Files
recflare/apps/auth/src/refresh-db.ts
T

102 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Refresh-token storage on the shared `recflare` D1 database (owned by the `auth`
* worker, migration 0003). Only a SHA-256 hash of each token is stored — never the
* raw value — alongside the account it logs in and an absolute expiry. Tokens are
* single-use: redeeming one deletes it, so a fresh token is issued each refresh
* (rotation) and a replayed token stops working.
*
* The platform identity is NOT kept here (dropped in 0006); a refreshed token takes
* it from the account, which is where the bound identity actually lives.
*/
/** Refresh tokens live this long (s) before the client must log in again. */
export const REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 // 30 days
/** Schema DDL (mirror of migrations/0003_refresh_tokens.sql + 0006). */
export const REFRESH_SCHEMA_DDL: string[] = [
`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refresh_tokens (
token_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
account_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL
)`,
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_account ON refresh_tokens (account_id)`,
`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_expires ON refresh_tokens (expires_at)`,
]
/** SHA-256 hex of the token. Tokens are high-entropy random, so no salt is needed. */
async function hashToken(token: string): Promise<string> {
const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(token))
return [...new Uint8Array(digest)].map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
}
/**
* Mint and persist a new refresh token for the given account, returning the raw
* token — the only moment it exists in plaintext (only its hash is stored).
*/
export async function issueRefreshToken(db: D1Database, accountId: number): Promise<string> {
const token = `${crypto.randomUUID()}`
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
await db
.prepare(
`INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (token_hash, account_id, created_at, expires_at)
VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4)`
)
.bind(await hashToken(token), accountId, now, now + REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS)
.run()
return token
}
/**
* Attempts per redemption. D1 occasionally answers a perfectly good statement with
* `D1_ERROR: internal error` — a storage-side hiccup carrying a support reference, not a
* verdict on the query. Unretried, one of those logs a player out: the grant throws, the
* shared error handler turns it into a 500, and the client falls back to the login
* screen with a refresh token it never got to spend.
*
* Deliberately small, like the Meta nonce retry next door: a refresh blocks the client on
* a loading screen, so two quick retries ride out a blip and a longer outage fails fast
* rather than hanging.
*/
const MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3
/**
* Redeem a refresh token: if it exists and hasn't expired, delete it (single-use
* rotation) and return the account it logs in; otherwise return null. The delete is
* atomic (`DELETE ... RETURNING`), so a token can't be redeemed twice — a
* concurrent second attempt finds no row. An expired token is deleted and rejected.
*
* A D1 error is retried (see {@link MAX_ATTEMPTS}). That is safe precisely BECAUSE the
* statement is atomic and single-use: an attempt that actually committed before failing
* to answer leaves no row, so the retry returns null and the player re-logs in — exactly
* what a replayed token does. There is no interleaving in which retrying redeems one
* token twice, and none in which it lands worse than the 500 it replaces.
*
* Only the D1 call is retried; the hashing around it is pure.
*/
export async function consumeRefreshToken(db: D1Database, token: string): Promise<number | null> {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
const statement = db
.prepare(
`DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?1
RETURNING account_id AS accountId, expires_at AS expiresAt`
)
.bind(await hashToken(token))
let row: { accountId: number; expiresAt: number } | null = null
for (let attempt = 1; ; attempt++) {
try {
row = await statement.first<{ accountId: number; expiresAt: number }>()
break
} catch (err) {
// The last attempt rethrows: a D1 outage is a 500, not a silent "bad token" that
// would tell the player to log in again over something that isn't their fault.
if (attempt === MAX_ATTEMPTS) throw err
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, attempt * attempt * 250))
}
}
if (!row || row.expiresAt < now) return null
return row.accountId
}