --remote
		//
		// The binding has to resolve for the deploy to succeed, so an operator who wants no
		// sweep still creates the secret with any placeholder value: the sweep then logs that
		// it's off and does nothing, and the claim is unaffected either way.
		{
			"binding": "DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN",
			"store_id": "local",
			"secret_name": "DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN"
		}
	],
	// The Discord role refresh: once a day, re-reads every claimed member's roles through
	// the bot token and rewrites `platform_account.role` (src/discord-roles.ts). One
	// Discord call and one D1 write per link, so a guild with more claimed members than a
	// cron invocation's subrequest budget (50 free, 1000 paid) is the point to split it up.
	"triggers": {
		"crons": ["30 4 * * *"]
	},
	// The `auth` worker, reached directly instead of over its public hostname. This is
	// about the CLIENT IP, not latency: a Worker subrequest to https://auth.<DOMAIN>
	// re-enters the Cloudflare edge, which overwrites CF-Connecting-IP with Cloudflare's
	// own address — so auth recorded the SAME `signupIp` for every browser signup and its
	// per-IP cap (3 by default) locked out every player after the third account ever
	// created. A service binding skips the edge, so the real browser IP www forwards on
	// that header survives (see src/upstream.ts `postAuthForm`).
	//
	// Only auth is bound, and only for SIGNUP — the one call this worker still makes on
	// the browser's behalf, because Turnstile's secret key can't ship to a page. Sign-in,
	// the profile mutations and the photo feed are posted by the browser straight to
	// auth/accounts/api/notify (as rec.net's own site did), where the edge sets the real
	// client IP for free.
	"services": [{ "binding": "AUTH", "service": "auth" }],
	// The notifications hub, owned by the `notify` worker. Bound for ONE action: a ban
	// handed down from the staff panel ejects the player from the instance they are
	// standing in, which needs a `ModerationKick` frame pushed to their client (see
	// src/staff.ts). Without it a ban would not bite until their next matchmake, so
	// someone banned mid-session keeps playing.
	"durable_objects": {
		"bindings": [
			{
				"name": "RECFLARE_NOTIFICATIONS_HUB",
				"class_name": "NotificationsHub",
				"script_name": "notify"
			}
		]
	},
	"upload_source_maps": true,
	"observability": {
		"enabled": false
	},
	"vars": {
		"ENVIRONMENT": "development", // overridden during deployment
		"SENTRY_RELEASE": "unknown", // overridden during deployment
		// Base domain every worker hostname is derived from (auth.<DOMAIN>,
		// accounts.<DOMAIN>, …). Overridden at deploy time with the real RECFLARE_DOMAIN
		// (see run-wrangler-deploy). www serves these to the SPA via `/api/config`, which
		// is how one client build works for any operator. For local dev, point it at a
		// deployed domain so the page has real workers to call.
		"DOMAIN": "rec.example.com",
		// The Discord server the benefits claim checks membership of, and the roles in it
		// that grant Rec Room Plus. Every value here is a Discord SNOWFLAKE — all digits, no
		// letters — copied off a client with Developer Mode on (right-click the server or the
		// role → Copy ID). They are ids, not names: "Supporter" is what the role is called,
		// 1077000000000000002 is what goes here. Not credentials, so they live in this file
		// rather than in the Secrets Store; quoted as STRINGS because a snowflake exceeds
		// 2^53 and would lose precision as a JSON number.
		//
		// ROLE_IDS is a LIST, separated by commas and/or whitespace. Any ONE of them
		// qualifies, so several tiers can share the benefit:
		//
		//   "DISCORD_BENEFITS_ROLE_IDS": "1077000000000000001,1077000000000000002"
		//
		// Empty by default: an operator who hasn't set up a Discord app has no server to
		// point at, and an empty value (or one that parses to no ids) closes the claim — see
		// src/discord.ts `discordConfig` — instead of leaving a form that grants Plus to
		// anyone who signs in with Discord.
		"DISCORD_GUILD_ID": "",
		"DISCORD_BENEFITS_ROLE_IDS": ""
	}
}