{
	"$schema": "node_modules/wrangler/config-schema.json",
	"name": "cdn",
	"main": "src/cdn.app.ts",
	"compatibility_date": "2026-06-16",
	"compatibility_flags": ["nodejs_compat"],
	// Workers Caching is OFF here, and must stay off: it STRIPS the `Range` header before
	// invoking the worker, asks for the whole body, and slices the 206 out of its own
	// cache. That works only while the response is actually cacheable — on any bypass
	// (see the automatic bypass rules) nothing slices, and the client that asked for a
	// byte range receives the whole object with a 200. A chunked downloader writes that
	// at the offset it asked for and the reassembled file is corrupt (EAC "Signatures
	// don't match"). With caching off the `Range` header reaches serveAsset, which
	// always answers a `bytes=` request with a 206 and a truthful Content-Range.
	// The cost is that every asset read hits R2; correctness on these blobs is worth it.
	"cache": {
		"enabled": true
	},
	// The JSON config files in `static/config/`, uploaded as Workers static assets rather
	// than bundled into the script, so `/config/:name` serves whatever is published there:
	// adding a config is dropping in a file (a bundled `import` can't do that — the
	// bundler has to see every path at build time).
	//
	// `run_worker_first: true` because these are the WORKER'S data files, not a site.
	// Without it the runtime answers any request whose path matches an asset before the
	// Worker runs, which would both publish every config a second time at
	// `/config/<name>.json` and put asset routing in front of the R2 routes below. With
	// it, the Worker sees every request and the files are reachable only through
	// `/config/:name`.
	"assets": {
		"binding": "ASSETS",
		"directory": "./static",
		"run_worker_first": true
	},
	// CDN binaries (signature blobs + room build data) are stored as R2 objects
	// and streamed back by key. Keys are prefixed `sigs/` and `room/`.
	"r2_buckets": [
		{
			"binding": "CDN_ASSETS",
			"bucket_name": "recflare-cdn"
		}
	],
	// Shared Secrets Store holding the HS256 JWT signing key. Every worker binds the
	// same store as JWT_SECRET so tokens signed by `auth` verify here. The "local"
	// store_id placeholder is replaced with RECFLARE_SECRETS_STORE at deploy time.
	"secrets_store_secrets": [
		{
			"binding": "JWT_SECRET",
			"store_id": "local",
			"secret_name": "JWT_SECRET"
		}
	],
	"upload_source_maps": true,
	"observability": {
		"logs": {
			"enabled": true,
			"head_sampling_rate": 1 // 100%
		}
	},
	"vars": {
		"ENVIRONMENT": "development", // overridden during deployment
		"SENTRY_RELEASE": "unknown" // overridden during deployment
	}
}